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
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- (Cont.)
- Chapter III - The Enemy - Defines basic strategy and intentions, Enemy Military Operations in RVN, VC Infrastructure, VC/NVA Support Activities and Allied Intelligence Mission);
- Chapter IV - Plans and Operations - Concerns Combined Strategic Planning, Seasonal Campaign Plans, Ground Combat Situation in 1971);
- Chapter V - Naval Operations; - Concerns US Navy role in Vietnamization, Air Force Operations, Various VNN Operations & USN Operations.
- Chapter VI - Air Opns in SE Asia - Consists of USAF Air Order of Battle, Army, Navy, Marine Aviation, Aerial Missions & Operations in SE Asia.
- Chapter VII - RVN Defense & Development - Concerns (Pacification Planning, Local Self Defense, Local Self-Government, Local Self-Development, Special Programs);
- Chapter VIII - Vietnamization; - 1971 Goals, RVNAF Improvement & Modernization, Planning, Advisory Efforts, Economic Aspects.
- Chapter IX - US Logistical Support. - Responsibilities, Programs, Military Construction, Communications-Electronics, Medical Support Activities.

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

**1971
COMMAND HISTORY
VOLUME I**

Prepared by the Military History Branch
Office of the Secretary Joint Staff
Headquarters, USMACV, APO San Francisco 96222
Saigon, Vietnam

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GENERAL CREIGHTON W. ABRAMS

COMUSMACV 3 JULY 1968-

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
PREFACE

As this history was being compiled, the US Military Assistance Command's role in South Vietnam was fast reverting to an advisory effort. Forces were withdrawing from combat, except for air units; the level of activity was reducing as personnel strengths reduced; and by end-1971, even the extent of MACV's advisory effort had diminished. In view of the rapid phasedown of this command, it is expected that this will be the last MACV Command History which will be this extensive in scope. Therefore a special effort has been made to provide summaries as well as to cover subjects which might have been dealt with too briefly in the past.

The purpose of this history has been to record, from the Headquarters MACV standpoint, how the MACV mission was carried out in 1971. The historians' objective was to provide as complete a reference document as possible; comprehensive, factual, and concise. The relatively brief material on some subjects should not discourage future researchers and historians, since all source documents referred to in the footnotes have been preserved on microfilm.

Through the year or more of preparation, many have contributed to this history. Particular credit goes to the historians who have been responsible for the final product: LTC William P. O'Bryan, USA, LTC Chester J. Piolunek, USA, Lt Col Ruth F. Reinholz, USMC, Lt Col John H. Scrivner, Jr., USAF, LTC Maurice R. Vincent, USA, CDR Jack D. Wells, USN, MAJ William L. Allen, USA, MAJ John A. Cash, USA, MAJ Eugene S. Olson, USA, and CPT William N. Dempsey, USA; to the two typists who prepared the final camera-ready copy, SP5 Charles E. Knudsen, USA, and SP4 Howard E. Hopkins, USA; to the MACJ3 draftsman, SP5 George W. Turner, Jr., USA; and to those who provided administrative support, CPT Juanita A. Killips, USA, SFC Gerald R. Snyder, USA, TSgt Charles E. Brenner, USAF, SP4 Michael E. Martinez, USA, SP4 Danny L. Wagoner, USA, and PFC Troy L. Tuggle, USA. Credit also goes to those who previously prepared material or assisted but have since departed: LTC Frederick A. Dodd, USA, Lt Col Ruth J. O'Holleran, USMC, MAJ Charles W. Glover, Jr., USA, LCDR Bradley Johnson, USN, MAJ Leland M. Martin, USAF, 1LT David E. Cook, USA, SFC Richard A. Smith, USA, SP4 Daniel E. Hampton, USA, SP4 Larry A. Spaid, USA, and SP4 Kenneth R. Wenzel, USA. The editorial excellence of the history is due to Mrs. Luise Lackland Shields' untiring efforts and professional expertise.


The historians have been privileged to observe and participate in recording USMACV's unique and monumental role at this turning point in the history of the US effort in Vietnam.



E H BRANCH
Colonel, USA
Command Historian

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Headquarters, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: VIETNAM TODAY

(U) The Republic of Vietnam today is markedly different from the Vietnam of earlier years. US and other Free World Forces efforts -- military, economic, humanitarian, political -- have had a tremendous impact on the country and the people. Today, even the nature of the war has changed. The process of Vietnamization has largely been achieved, and the withdrawal of US forces is well underway.

(U) Culminating efforts by US, RVN, and other Free World Forces since 1965, the war has now reached a point where South Vietnamese Regular Forces have been shifted from their former mission of providing security to the population centers. Now, Regional Forces are being used to secure unpopulated areas and the Popular and People's Self-Defense Forces, with the National Police, have assumed the responsibility for local security. The Regular Forces thereby have been freed to focus on enemy main force units.

(U) It is significant that these achievements in security could be accomplished even though the enemy has not abandoned his strategic objectives for Southeast Asia, and is continuing his efforts to counter the gains made in South Vietnam. North Vietnam's overall goal -- complete domination of the Republic of Vietnam and establishment of a sphere of influence throughout Indochina -- remains. Hanoi's desire to conquer South Vietnam is dictated both by the desire to expand its area of political control and by the need to secure the rich agricultural areas of the South. The enemy's activities in Laos and the Khmer Republic also derive from political power-seeking, and the necessity to control vital base areas and lines of communication.

(U) The enemy effort in South Vietnam requires a massive input of men and materiel from NVN. To meet this requirement he has established an extensive supply and infiltration system. He continues to suffer heavy personnel losses. Nearly all replacement manpower must come from NVN, as VC recruitment within SVN has become increasingly more difficult. The vast bulk of arms and ammunition also must be infiltrated. The principal corridor for this infiltration is the complex road-trail-network known as the Ho Chi Minh trail through the Laotian panhandle and its extension down the Mekong River corridor in the Khmer Republic.

(U) Because of the pressure from cross-border operations during 1970 and 1971, the enemy expanded his supply operations to the west and reinforced his tactical units in southern Laos. To protect his lines of communication he has stationed major combat elements in the east-central portion of the Khmer Republic. The Allied interdiction efforts have caused heavy losses to the enemy along their overland supply system with the result that it has become increasingly difficult to infiltrate arms and other supplies into and within South Vietnam. Thus the enemy is dependent on a shadow supply system through which his units in SVN are supported with funds and locally acquired supplies, especially food, medical supplies, and clothing.

(U) The basic Allied objective is to build and strengthen the RVN and to enable South Vietnam to continue the struggle for self-determination. To achieve this, a secure atmosphere must be provided wherein the Vietnamese people can develop economically, politically, and socially. The emphasis now is on cohesion at the local level. As developed by the GVN in its 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan, major emphasis has been directed toward three objectives: self-defense, self-development, and self-government.

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(U) Concurrent with these objectives is the obvious necessity to defeat VC and NVA forces. To achieve these complex and interrelated socio-political, economic and military goals, South Vietnam has developed an integrated military/political system. The RVN political structure runs from the President through the province and district chiefs down to the village chief. In the military chain of command, the commander of one of the four military regions is also the coordinator of socio-political and economic, as well as military efforts within his region. Similarly, the province and district chiefs have dual roles serving also as sector and subsector military chiefs. The village chief not only has responsibility for political administration but has operational control of all security forces assigned to his village. Interfacing with the GVN is MACV's Civil Operations and Rural Development Support organization (CORDS). In 1967, COMUSMACV was given the unique requirement of nation building while fighting a war. Thus, CORDS was established with a sizable civil-military advisory structure to provide support to the Vietnamese Government at all administrative levels down to the district. Its purpose was to complement Allied forces in achieving security for the people, and to promote political and economic progress. This MACV-RVN interrelationship at all levels of the governmental structure permits a more efficient application of resources.

(U) The RVN Armed Forces (RVNAF) are woven into the political/military structure at each echelon. The overall size of the RVNAF has grown by over 340,000 in 3 years. By March 1972 the RVNAF was just slightly under 1.1 million, consisting of 12 Army (ARVN) divisions. This includes a new division formed late in 1971. With the Marine Corps, which the Joint General Staff uses as a strategic reserve force, the RVNAF has the equivalent of 13 divisions.

(U) Concurrent with the ARVN manpower build-up, and of special emphasis in 1971, has been the re-equipping of the ARVN divisions with newer weapons and equipment to increase their firepower and overall combat capability. Emphasis on training has increased proportionately to the build-up and includes recruit training, officer and NCO leadership courses, and periodic refresher training for the maneuver battalions.

(U) Gradual improvement in the ARVN has occurred partially as a result of the assumption of a greater portion of combat responsibilities as US forces redeploy. The experience gained in the planning and execution of complex, large-scale, cross-border operations, starting with LAM SON 719 early in 1971, has been invaluable. While the ARVN command and control system has a long way to go, it has demonstrated that it can and will function under demanding combat conditions.

(U) A part of the Army, and even larger than the regular Army, are the Territorial Forces, which include the Regional and Popular Forces. These elements have been charged with the mission of assisting the Regular Forces in maintaining security within the RVN. The success achieved in increasing their effectiveness has been instrumental in permitting the regular ARVN forces to concentrate their efforts against enemy main force units and base areas. Regional Force (RF) rifle companies, operating separately or in company groups and battalions, have the general mission of conducting offensive operations against the enemy local forces within their respective province. Their objective is to attack the enemy as far as possible from the province's population centers and to act as reaction forces. Training for Regional Forces has been restructured to meet the requirements of the expanded offensive operations now entrusted to them.

(U) The Popular Force (PF) platoons provide security for hamlets or villages against small bands of VC guerrillas in the immediate vicinity. The Popular Force soldier is recruited locally and stationed in his home village where he participates in daylight patrols, perimeter defense, and night ambushes. The PF soldier now receives training in centralized training facilities which closely parallels that given to ARVN regular Army recruits.

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(U) The Vietnamese Navy grew from 16,400 men in January 1968 to over 43,000 in 1971. Approximately 960 craft have been turned over to it by the USN. By the end of 1971 the Vietnamese were able to assume responsibility for most of the naval operations in Vietnam and adjacent coastal waters.

(U) The Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) also expanded and improved. Total personnel strength in February 1972 was over 47,000 (from 16,000 in January 1968). The number of their aircraft has increased from 340 in 1968 to almost 1,100. VNAF's percentage of total Allied fixed wing attack sorties flown in South Vietnam and the Khmer Republic increased from 12.2 percent in January 1969 to over 60 percent in March 1972. Helicopter combat sorties flown by VNAF increased from 3,800 in January 1968 to over 45,000 in March 1972. The integration of more complex and advanced aircraft into the VNAF inventory has been accomplished with no increase in the average number of major accidents, attesting to the increased experience and level of training for both maintenance personnel and pilots.


(U) One of the dramatic achievements of Vietnamization has been the RVNAF's progress in achieving logistic self-sufficiency. They have assumed increased responsibility for depot supply and maintenance, to include ammunition and POL as well as general supplies and equipment, port facility operations, and an in-country distribution system. The responsibility for the movement of supplies is rapidly being assumed by the Vietnamese; by June 1971, the VNAF was transporting more cargo by air for the RVNAF than the US, and this trend continues. The speed with which the RVNAF are taking over their logistics activities in-country has surpassed expectations. They are developing a responsive logistics system capable of supporting the million men of their Armed Forces.

(U) The civil forces which augment the RVNAF must be considered when discussing SVN countermeasures to the enemy system. Not technically members of the Armed Forces, the civil forces include the already-discussed People's Self-Defense Forces (PSDF) and the National Police. The PSDF are villagers under the operational control of the village chief. They are neither paid nor issued uniforms, however the presence of armed citizens in a village materially and psychologically assists in providing security for the community. They operate within and on the fringes of hamlets as the eyes and ears of the wider-ranging Territorial Forces. At present the PSDF has a total strength of over 4,000,000; 1.5 million classified as combat and 2.5 million as support members. Nearly 3.2 million have received formal training. The GVN is very close to the goal of having one weapon for every 2.5 combat members. This is a fact of considerable significance. It says, in effect, that the Government of Vietnam is sufficiently confident of the support from the citizens that it is willing to trust them with arms in large quantity.

(U) The importance of an effective police force has been recognized and significant improvement made in recent years. The responsibility for the elimination of the Viet Cong infrastructure, as well as the conduct of population and resources control and maintenance of civil law and order, rests with the National Police. Since January 1968, the total strength of the National Police has risen from slightly more than 72,000 to over 114,000. Even more important is the fact that today over 40 percent of this total is assigned to district level or below. The most marked advance in police growth has been the establishment of village police forces and police stations. Prior to 1969 there were a few scattered local police in villages but none from the national law enforcement agency. By the end of 1971 there were approximately 35,000 National Police assigned to over 2,000 village police stations. The paramilitary arm of the National Police is its field police, who are given additional training in infantry tactics and then assigned to a platoon at the district level. These platoons are employed in rural areas where security is not adequate for regular police. They often work in conjunction with RVNAF and aid considerably in identifying the VC infrastructure.

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(U) The expansion and improvement of the Vietnamese military and civil forces has not been accomplished without major problems. Each segment has its peculiar problems, but several are common to all forces.

- The first has been the development of an adequate number of leaders for the expanded forces. To combat this problem, increasing emphasis has been placed on the early identification of men with leadership potential, expanding the number and lengths of leadership training courses, and elevating the standards of the leader-producing schools. Significant in this area are the VN Military Academy, the Command and General Staff College, and the National Defense College.
- Military desertions have always been a problem, and continue today at higher-than-acceptable levels. The problem is difficult to solve. The current effort to increase pay and to improve motivation training should assist in reducing its magnitude.
- Much has been done to make RVNAF training self-sufficient. In addition to the leadership and motivation training mentioned previously, increased emphasis is being placed on critical areas such as the need for combined arms doctrine and training, and improved training at the commander and staff level in operational support coordination procedures.
- The National Police have a particular problem stemming from a lack of experience. More than 25 percent of the force has less than 1 year of service; almost 60 percent has less than 4 years. The result is poor quality middle and low level leadership and lack of training and internal management.
- These problems are all significant, but they will be surmountable with time and effort. In 1971 there were some advancements in almost all fields.

(U) As in past years the US and Free World Forces continued during 1971 to assist the Vietnamese in attaining a secure environment. Since 1965, when US forces entered the war, they have provided a large portion of the fighting strength, combat support, combat service support, and advisory assistance at every level of the RVNAF. As the Vietnamese military forces have developed, the role of the US and Free World Forces has lessened. These forces are now conducting security operations rather than offensive operations and are chiefly providing combat support, combat service support, and advice.


(U) Two brigades of US ground combat forces remained in Vietnam in March 1972. The 196th Inf Bde, in MR 1, conducts security missions referred to as "dynamic defense" in the vicinity of Da Nang. The Capitol and 9th ROK Infantry Divisions perform security missions and conduct combat operations in selected in-country base areas in MR 2. In MR 3, the 3d Bde, 1st Cav has been primarily pulled into the rocket belt surrounding the Saigon-Bien Hoa-Long Bien complex to provide greater security for that key area. No US or Free World ground combat units have been located in MR 4, the Delta, since August 1969.

(U) The US Air Force continues the air interdiction campaign but provides sharply decreasing close air support of the RVNAF while the VNAF continues its buildup. The US Navy still provides naval gun fire and tactical air support and participates in coastal surveillance operations, but at a reduced level from previous years.

(U) The advisory effort has changed considerably. Where once the US had advisors in ARVN units down to battalion level, they are now for the most part at regimental level or higher. As the situation improves within the provinces, advisory teams at district level are being reduced or withdrawn.

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(U) These RVNAF and Allied organizations conduct a variety of operations and programs in a coordinated attack on the total enemy system. Such operations are derived from a combined campaign plan, written primarily by the RVNAF Joint General Staff and signed by the Chief of the JGS and commanders of each of the Free World Military Assistance Forces.

(U) The coordinated Allied effort is a triple-edged attack, including an extensive combined interdiction campaign to prevent enemy infiltration and resupply efforts through Laos; coordinated ground operations to seek out and destroy the enemy main and local force units; and complementary programs to neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure. The combined interdiction campaign integrates Allied air, land and sea assets in an effort to sever the enemy's vital logistic lifeline. The keystone of the interdiction effort is an intensive, sustained air interdiction program. As US redeployments continue, air power remains our most important means for denying the enemy the capability to build, maintain, and use his logistics system. Air interdiction operations are targeted primarily against the enemy's major means of resupply, the trucks moving down the Laotian logistics corridor, as well as the road and trail network over which they move, and the associated defenses. This network provides prime targets for air interdiction operations and is hit with B-52, TACAIR and gunship sorties. The second portion of the integrated interdiction campaign is the land interdiction effort. Virtually all ground operations in SVN contribute to the land interdiction program; however, those operations which are most directly involved are the cross-border operations into Laos and the Khmer Republic. Two such operations were launched simultaneously in February 1971 by six RVNAF divisions. In Operation LAM SON 719, three divisions drove west from northern MR 1 into Base Area 604, the hub of the enemy's logistic effort in Laos. In the south, three divisions pushed into the Khmer Republic from Vietnam's MR 3 on Operation TOAN THANG 01/71. Their objective was to defeat the enemy forces protecting the supply terminals south of Kratie in east central Khmer Republic. In addition to the losses inflicted on the enemy and the interdiction of his lines of communication, this latter operation gave the Khmers much needed time to organize and train their armed forces.

(U) Complementary to the land and air interdiction effort is the ocean surveillance operation, known as MARKET TIME. This operation has three barriers designed to interdict seaborne infiltration. The first barrier is an air patrol, which provides early warning capability against infiltration of large steel-hulled NVN trawlers. Providing the gun platforms that are required to interdict the heavily armed trawlers are the ocean-going ships of the outer surface barrier, which patrol areas from 10 to 40 kilometers off the coast. This part of the barrier is still under operational command of the US Navy, but the Vietnamese will take command in the near future. The Vietnamese Navy now has operational control over the inner surface barrier. This consists of small patrol craft recently turned over by the US Navy. These craft patrol high infiltration threat areas in task force units of four to five craft. A network of surface radars is being installed that will be able to search the entire coastline of RVN. This radar network when fully operational will be controlled by the VNN. Arrangements are also being made to integrate coastal air patrols by VNAF to supplement the inner and outer surface barriers.

(U) The key to the overall interdiction program is the coordinated application of all available air, land, and sea assets to disrupt the enemy's infiltration system. These interdiction programs are essential to the success of the other two elements of the triple-edged attack on the enemy system.

(U) The second element in the total effort against the enemy system is the conduct of ground operations with the goal of destroying enemy main and local force units and providing security to the population. The operations conducted in Military Regions 1 and 2 are similar. Regular RVNAF units conduct combat operations to locate and destroy enemy main forces unit and base areas in the foothills and mountainous areas to the west. Regional and Popular Forces operate in the populous coastal areas and out into the foothills, providing military support to community defense and local development. Because of the major enemy threat to northern MR 1, considerable

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effort is devoted to denying the enemy the ability to infiltrate his main force units across or around the demilitarized zone into the area. Air power is used extensively to interdict enemy movement, and to disrupt efforts to reinforce and destroy supply areas.

(U) The low level of enemy activity in Military Region 3 has permitted the employment of major forces in cross-border operations and has provided the opportunity for pursuit of the objectives of community defense and local development. Military Region 4's most noteworthy operations are its saturation operations. Their purpose is to detect and neutralize enemy local guerrilla forces and the VC infrastructure. Territorial Forces in coordination with local forces and, in some cases, ARVN forces, organize and conduct short term operations of 3 to 5 days throughout a district, province, or the entire MR, attacking multiple targets simultaneously. The concept of these operations is to have all Territorial Force units seek contact with the enemy, leaving no area open to enemy movement or occupation. The major role of regular ARVN forces is the conduct of operations in, and occupation of, enemy controlled areas such as the U Minh Forest, the Seven Mountain and Three Sisters area near the Khmer Republic border, and Kien Hoa Province. Additionally, riverine operations by the Vietnamese Navy are employed extensively in the Delta.

(U) The third element of the Allied effort is the neutralization of the VC infrastructure. Besides the saturation operations mentioned earlier, the GVN has initiated the Phung Hoang program: operating from intelligence and operations centers throughout the country, the National Police work to identify, capture, and try members of the VC infrastructure as civil offenders.

(U) The long term effectiveness of the Allied organization and operations can be measured by tracing the impact on the elements of the enemy system since TET 68. The most salient change in the enemy's main force posture since TET 68 has been the restriction of his operations. At that time enemy main force units operated throughout broad areas of the RVN, and the levels of enemy initiated activity were at their all-time high. This period saw the enemy bring to a climax the classic Maoist theory of guerrilla warfare by launching general offensives. TET 68 was the first and strongest offensive; by spring 1969, after the fourth, final and weakest offensive, Hanoi formally backed away from the strategy of main force warfare to that of protracted war. Battlefield activity has confirmed the shift. Levels of enemy activity have continued to drop. Strengths have declined and by early 1972 main force units had either redeployed out of the country or increasingly confined themselves to remote base areas.

(U) Enemy local force units have been hit hardest by the change in the nature of the war. At the time of TET 68, they frequently served as supplementary main forces units in large-scale actions. For example, many local force battalions participated in the assault on Saigon. Since the shift to protracted war, the local force battalions have gradually lost manpower, and today most are operating at reduced strength. In fact, many have been broken down into smaller guerrilla and sapper style units. This process of fragmentation is reflected in the reduction of of battalion size attacks the enemy has been able to mount, and his increased dependence on small-scale terrorist, sapper, and other guerrilla actions in order to maintain a presence with the population. By indiscriminate use of terrorism against civilians, the enemy has attempted to halt GVN political progress and hamper their development programs.

(U) The Viet Cong infrastructure has also shown a steady decline in influence from pre-TET 1968 to the present. Evidence of the gravity this problem poses to the enemy is the frequency with which it is mentioned in captured enemy documents and by ralliers and PW.

(U) The enemy's supply system has been disrupted in several ways: disruption of lines of communication and uncovering of caches have limited the enemy's in-country logistic capability; Operation MARKET TIME has interdicted his coastal supply routes; the overthrow of Sihanouk

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denied further use of the port of Kompong Som; Allied cross-border operations seized major stores of cached materiel and disrupted base areas; and the continuous air interdiction effort has impeded the flow of supplies. The enemy was able to deliver less than half as many supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail during the 1970-71 logistics season as were delivered in 1969-70. The effectiveness of the shadow supply system has been reduced by the denial of enemy access to the population. In spite of this the enemy places heavy reliance on this source of supply in an effort to partially alleviate the severe shortages he now suffers, particularly in southern SVN, where his supply lines through Laos are longest.

(U) Tangible evidence of the effect the Allied countermeasures have had on the enemy is reflected in improvement in security provided the people of South Vietnam since TET 68. There is no completely reliable way to quantify this, but there are indicators that show favorable trends. For example, the percentage of the population classified as living in a relatively secure status stood at a low of 60 percent in February 1968, but rose to 95 percent by January 1971 and has remained near that level. Closely associated with the security of the population is the number of VC controlled hamlets. In 1968 there were over 4,000; today there are less than ten. Although such trends are favorable and reflect a decline in enemy activity, the enemy has not lost his willingness to fight and still retains significant combat capability, a capability that is dependent on constant materiel aid being provided by the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

(U) Faced with the threat, it is encouraging that the Allies have been able to pursue other elements of strategy in addition to pure countermeasures, including promotion of political stability, economic development, road construction, communications network, and education. In 1967 national elections were held, as well as hamlet and village elections in many areas. This vital step toward political stability was seriously threatened by the 1968 TET offensive. However, it is significant that the Vietnamese Government not only withstood the stress of the offensive but capitalized on the strong anti-VC feeling that it generated. In fact, since TET 1968 over 115,000 former Viet Cong and NVA soldiers have rallied to the GVN under the Chieu Hoi program. This program, first initiated in 1963, permits former enemy cadre and soldiers to voluntarily surrender to the Vietnamese Government in exchange for full amnesty and a chance to return to their homes and families. The program has had a significant impact on the enemy. Since its inception over 195,000 former enemy have come under GVN control.

(U) Progress in developing local self-government resumed in late 1968, and has continued with 98 percent of the villages holding local elections. To improve the quality and effectiveness of local leadership, a training course for village officials was established at the National Training Center at Vung Tau. Village councils were established and granted more authority over local taxes and budgets and the village chief was given responsibility for the local PF platoon, rural development cadre, and village police. In 1970 provincial councils were elected for the first time since 1965.

(U) The national leadership has governed through a full term of office for the first time since the fall of the Diem regime. This stability is in marked contrast to the political turbulence of the years from 1963 to 1967, and has been a major factor in the successful advancement of military, political, social, and economic programs.

(U) Economic development interlocks with political stability. Without the latter, little or no progress could be made in the economic area. In Vietnam, the farmer is basic to the economy. Recognizing this, the Government of Vietnam has instituted a land reform program, known as Land-to-the-Tiller. This program will provide economic and social opportunity to over one million Vietnamese farm families. The goal is to distribute titles to one million hectares of rice land by March 1973. Agricultural production was declining prior to TET 1968. However, the improvement in security following TET reversed this trend and since 1969 agricultural production has increased in almost all areas. In 1972, for the first time in 7 years, Vietnam is expected to

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achieve self-sufficiency in rice production. Realizing that the introduction of miracle rice to Asia will eventually create a surplus market, the GVN is encouraging agricultural diversification by introducing livestock, feed grains, oils, and tree crops.

(U) An infusion of development capital into the rural areas is also necessary so that modern technology in the form of mechanization, irrigation, and fertilizers can be applied to the farm land. The GVN Agricultural Development Bank will have almost 22 billion piasters available to lend to farmers in 1972 at reasonable rates of interest. The Village Self-Development Program, in addition to teaching democratic processes, is a program designed to inject development capital into the rural villages. Each village will receive at least 300,000 piasters for its own self-development program projects. In some cases the Agricultural Development Bank will lend funds to the village people, matching their own investment in village self-development. This loan program is a transitional step towards the eventual local financing of all small development projects.

(U) The war in the countryside has caused an influx of people into the cities, and today over 40 percent of the population lives in urban areas. As a result of this tremendous growth, the urban governments have been able to provide only minimal public services. Former development plans singled out the countryside, but now the GVN with MACV's advice and assistance is paying special attention to improving urban living conditions.

(U) Vietnamese industry has also improved since the TET offensive, which caused nearly 30 million dollars in industrial damage. By the end of 1969, 90 percent of the output of the damaged factories had been restored. Damaged equipment was replaced with new modern equipment resulting in more efficient operation. To further advance the economy, USAID made available under the commercial import program, 40 million US dollar credits. Priority has been given to the areas of food processing and wood products. Investment has taken place primarily in light industry such as feed mills or textile factories, but in some cases, in heavy industry such as steel rolling mills.

(U) Since 1965, approximately 2,600 kilometers of first class primary highways and 2,400 kilometers of secondary interprovincial or provincial roads have been completed. This improved road network has not only supported military operations as intended but has provided land lines of communication between the central government and local governments in the provinces and villages. In addition, these roads serve as the primary arteries for the movements of goods, services, and food stuffs within the Republic. The construction effort has been primarily the responsibility of the United States, but has shifted gradually to the Government of Vietnam.

(U) The establishment of a telecommunications system to complement the road network is also underway. Steady progress is being made in developing a military system which will integrate the present RVNAF system and that part of the US system being turned over to the RVNAF. Although a concept has been developed for a single integrated national system, an effective civil telecommunications system is not expected until the late 1970s.

(U) The educational system in South Vietnam is considered to be one of the key building stones in the development of the Republic. The approach has been to improve both the quantity and quality of education. The 1975 goal of 100 percent enrollment of eligible children in primary school can probably be met. The situation in the secondary schools is not so bright since both teachers and classrooms are in short supply. The number of students per class is still around 60 and most schools run on double sessions.

(U) The people of Vietnam have suffered greatly. Since the war's beginning nearly a quarter of the Vietnamese people have been in refugee status. Disabled veterans, widows, and orphans number in the hundred of thousands. The GVN has made a major effort to assist

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these millions of war victims with food, money, housing, and medical care. Although the refugee problem is far from being solved, it is a measure of success that over 4 million refugees have been assisted by the GVN since 1964, and that fewer than 500,000 remain to be helped.

(U) The progress made by the GVN toward self-sufficiency and the reduction in enemy effectiveness described has taken place gradually and has been accompanied by a steady reduction in US forces beginning in 1969. The dismantling and redeployment of the US force has been a complex project. It has been a dynamic situation requiring careful and very flexible planning to maintain a balanced force throughout each phase. Base and installation transfers and closures have been accomplished in an orderly fashion. Combat support to RVNAF now consists primarily of air support and naval gunfire. Logistical and advisory support also continue but are being reduced as the RVNAF becomes increasingly self-sufficient.

(U) The force planning for further withdrawal will be based on Presidential decisions, such as the announcement which set a strength of 69,000 by 1 May 72. A potential problem associated with further redeployments is the risk of security degradation at major United States bases. This risk must be accepted and an even closer coordination with Vietnamese forces must be carried out as we become increasingly dependent on the RVNAF for security.

(U) Another important factor to be considered as redeployment continues is the legal residual responsibility the US retains for prisoners of war captured by US forces and transferred to the custody of the South Vietnamese. The US must assure compliance with the important provisions of the Geneva Convention, particularly those dealing with treatment of PW. Should the GVN fail to comply with the provision in any important respect, we are obligated to take effective measures to correct the situation or to request return of the prisoners to US control.

SUMMARY

(U) In summary, the enemy has paid a high price for his aggression since 1961, having suffered over 800,000 killed and an unknown number wounded. Yet he has been unable to defeat the Allies or realize his ultimate objectives. His operations have been restricted, his forces fragmented, and his supply system disrupted. VC infrastructure, a force which is vital to his effort, has declined considerably. Despite this he has not lost his willingness to fight and he still retains a significant capability. He is trying to win politically and psychologically as well as militarily what he has not been able to accomplish on the battlefield alone. He is attempting to counter the success of the RVN's Community Defense and Local Development Programs. He is striving to dominate the population through intimidation, and to wear down the resolve of the Free World by exerting pressure on public opinion, especially in the United States.

(U) The Allies too have paid a high price. Since 1961 the United States alone has suffered over 45,000 killed. The South Vietnamese have lost over 140,000 killed. This sacrifice has not been made without gain. Militarily the enemy has not only been prevented from defeating SVN but also from winning a single important campaign, including the 1968 TET offensive.

(U) The South Vietnamese with US and Free World assistance have built a strong, broadly based, military establishment, an establishment which will be difficult for an aggressor to defeat on its home ground. This military force has been used not only in-country to defend the SVN people and the vital areas of the Republic, but also to strike into the enemy's cross-border sanctuaries, disrupting his base areas and reducing his capability to conduct large-scale military operations within SVN.

(U) As a result of the Allied military successes, a greater degree of security is being provided the people of South Vietnam. Since 1968 the percentage of population living in secure areas has risen 37 percent. The number of hamlets under VC control has dropped more than

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99 percent. Assassinations have dropped 40 percent, abductions 51 percent, attacks-by-fire 85 percent. This has permitted the diversion of resources from the pursuit of military activities to the much preferred nation building effort, resulting in progress in the areas of economic development, education, and political stability. Where once potential political leaders were reluctant to assume political and administrative responsibilities, today candidates for leadership positions are coming forward, as evidenced by the recent successful hamlet, village, and district elections.

(U) A good foundation has been laid for continued socio-economic progress. Whether or not the progress will continue and whether the Republic can withstand subversion and external pressures is a matter that only the Vietnamese people and their leaders can resolve. In 1971, South Vietnam, with the assistance of MACV, made major progress toward its goal of self-sufficiency.

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CHAPTER II

SOUTHEAST ASIA SCENE

EXPANDED AREA OF OPERATION

GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

(U) From the bombing halt of November 1968 until early 1970, the war in Southeast Asia was confined to the Republic of South Vietnam, to the north central plains of Laos, and to aerial interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh trail through the Laos panhandle. In March 1970 Prince Sihanouk, the Cambodian Chief of State, was deposed and a prowestern government installed with Marshal Lon Nol as Premier. This action closed the Cambodian borders and ports to the North Vietnamese as an avenue of supply support for their troops in South Vietnam. To counter this threat to their lifeline, the North Vietnamese engaged in open fighting with the soldiers of the Khmer Republic. A cross-border action by the combined forces of the US and RVNAF in May and June 1970 further interdicted the Communist lines of communication and disrupted their base camps and storage areas. The RVNAF continued to assist the Khmer Republic troops in the eastern area of Cambodia in an effort to prevent its use as a staging area by the Communists. Thus the scope of the war enlarged to include Cambodia.

(U) In 1971 this expanded scope of the war was extended further into the Laos panhandle when RVNAF forces, with US air support, crossed into that crucial area during Operation LAM SON 719. This ground operation, the largest of 1971, was designed to interdict, during the designated period, Communist supply lines along the Ho Chi Minh trail. It represented another instance of RVNAF troops crossing borders to pursue the enemy and continued the direct involvement of the countries of Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia in the war against the Communist aggression of North Vietnam.

(U) Even though the phasedown of US air units continued throughout 1971 in South Vietnam, a few of the units were not returned to the US but were transferred to bases in Thailand. While this was not a new arrangement, it associated yet another nation at least indirectly in the SEA war. From Thai bases B-52 bombers and fighter aircraft took off daily to conduct missions against the NVN supply trails in Laos, in support of Lao, Khmer Republic, and RVNAF troops, and in strikes in SVN and Cambodia.

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN SEA

South Vietnam

(C) As the ground war gradually wound down in 1971, except for major cross-border operations, political activity in South Vietnam was on the upswing. For the GVN, 1971 was an election year, with separate elections scheduled for the Lower House and the Presidency. On 29 August, a nationwide election was held for the Lower House in which over five and one-half million voters

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out of slightly over seven million people eligible chose 159 representatives. In the period just prior to the election there were isolated instances of violence, but on the whole the voting was conducted peacefully. The Lower House election was barely over when campaigns for the presidential vote began. Despite US efforts to create a contest in the election, both opposition candidates to incumbent President Nguyen Van Thieu withdrew from the race. The voting, held on 3 October, became a one-man popularity contest and President Thieu promised to resign if he did not receive 65 percent of the votes cast. Some Viet Cong activity was encountered throughout the country before the election, but it was not sufficient to prevent it from being peacefully and democratically completed. President Thieu received a heavy plurality and interpreted this as a vote of confidence. The one-man election did not exalt the Thieu Government in the eyes of the world, but his regime emerged from the electoral process firmly in control of the government.¹

Cambodia

(U) When the coup in March of 1970 toppled Prince Sihanouk, Marshal Lon Nol became head of the Cambodian Government. The North Vietnamese pledged to reinstate Sihanouk and began small-scale, harassing attacks on and around the capital of Phnom Penh in an attempt to embarrass the new government. These attacks soon expanded into military operations to seize portions of Cambodian territory, especially in the north and east sections close to the SVN border. Politically and militarily the governments of the Khmer Republic and South Vietnam worked closely together -- a situation which age-old ethnic antagonisms made difficult at times, but never halted.

(C) Politically, the most significant event in the Khmer Republic in 1971 was the so-called "coup" in which Premier Lon Nol dissolved the National Assembly and the Council of the Republic and formed both bodies into a Constituent Assembly. This action effectively ended the legislative branch of the government and placed no legal restraints on the government. Immediate fears of a military takeover in the Republic were groundless as nearly all factions of Khmer society backed the Premier in his new powers. A report from the US Ambassador, Emory C. Swank, stated that as of late October the existing power structure changes were cosmetic rather than fundamental. It appeared at the time that the changes might be transitional to new republican institutions and a later resumption of the Khmer experiment in democracy. The US reaffirmed its support of the Lon Nol Government and continued to aid, within the limits established by the Congress, the Khmer Government in its efforts to repulse the Communists.²

Laos

(S) The Kingdom of Laos continued its lengthy battle with the Communist-led Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese throughout 1971. Fighting that traditionally centered on the Plain of Jars expanded into the Laos panhandle as the NVN sought more area in order to protect and enlarge their LOC to their troops in Cambodia. Royal Lao forces took and lost the Bolovens Plateau and the junction towns of Saravane and Paksong, all in the panhandle. On 3 Dec 71 the campaigns opened for 60 National Assembly seats in an election to be held on 2 Jan 72. The campaigning did not generate a great deal of interest and the election in January 1972 did not affect the Government of Prime Minister Prince Souvanna Phouma nor alter the worsening war situation.

(S) In December 1971 the Communists launched the strongest offensive ever encountered in Laos and succeeded in threatening the Royal Lao headquarters at Long Tieng. Of note was the desertion of over 600 Pathet Lao soldiers and officers in the latter part of 1971. Their defection from the Communist forces indicated that there was disharmony among the enemy.³

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Thailand

(U) The Government of Thailand continued to play host to the USAF at Royal Thai Air Force bases throughout the country and to provide volunteer forces, both air and ground, to assist its neighbors Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia in the fight against communism. Ties between Thailand and the US remained very close and were reemphasized when US Presidential advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, paid a visit to the Prime Minister, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn on 6 Jul 71 to discuss the latest seven-point NVN peace proposal.⁴

(S) In a bloodless coup on 17 Nov 71, the predominantly military leadership of Thailand cancelled the nation's 3-year-old constitution, dismissed the Parliament and all Cabinet Ministers, and established a military style national executive council. Martial law was declared.

Thailand's relationships with the US and other nations of SEA remained unchanged by the coup.⁵

Neutrality Meeting

(U) Gathering at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 25-27 Nov 71, representatives of most of the SEA nations, plus the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, debated a Malaysian proposal that they all join together in mutual neutralization of all of SEA. The nations attending generally indorsed the concept but none of them expressed openly a willingness to sign such a declaration nor did they see it being a practical measure until an attitude of peace without fear of aggression existed throughout SEA.

North Vietnam

(U) The North Vietnamese objective of dominating SVN and as much of SEA as possible underwent no discernible change in 1971. There were no concerted military offensives in SVN, but activity in Cambodia and in both sections of Laos continued sporadically. Infiltration from North Vietnam into the Laos panhandle violated the territorial integrity of Laos and the neutrality of the Demilitarized Zone. This activity continued to increase in late 1971 with efforts being intensified to construct a pipeline to speed POL supply, additional roads, trails, and supply dumps and to increase noticeably the antiaircraft defenses of their logistic network. The Hanoi Government made public only those political actions which it wanted the world to know. It continued to court both Peking and Moscow, the sources of its war materials. The announcement of President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China sent North Vietnamese Premier, Pham Van Dong to Peking on 20-27 Nov 71 in an apparent quest for reassurance.⁶

(U) The Hanoi Government was granted recognition by Norway and Denmark in 1971. It continued to participate in the Paris Peace Talks, which were into their third year with no effective results. Despite hopes that the Hanoi Government might negotiate separately on the release of prisoners of war they steadfastly refused to do so, indicating that most of all their "peace programs" had to be accepted before the PW release.

PARIS PEACE TALKS

(U) The talks in Paris between the US/RVN and the North Vietnamese/VC representatives, underway since November 1968, dragged on for yet another year with no results. The Communists demonstrated no inclination to negotiate from previously declared positions regardless of the op-

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portunities presented to them; apparently they continued to consider the Paris talks to be nothing more than a propaganda forum. It was plain that, at least in 1971, a negotiated settlement to the war in SEA was not desired by the Hanoi Government. In July, President Nixon accepted the recognition of his chief negotiator, Ambassador David K. Bruce, and replaced him with Ambassador William J. Porter in September, marking what appeared to be an end to patient talking and instituting more forthright prodding of the Communists. By the end of 1971, 138 plenary sessions had been held since the talks began. No results were achieved nor were any known meaningful negotiations underway. So the impasse continued.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN SEA

(C) The war in SEA had a deep-seated impact upon the economy of all of the nations in the area. Most were dependent in whole or in part upon US economic aid for their continuing participation in the war and possibly for their continuing economic existence. Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia relied heavily upon the US for varying amounts of economic aid and for military support of all kinds. Long years of war so severely burdened the economic systems of South Vietnam and Laos that US dollars were vital to their survival. Loans from the Asian Development Bank and its member nations were scarce to nonexistent. Discussions with other countries concerning investments in Indochina drew wary replies especially from the most logical investor, the Japanese. The pragmatic view from Tokyo was that the ability of Laos and RVN to withstand the military pressure of the Communists depended directly upon the continuation of US programs of military and economic assistance at or near their present levels.⁷

South Vietnam

(U) The RVN economy achieved reasonable stability in 1971. To illustrate, retail prices increased 30 percent in 1970, whereas they increased only 14 percent in 1971. As visible evidence of growing confidence in the piaster, private savings increased from \$VN33.9 billion to \$VN65.0 billion during 1971. During 1971 the agricultural sector of the economy moved the country toward self-sufficiency in food, and the fishing industry expanded the monthly catch by several hundred percent. On 15 Nov 71, President Thieu announced a commendable economic reform program which included a rationalization of the exchange rate and a comprehensive overhaul of the tariff structure. The reform package as a whole represented a significant step in providing an economic climate for efficient economic growth. To illustrate the rationalization of the exchange rate, at the end of 1970 the black market rate for US dollars was 41 percent above the legal rate, whereas at the end of 1971 it was equal to the legal rate. President Thieu also noted that the GVN's long-range goal was economic self-sufficiency rather than dependence upon foreign aid. He specified agriculture as the foundation for the economic progress and social reform he wished for the RVN. The implementation of such wide-ranging economic reforms during the war rather than waiting for the postwar period represented a courageous economic step forward by the GVN leadership.⁸

(U) One sign of GVN economic maturity came during the typhoon that swept ashore in northern SVN. On 25 Oct 71, Typhoon Hester struck Quang Ngai, Quang Tin, Quang Nam, Thua Thien and Quang Tri provinces. The storm and resulting floods destroyed homes, boats, and a large percentage of the crops in the area. Loss of life was lower than might have been expected from the ferocity of the storm. Prompt and efficient relief action by the GVN aided by US forces rapidly alleviated much of the damage and suffering.

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Cambodia

(C) The Lon Nol Government of the Khmer Republic faced a shaky economic situation when it came to power in 1969. Since that time considerable effort had been made to stabilize the economy. Negotiations were conducted, particularly between the governments of the GKR and SVN, to permit a greater interchange of goods. Phnom Penh, the capital of the Khmer Republic, was particularly dependent upon river traffic that had to pass from the coast through the SVN portion of the Mekong River. By the end of 1971 vital convoys were passing virtually unmolested all the way to Phnom Penh with minimal assistance from US forces.

(C) In accord with the Nixon Doctrine of helping friendly nations help themselves, the US offered economic assistance to the GKR. The offer was accepted and an AID agreement was signed on 31 May 71. The sudden refusal of the US Senate to approve foreign aid in October 1971 created great concern among the GKR, but the subsequent reversal of that vote in November eased the anxiety in Cambodia and elsewhere in the world. Because of the flagrant use of Cambodia by the North Vietnamese and the resultant combat throughout the northern and eastern portions, the GKR remained dependent upon US economic and military aid in its struggle against the Communist incursion.⁹

Laos

(U) The Kingdom of Laos also needed considerable economic and military assistance from the US in its struggle for survival against the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese. Significant during 1971's economic events in Laos was the passage by that government of an antidrug measure to curb the production and export of opium and other drugs.¹⁰

North Vietnam

(C) The economy of North Vietnam was staggered in September 1971 when one of the worst floods in the history of that area devastated large areas of the Red River Delta. Even NVN admitted the seriousness of the flood by stating that the natural disaster was the worst since the famine of 1945, which reportedly killed almost a million people. The September floods destroyed most of the fall NVN rice crop, forcing that nation to rely upon imports and stored reserves. Unofficial reports from news sources estimated the death toll from the flood at near one million. The Government of SVN offered US\$50,000 to NVN plus shipments of food by way of relief, but the gesture was refused. Aid was accepted by NVN from Russia and the People's Republic of China -- the same sources that supplied most of the material used in their war of aggression.¹¹

Summary

(U) As it had in years past, the US, through its diplomatic and military agencies, aided those nations of SEA with whom it was allied in the fight against Communist NVN. Military aid and outright grants of foreign aid continued to bolster war-strained economies in the Khmer Republic, Laos, and SVN. Thailand, technically at peace but host to US forces by agreement and feeling occasional Communist guerrilla pressures, also received US economic assistance. Through the injection of massive amounts of money and material as well as manpower, the US remained deeply committed economically to the backing and survival of Southeast Asia in 1971.

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US OBJECTIVES AND THE MACV MISSION

(U) As the Southeast Asia scene changed, MACV functions and activities changed. In South Vietnam the continued redeployment of US and Free World Forces altered roles and responsibilities, with RVN assuming the primary combat responsibility (except for strategic air) and the US turning more and more to the advisory effort. While US long-range objectives remained unchanged, the COMUSMACV mission adapted both to the expanded scope and area of the war and the changing US role in Vietnam.

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

US Objectives in Vietnam

(C) US objectives in Vietnam, the basis for the COMUSMACV mission, progressed through three phases. As reflected in the 1970 Combined Strategic Objectives Plan (further discussed in Chapter IV), the three phases were:

Phase I

- Immediate combined objectives were to expand areas of secure environment encompassing major cities, heavily populated areas and primary LOC, and to provide a favorable environment for continued growth and strengthening of political, economic, and social institutions.

Phase II

- Intermediate combined objectives were a secure environment throughout the RVN which permits and fosters further expansion of the economy and the national development programs, and a stable national government which represents and is supported by the people.

Phase III

- Ultimate combined objective was a free independent and viable nation of the RVN, functioning in a secure environment both internally and regionally.

(S) By late 1971, Phase II objectives for the most part had been reached. The security situation in RVN had been stabilized and the Government had turned its attention to economic expansion and local development, with increased participation by the people in government at the local level. The US continued in its objective, as expressed by CINCPAC:¹³

... assist the GVN to improve and modernize the RVNAF to enhance RVNAF effectiveness.

... assist the GVN to defeat the subversion and aggression and develop a secure environment that will promote selfgovernment within the RVN.

... assist the GVN to protect and further develop national resources, with emphasis on economic stabilization, economic growth, and improvement of social conditions to provide a better life for the people and win support of the people for GVN.

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GVN National Objectives

(C) The national objectives of the Vietnamese Government especially affected MACV functions in the military assistance and advisory areas. As stated in the Combined Strategic Objectives Plan, 27 Aug 70, the GVN objectives were to:¹⁴

- Develop and preserve democracy.
- Reform society to achieve improved social justice.
- Preserve territorial integrity and independence.
- Achieve peace.

THE COMUSMACV MISSION

Evolution of the COMUSMACV Mission

(S) Prior to the fall of 1969, no formal statement of the COMUSMACV mission existed in a single source document. The mission evolved as the US role in Vietnam evolved. Each new aspect of the war -- pacification, Vietnamization, US cross-border operations, support to operations outside RVN -- caused a new view or new interpretation of the COMUSMACV mission. Through the years the mission was derived from directives and guidance from SECDEF and the JCS, and from such national-level decisions as that contained in National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 362, 9 May 67, which made COMUSMACV responsible for the civilian-military management of the pacification effort, integrating certain agencies formerly under the US Embassy. Military responsibilities stemmed from CINCPAC instructions, "Terms of Reference for COMUSMACV," dated 3 May 68. On 21 Aug 69 the JCS provided the SECDEF guidance on improvement and modernization of the RVNAF as a principal means of Vietnamization of the war.

(S) As basic guidance for HQ MACV planners, COMUSMACV approved in October 1969 a new formalized statement of mission, the essentials of which were that COMUSMACV would, in pursuit of US objectives:

- Provide maximum advice and assistance to the RVNAF and other appropriate GVN agencies.
- Manage US Government civil and military field activities required to support continued accelerated pacification, civil action, and an area security program for RVN.
- Plan and conduct US military operations in RVN and, as directed or approved by CINCPAC in peripheral areas, in coordination with other Free World and RVN Armed Forces.
- Maintain plans for a comprehensive air and naval campaign in RVN.

(S) In 1970, after the cross-border operations in Cambodia, a revised mission statement made COMUSMACV responsible for:¹⁵

. . . the successful execution of the US military operations, military assistance, and advisory programs to promote national security and national development in RVN, and for authorized US military activities in areas adjacent to RVN which contribute to attainment of the US objectives in the RVN.

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The objective is to allow the people of RVN to determine their future without outside interference.

The 1971 Mission Statement

(U) A revised MACV Directive 10-11, "Terms of Reference for USMACV," was published 4 May 71. As stated therein, the mission of COMUSMACV had been derived to be:¹⁶

(U) Mission: Assist the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) to defeat externally directed and supported Communist subversion and aggression in order to attain an environment which will allow the people of the RVN to determine their future without outside interference.

Terms of Reference

(S) MACV Directive 10-11 further prescribed the following terms of reference (extract):¹⁷

7. (S) TERMS OF REFERENCE.

a. COMUSMACV is the commander of a subordinate unified command under the operational command of CINCPAC. USMACV comprises all MACV Service component commands, subordinate units, and detachments under the operational command of COMUSMACV.

b. COMUSMACV is the Commander Designate of the Central Region SEATO Field Force (CCRSFF), Commander Designate of the SEATO Field Force (CSFF), and Commander Designate of the United States Forces Southeast Asia (COMUSSEASIA). * In his designated capabilities he develops and is prepared to execute plans responsive to those of SEATO and CINCPAC.

c. COMUSMACV serves as the military member of the US Mission Council for purposes of coordination with the Chief of Mission on all matters relating to US military activities in the RVN. (See paragraph 9.)

d. In addition to other responsibilities, COMUSMACV is the representative of the Secretary of Defense and CINCPAC with respect to military assistance in the RVN.

(1) COMUSMACV or his designated representative, as the military member of the US Mission Council, coordinates with the Chief of Mission for military assistance matters to the extent provided for by law, and in accordance with Executive Orders and such other instructions as the President may promulgate. He coordinates military assistance activities with US Government agencies represented in the US Mission which are concerned with the execution of foreign assistance legislation. COMUSMACV will keep the Chief of Mission informed concerning current and prospective military assistance plans and programs. Unresolved differences between the Chief of Mission and COMUSMACV will be referred to the Secretary of Defense through CINCPAC.

* COMUSMACV is Commander Designate of CCRSFF for SEATO Plan 4, and Commander Designate of CSFF for SEATO Plan 6.¹⁸

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(2) Administrative and logistical support of the USMACV relating to military assistance normally will be provided by the RVN in accordance with the Pentilateral Agreement of 1950, and implementing arrangements thereto, or by the American Embassy in the RVN, or by an administrative agent as directed by CINCPAC. Airlift support for military assistance administrative use will be provided from aircraft assigned or made available to COMUSMACV. Flying hours cost for this purpose will be reimbursed by military assistance funds.

e. COMUSMACV is designated Single Senior Military Representative in the RVN. In this capacity, COMUSMACV is responsible directly to CINCPAC for coordination of matters of joint concern connected with the relationships among all personnel in the country area of concern who are under the jurisdiction of or accountable to the DOD, regardless of whether or not they are assigned to the Pacific Command (PACOM). As Single Senior Military Representative in the RVN, COMUSMACV serves as the military point of contact for and provides military support to the US Mission, Vietnam, as appropriate.

ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

FUNCTIONS OF COMUSMACV

Command Responsibilities

(S) COMUSMACV exercised operational command of all assigned US military forces and military agencies. The command relationships within USMACV varied from direct command to coordination and cooperation (see Figure II-1). Specific command relationships within the command were often determined by the operational requirement generated by the combat mission or as needed to achieve objectives established by higher authority. Following is an extract of MACV Directive 10-11, defining COMUSMACV's responsibilities and functions as a commander.¹⁹

8. (S) RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF COMUSMACV.

a. COMUSMACV, as commander of a subordinate unified command:

(1) Exercises operational command of all US Forces and military agencies assigned for the accomplishment of his mission.

(a) Within the framework of the definitions and guidance set forth in paragraphs of 3020b and 30234 of JCS Publication 2, and within the provisions of policies and directives imposed by higher authority and by legislation, COMUSMACV:

1 Plans for, deploys, directs, controls, and coordinates the actions of assigned forces in conformity with paragraph 8a (1)(b).

2 Exercises directive authority within his command in the field of logistics to insure effectiveness and economy of operations, and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the MACV Service components.

3 Establishes such personnel services and management policies to insure uniform standards when not in conflict with Service regulations.

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4 Exercises directive authority, in accordance with policy and procedures established by higher authority, over all elements of his command in relationships with foreign governments and with other agencies of the US Government.

5 Reviews the recommendations bearing on the budget from the MACV Service component commanders to their parent military departments to verify that the recommendations are in agreement with his plans and programs.

(b) COMUSMACV exercises operational command through the MACV Service component commanders and the commanders of subordinate commands within USMACV.

(2) Consults with the American Ambassador on US political and basic policy matters. Divergent views between COMUSMACV and the American Ambassador will be reported to CINCPAC by COMUSMACV.

(3) Keeps the American Ambassador fully informed, especially concerning all high level contacts with officials of the RVN, and on major RVNAF military plans and pending operations.

(4) Plans for and is prepared to conduct military operations as directed by CINCPAC.

(5) Discharges US military responsibility to the RVN in accordance with CINCPAC policies and directives.

(6) Assists the GVN and RVNAF in planning for military operations.

(7) Develops coordinated US/RVN military plans as directed by CINCPAC.

(8) Establishes policies and procedures pertaining to the effective operation, maintenance, and management of communications-electronics facilities required for command and control. Administers and supervises joint frequency coordination, and processes and validates communications requirements in the RVN in accordance with Pacific Command Communications Electronics Instructions (PACOM CEI).

(9) Exercises coordinating authority over all US military intelligence and counterintelligence units/elements operating in the RVN.

(10) Monitors research and development, test and evaluation, and combat developments (RDT&E and CD) activities of MACV Service component commanders in the RVN.

(11) To the extent agreed upon by the US and the countries concerned, controls and coordinates operations of third country military contingents and provides military and military assistance support therefor.

(12) Coordinates issuance of Army and Air Force Exchange privileges, controls identification procedures, determines common rationing policies, and coordinates merchandise control procedures in the RVN.

(13) Coordinates the development of labor provisions in status of forces agreements or other major country-to-country agreements and forwards recommendations on such matters to CINCPAC.

(14) Represents the US Forces position in formal discussion with the American Embassy and with representatives of the GVN on matters pertaining to the utilization of civilian employees in the RVN.

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SEACOORDS Representative

(S) A second basic responsibility of COMUSMACV was as CINCPAC's in-country representative and as Commander Designate of US Forces in Southeast Asia (COMUSSEASIA) in certain contingency situations. As such, COMUSMACV provided military advice and information to the Coordinating Committee for US Missions, Southeast Asia (SEACOORD). He was to represent CINCPAC at annual SEACOORD meetings, and keep CINCPAC and the JCS informed on all aspects of SEACOORD, including timely notification of agenda items and report of proceedings.²⁰

Military Assistance Functions

(S) In the military assistance and advisory areas, COMUSMACV had major responsibility to assist the GVN in achieving national objectives. As stated in the following extract from MACV Directive 10-11, COMUSMACV functions in these areas were:²¹

8. (S) RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF COMUSMACV.

c. COMUSMACV for matters pertaining to military assistance:

- (1) Makes recommendations to CINCPAC concerning military assistance to the RVN, to include recommendations concerning force structure modifications of the RVNAF and the preparation and submission of the RVNAF Force Structure List (FSL).
- (2) Develops military assistance plans in cooperation with the Chief of Mission and other US governmental agencies in the Mission, and submits them to CINCPAC.
- (3) Advises and assists the RVNAF in the logistic support of force development and operations as directed.
- (4) Observes and reports on the utilization of materiel furnished by and personnel trained by the US.
- (5) Provides appropriate advisory services and technical assistance to the RVN on military assistance.
- (6) Works directly with the military departments and appropriate military area commands on the development of arrangements for receipt and transfer of military assistance materiel, disposal of Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) excess property, and for training and services in the RVN.
- (7) Makes recommendations to CINCPAC concerning off-shore procurement of MASF materiel or services.
- (8) Provides advice and assistance to the RVN with respect to the materiel weapons development program, weapons production, and off-shore procurement matters.
- (9) Provides the point of contact for the RVN concerning the exchange of information on forces, budget, weapons, and capabilities.
- (10) Provides liaison with the RVN with respect to any other military assistance requirements or logistic matters of the DOD and performs such other functions as may be required under Foreign Assistance Legislation.

(11) With regard to the RVN implementation of that portion of its military program financed by other US agencies with US-owned local currency, develops and executes a program of review and observation to serve as a basis for reporting to the Chief of Mission and the Chief of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) when the execution of the budget is not being carried out in accordance with the agreed to security budget and the terms of the covering agreements.

(12) Develops, manages and controls the logistic programs for military assistance to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF).

(13) Reviews and approves MASF Programs developed by the Naval Advisory Group for the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) and Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMCM) and by the Air Force Advisory Group for the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF).

(14) Advise and assists the RVN in the organization and composition of its armed forces in accordance with approved combined strategy.

(15) Serves as the single point of contact for matters of interest to the Tripartite Deputies and provides liaison between the Deputies and the MACV, RVNAF, and FANK Joint Staffs.

d. In discharging military assistance functions, COMUSMACV will be guided by the policies and procedures set forth in the DOD Military Assistance Manual, including the CINCPAC Supplement thereto, the Foreign Assistance Act, applicable DOD directives and instructions, and such other directives as may be issued from time to time by appropriate authority.

Pacification Functions

(C) A major responsibility of COMUSMACV was support for pacification. In 1971 pacification support took the form of the 1971 GVN Community Defense and Local Development Plan, a plan which influenced US operations. As COMUSMACV stated in a 7 Jan 71 memorandum to all commanders and staff agencies, ". . . I strongly endorse the 1971 (GVN) Community Defense and Local Development Plan and request your full support in its implementation."²²

(S) Paragraph 8e MACV Directive 10-11 cited below, prescribed the functions of COMUSMACV for pacification matters.²³

8. (S) RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF COMUSMACV.

e. COMUSMACV is charged with US civil/military responsibility for support of pacification and development operations in the RVN under the overall authority of the American Ambassador. For pacification matters COMUSMACV:

(1) Develops and supervises the execution of joint and combined plans, policies, concepts, and programs concerning US civil/military support for pacification and development.

(2) Provides advice and assistance to the GVN, including the Ministry of Rural Development (MORD), the RVNAF Joint General Staff (JGS), and other appropriate GVN agen-

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cies, on US civil/military support for pacification, including US advisory and logistic support.

- (3) Develops requirements for military and civil assets US/Free World and GVN to support pacification and development.
- (4) Coordinates with the other agencies of the US Mission, Vietnam, in the planning of pacification and development activities.
- (5) Provides focal point for economic warfare to include population and resource control, and for civic action by US Forces.
- (6) Evaluates civil/military pacification and development activities, including provision of security by US/FW/GVN military forces, and reports on progress, status, and problems of the pacification and development support effort.

US Mission Council Member

(C) The US Ambassador to RVN was charged with overseeing and coordinating all activities of US Government in RVN, both civilian and military. As President Nixon wrote to Ambassador Bunker in December 1969:²⁴


Your mission as American Ambassador to Vietnam is of the utmost significance to our country and to me personally. As Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission, you have full responsibility to direct and coordinate the activities and operations of all of its elements. You will exercise this mandate not only by providing policy leadership and guidance, but also by assuring positive program direction to the end that all United States activities in Vietnam are relevant to current realities, are efficiently and economically administered, and are effectively interrelated so that they will make a maximum contribution to United States interests in that country, as well as to our regional and international objectives.

(C) Although the Ambassador was in no way a military commander, he maintained a close relationship with COMUSMACV on matters of mutual interest. The primary mechanism for coordination and cooperation in carrying out national policies was the US Mission Council. As explained by paragraph 9 of MACV Directive 10-11:²⁵

9. (C) UNITED STATES MISSION COUNCIL. The US Mission, consisting of the American Embassy; USMACV; USAID; Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO); and Office of the Special Assistant to the American Ambassador (OSA), has been established to implement programs to achieve US objectives in the RVN. While these US agencies respond to the direction of US agencies at the national level, local guidance is provided by a mission council that had been established to ensure an integrated US effort in the RVN. The council is composed of the American Ambassador (Chief); the Deputy Ambassador; COMUSMACV; Deputy Commander, USMACV, for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (DEPCORDS, MACV); Director, USAID; Director JUSPAO; and the OSA. The relationship between USMACV and the other elements of the mission team is one of coordination and cooperation. In case of differences of view between the Chief of Mission and COMUSMACV, each is free to communicate such differences to national authorities. COMUSMACV communications will be forwarded through CINCPAC.

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USMACV COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS



Source: MACV Directive 10-11

Figure II-1

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(C) The close relationship between the Ambassador and COMUSMACV was a critical factor to the successful functioning of the council, and it established an atmosphere conducive to a harmonious alliance between civil and military components of the organization at all levels. During 1971 the US Mission Council met weekly on Tuesday mornings at the US Embassy in Saigon. The agenda expanded over the years to include military operations, enemy situation, Vietnamization, economic assistance, political influences, and other appropriate topics.²⁶

MACV SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDS

(C) Certain common functions were performed by each Service component commander in accomplishing the MACV mission. As prescribed in MACV Directive 10-11, CG, USARV, COMNAVFORV, and Cdr, 7AF were tasked to perform the following common functions:²⁷

- Discharge component command functions for uni-Service matters in the RVN.
- Exercise operational control or command assigned and attached units.
- Advise COMUSMACV on service component combat, combat support, and combat service support operations.
- Prepare and execute contingency plans as directed by COMUSMACV.
- Perform RDT&E and CD functions as directed.
- Provide logistical support for service-peculiar items.
- Perform base development and real estate functions at installations where given primary mission requirements.
- Perform manpower authorization and personnel functions as directed by CINCPAC.
- Provide communications support and navigation facilities as required.
- Provide intelligence and counterintelligence support to MACV.
- Provide logistic support to FWMAF in accordance with agreements.
- Support pacification and Vietnamization as directed by MACV.

(C) With respect to logistic, administrative, technical, and other matters of uni-Service interest, MACV Service component commanders received instructions from and were authorized to communicate through unilateral Service channels with their respective Service at PACOM level.

Army Component Commander: CG, USARV

(C) COMUSMACV exercised operational command of USARV through the Deputy CG, USARV. USARV, with assigned and attached units, was assigned to HQ, USARPAC with station in RVN. CINCUSARPAC exercised command less operational control (see Figure II - 1). In addition to the functions common to each Service, CG, USARV was charged to perform the following functions, as shown in the appropriate extracts from paragraph 12a of MACV Directive 10-11:²⁸

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- (3) Provide COMUSMACV with US Army forces for the conduct of combat and combat support operations in the RVN.
 - (6) Direct and supervise the US Army logistic support system (less theater traffic management functions which remain with COMUSMACV) in the RVN. This includes common supply and common service support for all US and FWMAF in MR 1, 2, 3, and 4, and US Army-peculiar support throughout the RVN.
 - (10) Provide administrative, logistic, and service support functions to HQ, USMACV, and other activities as directed.
 - (12) Perform the functions of US area coordinator in the Capital Military District (CMD) and in MR 1, 2, 3, and 4.
 - (19) Render cryptologic support to HQ, MACV, RVNAF, FWMAF, and component commands as directed by COMUSMACV.
 - (20) Construct and maintain roads and bridges in the MR 1, 2, 3, and 4 as directed.
 - (22) Provide Army engineer construction support to US Forces and FWMAF as directed by COMUSMACV.
 - (23) Perform airfield maintenance for air bases in MR 1, 2, 3, and 4 less those assigned to Cdr, 7AF.
 - (24) Conduct the DOD property disposal mission in the RVN, and in such areas of Southeast Asia as may be assigned by competent authority.
 - (25) In coordination with GVN and civil agencies concerned, conduct port security operations in MR 1, 2, 3, and 4.
 - (26) Operate a Joint Central Graves Registration Office to maintain data of burial and recovery status of all dead and missing; to coordinate search, recovery, identification, mortuary, and burial operations; to supervise the establishment and maintenance of all temporary cemeteries; and to serve as a clearing point for graves registration information to all field elements.
 - (27) On odd number fiscal years, assume the chairmanship of the Joint Vietnam Regional Exchange Council (JVREC) and, with the Cdr 7AF, be responsible for mission evaluation, command supervision, and support (to include logistical and administrative support) of Vietnam Regional Exchange activities.
 - (28) As directed by COMUSMACV, coordinate directly with RVNAF and commanders of territorial forces on matters related to their installation security.

Navy Component Commander: COMNAVFORV

(C) NAVFORV, with assigned and attached units, was assigned to CINCPACFLT. CINCPACFLT exercised command less operation control of NAVFORV. COMUSMACV exercised operational command of NAVFORV (see Figure II-1). In addition to the functions common to each

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Service component commander, COMNAVFORV was charged to perform the following functions, as shown below in appropriate extracts from paragraph 12b of MACV Directive 10-11:²⁹

-
- (2) Conduct naval component planning in support of COMUSMACV operations plans and conduct other planning as directed.
 - (4) Exercise operational control of all Naval forces assigned to COMUSMACV, except those specifically assigned to the operational control of another commander.
 - (5) Exercise operational control of FWMAF units designated by COMUSMACV.
 - (8) Provide Service-peculiar support for US Navy and assigned US Coast Guard units throughout the RVN. Provide communications and navigation facilities as required.
 - (10) Provide Naval mobile construction support (NMCS) to US Forces and FWMAF as directed by COMUSMACV.
 - (12) Serve as Chief, Naval Advisory Group, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
 - (15)(a) Conduct air and surface surveillance, including visit and search, in accordance with current Rules of Engagement.
 - (b) Coordinate with and advise GVN military and civil agencies concerning harbor defense throughout RVN.
 - (d) Advise on port security and explosive handling.
 - (e) Provide naval gunfire support with assigned units as feasible and on a not-to-interfere basis with surface surveillance missions.
 - (f) Advise the VNN in mine countermeasure operations.
 - (g) Provide combat support of US Forces, RVNAF, and FWMAF as directed along the coast of the RVN, in the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ), and in the Mekong Delta.
 - (16) When directed, assume administrative control of designated Marine units and personnel.

Air Force Component Commander: Cdr, 7AF

(C) 7AF with assigned and attached units was assigned to HQ, PACAF. CINCPACAF exercised command less operational control of 7AF elements stationed in the RVN. COMUSMACV exercised operational command of 7AF (see Figure II-1). Logistic support was provided by USARV except for Service-peculiar items which were from own Service component command. In addition to the functions common to each Service component commander, Cdr, 7AF was charged to perform the following functions, as shown below in appropriate extracts from paragraph 12c of MACV Directive 10-11:³⁰

- (1) Exercise command and direction of all tactical, tactical support, base support, and training units assigned or attached to 7AF.

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- (3) Serve as Deputy Commander, USMACV for Air Operations.
- (4) Conduct and coordinate offensive and defensive air operations, tactical airlift, air traffic control, search and rescue operations, close air support, and reconnaissance operations, and provide communications and navigational facilities as required.
- (5) Exercise mission direction of MACV tactical air assets, including available Marine strike and reconnaissance aircraft, to provide close air support and reconnaissance for operations conducted in the RVN, in accordance with MACV Directive 95-4 (C), and other areas as may be directed.
- (6) Serve as Senior Air Advisor to the VNAF and exercise operational control of the AFGP.
- (7) Exercise operational control of FWMAF units designated by COMUSMACV.
- (8) Coordinate all military air operations in the USMACV area of responsibility, including those of US, FWMAF, and VNAF units which are not assigned or attached to 7AF.
- (9) Function as air defense commander and exercise overall air defense responsibility within the RVN and other areas as may be directed. Authority exercised over USARV air defense resources will be as specified in MACV Directives 95-4 (C) and 95-8 (C).
- (11) Provide weather and aerial port services for COMUSMACV through attached units.
- (21) Perform airfield maintenance for assigned air bases.
- (22) On even numbered fiscal years assume the Chairmanship of the JVREC, and with the Deputy CG, USARV, be responsible for mission evaluation, command supervision, and support (to include logistical and administrative support) of Vietnam Regional Exchange activities.

Naval and Air Force Advisory Groups

(U) US Naval Advisory Group (NAVADVGRP) and US Air Force Advisory Group (AFGP) continued their mission of advising their RVN counterparts in all matters of command, administration, logistics, tactical operations, training, and combat readiness.

(C) US Naval Advisory Group. NAVADVGRP was assigned to HQ, USMACV under the operational control of COMNAVFORV who was also the Chief of NAVADVGRP. Command less operational control remained with COMUSMACV, however by mutual agreement, the normal command functions of personnel administration and military discipline were accomplished through designated Service channels, with liaison maintained between NAVADVGRP and HQ, MACV. Logistics support was provided by USARV except for Service-peculiar items. Chief, NAVADVGRP, served as Senior US Advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations, Vietnamese Navy (VNN), and to the commander of the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC).

(C) Functions of Chief, NAVADVGRP were defined in MACV Directive 10-11, paragraph 12n as follows:³¹

- (1) Exercise command of subordinate advisory teams.

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- [REDACTED]
- (2) Advise and assist the VNN and VNMC commanders and staffs at all echelons in achieving and maintaining a high rate of combat readiness so as to fulfill their responsibilities for internal security, defeat of Communist insurgency, and resistance to aggression.
 - (3) Advise the VNN in the conduct of river patrol operations, and mine countermeasures and waterway security.
 - (4) Develop, in coordination with the VNN and VNMC, recommendations for VNN and VNMC personnel requirements.
 - (5) Develop, in coordination with the VNN and VNMC, recommendations for VNN and VNMC personnel and organizational requirements and submit to COMUSMACV for approval.
 - (6) Develop military assistance for VNN and VNMC and submit to COMUSMACV for review and approval.
 - (7) Manage and control the logistics programs for military assistance and Service-peculiar items to VNN and VNMC, coordinating with other USMACV subordinate commanders and staff elements as appropriate.
 - (8) Observe and report to COMUSMACV on the utilization of materiel furnished and personnel trained by the US.
 - (9) Assist GVN and other FWMAF agencies in the coordination of pacification and development programs.
 - (10) Advise and assist the VNN and VNMC in military support of pacification and development to include psychological operations.
 - (11) Coordinate all pacification and development program activities with CORDS advisors.
 - (12) Advise and assist the VNN in harbor defense matters.
 - (13) Advise the VNN in the operation of the coastal surveillance center in coordination with the Coastal Surveillance Force (TF 115) to provide an interchange of information and coordination of effort between VNN and US coastal surveillance forces.
 - (14) Provide intelligence and counterintelligence as directed by COMUSMACV.

(C) Air Force Advisory Group. AFGP was assigned to HQ, MACV, under the operational control of Cdr 7AF, who was also the Senior Air Advisor to the Vietnamese Air Force. COMUSMACV exercises command less operational control, however by mutual agreement, the normal command function of personnel administration and military discipline were accomplished through designated Service channels, with liaison maintained between AFGP and HQ, MACV. Logistic support was provided by USARV, except for Service-peculiar items which were provided by the AF component commander.

(C) Functions of Cdr, 7AF were defined in MACV Directive 10-11, paragraph 12c, as follows:³²

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- (1) Exercise command of subordinate advisory teams and operational control of designated units and detachments.
 - (2) Advise and assist the VNAF in achieving a state of combat readiness through application of proper techniques, procedures, and training.
 - (3) Advise and assist the VNAF in the conduct of combat operations.
 - (4) Develop, in coordination with the VNAF, recommendations for VNAF personnel and organizational requirements and submit through the Senior Air Advisor to COMUSMACV for approval.
 - (5) Develop, in coordination with the VNAF, recommendations for VNAF materiel requirements.
 - (6) Develop the MASF Program for VNAF and submit it to COMUSMACV for review and approval.
 - (7) Manage and control the logistics programs for military assistance and Service-peculiar items to VNAF, coordinating with USMACV subordinate commanders and staff elements as appropriate.
 - (8) Observe and report to COMUSMACV on the utilization of materiel furnished and personnel trained by the US.
 - (9) Advise and assist the VNAF in military support of pacification and development, to include psychological operations.
 - (10) Coordinate all pacification and development activities with CORDS advisors.
 - (11) Provide intelligence and counterintelligence to COMUSMACV, 7AF, and VNAF.

MACV REGIONAL ASSISTANCE ELEMENTS

(S) The US and FWMAF troop withdrawals which started in 1969 and continued through 1971 brought about changes in the structure of military region assistance elements, particularly in MRs 1 and 2. The changes also reflected a decreased combat role and increased emphasis on military assistance. On 9 Mar 70 as the Marine forces withdrew from Vietnam, CG, XXIV (US) Corps replaced the CG, III MAF as Senior US Advisor to CG, I Corps (RVN) and MR 1, and assumed operational control of all ground forces in MR 1. As the senior US Advisor, CG, XXIV Corps exercised operational control of the US Army Advisory Group (USAAG) and Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) in MR 1. Within their resources, XXIV (US) Corps and I Corps (RVN) conducted combined operations and provided security for critical US and GVN installations in MR 1. As US and FWMAF forces continued to redeploy, plans were made to replace XXIV Corps with the First Regional Assistance Command (FRAC) early in 1972.

(U) On 30 Apr 71, I Field Force, Vietnam was replaced as senior headquarters in MR 2 by the Second Regional Assistance Command (SRAC), which in turn was replaced by the Second Regional Assistance Group (SRAG), MR 2 on 16 May 71, when COMUSMACV appointed Mr. John P. Vann as the Senior US Advisor to the CG, II Corps (RVN) and MR 2. At the same time two deputies were appointed: A Deputy Senior Advisor (DSA) who was also the CG, US Army Forces, MR 2; and a Deputy for CORDS (DEPCORDS), MR 2. The appointment of a civilian to such a

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high position further indicated the reduction of the US combat role.³³

(U) On 30 Apr 71, II Field Force, Vietnam was replaced with the Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC) in MR 3. The Senior US Advisor was also the CG, USAAG, MR 3, and exercised operational control of US ground forces in MR 3. By the same authority a civilian was appointed DEPCORDS, MR 3.

(U) In late 1969 the Delta Military Assistance Command (DMAC) was established as US forces withdrew from IV Corps/MR 4. DMAC remained virtually the same through 1971, although redesignated the Delta Regional Assistance Command (DRAC) on 30 Apr 71.

(U) The senior US representative in the Regional Assistance Command/Group functioned as senior advisor to the RVN corps commander and exercised operational control of forces designated by COMUSMACV. He also was responsible for CORDS operations in the MR. Although there were certain differences in functions and responsibilities due to location, number of troops, or other conditions, each advisory element functioned similar to TRAC. The functions of TRAC as stated below in an extract from MACV Directive 10-11, generally applied to all MRs.³⁴

12. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR MACV COMPONENT COMMANDS, SUBORDINATE COMMANDS, AND ATTACHED UNITS OF USMACV.

g. TRAC is assigned to COMUSMACV, who exercises command of TRAC. USARV provides logistics support. CG, TRAC, will:

- (1) Exercise operational control of US and FWMAF units designated by COMUSMACV. Exercise operational control of USAHAC for defense and security matters within the Capital Military District (CMD).
- (2) Conduct, in coordination with CG, III Corps and MR 3, US unilateral, combined US/FWMAF/RVNAF combat operations.
- (3) Provide security for designated critical US and RVN installations in MR 3. Assist CG, CMD with surveillance and countermeasures, as required, to prevent rocket or mortar attacks on Saigon.
- (4) Serve as the US Senior Advisor to CG, III Corps and MR 3.
- (5) Prepare to execute contingency plans as directed by COMUSMACV.
- (6) Provide intelligence and counterintelligence as directed by COMUSMACV.
- (7) Conduct operations within assigned areas of responsibility to support pacification and development activities in established TAOR and in other areas in accordance with current instructions.
- (8) Provide advice, assistance, and support to the RVNAF at CMD, corps, division/special zone, sector, and subsector level in planning and executing coordinated pacification and development projects, through the Deputy for CORDS, TRAC.
- (9) Provide assistance to the GVN in developing and maintaining an effective military capability by advising and supporting RVNAF military and paramilitary commanders

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and staffs at all levels in operations, training, intelligence, psychological operations, personnel management, and combat support and combat service support activities.

(10) Exercise command of the TRAC advisory teams and operational control of designated units. Command of CORDS advisors will be through the Deputy for CORDS, TRAC.

(11) Supervise, through the Deputy for CORDS, TRAC, the formulation and execution of all plans, policies, and programs which support pacification and development in MR 3 and submit to COMUSMACV.

(12) Develop, in coordination with CG, III Corps and MR 3, recommendations for ARVN materiel, personnel, and organizational requirements in MR 3 and submit to COMUSMACV.

(13) Develop, with the assistance of the Deputy for CORDS, TRAC, recommendations for materiel, personnel, and organizational requirements for RF/PF and paramilitary forces in MR 3 and submit to COMUSMACV.

(14) Observe and report to COMUSMACV on the utilization of materiel furnished and personnel trained by the US in the MR 3 area of responsibility.

(15) Provide administrative and logistic support, as required, and administer military discipline for military personnel assigned for duty with CMD advisory teams.

RVNAF and FWMAF Relationships

(S) Since the Pentilateral Agreement of 1950, each troop contributing country to FWMAF in SEA entered into working agreements with COMUSMACV which, among other things, specified the command and control relationship. The Free World Military Policy Councils continued to coordinate and control the assignment of missions to insure mutual agreement with RVNAF in 1971. COMUSMACV generally exercised operational control of FWMAF while command less operational control remained with the troop contributing country. An exception was Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam (ROKVF) whose relationship was that of coordination and cooperation. A detailed discussion of FWMAF in RVN is found in Annex C, Free World Military Assistance Forces. Further information concerning logistic support of RVNAF and FWMAF is found in Chapter IX, US Logistical Support. Paragraph 13, MACV Directive 10-11 below, defines the relationship of MACV to RVNAF and FWMAF.³⁵

13. (C) RELATIONSHIPS OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM - REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES - AND OTHER FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES, VIETNAM.

a. National Level. The relationship between COMUSMACV and Chief, JGS, RVNAF, is one of coordination and cooperation. Each commander retains operational control of his respective national forces. Under this arrangement, RVNAF retains all territorial responsibilities.

b. Subordinate Level. (1) The basic concept underlying command relationships between US/FWMAF/RVNAF is one of mission accomplishment through mutual support, coordination, and cooperation. Components or units of one nation's military force may be placed under the operational control of a military commander of different national origin only if a military working agreement between the two nations concerned provides for such control. However, when the circumstances of the tactical situation require a

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combined operation involving the forces of two nations, the commanders of the forces involved may agree to direct support relationship, as defined in JCS Publication 1.

(2) As a matter of policy, US Forces will not be placed under the command or operational control of Allied commanders. However, this restriction does not preclude temporary direction of US Forces by RVNAF commanders or the temporary tactical direction of RVNAF or FWMAF by US commanders under certain circumstances. Such direction includes designation of targets or objectives, timing, duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and for efficiency. The tactics, methods, and procedures to be employed should be based on mutual agreement. Matters of this nature which cannot be resolved by subordinate US commanders will be referred to COMUSMACV.

(3) National unit integrity will be maintained at all levels.

(4) USMACV advisory teams at all echelons perform the combat liaison function between the US/FWMAF and RVNAF in addition to their primary mission of advice, assistance, and operational support of RVNAF.

c. Release of US Military Information. Release of US military information to representatives of the RVN will be made only in accordance with disclosure authority directives.

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1. Msg (C), Amemb, Saigon to SECSTATE, 18725/300440Z Nov 71, Subj: Vietnam in the Political Doldrums (Not stated), Gp-Not stated.
2. Msg (C), Amemb, Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 5256/171345Z Oct 71, Subj: National Assembly Becomes Constituent Assembly (Not stated), Gp-Not stated; Msg (C), Amemb, Phnom Penh to SECSTATE 5350/211140Z Oct 71, Subj: Political Developments in Cambodia (Not stated), Gp-Not stated.
3. Msg (U), Amemb, Vientiane to USINFO, 6333/280856Z Aug 71, No Subject; Msg (S/NF), SECSTATE to All SEA posts, 233607/302320Z Dec 71, Subj: Not stated, Gp-1; Msg (U), Amemb, Vientiane to USINFO, 9259/211149Z Dec 71, No subject.
4. Msg (U), Amemb, Bangkok to SECSTATE, 9326/071125Z Jul 71, Subj: Kissinger visit.
5. Msg (S), SECSTATE to all posts SEA, 215279/292118Z Nov 71, Subj: Thailand: The Military Leadership Reasserts Control (Not stated), Gp-1.
6. Msg (U), Amemb, Saigon to SECSTATE, 18359/211210Z Nov 71, Subj: Pham Van Dong Visit to the DRV (Not stated), Gp-Not stated.
7. Msg (C), Amemb, Vientiane to SECSTATE, 4092/091133Z Jun 71, Subj: Meeting of Japanese Diplomats on Indochina (Not stated), Gp-4.
8. LF (U), MACEA to MACJ031, 14 Apr 72, Subj: Staffing of MACV Command History (U).
9. Msg (C), Amemb, Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 2649/011130Z Jun 71, Subj: Khmer/Vietnamese Negotiations, Gp-Not stated; Msg (U), Amemb, Phnom Penh to SECSTATE, 5650/060603Z Nov 71, Subj: GKR Statement on US Aid.
10. Msg (U), Amemb, Vientiane to USINFO, 7156/280940Z Sep 71, Subj: Not stated.
11. Msg (C), SECSTATE to all posts, 174544/222222Z Sep 71, and 179270/292122Z Sep 71, Subj: Vietnam Highlights, p 4, Gp-Not stated; Msg (C), SECSTATE to CINCPAC et al., 14282/061135Z Sep 71, Subj: GVN To Offer Assistance for DRV Flood Victims (U), Gp-Not stated.
12. Plan (S), MACV, JCS/R1NAF, 27 Aug 70, Subj: Combined Strategic Objectives Plan (U), pp 1-2, 1-4, 1-7, Gp-Not stated.
13. Msg (S), CINCPAC to CINCUSARPAC et al., 120834Z Dec 70, Subj: 1971 CINCPAC Goals in SEA (U), pp 1-4, Gp-4.
14. Same as # 12, p 1-1.
15. Rpt (S), MACJ52, 16 Dec 71, Subj: Historical Briefs of JS, Excl 5, p 1, Gp-4.
16. Directive (S), MACV, 4 May 71 (as amended), Subj: Directive Number 10-11; Organization and Functions (U), p 2, Gp-4.
17. Same as # 16, pp 2, 3

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18. Fact Sheet (C), MACJ304, undated, Subj: SEATO Planning (U), p 1, Gp-Not stated.
19. Same as # 16, pp 3-5.
20. Same as # 16, p 5.
21. Same as # 16, pp 5-7.
22. Memo (U), COMUSMACV to JCS et al., 7 Jan 71, Subj: 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan (U), p 2.
23. Same as # 16, pp 7, 8.
24. Transcript (U), Speech by Saigon Mission Coordinator, Hawthorne Mills, 9 Mar 72, Subj: Mission Orientation Program (U), pp 1-3.
25. Same as # 16, p 8.
26. Same as # 24, p 3.
27. Same as # 16, pp 10-15.
28. Same as # 16, pp 10-12.
29. Same as # 16, pp 12, 13.
30. Same as # 16, pp 13-15.
31. Same as # 16, pp 23-25.
32. Same as # 16, p 25.
33. Ltr (U), COMUSMACV to Mr. John P. Vann, 15 May 71, Subj: Not stated, with 2 inclosures.
34. Same as # 16, pp 18-20.
35. Same as # 16, pp 28, 29.

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Chinese trucks such as this, and others supplied by Soviet bloc countries, were used by the enemy to transport war materiel down the Ho Chi Minh trail.

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CHAPTER III

THE ENEMY

BASIC STRATEGY AND INTENTIONS

OVERVIEW

(S) Since the initiation of US military aid to Indochina in 1950 the US has proceeded from the furnishing of equipment, to advice and assistance, to active combat by US units, to Vietnamization and finally, in 1971, to redeployment of US and Free World forces. The changed nature of the war was due to many factors, but important was that Allied redeployment could occur in spite of the fact that the enemy had abandoned neither his strategic objectives for Southeast Asia nor his effort to counter Allied gains in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Communist strategy for the war emanated in 1971 from Hanoi, as it had in the past, and military operations continued to be directed by the High Command of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces either directly or through major tactical headquarters in Laos and the northern portion of the RVN.¹

(S) Basic enemy strategy over the past years has remained relatively unchanged. It was always, and would continue to be, the conquest of all Vietnam through consolidation of the North, liberation of the South, and ultimate unification of the country. Although these objectives seemed to delineate three separate needs, they were in reality quite interrelated. Consolidation of the North was not solely a political process, but an economic problem as well: a firm economic foundation was necessary for political revolution. The 1954 Geneva agreements created two economically dissimilar Vietnams (the industrial North and the agricultural South), a factor which dictated that the economic foundation be based on northern located heavy industry rather than light manufacturing and agriculture. Foreign exchange needed to finance such development, though, had to be squeezed from a limited agricultural sector. Consequently, even with substantial foreign aid, the possibility of North Vietnam (NVN) achieving desired economic objectives was limited. Using and instigating political dissidence aimed at the Diem regime, the North launched a rural based revolution in the South, a revolution committed to achieving both economic and political domination of South Vietnam (SVN). Consolidation of the revolution in the North therefore became tied to liberation of the South and unification of the country.

(S) Hanoi's tactic in the South was the promotion of a people's war or a war of national liberation. As conceptualized in the writings of Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) leaders, it was a war of weak against strong, a war which exploited deficiencies of a central government with a minimum of resource expenditure by the aggressor. The capacity of an economically weak DRV to carry on this type of war depended upon external support, the capability to build a shadow political structure to organize the resource base of the RVN to the enemy's benefit, and the capability of NVN military units to use the shadow system for acquiring manpower, supplies, communications, and intelligence.

(S) In prosecuting the war, Hanoi's activity progressed through a series of clearly defined phases. The years from 1957 to 1960 were years of Viet Cong (VC) organization. Guerrilla warfare became the rule from 1960 to 1964. The first North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops were committed to the South in late 1964, which signalled the commencement of main force

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warfare. This activity culminated in a series of offensives which began during the TET holidays of 1968 and which ultimately ended in failure for enemy main forces. This failure of the offensives came at the same time NVN was suffering from a manpower drain in the North while their resource bases in the South were being cut by Allied successes. After the losses of TET 68 the DRV needed to rebuild the economy of the North to at least its prewar level. All these factors caused an NVN change in national priorities. In February 1970, Le Duan of the NVN National Defense Council publicly called for a two-track policy of building socialism in the North while simultaneously continuing the war in the South (a policy which in reality had been in effect since the failure of the general offensives). In terms of the primary objectives of liberation of the South and unification of the country, this meant that the original time frame for realizing these goals would have to be lengthened. Hanoi presumed that Saigon government weaknesses and US domestic pressures would eventually weaken the Allied position.

(S) The shift in NVN national priorities was reflected in enemy strategy throughout Indochina. Hanoi's energy was once again geared to a protracted conflict stressing conservation of forces, attempts to rebuild base areas, and efforts to strengthen the guerrilla and political structures.² After the spring of 1970, Hanoi's problems were compounded by the loss of use of the Cambodian port of Kompong Som, a factor which denied seaborne resupply of enemy efforts in the RVN. Cross-border operations, Allied air interdiction, the great strides in pacification and Vietnamization programs, and the constant development of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) also continued to weaken the enemy tactical position and logistical posture.

(S) Hanoi's intentions for Laos, Cambodia, and the RVN apparently remained unchanged as 1971 drew to a close. The enemy goal of complete domination of the RVN and the concurrent establishment of a sphere of influence throughout Indochina was supported by an overwhelming mass of evidence. Since DRV designs on the RVN continued to be based on the desire to reunite the Vietnamese people under a Communist government while broadening northern economic foundations, a most important intermediate objective was development and expansion of enemy lines of communication (LOC) through the Laotian Panhandle and the Khmer Republic.

(S) An examination of key indicators of enemy activity provided insight into enemy intentions. Among the most significant indicators towards the end of 1971 were deliberate preparations made by the enemy for the 1971-72 dry season logistical campaign designed to move supplies through the Laotian Panhandle to forces in southern Laos, Cambodia, and the RVN. Beginning in early August, enemy endeavors both in timing and substance closely paralleled those of previous years. Movement of supplies into southern NVN was accelerated as indicated by increased rear service activity. Aerial reconnaissance revealed prepositioned stockpiles of supplies and petroleum products, numerous new warehouses had been built near infiltration routes to the South, and there were significant increases in material stored at key transshipment points. LOC in Laos and Cambodia were systematically expanded in the south and west, while constant enemy effort was directed to maintaining them in useable condition. Major enemy transportation units extended their areas of operation to the same general areas with the objective of providing better command, control, and coordination. To provide protection along the expanded portions of the LOC in southern Laos the enemy deployed from 45 to 50 antiaircraft artillery (AAA) battalions in the vicinity, and there were indications that surface-to-air missile (SAM) units would move into the area. Toward the end of 1971 there were as many as 15 enemy infantry battalions together with security forces of two major transportation units positioned to provide protection of LOC against Allied ground attacks.

(S) During 1971, in continuation of previous trends, the enemy was forced to rely more and more on infiltration of personnel replacements from NVN into Laos, Cambodia, and the RVN. Such action was made necessary because recruiting of personnel in SVN had become progressively and seriously curtailed by RVN and Allied programs. Between 60,000 and 70,000 personnel were estimated to have been infiltrated into the Khmer Republic and the RVN by the end of the year, but even such high infiltration rates were not sufficient to compensate for enemy personnel

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losses. Additionally during 1971 approximately 10,000 personnel were estimated to have been infiltrated into southern Laos, an increase over previous years which demonstrated enemy concern for his LOC. Personnel in special purpose infiltration groups destined for the RVN increased from about 2,000 in 1970 to 3,000 in 1971. This significant increase in specialists and technicians who were skilled in Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI), guerrilla, and sapper operations, revealed continued enemy emphasis on protracted warfare and the attendant political subversion and countering of successful GVN programs. Similar infiltration patterns were expected to continue into 1972.

(S) The DRV need for external support was still critical. In September and October 1971 Hanoi concluded annual military and economic assistance agreements with Moscow and Peking for the year 1972. Assistance was expected to approximate US\$415 million from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and US\$200 million from the People's Republic of China (PRC). In a related activity, NVN continued to improve her ports during the year -- new wharves were completed in several locations resulting in reduced turnaround time for shipping and increased storage capabilities for vital imported materiel. The Hanoi government continued to expand a petroleum pipeline, started earlier, to the south and west in NVN and Laos.

(S) Thus it was in 1971 that the DRV continued the protracted war concept and was making preparations for similar actions in 1972, as was espoused by the Party and its leaders. In a rare public statement explicitly ranking DRV priorities, the Party newspaper Nhân Dân on 18 May specifically pointed up Hanoi strategy: economic development of the north and fighting US aggression. Noteworthy was the fact that economic development was listed first.⁴ A similar theme was voiced by Premier Pham Van Dong on the anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birthday when he specifically emphasized the necessity for preparing for a long hard struggle and the need for international solidarity, i.e., continued Chinese and Soviet help was welcomed.⁵ The Premier stressed the value of such strategy later in the year at the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the August Revolution by stating that more than ever NVN had to advance to complete victory, defeat the Vietnamization of the war, and topple the puppet regime while smashing the pacification program.⁶

COMMUNIST STRATEGY REVEALED IN DOCUMENTS

Background

(U) Communist strategy for the unification of Vietnam was for the most part implemented by the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), the major enemy headquarters element. There were four distinct "strategical" periods: the pre-TET 1968 phase, the post-TET phase, the revision of strategic goals (as initiated by COSVN Resolution 9 discussed below), and the 1971 phase. These phases were revealed through analysis of available COSVN resolutions, directives, and instructions.

(C) COSVN Resolution 5, which was adopted late in 1967, and which implemented Resolution 13 of the Lao Dong Party, commented on the failures of the GVN and U during the 1965-66 and 1966-67 dry seasons. Convinced that the Allies were unable to conduct counteroffensives, COSVN advocated the initiation of the general offensive phase to gain a quick and decisive victory. The 12-month period following the TET 68 offensive was characterized generally by a still firm adherence to the philosophy of the general offensive. COSVN Resolutions 6, 7, and 8, released from March to October 1968, emphasized the main objective of complete military victory through a series of offensive phases in which control of the urban areas was the key to strategical success. The control of rural areas was viewed as of secondary importance. Although Directive 58, released in December 1968, drew attention to the necessity of disrupting the newly announced Accelerated Pacification Program, VC action during this period was still gauged to the strategy of the general offensive.

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AkVN rangers display a captured NLF flag and an AK 47.

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(C) The first indication of a revision in COSVN strategy for South Vietnam, and the reversion to tactics of a protracted struggle, appeared in April 1969 with the release of Directive 81. This directive warned cadre of the impossibility of destroying one million Army of Vietnam (ARVN) and US soldiers and called for a limited victory rather than a clear cut, complete victory. Accordingly, cadre were to struggle for decisive successes, the forced withdrawal of American troops, and the establishment of a coalition government. On 10 Jun 69 Liberation Radio announced the establishment of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), a governmental body representing "the will and aspirations of all the South Vietnamese people," with the duties of mobilizing and leading all people and armed forces and leading people's Revolutionary Committees. Creation of the PRG merely formalized a local governmental structure which had the ultimate goal of establishing legitimate Communist control over the villages of RVN and increasing popular support of the VC effort by providing basic governmental services to the people.

(C) The reversion to the protracted struggle was completed with the promulgation of COSVN Resolutions 9, 10, and 14 during the period July to November 1969. Resolution 9 remained in 1971 as the basic policy document of the Communists in the South. Together with Resolutions 10 and 14 which amplified it, Resolution 9 represented a departure from the quick and total victory of the General Offensive and a return to limited warfare. In comparison with Resolutions 6, 7, and 8, Resolution 9 stressed continued but limited military operations carried out primarily in rural areas, the Delta, and the sparsely populated jungle and highlands.

CONTRAST OF COSVN POLICY DIRECTIVES

<u>Item Stressed</u>	<u>Resolutions 6, 7, and 8</u>	<u>Resolution 9</u>
Objective	Complete military victory	Continued military and political moves: ultimate victory
Geography	Urban areas	Delta, rural, jungle and mountain areas
Counter-pacification	Low-key approach	Strong emphasis
Improvement & Modernization	8: minor emphasis 6 and 7: no mention	Vietnamization: strong emphasis

These operations, in conjunction with political moves, would lead to ultimate victory for the VC. For the first time the Allied pacification program took on an importance in Communist eyes, and counter-pacification and counter-Vietnamization missions received strong emphasis. Thus, COSVN Resolution 9 heralded the return of the protracted guerrilla war, with its emphasis on small unit tactics, reliance upon sappers, terrorism, and increased emphasis on attacks-by-fire as the most efficient means of wearing down the fighting capability of the RVNAF heightening demands by the US public for a withdrawal of US forces, and eroding the Vietnamese people's faith in their government's ability to maintain security. Directives released subsequent to Resolutions 9, 10 and 14, the latest released by COSVN, continued to stress protracted war and guerrilla tactics.

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Strategy in 1971

(C) Three directives released by COSVN in 1971 generally continued to reiterate the common themes of Resolution 9. Directive 01/CT-71, a general guideline for 1971 issued in late 1970 or early 1971, emphasized the strategy of continual attacks to achieve piecemeal victories, the predominance of the counterpacification effort, and the necessity to defeat Allied efforts to drive the VC into isolated areas and thus away from the rural population upon whom they were so dependent. Directive 06/CT-71 focused on the 1971 Government of Vietnam (GVN) congressional and presidential elections, while COSVN directive 39 was another general guideline.

(C) Directive 01/CT-71 was probably designed as a 6-month strategy paper covering the period generally from the beginning of the calendar year to the pre-GVN election periods in August and September. It began by assessing the development of the insurgency in SVN since the time Resolution 9 was issued. It contained the usual evaluation of Communist victories, the beginning of withdrawal of US troops, the Paris Peace Talks, the de-escalation of the war, and an assessment of Allied strategy. The document stated that since Resolution 9, the US pushed Vietnamization to the point that it fostered the formation of a "three nation front" within the Communist resistance movement. However, even with the increased mobility of the RVNAF and the build up of a defensive system in the densely populated rural areas, the Allied forces not only failed to destroy the infrastructure, but alienated the people, creating "new favorable conditions for popular struggle movements in Saigon and other cities and rural areas." According to the directive, with the coup d'etat in Cambodia in March 1970 and the Allied cross-border operations, a united Indochina front was established. South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia comprised the large strategic theater of operations; North Vietnam was the "large rear area"; Cambodia became "the most vulnerable point of the US and Puppets"; and South Vietnam remained as the "main area of operations which would decide the common victory." While the VC rural movement was subjected to "unprecedented disturbances" by the Allied pacification program, the VC survived and increased control in some areas. Similarly, VC/NVA main force units were successful against Allied mobile forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

(C) The introductory portion of the directive also reiterated weaknesses in the VC/NVA effort. The political struggle, military proselyting, and guerrilla movements were weak; development of Party chapters was slow; military training and replacements were unsatisfactory; and local chapters were unable to set forth specific missions, guidelines, and organizational methods in accordance with local requirements. Local Party chapters lacked an accurate understanding of the GVN pacification and Vietnamization programs and vulnerabilities and they did not understand the need for continual combat operations, development of forces, and simultaneous piecemeal victories. The basis for these shortcomings and for poor Party leadership and guidance was seen as the desire for quick victory, poor conduct, and the lack of democracy in internal Party activities.

(C) The second half of the document, dealing with "enemy schemes, friendly missions, and development of a new strategic position," comprised the bulk and substance of Directive 01. Two important weaknesses of the GVN and its Allies which the VC/NVA could exploit were stressed in Directive 01. As the US continued to withdraw its combat forces and RVNAF accepted a greater burden of the fighting, the GVN would be forced to increase conscription and raise taxes. These and associated resultant actions would only serve to aggravate contradictions which already existed between the GVN and the population. The other exploitable weakness was the outpost and local security network manned by Regional Forces/Provincial Forces (RF/PF) and the People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF).

(C) Objectives for the period covered by the directive were in reality little different than those of previous documents: stressed was the primacy of counter-pacification. There was a possible shift in emphasis to main force warfare, but this was probably treated, in the context of the document, more as an eventual option rather than an immediate goal. Specific military

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missions outlined in the directive stressed equal use of main force and guerrilla tactics. Improvements were to be made in main force roles in countering US and RVN mobile forces, while guerrilla warfare was to be developed in rural and urban areas.

(C) The primary mission of both VC/NVA forces and the VCI in the rural areas would be to establish a secure base area for the urban movement. To rebuild the rural base the GVN Community Defense and Local Development (CD and LD) Program not only had to be countered, but disrupted completely, a task which required an all-out coordinated enemy effort.

(C) The directive was specific in its planned treatment of Saigon and other major urban areas, providing explicit instructions to organize workers, laborers, and other groups into overt or semi-overt organizations. The VCI was to seize control of popular organizations and religious groups, to include important personalities (both in and out of the GVN). Throughout the treatise concerning the urban movement, stress was laid on political activity rather than use of sappers and guerrillas to wear down the GVN metropolitan structure.

(C) Directive 06/CT-71, apparently published in early June 1971, was restricted to general guidelines for cadre concerning the GVN Lower House and Presidential elections held in August and October 1971, respectively.⁸


(C) In November 1971 COSVN issued Directive 39 to subordinate cadre as an apparent guideline for the remainder of 1971 and the first half of 1972. In a departure from past Communist pronouncements, COSVN in effect admitted to the general successes of the GVN pacification program. The main thrust of Directive 39 was in COSVN's renewed emphasis on the importance of the political and proselyting effort at the grass roots level. The directive indicated that COSVN gave some autonomy to local level Party elements in an attempt to reappraise the local situation and popular aspirations. While Directive 39 did not necessarily reflect a feeling of defeat, or even deterioration on the part of COSVN, it possibly signalled an advent of a renewed and more realistic approach at the local level, with the intent of rebuilding a sagging counter-pacification and political effort.⁹

(S) That the DRV intended to pursue strategy outlined in 1971 COSVN directives was reflected in a Liberation Radio broadcast wherein Cuu Long (who was believed to be a senior NVA general) possibly reflected new Hanoi instructions. Announcing that "we will certainly annihilate the Saigon puppet main force troops," the Cuu Long statement was one of a series which among other things, obliquely endorsed large scale tactics. Noted, however, was the fact that these statements were largely retrospective, i.e., justifications of Communist victory claims for TET 68, LAM SON 719, and Snuol. Conferences called in late fall were believed to have been for the express purpose of reviewing instructions superseding or updating COSVN Directive 01/CT-71, the VC policy document mentioned above. Intelligence information available towards the end of 1971 indicated that there would be no radical change to priorities mentioned in Directive 01.¹⁰

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Source: MACJ2

Figure III-1

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ENEMY MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE RVN

ORGANIZATION

(S) Military operations in the Republic of Vietnam were directed by Hanoi through the High Command of the North Vietnam Armed Forces either directly or through major tactical headquarters in the northern half of the Republic or through COSVN. Northern RVN was divided into the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) Front (often referred to as the B-5 Front), Military Region Tri Thien Hue (MRTTH), Military Region (MR) 5, and the B-3 Front (see Figure III-1). COSVN exercised tactical command over the remainder of the RVN: i.e., over VC MRs 2, 3, 6, 7, 10 and several subregions (SR) around Saigon. This command was vested in COSVN's military arm, the so-called South Vietnam Liberation Army (SVNLA) Headquarters.¹¹

(S) Enemy units operated either as main force (MF) or local force (LF) structures organized as divisions, regiments, and battalions, with artillery support. They were directly subordinate to the military region (see Figure III-2). All NVA units were MF units, and NVN personnel made up predominate portions of the VC MF units. LF units, organized as battalions or smaller, were subordinate to the province or district level organization. Generally they did not operate outside the province or district to which they were assigned. NVA personnel gradually appeared in LF units, though at a lower ratio than in MF units. Included in the LF category were guerrillas, the part-time soldiers whose main task was terrorism. Subordinated normally to the district level or lower, they did not operate far from the area in which they lived. Coupling all echelons with the political aspect of the struggle was the VCI, which paralleled and guided the enemy military activity. Through its hard core cadre, many of whom held military as well as political leadership positions, the enemy controlled the insurgency.¹²

(C) Enemy provincial boundaries and names were not always the same as those of provinces in the Republic. For example, Quang Da was the enemy name for GVN Quang Nam Province and VC Quang Nam was the same as GVN Quang Tin Province. This fact was important because enemy units maneuvered within VC designated boundaries, not GVN designated. Districts, like the provinces, did not correspond to the GVN structure and were frequently altered to facilitate local control and administration. Villages and hamlets could be contrasted to US townships, with a village being composed of one or more hamlets.¹³

STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Trends

(S) During 1971 Hanoi's long-range plans dictated two primary themes: continuation of the war in the South and the building of a firm economic base in the North.¹⁴ Superimposed upon these two goals was the primary and long-standing guiding principle, the reunification of the RVN under a Communist government and domination of Laos and Cambodia. Enemy activity during 1971 was pointed toward these directions, and it appeared that the primary objectives for the near future would encompass the same themes. Withdrawal of US forces, elimination of US influence in Indochina, disruption of the Vietnamization program, and discrediting of the GVN would be the means by which the enemy would continue efforts to achieve primary goals. Activity was characteristically that of the protracted war and involved increasing use of small unit attacks, guerrilla, and terror operations. The primary target changed from US Forces to pacification-related aspects of Allied efforts.

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Figure III-2

Source: MACV Command History 1970

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(S) Through the period ending in mid-1971, the latest for which strategic analysis was available, the overall direct threat to the RVN had decreased. The VC/NVA had about as many battalions in the RVN as they had during the 1968 TET season, but fewer than in mid-1969; however, their organic personnel strengths were substantially lower. Further significant decreases were not expected. These battalions were formidably disposed throughout the RVN near enemy base areas (BA) and sanctuaries. (See Figures III-9 through 17.)¹⁵

(S) As can be noted in Figure III-18 the total number of enemy initiated incidents (assaults, attacks-by-fire, ambushes, harassments, terrorism, sabotage, propaganda, and AA fire) generally decreased throughout the years, with a slightly more substantial decrease for 1971. Generally speaking, in 1971, for all types of attacks as well as for harassment, sabotage, and terrorism, the trend seemed to be downward.¹⁶

(S) For the period beginning December 1971 and continuing through 1972, MR 1 was expected to continue to remain as the area where there was the greatest VC/NVA tactical threat; 23 Allied maneuver and combat support battalions were expected to be deployed in the area to counter the threat. The enemy was expected to continue scattered attacks-by-fire (ABF) and ground attacks up to battalion size. In MR 2 the Hanoi-directed forces were expected to create a high threat area in the B-3 Front locale. The main threat area in MR 3 was expected to be the RVN/Cambodian border region northeast of Tay Ninh where three VC/NVA divisions were deployed in the immediate vicinity. Enemy capabilities, however, would continue to be limited by logistical shortages and the requirement to protect LOC against RVNAF operations. In the remainder of MR 3, protracted warfare characterized by sapper and terrorist attacks, would be the enemy mode of operation. For 1972 in MR 4, the enemy threat was expected to continue to be reduced and mainly limited to the U Minh Forest area, a situation which had been created by erosion of enemy control due to the GVN Community Defense and Local Development (CD and LD) Program. Small scale attacks would continue against outposts, while sapper and terrorist tactics would also be the rule.¹⁷

VC/NVA PERSONNEL AND UNIT STRENGTH TRENDS

(C) As can be noted in Figures III-3, III-4, and III-5 enemy combat and total strengths declined slightly during the year, and significantly from 1968. There were no significant changes in force disposition among military regions during 1971, however increases in NVA strength in MR 4 during 1969 and 1970 were clearly evident. Figures III-6, III-7 and III-8 established similar patterns for enemy battalions since 1966 and in 1971.¹⁸


VC/NVA Strengths in RVN 1966 through 1971

Figure III-3	Total VC and NVA Strengths in RVN
Figure III-4	Total VC Combat Personnel Strength by RVN MR
Figure III-5	Total NVA Combat Strength by RVN MR
Figure III-6	Total VC and NVA Battalions in RVN
Figure III-7	Total VC Battalions by RVN MR
Figure III-8	Total NVA Battalions by RVN MR

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TOTAL VC AND NVA STRENGTH IN RVN
1966 THROUGH 1971
(ANTROACTIVE)




NOTE: NVA includes infantry, other maneuver, combat support, administrative service support personnel; VC totals also include separate Co/Plt and guerrilla force personnel.

Source: MACJZ

Figure III-3

TOTAL VC COMBAT PERSONNEL STRENGTH BY RVN MR
1966 THROUGH 1971
(RETROACTIVE)




NOTE: Totals include infantry, other maneuver, combat support, separate Co/Plt, and guerrilla personnel.

Source: MACJZ

Figure III-4


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
Figure III-5



Source: MACJ2

Figure III-6


**TOTAL VC BATTALIONS BY RVN MR
1966 THROUGH 1971
(RETROACTIVE)**



Source: MACJ2

Figure III-7

**TOTAL NVA BATTALIONS BY RVN MR
1966 THROUGH 1971
(RETROACTIVE)**



Source: MACJ2


Figure III-8

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VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE

(C) In general, movements of enemy units were not major in scope during the year. Mid-year order of battle (OB) maps which follow were representative of the enemy force disposition. 19



Source: MACJ2


Figure III-9

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UNLOCATED UNITS

31 NT2 141 FR4
 1 NT2 MR5
 NT2 MR5

MACV ORDER OF BATTLE QUANG NAM PROVINCE MR I 30 JUN 71



ABBREVIATIONS

QN QUANG NAM
 MR MILITARY REGION
 FR FRONT

NVA
 VC MF
 VC LF


Source: MACJ2

Figure III-10

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**MACV ORDER OF BATTLE
MR I
QUANG NGAI PROVINCE
30 JUN 71**



ABBREVIATIONS

QNG QUANG NGAI
MR MILITARY REGION

- ☐ HVA
- ☐ VC MF
- ☐ VC LF

Source: MACJ2

Figure II-11


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UNLOCATED UNITS

11A  MRTTH

324B  MRTTH

MACV ORDER OF BATTLE
MR I
THUA THIEN PROVINCE
30 JUN 71



Source: MACJ2


Figure II-12

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**MACV ORDER OF BATTLE
MR I
QUANG TIN PROVINCE
30 JUN 71**



ABBREVIATIONS

QT QUANG TIN
MR MILITARY REGION
FR FRONT

□ NVA
□ VC MF
□ VC LF

Source: MACJ2

Figure IX-13

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III-19

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[illegible]

BINH DINH	BD
PHU VEN	PV
KONTUM	K
GIA LAI	GL

Figure III-14

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ON 08-11-2013

UNLOCATED UNITS


250  B3

7  B3

253  250

130  MR6

MACV ORDER OF BATTLE MR 2 SOUTHERN HALF 30 JUN 71



ABBREVIATIONS

KHANH HOA KH
QUANG DUC QD
LAM DONG LD
TUYEN DUC TD
NINH THUAN NT
BINH THUAN BT

Source: MACJ2

Figure III-15

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Figure III-16

III-22

UNLOCATED UNITS

MR2  COSVN Z7  IOID D5  SC

NT1  COSVN Z8  IOID D4  SC

88  MR2 Z9  IOID 295  MR2

K7  88

MACV ORDER OF BATTLE MR 4 30 JUN 71




Figure III-17

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A US soldier inspects an NVA grave.




A captured NVA 22mm field gun of Russian manufacture.

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STATISTICAL DATA AND ENEMY ACTIVITIES

(U) The following sections are designed to permit rapid comparison of statistical data concerning the enemy in the RVN. Figure III-18 provides an overview of enemy initiated incidents for the period 1966 to the present, while Figure III-19 provides detailed information regarding incidents for 1971 by RVN military region. Figures III-20 and 21 cover captured enemy crew-served and individual weapons.²⁰ A brief summary of enemy activities follows the statistical review.



NOTE: Total enemy initiated incidents includes assaults, attacks-by-fire, ambushes, harassment, terrorism, sabotage, propaganda, and AA fire.

Source: MACJ2

Figure III-18

III-25

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VC/NVA INITIATED INCIDENTS - 1971

MR 1

	Attacks-By-Fire	Assaults	Ambushes	Harassment*	Intimidation**	Sabotage	Propaganda	AA Fire	Total
Jan	15	10	2	219 (144)	19	6	0	145	416
Feb	22	35	9	246 (124)	19	8	0	296	635
Mar	49	39	17	317 (204)	45	11	3	492	973
Apr	17	28	2	256 (154)	40	1	1	416	761
May	21	41	1	270 (152)	67	1	9	266	676
Jun	39	44	2	357 (216)	58	1	31	420	952
Jul	11	8	0	237 (126)	60	0	30	307	653
Aug	41	21	0	243 (118)	23	1	2	300	631
Sep	26	5	1	212 (65)	39	2	12	212	509
Oct	7	1	1	124 (36)	33	2	7	108	283
Nov	15	13	0	112 (36)	11	1	4	199	355
Dec	22	16	2	84 (47)	4	2	0	73	203

MR 2

Jan	17	14	5	110 (85)	41	1	14	23	225
Feb	18	52	20	151 (124)	70	7	15	87	420
Mar	13	61	21	154 (971)	74	4	11	127	465
Apr	23	65	23	180 (116)	56	2	0	170	519
May	8	56	12	139 (80)	103	5	3	82	408
Jun	15	42	9	143 (67)	69	4	36	95	413
Jul	5	19	12	107 (27)	80	6	10	48	287
Aug	10	24	5	112 (70)	78	2	21	67	319
Sep	6	14	9	37 (51)	74	5	46	66	277
Oct	6	16	8	58 (46)	40	1	19	46	194
Nov	6	14	4	64 (50)	12	0	5	57	163
Dec	6	19	5	54 (32)	1	0	0	46	131

* Shows in parentheses harassment fire as defined by MACV Directive 381-21, i.e., attacks-by-fire of less than 20 rounds or small arms harassing fire. ** Prior to July 1971, intimidation was referred to as terrorism.

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VC/NVA INITIATED INCIDENTS - 1971 (Continued)

MR 3

	Attacks-By- Fire	Assaults	Ambushes	Harassment*	Intimidation**	Sabotage	Propaganda	AA Fire	Total
Jan	7	9	4	207 (97)	30	0	3	39	229
Feb	10	15	4	250 (78)	49	1	0	36	365
Mar	12	16	6	331 (238)	76	1	0	69	511
Apr	8	13	2	333 (93)	50	2	0	38	446
May	11	13	8	382 (143)	67	1	3	25	510
Jun	14	17	5	274 (126)	77	3	23	24	437
Jul	8	10	0	225 (74)	55	2	7	46	353
Aug	12	8	7	231 (81)	34	1	2	32	327
Sep	25	16	9	236 (118)	29	0	0	98	413
Oct	29	17	8	312 (245)	36	3	6	154	565
Nov	5	3	4	164 (46)	20	0	8	56	260
Dec	7	5	2	181 (78)	6	2	0	19	222

MR 4

Jan	27	42	10	489 (441)	86	1	8	102	765
Feb	45	56	13	504 (458)	67	3	2	23	713
Mar	36	45	30	576 (520)	77	2	0	566	1,332
Apr	28	28	9	399 (361)	58	1	0	229	752
May	23	39	7	388 (347)	46	3	0	246	752
Jun	12	36	6	237 (213)	38	3	4	215	551
Jul	11	32	3	149 (123)	40	2	3	145	385
Aug	9	13	2	171 (139)	23	1	3	100	322
Sep	4	16	8	151 (126)	44	2	15	167	407
Oct	10	15	5	183 (154)	35	2	4	123	377
Nov	7	15	9	151 (103)	12	0	0	111	305
Dec	10	12	7	191 (139)	7	0	0	71	298

Source: MACJ231-6

Figure III - 19

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III-27

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INDIVIDUAL AND CREW-SERVED WEAPONS CAPTURED IN THE RVN 1966 THROUGH 1971




Figure III-20

Source: MACJ2

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Weapons Captured

(C) The number of weapons captured in-country by US, GVN, and other Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) declined in 1971 from previous years, as shown by Figure III-21. This reduction, both of individual and crew-served weapons, was consistent with the reduced level of activity for the year.

VC/NVA WEAPONS CAPTURED - 1971

MR 1

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
CSW	64	83	101	100	147	280	48	193	56	25	36	55
IW	853	931	885	811	663	1030	444	658	457	280	424	485
Total	917	1014	986	911	810	1310	492	851	513	305	460	540

MR 2

CSW	33	60	57	172	130	58	59	92	56	60	30	35
IW	352	575	479	802	624	420	712	606	620	354	277	375
Total	385	635	536	974	754	478	771	698	676	414	307	410

MR 3

CSW	91	50	38	30	34	30	25	19	40	52	12	23
IW	570	657	411	308	300	292	251	218	286	347	228	216
Total	661	707	449	338	334	322	276	237	326	399	247	249

MR 4

CSW	93	72	89	81	95	38	97	20	83	72	119	61
IW	794	1092	1021	1449	1103	1023	1068	778	991	1183	1146	897
Total	887	1164	1110	1530	1198	1061	1165	798	1074	1255	1265	958

Source: MACJ231-6

Figure III - 21

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Figure II-22

LI-30

Enemy Activities

(C) Summary 1971. Enemy activity during 1971 characterized the protracted war concept espoused by Hanoi: it was generally held to a low level. Although sporadic high levels occurred in different areas of the Republic at different times, contrasted to previous years activity was low.

-- The northern sector of RVN MR 1 (Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces (see Figure III-22) remained relatively quiet in the populated areas as a result of the continuing success of Allied forces in keeping MF NVA units out of lowland areas. MF NVA units were, however, present in strength along the DMZ and the unpopulated western areas of the sector, but their relative inactivity permitted steady GVN progress in all areas of endeavor. In contrast, the southern sector of MR 1 (Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces) was the scene of considerable military and terrorist activity in the populous lowlands (the area was historically a stronghold for the Viet Minh, and popular support for the enemy was considerable).

-- In RVN MR 2 a reduced enemy presence was noted near population centers as the year was ending. The primary reason for this decrease was a considerable enemy consolidation and resupply effort thought to be presaging a spring 1972 offensive in the Central Highlands. The major enemy threat continued to be in the B-3 Front (Kon Tum, Pleiku, Phu Bon and Darlac Provinces), where large NVA forces were located along the Cambodian Border. Enemy activity and terrorist incidents continued to be plentiful in Binh Dinh, the most populous and contested province in the region.

-- For RVN MR 3, enemy activity remained at a moderate level in the Cambodian border area and at a low level elsewhere. The enemy appeared to be concentrating on resupplying and refitting his units and avoiding major contacts; economy of force tactics, such as terrorism and sapper activity, represented COSVN modus operandi in the region. A major threat to the security of western RVN MR 3 was the 101st NVA Regt, which operated out of BA 355 on the Tay Ninh-Binh Duong border. In the provinces of Phuoc Long, Binh Long, and Lon Khan, three enemy units (the aforementioned 101st NVA Regt, the 33d NVA Regt, and the 274th VC LF Regt) operated with relative impunity, resisting Allied targetting efforts. long
khan

-- In RVN MR 4 the major threat from the enemy was the overrunning of GVN operating bases in outlying areas. Enemy units overran 96 outposts in 1971. He retained the ability to selectively overwhelm weak positions with few losses and with psychological gains in terms of local population perception of enemy strength.²¹

(C) First quarter activities. In MR 1 during January activity was at a low ebb; significant was the sighting of a T-4 tank north of the DMZ on 15 January and a sharp increase in activity confined to VC MR 5 towards the end of the month. In February, activity began to increase as the enemy interdicted friendly LOC in the two northernmost provinces and conducted his winter/spring campaign in the three southernmost provinces. B-5 Front movement was at a moderate level, characterized by ABFs to disrupt Allied LAM SON 719 support. As March began, activity was on the increase, reaching a high level at the end of the month. In the B-5 Front activity continued to be a reaction to LAM SON 719 Allied force withdrawals from Laos. It consisted of increased ABFs, numerous ambushes, harassing ABFs, and incidents of sabotage against LOC and support activities. In VC MR 5, on the night of 28 March, the enemy launched a widespread and coordinated campaign in the three southern provinces, to include actions in the Da Nang and fire support base (FSB) Mary Ann vicinities.

-- MR 2 overall enemy activity was characterized by the term "reduced" for the entire quarter. B-3 Front elements remained out of contact. Captured enemy documents indicated that an enemy winter/spring campaign would target LOC, Allied installations, hamlets, and villages, and that the campaign would emphasize employment of guerrilla forces and political

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movements. The campaign was scheduled to continue into February. As February began, activity remained at a reduced level except in VC MR 5, where action intensified during the first and last weeks of the month. On 1 February there were 16 ABFs and 11 ground attacks in the area. Also on 1 February a power plant at Cam Ranh Bay was attacked, causing some US\$300,000 damage. Enemy activity in March increased slightly military regionwide due to Allied operations near BA 609 and as the winter/spring campaign continued. B-3 Front activity was related to enemy defense of supply caches in the area.

-- Activity in MR 3 was reported as low for the quarter, with a slight increase towards the end of March. In January there were several ambushes of RVN Army (ARVN) convoys. A localized increase in aggressiveness in VC MR 10 was characterized by ABFs, limited ground attacks, and various counterpacification operations. Several significant cache finds occurred in both January and February. Characteristic activity throughout the MR for the rest of the quarter consisted of light, scattered ABFs and limited ground attacks. February enemy emphasis in the region was directed to reestablishment of the enemy logistical base; operation of the shadow supply system was very evident. Bien Hoa was rocketed (122mm rockets) on 22 January (two rounds) and on 16 March (five rounds). Long Binh Post was struck by four 122mm rocket rounds on 5 March.

-- Low in January and moderate in February and March were the descriptors of enemy activity in MR 4 during the quarter. Throughout the region for the entire period, the enemy effort was characterized by ABFs against RF/PF outposts, ARVN field positions, provincial capitals, and district towns. In January there was a daily average of 11 ABFs in the region, while in February and March the average was 14 and 13 respectively. The enemy overran 40 friendly outposts during the quarter, an activity which reached its peak during the end of February. Also in February the enemy conducted three battalion size attacks, unusual for Military Region 4.

(C) Second quarter activities. As the second quarter began, enemy activity in MR 1 was classified as moderate, dropping to low in mid-April, and rising to a higher pitch at the end of the month. This trend was repeated in May after which enemy actions remained at a moderate level to the end of the quarter. The fluctuations were an embodiment of the enemy spring/summer campaign except in the B-5 Front area, where there was continued early-quarter enemy reaction to LAM SON 719 troop withdrawals. Activity typically consisted of ambushes and ABFs along LOC. The rest of April was spent in resupply and refitting of B-5 Front units, however there was an attack against Vietnamese Marines in Quang Tri City. After a mid-May decrease, activity rose as enemy B-5 Front and VC MR 5 units launched their spring/summer effort. Characteristic activity was a light to moderate ABF level. On 29 May, in lowland Quang Nam Province, enemy units staged a campaign of ABFs and ground attacks in what was known as "Phase III" of his "K-950" Campaign. June MR 1 activity levels remained moderate except for a marked increase at the end of the month in the B-5 Front. A concerted 23 June attack against FSB Fuller resulted in its evacuation by ARVN forces; concurrent attacks occurred elsewhere in the area.

-- Activity in MR 2 began at a higher level with the enemy beginning his spring campaign in the B-3 Front located in the Ben Het area; thereafter activity was sporadic. During this phase the enemy suffered heavy losses, with 3,452 soldiers killed in action. Phase II of the spring/summer campaign began in VC MR 5 with scattered, low intensity ABFs and limited ground probes against RF/PF and Allied positions. For the rest of the quarter enemy aggressiveness remained at a reduced level except for the 23 May commencement of a new spring/summer activity phase by enemy troops in the highland provinces. Concentrated in two areas, the triborder region and the southern portion of Pleiku Province, this B-3 Front coordinated effort was greatly preempted by the Allies. VC MR 5 enemy activity was restricted to logistical and resupply efforts during the rice harvesting season. The incidents that occurred were isolated, localized and uncoordinated. Of note was a 23 May sapper attack against a petroleum tank farm

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at Cam Ranh Bay, which resulted in great damage, and a 300 round attack against FSB 5 in the B-3 Front on 1 June.

-- Throughout the quarter, enemy activity in MR 3 was characterized by scattered ABFs and limited ground attacks against territorial forces. Some significant caches were discovered by Allied forces. There were several enemy initiated contacts in VC MR 10 during the period 24-25 May: a 4-hour significant attack occurred in Phuoc Long Province during June, and ten significant enemy attacks occurred in VC MR 7, also during June.

-- Low activity levels characterized enemy action in MR 4, which was typified by ABFs against RF/PF, ARVN, and selected populated areas: there was an average of nine ABFs per day in April, ten in May, and six in June. Allied outposts continued to be overrun, there being 28 such incidents during the period. One peak activity level occurred during the period 18-23 May, thought to be in conjunction with the anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birthday. The extremely low level of enemy activity in June was due to the southwest monsoon and attendant flooding which restricted enemy movement.

(C) Third quarter activities. As the rainy season continued, enemy activity in MR 1 was at a relatively low level and remained so throughout the quarter with the exception of an increase brought about because of the approach of the 29 August GVN lower house elections. In the B-5 Front the enemy continued to threaten FSBs south of the DMZ, while in MRTTH emphasis was on securing LOC. In August, enemy units in VC MR 5 began Phase 1 of their fall/winter campaign with a rocket attack on Da Nang and ABFs elsewhere in Quang Ngai Province. September activity began with a significant number of ABFs in Quang Tri Province and in MRTTH. The enemy avoided significant contact with Allied forces conducting LAM SON 810. On 20 September enemy forces in VC MR 5 began Phase 1 of their fall/winter campaign with light ABFs against PSDF in Quang Nam Province.

-- For MR 2, enemy activity remained at a reduced level for the entire quarter with an increase in conjunction with disruption of GVN elections. B-3 Front elements were engaged in resupply and refitting activities during July in order to prepare for their fall/winter campaign (designed to begin on 19 August to influence GVN elections), while in VC MR 5 enemy units remained out of contact. On 17 August enemy sappers sank the US freighter SS Green Bay in Qui Nhon Harbor, while on 25 August enemy sappers penetrated the perimeter of the Allied Cam Ranh Bay triservice ammunition storage area: 6,000 short-tons of ammunition were destroyed. Activity on the part of the enemy increased towards the end of September as the GVN presidential elections approached. Two US installations in Pleiku City were rocketed on 21 September, receiving a total of 10-122mm rounds.


-- Activity in MR 3 remained low with a slight increasing tendency during the quarter. Typically, activity was characterized by scattered ABFs and light ground attacks against isolated territorial force outposts and Allied base camps. There were some significant cache finds in July. In August an expected GVN election-related activity increase failed to materialize. Tan Son Nhut Air Base was struck by three rocket rounds on 28 August. ABFs increased towards the end of September, especially during the period beginning on the 25th when FSB Pace and other ARVN camps came under attack.

-- MR 4 enemy initiated activity was low during the quarter, consisting of ABFs directed against RF/PF outposts and ARVN field positions. ABFs per day averaged 10 in July, two in August, and one in September. By the end of July 1971, 77 outposts had been overrun by the enemy, contrasted to a total of 67 for the same period in 1970: a total of 18 outposts were overrun during the quarter, considerably lower than that for previous quarters. Allied intelligence reported attempts to organize an infrastructure among PW held on Phu Quoc Island, and there were also indications of intensive administrative reorganizations. Combat activity in the U Minh Forest area increased in September due to ARVN operations.

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VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM



Source: MACJ2

Figure III-23

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(C) Fourth quarter activities. Beginning the quarter at a moderate level, enemy activity in RVN MR 1 lessened as the year ended. During the first 7 days of the quarter there were 12 ABFs in Quang Tri Province and 14 in Quang Nam Province. Elsewhere, and following the 3 October GVN presidential elections, activity decreased. Typhoon Hester, which struck the area on 23 October, further reduced the enemy effort. FSBs were the targets of ABFs in the B-5 Front area, while the Da Nang environs were VC MR 5 targets. Northwestern Quang Tri Province was the focal point for enemy repair of roads and LOC. Supplies had begun to arrive from the DMZ and Laos, and related activity was noted in the A Shau Valley. Enemy forces in VC MR 5 increased their aggressiveness during the holiday period of 19-22 December, but manpower and supply problems limited the effort.

-- Activity in MR 2 remained low for the entire quarter, with slight increases brought about by reaction to the GVN presidential elections, Allied offensive operations in and around BAs 202, 701, and 226, and the 19-22 December holiday period. Information obtained from a rallier revealed that there would be a large scale offensive during TET 72 in the Ben Het area, while other reports referred to future planned activity in Pleiku Province.

-- Enemy initiated activity remained low in MR 3, limited to scattered ABFs, limited ground attacks, and sapper operations. In Tay Ninh Province ABFs occurred against various FSBs and Tay Ninh City itself. On 3 October Bien Hoa Air Force Base and Saigon were the subject of an ABF and a rocket attack, respectively. There was a high incidence of fire bombing of vehicles in Saigon during the first 2 months of the quarter. Thien Ngon Base Camp (ARVN) was attacked on 23 December with resultant loss of a large amount of ammunition and petroleum products. Bien Hoa was attacked by indirect fire on both 17 and 19 December.

-- MR 4 enemy initiated activity remained low for the quarter, again typified by ABFs against RVNAF outposts and field positions. By year's end, 96 Allied outposts had been overrun by the enemy, contrasted with 67 for 1970.²²

THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE

HIGHER ECHELON CONTROL

(C) The People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), whose existence was acknowledged in 1962, was the controlling element for Communist activities in South Vietnam. The PRP (in reality the southern branch of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's Communist Labor Party, the Lao Dong Party) was actually controlled by Hanoi through the political and military staff organization known as COSVN. Since 1962, all leadership positions in COSVN had been filled by PRP members; COSVN itself was controlled by the Central Executive Committee of the PRP (see Figure III-23). COSVN's staff was estimated as numbering some 2,300 members.²³

(C) To carry out the insurgency, the Communists had four distinct organizations: the PRP, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN), the SVNLA, and the PRG. Figure III-23 depicts the hierarchical interlocking structure of these organizations -- their activities were coordinated at all levels from national to village.

(C) Since the PRP was formed as a replacement for the southern branch of the Lao Dong Party, all members were hardcore Communists totally dedicated to the "revolution" in SVN. At all echelons, the PRP was the most important of the four Communist organizations in the south, directing most of the activities of the other three organizations: the NFLSVN, SVNLA, and PRG. In short, the PRP controlled and directed the insurgency in SVN.

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(C) The NFLSVN was established in 1960 as a front organization formed by the Communists to attract non-Communist support for their activities. The PRP carefully concealed its control of the NFLSVN; many South Vietnamese did not realize that they were working for the Communists when they supported it.

(C) The formation of the SVNLA, also known as the People's Liberation Armed Forces, was announced in 1961; it was described by the Communists as the military arm of the NFLSVN. In reality, it was controlled by COSVN and provided the organization and leadership needed by Communist military forces in SVN.

(C) The PRG was formed in 1969; the Communists described it as an administrative body greater in ability and popular support than the GVN. It was not, of course, but the Communists continually strove to increase the popular support and administrative capabilities of the PRG. In 1971 the PRG was important because its formation strengthened Communist claims to legitimacy; increased the following and support outside of SVN; and enabled them to use effectively the international arena, principally the Paris Peace Talks, for the presentation of their policies and propaganda.²⁴

(U) PRP members held key positions in front organizations and made all policy decisions. All VC military units contained Party organizations within them which provided direction through political officers who served as the unit party secretaries, and VC local force units were directly controlled by district and village military affairs committees.²⁵

(C/NF) COSVN assured Communist control of its establishment by a system in which trusted Communist Party members occupied key positions in several different organizations. For example, Lieutenant General Tran Luong, a Lao Dong Party Central member, was on the Current Affairs Committee of the PRP, the Military Affairs Committee of the SVNLA, the Presidium of the NFLSVN, and was the Minister of Defense of the PRG. The eleven members of the Current Affairs Committee of the PRP occupied a total of 20 positions in the PRP, NFLSVN, SVNLA, and PRG; nine members of the Military Affairs Committee of the SVNLA occupied 20 positions in these organizations, and the 15 members of the Presidium of the NFLSVN occupied 27 positions. The system of interlocking directorates was most evident at the national level, but it was used at all echelons down to village level. The chief of the village party committee could also be the head of the village guerrillas and possibly the head of the village revolutionary committee of the PRG. Through this system, COSVN was able to insure Communist control of the various insurgent organizations in SVN.

(C/NF) COSVN's exact relationship with Hanoi remained imprecise and poorly defined. Although studies were made in an attempt to portray Hanoi's direction of the war in the South, the means and extent of that control were not perfectly clear. The Communists always portrayed the PRP as an entity independent of the NVN Lao Dong Party. All available evidence, however, indicated that the PRP worked closely with the Lao Dong Party and received considerable strategical advice from NVN. It was probable that one of the main reasons for the establishment of the PRP was to provide a means for Hanoi to influence the insurgency in the South, and at the time, to propagate the fiction that the struggle was strictly an indigenous patriotic movement.

(C/NF) One of the keys to understanding Hanoi's influence on the southern insurgency was examination of the composition of COSVN and its subordinate organizations at the national level. Most of the cadre with influential positions were indigenous to the South, but they were southerners with long histories of involvement in Communist activities. Many were Lao Dong Party members and concurrently occupied important positions of responsibility in both North and South Vietnam. For example, in 1971 seven of the eleven identified members of the Current Affairs Committee of the PRP were born in South Vietnam; two were NVN Lao Dong Politburo members,

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three were on the Lao Dong Central Committee, and two were alternate members of the Lao Dong Central Committee. The remaining five individuals were all PRP members, and some of them were thought to be covert members of the Lao Dong Party.

(C) A similar situation existed on the Military Affairs Committee of the SVNLA. Although the Military Affairs Committee had a higher percentage of northerners than any other national level organization, at least four of the nine identified members were southerners. Furthermore, various Military Affairs Committee members held positions in the Lao Dong Politburo, the Lao Dong Central Committee, and the Central Committee of the PRP.

(C) The PRG and the Central Committee of the NFLSVN were composed almost entirely of southerners, but their membership was also entwined in the system of interlocking directorates.

(C/NF) As might be expected, since the war in the South was largely directed and controlled by experienced Communist cadre trusted by the North, Hanoi did not feel the need to minutely control activities in the South. On the contrary, the PRP's Central Executive Committee (COSVN) appeared to have broad powers in conducting the day-to-day activities of the insurgency in the South and frequently analyzed the current situation and suggested policy to Hanoi. Apparently, most of the direction given by Hanoi to COSVN consisted of policy suggestions of a strategic nature rather than detailed orders. Presumably, Hanoi realized that COSVN was much closer to the scene of action and thus in a better position to formulate workable tactics. Lao Dong Party directives and resolutions became COSVN directives and resolutions only after COSVN had analyzed and adapted them to fit the situation in SVN. It appeared, then, that the Lao Dong Party ruled in the North and played a decisive role in the Communist effort to gain control in the South. Its relationship to COSVN and the insurgency in SVN however, was not one of a simple superior-subordinate nature. On the contrary, the NVN Lao Dong Party developed a subtle and sophisticated system of organizations in SVN and depended on the placement of trusted cadre in key command positions in these organizations to insure its control of the PRP, NFLSVN, SVNLA, and PRG.

(C/NF) It was generally believed that COSVN had both political and military responsibility for VC Military Region (MR) 10, MR 6, and all of the south (MR 3, MR 2, MR 7, Tay Ninh, and the subregions surrounding and including the city of Saigon). (See Figure III-24.) All the political and military direction for these areas passed from COSVN to subordinate echelons through channels controlled by the PRP. But the chain of command in the northern part of the country (MR 5, B-3 Front, and MR Tri-Thien-Hue) was not as clearly delineated. Apparently, both COSVN and Hanoi communicated with MR 5 and B-3 Front; Hanoi controlled the military activities while COSVN provided the political guidance. While this separation of military and political command was frequently substantiated by intelligence analysts, evidence was far from conclusive. Moreover, it was difficult to envision a command structure in a given geographical area in which the control of political and military activities were separated. In late 1966, Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces were separated from MR 5 and renamed Military Region Tri-Thien - Hue (MRTTH). Since that time, it was believed that MRTTH was under complete North Vietnamese military and political control. Supposedly, all directives to the Communist Party and the army in MRTTH came directly from Hanoi via the NVN Secretariat and the Ministry of National Defense. As in the case of B-3 Front and MR 5, this was the best available explanation but evidence for it was inconclusive. For example, both Lao Dong Party directives and COSVN directives were reported in MRTTH.²⁶

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Regional Force soldiers uncover an enemy tunnel entrance near Da Nang.

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LOWER ECHELON CONTROL

(C) As shown in Figure III-23, VCI control of the insurgency in the Republic of Vietnam extended even to the lowest echelon, to the farmer at the grass roots level, to the shopkeeper in a remote village far removed from GVN control, and to the city dweller in urban centers. At lower echelons the NFLSVN was the VC organizational contact with the popular masses, both in the RVN and worldwide. Although there was some NFLSVN representation at each echelon, the Front had operational units only at village/hamlet and national levels, where contacts were made. Designed to put every Vietnamese citizen in touch with the "true revolution of the oppressed masses," the Front organized associations for all categories of people, creating the impression that it was representative. Actually, the Front had no authority independent of the PRP, but merely acted in the Party name to maintain an aura of legality for Party activities. The NFLSVN was represented at each echelon by a Front Committee: at the village and hamlet level the masses came into daily contact with the Front and were rarely aware that other than Front members were involved in the revolutionary struggle. At all levels, receipts, execution orders, proclamations, and any other Party documents for consumption were always signed and sealed by Front representatives.

(U) Associated with the NFLSVN were many mass organizations designed to simplify control of the populace; these organizations appealed to persons in every walk of life. Among the most important was the Liberation Youth Association which implanted the germ of communism in young people and supplied the manpower pool from which most laborers, guerrillas, and future Party members were drawn. Also important was the Liberation Women's Association, open to all women who were not in the Liberation Youth Association, and whose members accomplished such varied tasks as sharpening spikes, preparing food and shelter for transient VC troops, and participating in face-to-face struggles with GVN authorities. The Liberation Farmer's Organization and the Liberation Worker's Association were the tools for involving rural and city people who were not members of other organizations, while other lesser organizations, such as the South Vietnam Patriotic Buddhist's Association or the South Vietnam Patriotic Teacher's Association, involved various special interest groups. All in all, the associations offered something for nearly everyone.


(U) On 10 Jun 69 the founding of the PRG was announced, a body which was presented to the world as the functioning, truly representative, Government of South Vietnam. Like the NFLSVN, the PRG had representation at all echelons. At lower levels the PRG formed People's Revolutionary Councils, the "elected bodies" which the VC created as the vanguard of their long-promised establishment of a legitimate government. The councils had an executive body, the Revolutionary Committee, which often replaced the Front Committee and administered to the needs of the populace. Although there were established ideals pertaining to the election of officials, the procedures were rarely realized in practice. Often, revolutionary committees were appointed where no council existed, another PRP attempt to exercise population control. Revolutionary committee formation at village level received Party emphasis as a tool to secure the support of the people and subvert the RVN civil administration. In practice, it resulted in a village government which was ready to assume or contest control should the RVN weaken: in most cases, this opportunity has not occurred. The Revolutionary Committee, theoretically selected by a caucus or "representative (hamlet) citizens," administered the civil government by means of staff sections. The interlocking principle was always in effect. To provide face-to-face administration, the Committee might have the following positions:

- Chairman/General and Military Affairs Section
- Vice Chairman/Production, Economy and Finance Section
- Secretary/Administrative Section

**DMZ FRONT
(B-5 FRONT)**

**REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
NEW COMMUNIST ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS AND
MILITARY REGIONS**

(NEW ENTITIES DENOTED BY UNDERLINES,
NEW AREAS ARE SHADED)



Source: MACJ2

Figure III-24

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-- Member/Information and Culture Section

-- Member/Education Section

-- Member/Public Health and Welfare Section.²⁷

(U) Lower level activities varied. Directives from higher echelons normally proceeded from province to district to village by established commo-liaison routes, and village, district, and province Party chapters normally had one meeting monthly -- current affairs committees at each level met more often in order to carry on day-to-day activities. Monthly reports of activities were forwarded to higher echelons, while in many areas district cadre were assigned as roving intervillage directors for three or four villages.

(U) Day by day activities and habits of important political cadre varied according to the amount of security in the area of operation. In strong VC areas the village cadre lived in their own houses during the daytime but changed sleeping places every night. A district Party secretary, for example, most likely operated from the strongest VC hamlet in the most "liberated" village in his district, continually alternating his time schedule. In weak or contested VC areas, cadre could be expected to carry on their functions only at night and seldom for more than 1 hour in any given place.²⁸

(U) Thus it was that Hanoi and PRP cadre controlled their military and political effort in the RVN. As the VCI gained power over the villages they began to regulate every aspect of the villagers life. Movement to and from GVN controlled areas was strictly monitored; government papers and identification cards were frequently destroyed; government administrators were neutralized or executed and replaced by elements of the VCI; heavy taxes were levied; fortifications were constructed in order to establish "combat villages;" the Military Affairs Committee organized local guerrilla forces; the youths were urged or forced to join the Liberation Youth Association or the People's Revolutionary Youth Association; through propaganda and indoctrination, leaders were recruited and trained to act on behalf of the PRP and/or the NLF; men were recruited or drafted for the Liberation Army; news media was strictly controlled so that all events were reported from the PRP point of view; security agents controlled visitors and prosecuted "spies;" villagers were forced to house and feed VC troops as they moved through the area; women were urged to participate in face-to-face struggles (demonstrations against GVN authorities); families of RVN soldiers were plagued to order their men back home; villagers were forced to provide bearer services for supplies and ammunition; and a constant barrage of propaganda vilifying the "American imperialists and their Saigon puppet government" was repeated so often (in VC controlled areas), even by school children, that neither free thought nor free action was possible.²⁹

VCI REORGANIZATION

(C) Since 1971 saw a shift in VC emphasis on political and logistical activity from urban to rural areas and the need to establish safe rear service areas to support protracted warfare, the VCI initiated and began completing major political and administrative reorganizations in the RVN. There were three major areas of concern in terms of this reorganization: (1) a strategic base area was organized, named "Area A," encompassing the northwestern portion of VC MR 5 and the northern portion of the B-3 Front, (2) an extensive reorganization of the area surrounding Saigon was accomplished, and (3) a considerable revamping of the Mekong Delta region took place (Fig III-24). Except for the formation of Area A, reorganization stemmed from problems in VC procurement activities, manpower shortages, and command and control over infiltration routes. If the VCI were successful in completing its reorganization five major goals would be achieved: self-sufficiency in food; adequate experienced cadre; consolidation of Party control of political and military activities; streamlining of control of infiltration of both personnel and supplies;

ENEMY RECRUITMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 1968 through 1971




Figure II-25

Source: MACJ2

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and potential leverage in a possible political settlement in RVN.

(C) Except for the formation of new provinces in MR 5 and northern Kontum Province, reorganizations in central RVN were limited to redistricting and village consolidations. The noticeable absence of major reorganizations in central RVN possibly indicated that VC/NVA units controlled the infiltration of personnel and supplies into the areas and that the infrastructure reflected the current VC emphasis on rural areas.³⁰

VCI ACTIVITIES SUMMARY

(C) Throughout 1971 the VCI maintained a very low activity level. There was evidence early in 1971 that the VCI planned to disrupt GVN elections during the year, but little materialized in the way of activity. VCI activities which were noted were primarily confined to resupply, reorganization of the infrastructure, and consolidation of command and control apparatus. During the months of November and December evidence pointed to the VCI making preparations for the "General Offensive" of 1972.³¹ Additional information related to VCI activities may be found in the statistical data portion of this chapter.

VC/NVA SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

RECRUITMENT IN NVN

(S) Hanoi, because of the need for providing troops in the South, and because of the need for providing (in the North) a disciplined work force for "some" economic tasks, stressed increased military recruitment throughout the year.³² NVN had a population which in 1971 could produce about 100,000 males of military draft age, and the political and military system was capable of training some 80,000 personnel per year.³³

RECRUITMENT IN RVN


(C) In-country recruitment of personnel, so vital to the enemy's capability to continue a protracted war effort, continued to decline in 1971 as it had in past years -- dramatically from 1968. For a complete statistical history, see Figure III-25.³⁴ Recruitment of personnel in the Republic was decreasing because of increased effectiveness of Allied and GVN efforts, to include those related to security of the countryside.³⁵

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Source: MACJ2

Figure III-26

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INFILTRATION

Organization

(C) NVA supply and personnel infiltration was defined formally as the movement of material, units, and replacements from NVN to the RVN. This movement was directed through the DMZ into and through the Laotian/RVN border areas, and into and through the Cambodian/RVN border areas. Infiltration of enemy personnel from one area to another within the RVN was considered to be unit movement, not infiltration. Infiltration of men and equipment was an extremely complex process. The NVA not only crossed the DMZ, but took advantage of weaker nations, Laos and Cambodia, by using their border areas to enter the RVN. Along the borders the NVA established elaborate base areas which were used as logistical and troop staging areas for infiltration.³⁶

(C) Even though the movement of personnel and supplies from the DMZ followed the same general routes south (see Figure III-26), there was little relationship between the two. Personnel and supplies paralleled each other along the trails; however, very seldom were they moved together. Supplies were shipped to storage areas where elements from support units arranged pickup of their supplies. Personnel were led from Binh Tram to Binh Tram, i. e. by elements of the NVA 559th and 470th Transportation Group which were responsible for infiltration of personnel and supplies; they were also processed from commo-liaison station to commo-liaison station until they reached their assigned units as described below. It was reported, however, that infiltrators were sometimes stopped along the route to help with movement of supplies. Once they were finished, the group continued on its journey.³⁷

(C) The NVN High Command, whose functions were similar to those of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, consisted of three directorates: the General Political Directorate, the General Staff Directorate, and the General Directorate of Rear Services (GDRS). Of concern here was the latter, which had overall responsibility for personnel and logistical support for the NVA throughout Southeast Asia. It handled the movement of large military units, procurement and distribution of weapons, equipment and supplies, and the construction of military establishments. The GDRS had three Rear Service Transportation Groups (TG) as subordinates; the 500th TG, the 559th TG and the 470th TG. The 500th TG was responsible for the movement of personnel and material through NVN; the 559th TG was responsible for the movement of personnel and material through Laos; and the 470th was responsible for movement of personnel and material through Cambodia.

(C) The 559th TG was established in May 1959 (the designation 559 indicated the month and year of organization). The 470th TG was formed in May 1970 in the wake of the Allied cross-border operations. Although little was known of the 470th, it was believed that its functions were similar to those of the older 559th. At the time of its inception the 559th consisted of two numbered regiments; the 70th Trans Regt responsible for infiltration between Mu Gia Pass and Thua Thien Province, RVN, and the 71st Trans Regt responsible for infiltration between Thua Thien and the RVN/Laos/Cambodia border area; three specialized units (antiaircraft, signal, and medical); station 70, the final preparation point for elements infiltrating into South Vietnam; and other lesser units. It was estimated that the unit had a strength of approximately 1,300 personnel in 1959 and 2,000 in 1961, but since then the group underwent continual expansion and structural sophistication in order to accommodate the ever-increasing need for the infiltration of men and material into the Republic of Vietnam.

(C) Four major responsibilities were assigned to the 559th and 470th TGs: Transportation, troop movements, construction of LOC, and protection and maintenance of LOC and installations. The prime rear service mission of the 559th TG was the movement of goods and personnel from NVN through Laos to the battlefields of South Vietnam and Cambodia. Once in Cambodia it was

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believed the 470th took over. To accomplish this mission the groups primarily used motorized equipment of Communist Bloc manufacture. Maximum capacities of both trucks and roads were used as trucks traveled a specific portion of a route, discharged cargo, and returned to the point of origin. During the dry season, preparations were made to maintain logistical flow through the rainy season.

(C) The 559th underwent extensive reorganization after its inception. The regimental structure which existed during the early stages of development was abolished and command and control was vested with the Binh Trám (BT). According to captured documents, all BTs were organized like a transportation group with organic installations, communications, transportation, and commo-liaison cadre. In addition, they had organic security and air defense forces as well as other specialized elements assigned to provide local security and to assist in building and maintaining roads.

(C) BTs under both the 559th and 470th TGs had command and control responsibilities within a specific geographic area: responsibility included monitoring and administration of all activity within. BTs coordinated the activities of transportation, engineer, air defense and other specialized elements to insure expeditious movement of men and material.

(C) The 559th TG appeared to have relinquished control over their lines of communications in the Saravane area where the 470th TG took over responsibility for further movement of men and material south into southern MR 4 in Laos, and into Cambodia. Each BT generally had at least one subordinate AAA, engineer, transportation, and commo-liaison battalion. In Laos there were 13 identified BTs subordinate to the 559th TG: BTs 9, 12, 14, 27, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 39, 41, 42, and probably 44. There were four identified BTs subordinate to the 470th TG also operating in Laos: BTs 36, 37, 38, and 50 concentrated on the Laos-Cambodian border. The estimated strength of the 559th and the 470th TGs included seven identified base areas along or near the Laos/SVN border, which included training and medical facilities, logistical and supply depots, as well as food growing areas. NVA forces, operating mainly in SVN, used base areas for refitting, reinforcement points, and for rest and relaxation. All base areas were located along major infiltration routes and transshipment points. Most of the larger transshipment points and storage depots appeared to be located near major road and river junctions.

Facilities

(C) To facilitate the movement of men and supplies into the RVN the VC/NVA developed commo-liaison and interstations subordinate to BTs. The purpose of these stations was three-fold: to supply food and to provide bivouac sites for infiltration groups; to provide infiltration groups with a guide, whose function was to lead the groups from one station to the next in the chain; and to provide the necessary medical supplies and facilities. While these stations were somewhat similar in function, basic differences were evident. Generally, each commo-liaison station was physically separated from the next by the distance an infiltration group could travel during one day/night journey. The exact distance between stations therefore depended upon the terrain traversed. Commo-liaison stations were manned by varying size units, from squad to company, depending upon the terrain and the security of the area. The facilities of the commo-liaison station included permanent buildings for the station personnel and bunkers and foxholes/tunnels for the infiltration groups. While it appeared that large infiltration groups were not allowed to enter the station itself, smaller groups were believed to have entered the stations with the consent of the station personnel. For security reasons, however, these groups were bivouacked in sites located 30 to 60 minutes walking distance from the station. Each commo-liaison station usually had two bivouac sites, one on either side, which could be utilized to keep two infiltration groups isolated from each other, particularly when a group moving south met a group moving north. Commo-liaison stations were located near a water supply. The soil of the area was

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suitable for construction of bunkers and foxholes/tunnels, and had proper drainage for sanitation reasons. They were placed so as to avoid casualties and damage in the event of a flash flood. The stations and their facilities were located under thick jungle foliage to preclude detection from the air; they had to be defensible yet afford quick routes of withdrawal in the event of an enemy attack. They were located at least 30 minutes walking distance from vehicular infiltration routes to avoid simultaneous destruction of both a motor convoy and an infiltration group. As a rule, infiltration groups did not come into contact with the populace while infiltrating.

(C) Within each BT were located one or more interstations. Interstations were located near the intersection of a vehicular infiltration route and a foot infiltration route. Interstations were believed to be responsible for two or more commo-liaison stations, and were located near the middle of each sector of responsibility. Interstations also served as a commo-liaison station in that they provided lodging for infiltration groups and guides to move the infiltration groups to the next commo-liaison station. The interstation differed in that it had storage facilities for food which infiltrators picked up to replenish their supplies, and in that it was located close to medical facilities which could be used by members of the infiltration group. Interstations were usually connected by field telephones with adjacent interstations and with the BTs to which they were subordinate. Locations of interstations were subject to the same geographic requirements as commo-liaison stations. However, they also had to be situated in the general vicinity of the vehicular infiltration routes, but, for reasons of security, about 30 to 60 minutes walking distance from the route. They had to be large enough for storage sites for food, bivouac sites for two or more infiltration groups, and billeting for permanent personnel. Bivouac sites were secure enough to allow infiltration groups an extra day of rest. Because of the increased responsibilities and security of interstations, they were manned by a larger unit than commo-liaison stations, possibly up to battalion size. Again, the exact strength of each interstation depended upon the terrain and the area's vulnerability to attack.


(C) The movement of personnel and supplies through the Ho Chi Minh trail from NVN to the ultimate destination in the south was accomplished over roads of varying conditions, trails and waterways. The entire process involved many and varied types of carriers, from sampans to boats. There were three major entry points and associated supply lines leading into the central Lao Panhandle from NVN. They were the Mu Gia Pass, Ban Karai Pass, and the Ban Raving Pass/DMZ area. In 1971 the NVA improved the road/trail structure through Ban Karai and Ban Raving/DMZ areas, thus shortening the supply line to the south. This development decreased NVA dependence upon the Mu Gia Pass, which had been considered the major entry point. 38

The Petroleum Pipeline

(C) The NVA facilitated delivery of fuel supplies to key pick-up points in the Lao corridor with the construction of two pipeline systems. One entered Laos through the Mu Gia Pass while the other entered just to the northwest of the DMZ. The 592d NVA Engineer Pipe-laying Regiment, with three subordinate battalions and a total strength of 1,050 men, was responsible for the maintenance and construction. The pipelines were constructed of Soviet 4.4 inch tactical pipe. Rubber or canvas flex pipe was used to bypass interdicted points, make sharp turns, or surmount obstacles. The pipe had a theoretical capacity of 1,130 metric tons, or 400,000 gallons per day, under optimum conditions. The actual capacity depended on the number of pumping stations and the terrain. While enemy POL requirements in the Laotian panhandle were difficult to estimate, they probably averaged about 10,000 gallons per day. Both pipelines were interdicted on numerous occasions and the flow of POL was temporarily stopped; however, the enemy learned to reduce interdiction effectiveness by building multiple lines across rivers, installing cut-off valves, and diverting flow to wayside storage areas. 39

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
**ESTIMATED ANNUAL PERSONNEL INFILTRATION
1959 THROUGH 1971**



Source: MACJ2

Figure IX-27

SHORT TONS OF SUPPLIES INFILTRATED BY MONTH - 1971



Source: MACJ231-6-1

Figure IX-28

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Routes

(C) Personnel and supplies bound to Laos through the Mu Gia Pass were routed further south by way of the Route 23/011 net, historically the key to the enemy resupply effort. Men and material coming into Laos from the Ban Karai Pass via Route 912 were for the most part moved further south into the Tchepone area, while the remainder were transported further west to numerous other storage sites. The Tchepone area was considered the most important sector along the infiltration corridor because of its strategic location at the convergence of several key supply routes. Supplies entering the Ban Raving pass/DMZ area bound for Laos were also routed to the Tchepone area. From the Tchepone complex, infiltration continued south through key transshipment points south to Saravane and the triborder area. From Saravane and the triborder area supplies were moved into the RVN, and from the triborder area into Cambodia and west to the Attapeu area. In Cambodia, infiltration continued via the Route 1, Route 13, and Route 19 networks.

(S/NF) During the 1970-71 dry season, road building activities opened new routes and increased the mileage of the system by approximately 30 percent. Prior to the 1970-71 construction season, the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos consisted of approximately 1,700 miles of single-lane unpaved roadway, most of which had been constructed since 1965 at the rate of about 300 miles per season. During the 1970-71 dry season the Communists added more than 600 miles of well-constructed new roads, bringing the total mileage built to 2,200. Most of this new construction consisted of bypasses along established entrance corridors, extensive work on two new logistical corridors, and improvements to the logistical network serving Communist forces in southern Laos.⁴⁰ As a result of LAM SON 719 early in 1971 there was an enemy western expansion of the system, with more use of Routes 16 and 23 in Laos; this to offset Allied interdiction of Route 914. Expansion continued even after termination of the Allied operation.⁴¹ With better and shorter logistical routes and better maintenance, the North Vietnamese would be able to move more supplies faster and with less exposure to bombing during the 1971-72 dry season than previously.⁴²

Personnel Infiltration

(C) The infiltration of personnel into the RVN followed generally the same pattern over the past several years. Personnel were infiltrated into the RVN as replacements or units, at Hanoi's discretion. Training consisted of basic military training, special individual training, and political indoctrination. Upon completion of training, infiltration groups, with as few as 10 and as many as 800 personnel, were infiltrated into the RVN. Training quotas and scheduling clearly followed a timetable which coincided with the monsoon season and its effect on the infiltration route. These groups departed NVN during the dry months (October through May) along the infiltration routes described previously (see Figure III-26). Infiltration groups were identified not only by unit designation, but also by infiltration group numbers, usually in sequence. The groups were assigned to an area normally indicated by the first digit of the infiltration group number. The greatest number of infiltrators were assigned to RVN MR 1 and MR 3 where VC/NVA activity was the highest.⁴³

(C) Personnel infiltration into the RVN followed two policies. First, the NVA seemed to have a planned number of infiltrators entering the Republic. This was demonstrated by the groups which infiltrated under the numerical system explained earlier, as these numbers were in sequence with departure and arrival dates planned. Secondly, the enemy had in the past proved that he could infiltrate complete units or large groups of replacements prior to or during large operations. This was the case during the TET, Khe Sanh, Hue City, and Saigon campaigns in 1968 and was strikingly evident during LAM SON 719 when the enemy deployed five regiments and a major headquarters from NVN and three regiments from the RVN.⁴⁴

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(C) While it was long surmised that an exfiltration system from the RVN did exist, it was not until the May-June cross-border operations that substantive documentation became available. It was thus determined that infiltration group cadre, sick and wounded soldiers, and school age children were routinely returned to NVN. Exfiltrators used the same routes and facilities provided for infiltration.⁴⁵

(C) Statistical details concerning infiltration of personnel into the RVN are shown in Figure III-27. As can be noted, infiltration of personnel declined sharply over the peak of more than 150,000 in 1968.⁴⁶ It also followed the same seasonal trend as infiltration of supplies (Figure III-28).

Infiltration of Supplies

(S/NF) During 1971 there was little difference from previous years in activity related to the infiltration of supplies into the RVN, except as described below. Coming into the RVN over the previously described routes (Figure III-26), the rate of infiltration was high during the dry season and low during the rainy season (see Figures III-28 and III-29). Although detections of enemy supply movement increased over former years, MACV considered that this did not represent an increase in infiltration of supplies and material; the increase was because detection methodology had improved and the number of ways to detect infiltration activity had increased. Noteworthy for 1971 was increased infiltration of arms and ammunition with a concurrent decrease in infiltration of foodstuff. This change in emphasis was attributed to the fact that the enemy was obtaining more of his rice from the Khmer Republic, and thus not needing to bring it down from the north.

(S/NF) Total movement of material was determined by a combination of sensor activations, visual reconnaissance, and road watch teams. In January the total number of indications of supply infiltrations was up by 537 percent over December 1970, typical of that time of year. During the period January through May, the estimated throughput was more than the estimated minimum external requirement for the area, therefore enemy forces had the capability to stockpile reserves in the border BAs, a normal happening for the time period.

(S/NF) During the first 3 months of the year, no war-related supplies were believed to have been imported through the Cambodian port of Kompong Som for traditional support of VC/NVA forces in southern GVN MRs 2 and 4. The enemy was thus forced to resupply his forces in these areas via the Laotian Panhandle. Enemy external requirements for weapons and ammunition were probably met from stocks of material previously imported into Cambodia and stored in the border areas or in the RVN. As of December 1971, for the period since 20 Jan 71, a total of 1,381.5 short tons of material had been detected as entering northeastern Cambodia via Route 110A (see Figure III-26), but none of this tonnage had been shipped during the rainy season period of August, September, October, or November. The VC/NVA forces in southern RVN MR 2, MR 3, and MR 4, which had previously been supplied through the port of Kompong Som, received a portion of these supplies. The 1,381.5 short tons did not include material which could have been infiltrated into Cambodia by way of the Mekong River system.

(S/NF) During the period between June and December, with the exception of August, the estimated throughput was less than the estimated minimum external requirement; thus enemy forces were forced to draw upon accumulated reserves in the border areas, a normal occurrence for the period except that this situation began 1 month earlier than usual.⁴⁷

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RVN MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS AND FILLS
(1970-1971)

<u>1970</u>	<u>Total Troops Supported</u>	<u>STON Per Day Required by No of Troops Supported</u>	<u>Estimated STON Supplies Infiltrated Per Month</u>	<u>Percent Procured in RVN</u>
Jan	235,930	284	2,945	67
Feb	233,460	309	3,108	64
Mar	231,135	305	5,252	69
Apr	229,640	253	2,592	64
May	230,750	476	1,535	35
Jun	235,843	304	NA	55
Jul	235,030	246	NA	61
Aug	239,765	230	206	63
Sep	239,695	229	87	64
Oct	237,715	221	None	66
Nov	235,720	218	None	67
Dec	230,060	215	208	67
<u>1971</u>				
Jan	229,030	210	1,116	68
Feb	229,020	212	1,764	67
Mar	230,115	211	2,848	67
Apr	228,020	241	2,400	60
May	226,275	222	1,588	64.5
Jun	220,075	225	378	64.2
Jul	220,925	223	56	65.1
Aug	220,949	230	161	63.2
Sep	219,224	205	24.5	64.8
Oct	216,979	207	10.5	67.6
Nov	214,372	206	28.0	87.2
Dec	217,775	205	164	86.8

Source: MACJ2

Figure III - 29

BASE AREAS

Definition


(C) Base areas (BA) were defined as sections of terrain which contained installations, defensive fortifications, or other physical structures used for the following purposes: for basic or advanced military training of both personnel and units; as a permanent or temporary location for political, military, or logistical headquarters; for storage and distribution of medicine, ordnance, food, POL, and other war materiel; and as a site used by combat units to rest, re-group, retrain, evade friendly operations and/or initiate preparatory phases of offensive operations.

(U) Figure III-30 depicts BAs as of 23 Jan 72. Activity in the various areas during 1971 is described below.

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Source: MACJ2

Figure III-30

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Base Areas in MR 1

(C) Base Area 112 was reconfigured in 1971 to include additional areas to the east and the Song Goung. It was believed that the area had become the area of operation (AO) of the 38th NVA Regiment. A third quarter 1971 increase in enemy activity in the area was largely attributed to the fact that enemy forces were recovering from the effects of LAM SON 719 and attempting to build up caches and make preparations for the monsoon season. A sharp rise in enemy activity noted during the last quarter of the year was attributed to the limitations imposed on both friendly and enemy operations caused by the rainy season. Such activity was made necessary because of earlier resupply problems caused by the summer floods in the DRV and Typhoon Hester which ravaged the area in October, flooding many enemy installations and cache sites.

(C) Base Area 128 for the last half of 1971 was characterized by the historic tapering off of enemy activity due to the rainy season; in actuality activity almost came to a halt due to the same reasons cited for BA 112. Enemy units in the vicinity were extremely hard pressed for supplies and were thus engaged in refitting and resupply actions at the expense of operations.

(C) Enemy activity in base area 129 declined considerably over previous periods, again due to the monsoon season. Overall activity in the area was centered around enemy road building efforts and logistical and rear service activities.

Base Areas in MR 2

(C) Base Area 201, was thought to be an intermediate storage and bivouac area; it was astride an important infiltration and resupply route extending from BA 614 used for resupplying areas and transshipment points in GVN Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces. A reported decrease in enemy activity in the area was probably due to the fact that headquarters, VC MR 5, previously thought to be located in the area, was believed to be somewhere in MR 1.

(C) Base Area 202 was the terminus of a logistical route which originated in BA 701 and which supported enemy units in eastern Pleiku Province and western Binh Dinh Province. Personnel infiltrating from BA 201 were possibly passing through BA 202, an area historically known as a storage and training area for elements of the 95B NVA Regt. BA 202 was used as a staging area for enemy operations directed against Pleiku Province and enemy interdiction of QL 19 between Pleiku City and Binh Dinh Province.

(C) Base Area 226 was consistently the most active in-country BA in RVN MR 2. Major combat and support elements of the 3d NVA Div, as well as other main force and local force units, used this BA as their primary training and resupply area. The mission of units located in the area was to disrupt the GVN pacification programs in the heavily populated coastal lowlands. Enemy activity decreased as his forces concentrated on refitting and resupply activities.

(C) Base Area 236 continued to be used as the primary rear service and support area for two LF infantry battalions whose mission was to disrupt GVN pacification efforts in the coastal lowlands of Phu Yen Province by means of small unit operations and terrorist activities. Enemy initiated activity in this BA increased towards year's end, probably due to the fewer number of Allied operations being conducted.

(C) Base Area 238 continued as one of low activity levels, serving as a rear service area for a local force sapper and infantry battalion whose mission was to conduct harassment operations and highway interdiction in the vicinity of Ban Me Thuot.

(C) Base Area 252 continued to serve as a storage, resupply, and training area for enemy units operating in Khanh Hoa Province; low levels of enemy activity were due to the absence of

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Allied operations within the area. Levels of enemy activity along the coast indicated that enemy units in the area were adequately resupplied and supported from BA 252. This BA also served as the terminus of a logistics route which extended from BA 740, across RVN MR 2 to Khanh Hoa Province.

Base Areas in MR 3

(C) Base Area 300 was considered to be the terminus of enemy logistical infiltration routes which generally paralleled the MR 2/3 border south from the direction of BA 351. Enemy activity was at a low level because of frequent Allied operations in the area during the last half of the year. Historically used as a storage area for rice collected from Binh Tuy Province, it was believed that further use of the BA would increase as Allied assets were withdrawn from eastern MR 3.

(C) Base Area 303, located in the triborder area of Phuoc Tuy, Bien Hoa, and Long Khanh Provinces, was used by enemy units as a staging area for attacks against friendly forces and installations in all of Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces, and in portions of Bien Hoa Province.

(C) Base Area 305, located only 6 km from BA 300, served as a site through which most infiltration and logistical routes from the north passed. Enemy activity was light at year's end as Allied forces conducted operations in and around the BAs. Once friendly activity decreased, it was expected that the BA would become more logistically significant for the enemy.

(C) Base Area 306, located on the MR 2/3 border between Binh Tuy and Binh Thuan Provinces, was characterized by a low level of enemy activity towards the end of the year, possibly due to a relocation of all but a forward element of a unit previously active in the area. Although activity was light, this BA was considered to be an important enemy rest and recuperation site where future enemy activity would be governed by the local tactical situation.

(C) Base Area 351 was situated astride the border between the Republic of Vietnam and Cambodia in northern Phuoc Long Province. Two extremely important logistical routes, the Jolley and Adams Roads, originated in BA 351 as they extended from Cambodia to War Zone D and BA 359, respectively. Enemy activity decreased significantly in 1971, partially because Allied cross-border operations forced regular infiltration and logistical activities to shift deeper inside Cambodia. As RVN forces withdrew from Cambodia, BA 351 would concurrently increase in importance.

(C) Base Area 353, in northern Tay Ninh Province, continued to show a moderate level of activity for 1971 as RVN cross-border operations severely limited its effectiveness. In the past it served as a staging area for enemy operations conducted in Tay Ninh Province and for attacks directed against RVN forces along QL 22 and Route 7 in Cambodia. As RVN units completed cross-border operations, the BA would again become a center of enemy activity.

(C) Base Area 354, extending into Cambodia, was considered to be the most active BA in RVN MR 3. As of the end of 1971, RVN forces had not conducted extensive operations within its boundaries, thus the area probably contained several training areas, base camps, and many logistical facilities. During the last half of 1971 the BA was used as a staging area for large scale enemy operations in western Tay Ninh Province and along QL 22 north of Tay Ninh City. Two important logistical and infiltration routes originated in BA 354: the Nui Ba Den Corridor which extended eastward into BA 353, and Robert's Route which extended southwest into Hau Nghia Province. The importance of the BA to the enemy was to continue, and activities on his part were likely to increase if RVN forces consolidated in MR 3 and the area continued to remain unmolested.

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(C) Base Area 355 was located on the border between Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces: it contained the Razorback Mountains and was situated near the Michelin rubber plantation, the Trapezoid, and the Boi Loi woods, all of which were strategic to the BA. BA 355 was located along the historical Saigon infiltration route at the terminus of the Nui Ba Den Corridor. Enemy activity in and around this BA was centered on the storage of supplies and the movement of ordnance and munitions toward the Saigon area. Since the area was important to the enemy, it was well defended by the 101st NVA Regiment, the K5 VC Artillery Battalion, and the 10th Sapper Battalion. Future enemy operations in RVN MR 3 would place greater emphasis on the area.

(C) Base Area 359, the largest in MR 3, was located near War Zone D to the west. Enemy activity within remained at a moderate level throughout 1971, probably because there were no large scale friendly operations in the area. The area was used by rear service elements of several groups because of its size, its inaccessibility to Allied forces, and because it acted as the terminus of the Song Be Corridor, the Adams Road, and the Jolley Road, all major logistical routes. Continued enemy use was foreseen.

Base Areas in MR 4

(C) Base Area 400 was reduced in size during the year due to decreased use by the enemy and the construction of Allied fire support bases and outposts nearby. Long considered a transshipment area and depot for logistical infiltration from Cambodia, a rest and training area for personnel infiltrating into RVN MR 4, and a support base for units operating in the northern Delta areas, its importance declined in 1971. Enemy elements deserted the Seven Mountains area and moved into the U Minh area during the year, and BA 400's use as a rest area virtually ceased.

(C) Base Area 470 remained as the center of enemy activity in VC MR 2. Supplies and personnel infiltrated into the BA from Cambodia through Kien Tuong Province were distributed to enemy units operating in central VC MR 2. Some personnel and materiel continued to be moved between BAs 470 and 490. BA 470 was of strategic importance because it supported units capable of cutting QL 4, the only major highway connecting RVN MR 3 and 4.

(C) Base Area 482 also was used by the enemy very little during the year; this was attributed to the fact that the enemy was operating in small units, most of which were engaged in rear service activity rather than operations of a tactical nature.

(C) Base Area 483 was the center of enemy activity in VC MR 3. Situated in the U Minh forest area, it was historically an enemy stronghold with its dense vegetation providing a secure storage, training, and staging area. Personnel and supplies were infiltrated into the area overland from the Cambodian border area of VC MR 3 as well as by sea along the coastline between the Song Sai Lon and Song Ong Doc. They also infiltrated overland from the southern Ca Mau Peninsula. The entire logistical network distributed supplies throughout western and southern VC MR 3. In spite of intensive RVN operations in the area, the rate of enemy infiltration of personnel indicated that he intended to retain control of the area -- a significant enemy threat still existed at the end of the year.

(C) Base Area 487 was used as a base for local force units operating in the Vinh Long/Vinh Binh Province Boundary area, but recent RVN operations hampered enemy activities. Many smaller base areas collectively formed the much larger BA 487.

(C) Base Area 490 was used as a terminus for supplies infiltrated through two "secret zones" on the coast of VC MR 2 and as a base for LF units operating in VC Ben Tre Province. The VC1 was particularly active in MR 4. Most enemy tactical activity was low in intensity, while the rear service activity was very local in nature.

Base Areas in Laos

(C) Base Area 604 continued to serve as a vital logistical support, transient storage, and transshipment point for supplies entering the Laotian panhandle via the Ban Karai, Ban Raving, and western DMZ input corridors. Although enemy activity in the BA was traditionally affected by the rainy season, the development of an extensive communications network consisting of roads, trails, and waterways greatly facilitated enemy capability for forward logistical movement. Two BTs of the 559th NVA Transportation Group were identified in the area during 1971.

(C) Base Area 607 was historically a logistical support and troop staging area, providing rear service support for enemy forces operating in Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces. It continued the same support in 1971. One BT of the 559th was identified as providing logistical movement of supplies into the area.

(C) Base Area 609 continued to operate in 1971 as a major logistical and troop staging area for enemy forces operating in Kontum Province and the enemy B-3 Front. The LOC consisted of well developed roads and trails, while extensive multicanopy forests provided excellent concealment of storage facilities and base camps. Supplies entering the BA were transshipped via the Route 96 and 110 road net. During the last 3 months of 1971 large numbers of personnel and large amounts of supplies were reportedly infiltrated into the BA; these resources were used to refit units under control of the B-3 Front.

(C) Base Area 611, especially its western reaches, served as a major transient storage area for supplies being infiltrated southward toward BA 612. Included in the BA was the main north/south route structure which consisted of Routes 92, 991, and 99. The eastern portions of the BA historically served as the Headquarters of MRTTH and provided transient storage facilities into BA 129 to the north.

(C) Base Area 612 served as a major transshipment point and transient storage area along the Route 92/96 structure. Supplies moving through the BA were either shipped southeast to BAs 609 or 614, or further south into Cambodia. The area traditionally served as the location of major rear service elements of the 559th TG.

(C) Base Area 614 was characterized by a slight decrease in enemy activity and was re-configured slightly to include the area around A Roe. It served historically as a logistical base and troop staging area for enemy forces operating in Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Kontum Provinces.

Base Areas in Cambodia

(C) Base Area 701 was enlarged in 1971 due to the fact that two large VC/NVA units were found to be operating near the original boundaries. This BA continued to serve as a major transshipment point and logistical support area for personnel and supplies entering the B-3 Front, and continued its traditional role as a staging area for enemy operations in Pleiku and Darlac Provinces.

(C) Base Area 702 provided logistical and rear service support to the units of B-3 Front operating in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces. Food production in the area was given high priority by the enemy. The major enemy unit operating in the area was BT Central, responsible for moving the supplies passing through.

(C) Base Area 704 served as a logistical and transshipment area for personnel and supplies which entered VC MR 2. It contained an extensive communications network consisting of cart

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tracks and waterways, and was deemed of special significance because of its Mekong River location, the main logistical corridor to Phnom Penh. Both VC LF and transportation battalions were reported to be located in the area.

(C) Base Area 708 continued as a staging area and transshipment point for men and materiel entering War Zone C and the Song Saigon infiltration corridor.

(C) Base Area 711 saw a decrease in enemy activity during the last half of 1971 as the enemy shifted his activities westward. Located in a dense forest region along the Prek Chlong, the area afforded excellent concealment of logistical facilities and base camp installations. BA 711 was well suited for effective support of enemy operations in GVN MR 3 and the infiltration of men and supplies into BA 708. It also served as the eastern flank of a major Cambodian base area complex established by the enemy as a reaction to Allied cross-border operations. COSVN and various rear service units were known to be operating in the area.

(C) Base Area 712 served as a logistical support and transshipment area for personnel and supplies entering GVN MR 3 by way of the Song Be Corridor to War Zone D and BA 359. The area afforded excellent natural concealment from aerial observation while Routes 131, 1311, and the Prek Chlong provided adequate internal LOC.

(C) Base Area 713 supported the infiltration and transshipment of supplies into the Long An Subregion by various smaller corridors.

(C) Base Area 714 was a logistical and transshipment support area located on the Route 75 infiltration corridor. The area was actually in the center of a major Cambodian BA complex established by the Communists as a reaction to Allied cross-border operations. Supplies and personnel entering the area were directed to either BAs 711 and 715 (part of the major BA complex) or to BAs 353 and 354 in support of enemy operations in RVN MR 3. During limited RVN cross-border operations of December 1971 the strongest enemy resistance was experienced in the Dambe region.

(C) Base Area 715 was located on the western flank of the Cambodian complex mentioned above. Centered at the Chup rubber plantation, this BA evolved into the most important portion of the major complex. As the resupply and refitting area for two NVA divisions, BA 715 was well suited for effective support of enemy operations in RVN MR 3 and against FANK forces in the Phnom Penh and Route 6 areas.

(C) Base Area 740, located in an area called the Nam Lyr Secret Zone Region, experienced a continued low level of enemy activity. The BA served as a logistical support and transshipment area for personnel and supplies destined for the B-3 Front and was a base of operations for enemy forces targeted against Darlac and Khanh Hoa Provinces.⁴⁸

ENEMY LOGISTICAL ACTIVITY IN THE RVN

Supply Activity

(C) MR 1. Materiel entered MR 1 via several corridors; across the DMZ, through western Quang Tri Province, western Thua Thien Province, and through the A Shau Valley (see Figure III-30). The entire system was dependent upon the 559th TG. Every variety of unit, from the transportation regiments to impressed labor groups, were used to distribute supplies to the using units. By taking advantage of the multiplicity of routes, forced labor, and experience, the VC/NVA logistical system in-country was extremely flexible and capable of maintaining

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adequate supplies for most units. The DMZ and northern Quang Tri Province were the locus of road building activity aimed at providing extra entry routes for supplies entering the MR. For example, a new clear route for truck traffic was opened which extended down to Khe Sanh and Route 9, with extensions noted even farther south. Agent reports stated that the enemy even built warehouses in the DMZ and northern Quang Tri Province, and the system was expanded in western Quang Tri Province as well. In western Thua Thien Province, supplies which entered the A Shau Valley from Laos and supplies which entered the RVN via Route 616 (which eventually entered the A Shau Valley) were distributed to using units within the province as needed. There were reports of severe food and materiel shortages in the area resulting from ARVN interdiction efforts. In western Quang Nam Province supply activity (from Laos by way of Route 614) declined during the year, possibly because of the deactivation of a BT in the area. In contrast, however, materiel did enter the province by way of Routes 966 and 969 in Laos. Extensive road construction was noted off Route 966 which indicated that the enemy might place heavier reliance on this area in the future. From these entry points, supplies were delivered eastward by an extensive oxcart, bicycle, porter, and sampan system. In western Quang Tin Province goods were received from the north, in this case often by truck, then moved eastward. A portion of these goods was transshipped further south into Quang Ngai Province. In Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces food production units of a transportation regiment supplemented supplies which arrived from out of country -- rice was the most important product. Aside from the land lines, numerous sections of the isolated coastal areas of the provinces in MR 1 were used in the transshipment of materiel, and infiltration by sea was also reported.

(C) MR 2. The western border of GVN MR 2 was controlled by the VC B-3 Front (Figure III-2) which coordinated the movement of supplies through liaison with the 470th TG and with rear service groups in Cambodia. Materiel was concentrated in four major BAs along the MR 2 border while awaiting shipment into the RVN. A variety of transportation units subordinate to a number of NVA/VC commands was responsible for moving the materiel into MR 2 and then delivering it to using units. Supplies entered the MR via various corridors from MR 1, as well as Kontum and Binh Dinh Provinces; supplies were then delivered to enemy maneuver elements operating in Phu Bon and Phu Yen Provinces. Chu Pa Mountain was a distribution area for enemy supplies needed in northern Pleiku Province, while supply routes in the Ia Drang Valley and southern Pleiku Province serviced the coastal areas. The extreme southern portion of the MR was serviced by supply routes which originated in the Nam Lyr Mountain area of BA 740, and an additional transportation route existed along the border between MRs 2 and 3.

(C) MR 3. Allied operations created a serious enemy supply problem in MR 3 during 1971. Logistical activity in the MR was highly dependent upon the use of Cambodia by VC/NVA rear service elements. Once supplies reached this portion of the COSVN AO, they were handled by a series of Rear Service Groups (RSG), the first one (the 400th RSG) assuming responsibility at a point north of Kratie, a major transshipment point for supplies destined for GVN MR 3. The 86th RSG, COSVN's largest, operated two supply corridors out of BA 351, Adams Road and Jolley Road. Supplies transported along these complexes were taken ultimately to BA 359, turned over to the 81st RSG (possibly combined in 1971 with RSG MR 7 forming RSG 814), and delivered to enemy units operating in VC MR 7 and War Zone D. Other RSGs were responsible for delivering supplies to the northern Binh Duong Province area via Serres Jungle Highway, to the Chup rubber plantation area, to RVN Tay Ninh and Hau Ngia Province, to the Parrot's Beak area and on into southern MR 3 and the VC LASR. The 500th RSG, which was located west of the Mekong River, was responsible for movement of rice from the Tonle Sap area of Cambodia into MR 3.

(C) MR 4. During 1971 the enemy infiltrated supplies into MR 4 overland from Cambodia, usually at night, using porters, oxcarts, and motorized sampans. As a result of Allied operations, enemy supply and personnel requirements were very critical in MR 4. Four infiltration routes were in general use, all of which originated in Cambodia. Beginning in BAs 713 and 704, they followed varied and complicated routes into the MR. Of note was the fact that 35

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foot sampans with double bottoms were used to deliver large quantities of supplies, especially large caliber ammunition, small arms, and medical equipment. Most supplies transshipped by this method were destined for Go Cong and Kien Hoa Provinces via the Mekong.⁴⁹

The Shadow Supply System

(S/NF) Background. The Shadow Supply System (SSS) was defined as the enemy's method of supporting military units and political organizations throughout the Republic of Vietnam with funds and supplies. The VCI in 1971 had to cope with increasing problems concerning the finance and support of military and political activities. Although most enemy war materiel came from Communist Bloc countries, the VC/NVA were primarily dependent upon the people and the land of SVN for other assistance. To acquire this vital support, Hanoi was forced to rely more heavily on covert apparatus to obtain funds and supplies. In addition, military supply procurement ranged from armed extortion and terrorist tactics to tax collection and actual farming.

(S/NF) Specific agencies at each level of the enemy's command and control structure formed the internal organization of the SSS. The Lao Dong party and the High Command exercised political and military control through the five major headquarters in the Republic. Senior political cadre of the Current Affairs Committees (CAC) provided overall policy guidance and planning. Finance and Economy Sections were responsible for acquiring and distributing funds for activities within their respective area, to include supporting VC/NVA activities with RVN piasters from converted US dollars. Rear Service Staffs supervised logistical functions of subordinate rear service units. These same three elements were also found at province, district, and some village levels throughout the RVN. The core of the SSS included lower echelon rear service groups (RSG). VCI staffed Finance and Economy Sections and Forward Supply Councils. RSGs functioned under enemy military regions and fronts, having specific areas of operation. The mission of an RSG was to receive, store and transport materiel; collect taxes; and purchase supplies. Finance and Economy Sections at region and subregion levels planned and managed manufacturing of materiel and food production. They were also the primary collection and allocation agencies of money and provisions. At district levels, these sections determined when and where to tax the populace in order to meet financial objectives. Forward Supply Councils were subordinate to CACs at all echelons and coordinated activities between Finance and Economy Sections and RSGs. Councils at each echelon obtained porters, litter bearers, and other logistical support mainly by exploiting the population. Forward Supply Councils also managed the entry and exit points where supplies were purchased on the open market and cached nearby for future distribution. Councils were staffed jointly by VCI civilians from finance and economy sections and military personnel from RSG staffs.

(S/NF) External financing. External financing was one of two principal money sources and was provided by the Foreign Trade Bank, subordinate to the National Bank of NVN. The bank obtained US dollars through foreign exchange accounts maintained in Hong Kong, Singapore, Djakarta, France, Japan, and Egypt. Numerous captured documents indicated that dollars were acquired in \$1,000, \$500, \$100 and \$50 denominations. US banknotes were usually distributed by bursar cells of finance and economy sections to VC region and subregion (SR) levels for exchange for piasters on illegal money markets located in cities such as Saigon, Da Nang, and Bien Hoa. Piasters thus obtained were used to finance enemy commercial and VCI activities, while the bulk was forwarded to higher echelons, probably for use in funding military activities. The use of American banknotes increased after 1970. Two examples were the capture of an enemy cache containing \$5,000 in US currency in Quang Nam Province during June 1970 and another \$27,300 in Binh Tuy Province in mid-August. A more recent example, in February 1971, involved the 1st Bde of the 1st Cav Div in MR 3 which had established an automatic ambush. Mines were detonated killing five VC/NVA who were members of a finance and economy section subordinate to rear service elements of VC Military Region 7. Discovered on the person of the individuals was a total of \$50,000 in US currency and over 1 million GVN piasters. The enemy

also exploited the RVN blackmarket for exchanging currency, generally conducting such transactions in urban areas where converted funds could be used to purchase supplies. However this situation probably changed in 1971. Documents captured during late June revealed that during the period 1 January through June 1971, the Finance and Economy Section of SR 4 received approximately US\$598,316 from HQ SVNLA; HQ VC MR 7; and various units and agencies subordinate to SR 4. During the same period, the Finance and Economy Section of SR 4 issued approximately US\$325,100 to its cadre for conversion to SVN currency.

(C) In-country taxation. In the RVN, the VCI created a second money source to support in-country operations, i.e., a comprehensive and complex system of taxation. Virtually every product and every activity was subject to some sort of levy, which actually amounted to VC extortion of the populace. Methods varied from area to area, and until 1971 were very effective. Although taxation took several forms, agricultural taxation, taxation in the form of protection insurance, and transportation facility taxation were perhaps the most productive. With increasing success of the GVN Community Defense and Local Development programs the VCI found it more and more difficult to cope with the problems of supporting their military and political activities; they had to rely more on the use of force in collection efforts. The VC showed evidence of their concern for, among other things, the deteriorating tax collection system when the published Directives 03/CT-71 and 04/CT-71 in February 1971: the former prescribed general financial and economic policy for 1971 while the latter presented a more detailed discussion of the weaknesses of the financial and economic effort and prescribed activities to be carried out in the RVN. Numerous agent reports and captured documents attested to the fact that the enemy was finding it increasingly difficult to collect taxes.⁵⁰

(S/NF) Food and supply procurement. The most complex and sensitive aspect of the Shadow Supply System was the procurement of food and supplies. The enemy used at least five methods to obtain supplies. First was the receipt of goods rather than cash as tax payments. Second was the use of intermediary purchasing agents with legal RVN status who could obtain the necessary licenses and permits to acquire and transport supplies. Purchasing agents employed by the VC also worked under the jurisdiction of trade shops which sent agents to cities to purchase food and supplies for resale to VC/NVA cadre. The well-publicized discovery in July 1970 of American flour in VC caches in Binh Tuy Province, as well as subsequent discoveries of locally manufactured and imported cloth in August 1970, attested to the effectiveness of this system, particularly around Saigon. Likewise, in late June 1971, US forces discovered four supply caches near Ham Tan totaling 15.5 tons. Among the items found were 98 bags of flour marked "Tiger Brand-Wheat-Flour USA," and an additional 75 bags of flour marked "Donated by the People of the United States." During August 1971 elements of the 3d Bde 1st Cav Div uncovered 11 caches south of FSB Round Rock totaling 55.9 tons of flour, all of which was of American origin.

-- Third and most widespread was the purchase of supplies by proxy in local markets by individuals at the request or insistence of VC finance and economy cadre. In VN MR 3 the VC reportedly paid 10 to 35 percent over market prices to obtain goods. Information obtained from four Hoi Chanhs who rallied on 11 Oct 70 provided an example of this method. The Hoi Chanhs, members of a tax collection team, stated that the VC required truck drivers to purchase clothing, batteries, salt, and rice which were then deposited in small caches for future distribution.

-- Direct purchases by military units and VCI cadre or organizations was the fourth method, an activity commonplace in isolated hamlets and villages. For example, a document dated 30 May 70 captured in Quang Tri Province contained instructions for a district party committee that "provisions sections" of villages must establish steering committees. These committees were tasked to motivate members of farmers', foster mothers', and women's associations in various hamlets to purchase and requisition food.

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-- The final manner of securing supplies was outright confiscation. Methods of confiscation differed. Throughout the Republic, confiscation was occasionally perpetuated under the guise of taxation, even though the people may have already paid their taxes. Receipts for confiscated material which promised future reimbursement were sometimes given, but payment probably never followed. Frequently, the enemy entered an area during the harvest period and forced farmers to give whatever was demanded. The movement during October 1970 of a battalion of the 33d NVA Regt into the rice-producing area near Tanh Linh in Binh Tuy Province suggested that elements of this regiment were planning to secure rice from the area during the harvest. Information in November 1971 revealed that the VCI was helping Montagnard farmers harvest their rice crop: they received one-half the crop for this assistance.

(S/NF) While there was often little distinction between taxation and confiscation as conducted by the VC, the important point was that the enemy became increasingly reliant upon the local population as a source of supply. As an example, enemy directives captured on 6 Sep 70 south of Long Thanh revealed that SR 4 had revised its supply system and would no longer issue food to subordinate elements. According to the documents, the SR headquarters would henceforth allocate only funds; units would assume the responsibility for purchasing their own supplies. While reliance on local procurement reduced the centralized rear service requirement, it placed a greater logistical burden on the SSS. Combat capability of tactical forces was reduced because they were required to devote resources and time to supply activities.

(S/NF) Miscellaneous activities. Transportation, storage and distribution of goods completed the supply cycle. Forward Supply Councils at various echelons were natural bridges between VCI Finance and Economy Sections and military RSGs. Their basic responsibilities included the management of an intricate system of pickup, intermediate storage and delivery of supplies to political and military elements. Captured documents confirmed that many deliveries were made by individuals with legal status. For example, it was reported that between January and May 1970, truckload quantities of wheat, flour, corn, salt, milk, sugar and salted fish were delivered by independent truck owners to elements of RSG 84 in southern Binh Tuy Province. This RSG had its own purchasing and trucking system which reportedly operated between Saigon and Binh Thuan Province. The enemy allegedly paid up to 300,000 piasters per truck to procure proper passes and legal documentation.

(S) VC commo-liaison stations also played a major role in passing supplies to enemy units. Information acquired by the Saigon Municipal Police revealed the details of the operation of a commo-liaison station on the outskirts of Saigon. According to the report, the station was run by a 55-year old woman for the purpose of feeding enemy troops and running a VC commo-liaison route between Hau Nghia Province and Saigon. Young girls, disguised as grass cutters, picked up food and information on a daily basis for delivery to VC military personnel operating in the vicinity of a local village, clearly indicating that the VC/NVA were obtaining supplies from local villages and cities on a systematic basis.

(S/NF) The magnitude of the system was revealed by the ability of the enemy to procure imported US supplies from urban sources. The GVN Ministry of Economy sold such products to privately owned and approved jobbers for a profit. Jobbers resold these items into the retail market without any GVN restrictions or checks being made as to the final destination of the goods. To transport goods out of Saigon, the jobber merely applied for a permit from the Ministry of Economy which often granted approval without question. As an example, forces operating in Binh Tuy Province in July 1970 captured 66 tons of flour which were stored in eight different VC cache sites. All flour sacks were inscribed with the same purchase authorization number and had been imported into South Vietnam by USAID. The flour was apparently being shipped from Saigon to Phan Thiet in Binh Thuan Province when it was diverted for enemy use. When GVN judicial police attempted to review records concerning deliveries with the Ministry of Economy, they were told that the records had been destroyed by fire. It appeared that the commodities

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reached VC hands through corruption or collusion between jobbers, retailers, truckers, and possibly some government and local officials.

(S) The SSS organization and methods of operation had several vulnerabilities. Access to the population, which permitted taxation of the populace and ubiquitous small-scale purchases of required items, remained the key to effectiveness of the system. Allied operations and pacification efforts eroded enemy capabilities in this respect, and continued progress would further restrict freedom and ability to purchase or confiscate supplies.

(S/NF) The SSS, which was developed over at least two decades, constituted a complex and well organized apparatus which was attempting to provide revenues and resources to support enemy endeavors. Enemy emphasis in 1971 was directed toward self-sufficiency measures, increased tax collection efforts, and a much heavier reliance on "legal" sources of food and supplies because the system was more vulnerable to intensified pacification efforts than ever before.⁵¹

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

(C) New weaponry and equipment introduced by VC/NVA forces took two forms, that of DRV origin and that introduced from Communist Bloc countries. On 11 Dec 70 personnel of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) located a rocket of unknown origin in Quang Tri Province. Later evaluation showed that it was an MBU-1800 antisubmarine rocket of USSR manufacture, a 29.5 kg device normally fired from a launching tube.⁵² On 22 Jun 71 a Polish PGN-60 antitank grenade was found in a VC/NVA arsenal. Using a shaped charge, the device was normally fired from the Polish PMK assault rifle.⁵³

(C) The 1st Inf Div (ARVN) captured a Rumanian 7.62mm light machinegun, Model 1964, while engaged in LAM SON 719 -- date and place of capture was not specified. This weapon appeared to be identical to the Soviet RPK light machine gun, the latter a development from the AKM assault rifle. The RPK was a new item of issue in Warsaw Pact armies.⁵⁴ The DRV did not introduce any newly developed locally manufactured weaponry in 1971, however a new type shaped charge was captured on 27 Mar 71. Of factory manufacture in the DRV, it was simple in design and well constructed. It weighed about a pound and could be fired several ways; with a mechanical device such as the Soviet MUV, a chemical pencil such as the MY-8, or electrically.⁵⁵

(C) Signal equipment of significance introduced into the RVN consisted of several items, most important of which was the capture of a Chinese Communist A130B transceiver. This transceiver appeared to be identical to the USSR-manufactured R105D radio in most respects, and it was believed to operate in the same frequency range. The radio was capable of netting with the US AN/VRC-12 series radios.⁵⁶ Other items captured included a Sony all-wave radio receiver and a Chinese Communist field telephone.⁵⁷

(C) Newly introduced chemical equipment of significance included the newly manufactured USSR SHLEM protective mask. This item, recovered in MR 1, was a modified version of the standard Soviet issue protective mask, but it did not appear to be a significant improvement in design for use by the VC/NVA.⁵⁸ Other chemical items included canisters for protective masks, protective mask repair kits, and agent detector kits. One canister was of DRV manufacture, the other was suspected to have been manufactured in Poland, while the latter two items were of Chinese Communist origin.⁵⁹

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(C) Three items of interest were recovered which were directly related to POL transmission and analyzation. Two items were of UFSR origin; tactical POL pipe of metal construction and a tactical POL gate valve made of cast iron. The third item was a viscometer of Chinese Communist origin.⁶⁰

INTELLIGENCE

Background

(S/NF) The mission of the enemy in South Vietnam was establishment of a Communist government. North Vietnam controlled this effort through the COSVN, which in turn controlled the PRG. Communist intelligence and security organizations supported the enemy's mission in three areas of activity. They collected and produced strategic and tactical intelligence; they conducted subversion, sabotage and penetration operations against GVN, US, and other organizations; and they had responsibility for information security, personnel investigations, and maintenance of party discipline. There were three major enemy entities which controlled intelligence operations against GVN, US, and other Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF): (1) the North Vietnamese Security Service, (2) the North Vietnamese Strategic Intelligence Service, and (3) COSVN Intelligence Elements.

(S/NF) The NVN agencies were usually directed against strategic, long-range targets, while COSVN intelligence elements were concerned with short-term, tactical intelligence, as well as strategic intelligence. The backbone of the COSVN intelligence organization was the VCI. The VCI provided local intelligence and detailed information on specific geographic areas in South Vietnam. The NVA and VC main force units used the intelligence capability of the infrastructure, together with that of their own tactical reconnaissance units.

Activities

(S/NF) North Vietnamese Security Service (An Ninh). The North Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security functioned in South Vietnam through the An Ninh, or Security Service. The necessity of establishing an extension of the ministry in South Vietnam was recognized early. In 1959 when the North Vietnamese began sending substantial numbers of infiltrators into the South, officers of the An Ninh were included in the first infiltration groups. It was estimated that the An Ninh had between 15,000 and 20,000 people in South Vietnam in early 1971. There were An Ninh Security Sections at every level of VC organization, from the 500-man section at COSVN Headquarters to 3-man sections at village level.

(S/NF) Primarily a counterintelligence organization, the An Ninh was responsible for party discipline and personnel security within the PRP. It functioned overtly as an internal security agency in VC and NVA controlled areas. In areas under GVN control it provided the security for the VC infrastructure, compiled black and white lists, performed abductions and assassinations, and produced local situation reports. Penetration of GVN intelligence agencies and of the Chieu Hoi program were among the An Ninh's aggressive counterintelligence efforts. As required, it also furnished assistance in the collection of tactical intelligence.

(S/NF) The definitive An Ninh organization was that of the section at COSVN Headquarters level. The An Ninh section was divided into ten subsections, while at region and province level the organization was compressed to four subsections: B-1 (Administration), B-2 (Political Protection), B-3 (Intelligence and Reconnaissance), and B-4 (Judicial). At district level the section was further reduced to three subsections: B-1 (Administration), B-2 (Internal Security), and B-3 (Espionage). In theory the more austere sections at the lower levels performed all of

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the functions indicated by the full organization at COSVN level. Any Security Section could be tasked by the CAC at its own level and by the Security Section at the level above it. Security Sections down to province level could be tasked directly by the Ministry. Most of the An Ninh personnel selected to serve in the South were South Vietnamese who had regrouped to North Vietnam after 1954. It appeared in 1971 to be the policy to select An Ninh officers who met the following criteria: unblemished personal history, member of the "revolutionary class" (either peasant or lower middle class), junior high school education, circumspection in dealing with people, excellent health, and membership in the Labor Youth Group. Membership in the Lao Dong Party was not a prerequisite for selection, although desired. The Central Public Security School, C-500, commonly known as "Ha Dong C-500," was located near Hanoi. With a staff of about 100 personnel, the school could accommodate about 400 students at a time. New recruits were given a 3-month basic training course, with emphasis on political rather than military subjects. The students also received training in a wide variety of basic weapons, especially the K-54 pistol. An advanced course in some specialty followed basic training. Among the subjects taught in advanced training were agent recruitment and handling, report writing, and communication procedures. The student selection process was very effective in assuring high motivation, and few students failed the course. Personnel selected for advanced training in the Soviet Union or Communist China received language training and extensive cultural familiarization at the school. In South Vietnam, security sections at all levels down to district conducted training courses of their own. Course duration varied from 1 year at COSVN level to 1 week at district level.

(S/NF) Although conventional military operations and the GVN Community Defense and Local Development program took their toll of the An Ninh, the service remained effective. It retained a substantial capability to safeguard the reliability of enemy forces and to conduct intelligence and aggressive counterintelligence operations against Allied forces.

(S/NF) North Vietnamese Central Research Agency (Cuc Nghien Cuu). Strategic intelligence was the province of the Cuc Nghien Cuu (CNC), an agency of the North Vietnamese Ministry of Defense. Its targets were RVN and the Free World Forces, and other countries considered significant to the national security of North Vietnam and the furtherance of her national objectives. The CNC was formed in 1957 by the merger of a civilian intelligence agency subordinate to the Office of the Premier, and a military agency under the Defense Ministry. In 1971 the CNC was controlled by the Defense Ministry, but was also tasked directly by the Prime Minister's Office and the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party. The CNC provided finished intelligence, not only to its parent ministry, but to the highest policy-making levels of the North Vietnamese Government. Its school in North Vietnam also gave advanced training to military intelligence personnel not members of the CNC.

(S/NF) The CNC's mission was to provide the highest policy-making levels of the NVN regime with strategic intelligence and to advance national objectives by manipulating the affairs of countries of interest. The CNC was charged with conducting training, research, and clandestine operations incident to the accomplishment of this mission. In addition to its primary functions of management, collection, evaluation, and dissemination of strategic intelligence, the CNC also provided some tactical intelligence support to Communist forces throughout Indochina. It provided combat intelligence training and advanced general military intelligence training for NVA personnel as well as its own.


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(S/NF) The organization of the CNC:



Source: MACJ2

Figure III - 31

The Research Office levied requirements, maintained the CNC intelligence files, and produced finished intelligence. The Foreign Intelligence Office was responsible for collection on target countries other than South Vietnam. The collection effort against RVN, including the training of CNC personnel for RVN operations, was the responsibility of the Internal Intelligence Office. The Technical Office conducted research and development of intelligence material and was responsible for training in the use of documentation, secret writing, photography, radio communications, and cryptography. It also provided communications support for the CNC and conducted communications intelligence operations. The Combat Intelligence Office was responsible for the planning, training, and supervision of combat intelligence operations, and for production of combat intelligence operations, and for production of combat intelligence studies. The Combat Intelligence Battalion was a 600-man military unit directly under the control of the CNC. It controlled a tactical intelligence company, and a sapper company, and conducted operations in response to the requirements of the Combat Intelligence Office. It also provided an opportunity for on-the-job training of military intelligence personnel. A tour of duty with the Combat Intelligence Battalion was a customary phase in the career development of all NVA intelligence officers and non-commissioned officers.

(S/NF) CNC operations in South Vietnam were compartmented from those of other Communist intelligence organizations, except COSVN's Strategic Intelligence Office, in order to increase operational security. CNC high-level collection activities concentrated on the acquisition and exploitation of penetrations into such sensitive targets as the RVN Presidential Staff.

(S/NF) There were four operational levels in the CNC organization in SVN. The highest level CNC operative in SVN was the Phai Vien or field intelligence commissar. He was the leader of a cluster of three to five intelligence collection cells. The Phai Vien was an intelligence professional who had two or more years of training in North Vietnam and possibly also in the Soviet Union. He seldom risked leaving his base in a VC or NVA-controlled area, and communicated with CNC headquarters by encrypted radio messages and with his cells by clandestine radio and courier. A Phai Khien, or principal agent, controlled each of the collection cells. He was a well trained operative who resided legally in a GVN-controlled area. He served to compartment his subordinates from each other and from his chief, and according to CNC doctrine, his subordinates should not know his true identity. Below the principal agent was the Co Can, or source, who constituted the lowest echelon of collection. A source had to be politically enlightened and have access by virtue of being a military or civilian employee of the GVN, or at least frequent contact with knowledgeable individuals.

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(S/NF) Although officer candidates for assignment to military intelligence were expected to have the equivalent of a high school education, this requirement was waived to admit those with outstanding combat records or demonstrated abilities. When possible, the CNC offered its personnel a chance to obtain further education during lulls in their military careers. The operational preparation of espionage agents included an orientation concerning conditions in South Vietnam. Intensive instruction and practical exercises were conducted in espionage net organization, technical and nontechnical communications, source recruitment and handling, and reporting. Combat intelligence personnel received refresher training in basic military subjects, including the use of the latest individual weapons available to both friendly and enemy forces. They also received limited training in demolition, reconnaissance techniques, terrain analysis, tactics, ambush, abduction, and countersweep operations.

(S/NF) In 1971 the CNC was capable of continuing high-level penetration operations, collecting tactical intelligence as a secondary mission, continuing provisions of high-quality training for CNC trainees and other NVA intelligence personnel. There were indications that the CNC might be shifting its emphasis to stay-behind operations, employing agents with well-documented legal residence status in GVN controlled areas. Due to difficulties of maintaining a satisfactory level of communications security from the field to Hanoi, the CNC was transferring its assets in South Vietnam to the control of COSVN's Strategic Intelligence Office, otherwise known as B-22.

(S) COSVN intelligence organizations. This effort was carried on by five elements: the Strategic Intelligence Office (B-22), the Military Security Office, the Military Intelligence Office (B-2), the Technical Reconnaissance Office, and the Military Proselyting Sections.

(S) B-22 was created in the summer of 1968 from a merger of ten strategic espionage cells of the former VC Military Intelligence Bureau and at least five espionage networks of the CNC. This reorganization was the result of Allied military pressures during the counteroffensive following TET 1968, during which various weaknesses in control of operations and dissemination of intelligence were discovered. The Strategic Intelligence Office (SIO), had the primary mission of collecting high-level military, political, diplomatic, and economic information concerning South Vietnam, and subverting the GVN. To accomplish these missions, the SIO worked through penetration agents at the most sensitive levels of the RVN structure. SIO agents included a member of the Chamber of Deputies and an advisor to President of the Republic. Being largely an outgrowth of the CNC, B-22's modus operandi was substantially the same as that of the North Vietnamese agency. The SIO and the CNC continued to be the two most sophisticated and competent of the enemy intelligence agencies.

(S) The Military Security Office (MSO) functioned as the military counterintelligence arm of COSVN, and appeared to be similar to the An Ninh in structure. Very little information was available concerning the MSO. Its targets and the elements it protected were primarily military, and its activities appeared to be coordinated with the An Ninh. Counterespionage operations and the maintenance of internal security were activities of the MSO. Since the office was subordinate to the Political Bureau of the Military Directorate, COSVN, an important function of the MSO was most likely the preservation of party discipline within NVA and VC forces.

(S) COSVN's tactical intelligence requirements were satisfied by a number of units and specialized organizations. The agency exercising overall control was the Phong Quan Bao, Military Intelligence Office (MIO), designated B-2. The MIO conducted clandestine collection activities in support of VC and NVA military operations, provided training and guidance to VC reconnaissance elements, and coordinated the activities of Technical Reconnaissance Units (TRU). It shared with the An Ninh the mission of penetrating the Chieu Hoi program, and had some conspicuous successes in introducing false ralliers into the system. Surveillance and penetration of RVNAF, US, and other Allied military installations was an MIO priority collection activity. At COSVN level there was a B-2 military intelligence staff of about 1,500 persons

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which produced combat intelligence for use by the High Command of the SVNLA. This information was used in the planning of VC military operations. The Military Intelligence Staff of COSVN also operated two training schools, both organized as companies. One school provided radio training in preparation for technical reconnaissance duties and the other taught basic espionage methods and techniques. The basic VC military intelligence field unit was a province-level element: usually designated a battalion, it numbered about 225 personnel. Besides the headquarters, it contained a signal element, five collection teams, and sometimes a reconnaissance company and company size special action group. The MIO possessed a capability to reconnoiter RVNAF and Allied military installations throughout the RVN. Additionally, it conducted elicitation of information operations by using Vietnamese nationals who had contact with military personnel. It could penetrate the RVNAF directly by recruiting military personnel or by having its own personnel join the RVNAF. MIO had the capability to recruit US and other Allied personnel through intimidation, bribery, or less probably, on an ideological basis.

(S) It was estimated that about 4,000 personnel were involved in COSVN's communications intelligence effort, conducted by TRUs and controlled by the Technical Reconnaissance Office. The units ranged in size from the four-man team supporting a VC or NVA battalion to large units with impressive intercept, deciphering, translating, and recording capabilities. TRUs deployed so as to be able to react immediately to intelligence derived from Allied tactical voice communications. They submitted spot reports regarding sweeps, helicopter operations, tactical airstrikes, and artillery missions. Captured training documents and notebooks stressed attention to Allied communications security violations. Deception operations, particularly misdirection of airstrikes and artillery fire against friendly troops, were also attempted. The enemy used captured US tactical radios augmented by large numbers of commercial and Chinese Communist military radios.

(S) Military Proselyting Sections had a twofold function: the first was to win RVN troops over to the VC cause and the second was to impress loyal VC of the broad scope of their own proselyting activities. The majority of propaganda directed against US forces fell into the second category. The bilingual (Vietnamese - English) character of propaganda leaflets was an indication of their true purpose. The mission of the Military Proselyting Section was simply to undermine the will and cause desertion of Allied forces. Parallel proselyting efforts existed on the civilian side of the VC movement. The activities of both proselyting sections served military goals, but the civilian elements operated covertly in GVN-controlled areas while the military elements proselyted in "liberated" zones. The principal US targets of propaganda activities were draftees and negro troops. Recent military proselyting activities included recruitment in place and the insertion of penetration agents within the GVN and RVNAF. It is probable that these activities were coordinated with and supervised by the Military Security Office at the same echelon.⁶¹

ALLIED INTELLIGENCE


US INTELLIGENCE MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

(C) The staff agency responsible for intelligence within MACV was the ACoS J2, which was charged with a two-fold mission. One aspect of the mission involved the continuing US effort to aid the RVNAF in becoming self-sufficient in their struggle to counter the threat to their country. Accordingly, the J2 was responsible for providing support for the RVNAF intelligence effort and assisting them in enhancing their own capabilities. The other aspect of the J2 mission was responsibility for the submission of accurate and timely information concerning areas of

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SUPPORTING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM
(as of 31 Dec 72)



Legend:
— Operational control
- - - Coordination

Source: MACJ2

Figure III-32

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enemy activity of current and future interest to COMUSMACV and to other senior headquarters, national agencies, and Free World authorities. These missions required a major management effort to insure that subordinate intelligence activities coordinated the collection, production, and dissemination of critical information in the most efficient and expeditious manner possible. To accomplish this management task, the ACoS J2 was organized to coordinate intelligence activities as shown in Figure III-32.⁶²

GVN INTELLIGENCE MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

(C) The J2, Joint General Staff, RVNAF, held joint staff responsibility for all matters pertaining to RVNAF intelligence. These responsibilities included formulation of plans, procedures and orders, staff supervision, and control of functions relating to RVNAF intelligence. The Joint General Staff also retained primary responsibility for follow-up analysis and exploitation of military information provided by RVNAF military attaches abroad. Paramount among responsibilities was advice concerning political warfare and counterintelligence measures. In order to accomplish these varied missions, the Joint General Staff maintained operational control over several Vietnamese agencies: the RVNAF contingents of the various Allied combined intelligence centers (Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Combined Document Exploitation Center, Combined Military Interrogation Center, and Combined Materiel Exploitation Center) and the J2 Tactical Air Support Element. A Military Security Directorate was assigned to the Joint General Staff to provide counterintelligence services, while the J7 was responsible for communications security and radio research. On the civilian side of the Government, the primary intelligence agency was the National Police Force, a many-faceted organization with a nationwide operating area.⁶³



An entrance to a VC tunnel complex.

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57. IR (C), US Element, CMEC, USMACV, 7 May 71, Subj: Radio Receiver Son/ All Wave (U), Gp-3, and IR (C), US Element, CMEC, USMACV, undated, Subj: Unidentified CHICOM Field Phone (U), Gp-3.

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CHAPTER IV

PLANS AND OPERATIONS

COMBINED STRATEGIC PLANNING

DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMBINED STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN

(S) In late 1968 Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) directed that a plan be developed which would clearly delineate long-range US goals and objectives in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Such a document would complement the annual Combined Campaign Plan (CCP), which outlined short-range objectives and strategy for the Allied forces. By May 1969 the MACV staff had drafted the MACV Strategic Objectives Plan (SOP), an in-house document which enunciated US long-range objectives. Yet if the joint efforts of the Allies were to be efficiently employed, the MACV SOP, an essentially unilateral paper, would not suffice. Accordingly, COMUSMACV directed that the staff work jointly with the RVN Joint General Staff (JGS) in developing a combined strategic plan. The concept envisioned a "national blueprint" which would incorporate in one document the essentials of the CCP, the Pacification and Development Plan, and the recently evolved "area security concept." In preparing the plan, increased rapport developed between JGS planners and their MACV counterparts in staffing efforts. With the MACV SOP as the model, the Combined Strategic Objectives Plan (CSOP) was developed and implemented by August 1970. Because the CSOP incorporated the MACV SOP objectives and policies, the latter was rescinded on 25 Nov 71.

(S) Throughout 1971 HQ MACV planners and their JGS counterparts continued to be guided by the CSOP in short- and long-range planning efforts. The plan centered on three essentials:

-- Immediate combined objectives (to be accomplished by end of 1972). Expansion of areas of secure environment encompassing major cities, heavily populated areas, and primary LOC which would provide favorable environment for continued growth and strengthening of political, economic, and social institutions.

-- Intermediate combined objectives (to be accomplished by mid-1974). A secure environment throughout the RVN which permitted and fostered further expansion of the economy and the national development programs, under the direction of a stable national government which represented and was supported by the people.

-- Ultimate combined objectives (to be accomplished beyond 5 years). A free independent and viable nation of the Republic of Vietnam functioning in a secure environment both internally and regionally.

(U) At the close of the year, the CSOP was being revised, with the new document to become effective 1 Jan 72.

(S) Other major combined United States/Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (US/RVNAF) planning efforts during the year included a posthostilities plan which envisioned the redirection of an even greater share of GVN military efforts towards the nation-building role. Additional

MOVING TARGET GEOGRAPHIC DISPLAY

A sensor readout device
(as presented on IBM 2250 display console)


/ - Route Segment

X - Individual Sensor

+ - DMPI (desired mean point of impact)

--- Moving target indicator
showing minute-by-minute location
of vehicle along route segment

□ Area within which
ordnance is predicted
to fall for each
DMPI



The numbers 20 to 37 represent (in minutes past the hour) the future location of a vehicle as calculated by the computer on the basis of sensor-derived information about the vehicle's speed and direction of travel. For example, the display predicts that the vehicle will pass the sensors at DMPI 2 at 29 and 30 minutes past the hour. Consequently the sensor facility could direct a fighter aircraft to strike the predetermined coordinates of the DMPI at the appropriate time.

Source: USAF, Project CHECO-IGLOO WHITE - Nov 71

Figure IV-1

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planning was done on prisoner of war repatriation activities, the activation of a new ARVN infantry division, and various courses of action in the event of a cease-fire.²

COMBINED INTERDICTION PROGRAM

(U) As part of the coordinated attack on the total enemy system outlined in the Combined Campaign Plan (CCP), mid-1971 saw the genesis of an extensive Combined Interdiction Program. The basic concept recognized the changed nature of the conflict from a war within the boundaries of RVN during pre-1970 days, to a widening Southeast Asia endeavor. As such the CCP involved intensified integration of all Allied air, land, and sea assets in an effort to disrupt Hanoi's vital personnel and logistical lifeline into the enlarged battle arena. (A detailed discussion of these enemy infiltration movements is included in Chapter III. The keystone of the interdiction offensive -- airpower -- is covered in Chapter VI; ocean and waterway surveillance operations are discussed in Chapter V.) No formal written document outlined the goals of the Combined Interdiction Program for 1971. Instead, prosecution of the mission was accomplished by the newly formed Combined Interdiction Coordinating Committee (CICC) composed of MACV and Joint General Staff (JGS) staff members who, beginning in August 1971, met at least monthly to review interdiction efforts.

(S) Ground interdiction efforts in 1971, as in the previous year, essentially involved two major efforts: ground combat operations and the unattended ground sensor program. Certain ground combat operations had specific interdiction missions, such as the LAM SON 719 cross-border operations. Others indirectly supported the interdiction goal; for example, the combat activities of the 3d Bde 1st Cav Div around the Saigon-Bien Hoa-Long Binh rocket belt. The second form of ground interdiction was the unattended ground sensor program, first used in late 1967. The US program, DUFFEL BAG, was primarily for intelligence purposes, specifically the analysis of enemy movement patterns, while the Vietnamese side of the program, called TIGHT JAW, dealt with target acquisition activity. By 27 Nov 71 approximately 4,000 ground sensors (US and RVNAF) were employed throughout RVN, primarily along the western border. RVNAF units operated 75 percent of these, evidence of the "Vietnamization" of the activity.³ Late in 1971 MACV estimated that the RVNAF would assume complete control of the sensor program including management and operational responsibility by April 1972.⁴

(S) Using seismic, acoustic, magnetic, electromagnetic, or infrared sensing means to detect enemy personnel or vehicle movements, the devices were employed in strings of two or more sensors, usually along an avenue of approach. Signals transmitted from the sensor to a monitor, either by radio frequency or wire lines, were displayed or heard on various readout devices (see Figure IV-1). The sensors were emplaced by hand, either by Ranger Border Defense Units and Ranger Mobile Strike Groups during specific border counterinfiltration missions, or by air. By November, Deployable Automatic Relay Terminals (DART's) were being implanted by USAF F-4 aircraft at the rate of 40 per month, while other sensors were positioned by helicopter. A recognized problem was the relative lack of success of Vietnamese helicopter implant efforts compared to US experience. The CICC acknowledged this as a training problem which continued to receive its primary attention.⁵

(S) Throughout the year, unattended ground sensors played a major role in "high threat" interdiction zones, especially in the DMZ and northwestern Military Region (MR) I area encompassing the ground south of the DMZ and north of RT 9 from the Laotian border eastward to the Gulf of Tonkin. In that area in May, 228 sensors identified 2,226 targets, of which 256 were engaged.⁶ DUFFEL BAG activations countrywide during the same month recorded 4,171 enemy movements from 1,833 active devices, with 1,429 engagements as a result. A variety of responses were usually made, including mixed artillery, mortar, naval gunfire, troop insertions, small arms, and airstrike missions.⁷

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GEN Abrams, COMUSMACV, and GEN Vien, Chief, JCS, RVNAF, wait for other FWMAF commanders to sign the Combined Campaign Plan for 1972.

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(S) At the end of 1971 JGS and MACV planners had completed a comprehensive Interdiction Annex (Annex P) for incorporation into the forthcoming 1972 CCP. This special interdiction planning, as in the case of the CCP itself, demonstrated the continued progress of joint planning efforts and the increased JGS capability and desire to assume the major role. Since the enemy was engaged in long-range infiltration planning, as evidenced by the discovery of a new north-south trail into the DMZ and an estimated 60,000 infiltration into RVN by end-December, the new, dynamic Vietnamese effort seemed timely.⁸

COMBINED CAMPAIGN PLAN

(S) The principal vehicle guiding RVNAF and US/FWMAF military operations in 1971 was the Combined Campaign Plan (CCP) 1971, AB 146. Since the first CCP had been published by HQ MACV and RVNAF JGS in November 1967 (for CY68), the CCP annually provided broad statements of missions, goals, and priorities, dealing with the measured application of combat power and other resources in accordance with the "one war" concept.⁹ Unlike previous versions (essentially US), the 1971 plan was a Vietnamese effort with American cooperation. Approved on 31 Oct 70 by the Chief, JGS, COMUSMACV, and the FWMAF commanders, the plan contained detailed guidance in 22 separate annexes, and served as one of the foundations out of which the Combined Interdiction Program and seasonal plans were developed.¹⁰

(S) As in the case of the 1970 document, the CCP for 1971 was based on two assumptions regarding Vietnamization: continued redeployment of US/FWMAF forces, concurrent with RVNAF taking over their roles. Further assumptions were that Communist Bloc nations would continue materiel aid but would not intervene overtly in the conflict; NVN would continue its southward flow of materiel, reinforcements, and command direction of the war effort; any agreement reached at the Paris peace negotiations would not result in the removal of the VC infrastructure (VCI) or their combat forces; and the NVN would continue pressure on the people of RVN indefinitely.¹¹


(S) The mission statement for the 1971 plan was little changed from 1970. As stated in the 1971 CCP:

The mission of the RVNAF and FWMAF is to assure the security of the Vietnamese people throughout the Republic of Vietnam by defeating the VC/NVA forces and by participating in the GVN Pacification and Development Plan. [The latter was redesignated the Community Defense and Local Development Plan on 1 Mar 71.]

(S) Combat operations stressed mobility and interdiction of enemy LOC. Specifically, maneuver forces were to conduct sustained, coordinated, and combined mobile operations against VC/NVA forces, base areas (BAs), and logistical systems in RVN and authorized contiguous areas. Ground, sea, and air operations would be conducted to interdict enemy land and water lines of communication (LOC), to include cross-border operations and counterinfiltration activities, as required. RVNAF and FWMAF units would be required to undertake various efforts for the support of nation building. This would include, as it had in the past, protection of population centers of all sizes as well as military bases and installations. Additionally, RVNAF personnel were to be integrated into US communications facilities in order to provide for a single, comprehensive telecommunications system.¹²

(S) The concept of operation called for the employment of RVNAF and FWMAF units in critical priority areas, with economy of force the guideline in other less threatened zones. With mobility the keynote, the available forces were to be employed in two interdependent roles.

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AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

Source: MACV Combined Campaign Plan 1971

Figure IV-2

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Mobile Field Forces

(S) These consisted of infantry divisions, an airborne division, a marine division, and ranger units supported by FWMAF, who were to conduct operations primarily to: (1) locate and neutralize enemy main forces, base areas, and logistics systems; (2) deter enemy incursion into RVN along the DMZ, Laos, and Cambodian borders, and in coastal waters; (3) prevent enemy incursion into consolidation zones and secure areas. (See Figure IV-2.)

Territorial Forces

(S) These consisted of Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF), supported by the National Police (NP) and People's Self Defense Force (PSDF), and by mobile field forces when the situation warranted, who were to conduct operations primarily to: (1) participate in GVN pacification and development programs; (2) prevent enemy infiltration, attacks, and harassment of villages, hamlets, cities, province and district capitals, industrial centers, military bases, populated areas and vital LOC.

(S) The naval forces of both FWMAF and RVNAF were to continue off-shore surveillance operations to deny the enemy use of sea infiltration routes. The Vietnamese Navy (VNN) specifically was to continue coastal surveillance and inland waterway interdiction efforts in the Delta, the river approaches to Saigon, and in other inland waterway systems, to deny enemy use of vital LOC and to protect them for friendly use. Naval gunfire was to be employed for interdiction fires, support of friendly coastal operations, and neutralization of enemy facilities and forces. The VNN would also continue riverine operations in MRs 1, 3, and 4, and would provide harbor defense and waterborne security for the major ports and minor river ports as required.

(S) Within its capabilities and based upon progress through Vietnamization, the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) was to maintain air supremacy over the RVN and contiguous areas where authorized and conduct interdiction, airlift, and reconnaissance, as well as close air support. The FWMAF air forces would continue to support the VNAF, both in its combat role and in furthering development of its self-sufficiency.

(S) To measure progress toward the accomplishment of the purposes of the CCP, results were to be analyzed against nine goals. As in the past, major commanders would report to the Chief, JGS, and COMUSMACV at the semi-annual review. The yardsticks for 1971 were:

- Participate in the 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan (CD and LD Plan). The objectives of the CD and LD Plan would continue to be implemented according to the principle of community cooperation to restore peace, freedom, and security. The goals used to measure progress in achieving these objectives during 1971 were contained in detail in the GVN 1971 CD and LD Plan and supporting documents. (These are discussed in detail in Chapter VII.)
- Organize, train, equip, and modernize RVNAF to achieve a maximum state of combat effectiveness.
- Employ RVNAF in accordance with their assigned missions and capabilities.
- Inflict more losses on the enemy than he can replace.
- Deny the maximum number of base area sanctuaries and logistics systems in RVN and adjacent border areas to the enemy.

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- Restore and secure LOC to the greatest extent possible.
- Protect all national resources and deprive the enemy of their use.
- Increase intelligence and counterintelligence activities.
- Neutralize the VCI to the maximum extent possible. ¹³

(U) Preparation of the 1972 CCP (AB 147) began on 25 Jun 71. As 1970 and 1971 experiences plainly dictated, there would continue to be a need to achieve the proper balance between the military and nonmilitary aspects of the strategy. Furthermore, an even more important role was to be assumed by the Territorial Forces. In subsequent planning sessions, which culminated in the signing of the document on 29 October, HQ MACV planners continued to emphasize the close relationship between the 1971 CD and LD Plan and the CCP as complementary efforts that would lead to the accomplishment of GVN national goals. Their JGS counterparts agreed, assuming at the same time an even greater share of the planning effort than in the previous year. ¹⁴

SEASONAL CAMPAIGN PLANS

(S) MACV continued to be responsible for developing complementary guidance for subordinate and component commanders. Consequently, during 1971 MACV periodically issued short-range planning instructions to US commanders.

WINTER CAMPAIGN PLAN: January - April 1971

(S) To insure continuity with the 1970 fall campaign plan, late in December 1970 HQ MACV directed subordinate and component commanders to continue unilateral/combined combat operations and assist the RVNAF as they assumed greater responsibility for the war. For if the immediate combined objectives of the CSOP were to be fulfilled, these efforts were of paramount importance. Specifically, the plan stressed those endeavors geared to disrupt enemy objectives to frustrate the Allied pacification effort and to intensify guerrilla warfare. (A detailed discussion of Central Office for South Vietnam [COSVN] Resolutions 9 and 14, which encompass these enemy aims, is included in Chapter III.) Elimination of VCI, support of pacification, Lines of Communication (LOC) security, training support, resources denial, and psychological operations; all of these efforts were to receive major emphasis. And with continuing and possibly accelerated incremental redeployment of US/FWMAF units, the plan emphasized that close coordination between relieving and relieved units was essential in the transfer of security and nation building tasks.

(S) The winter campaign plan specifically tasked subordinate and component commanders to do the following:

- Elimination of the VCI. By emphasizing the bilateral aspects of the special collection program, the BIG MACK VCI statistical report, and on-going coordination with the province and district intelligence and operations coordination centers (PIOCC/DIOCC), FWMAF and US commanders were to insure the maximum exchange of intelligence. In the area of neutralization programs, VC infrastructure province and district senior officials were to be priority targets.

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-- Support of pacification. Commanders were to exert a concerted effort to provide sufficient security to Government of Vietnam (GVN) elements so as to enable upgrading of all V-rated (VC controlled) hamlets. Accordingly, units were to conduct combat operations against enemy maneuver units in the consolidation zones. When necessary, FWMAF and US units would serve as ready reaction forces for territorial security elements, and would also provide fire support, whenever these requirements exceeded RVNAF capabilities.

-- LOC security. By stressing around-the-clock use of road, railroad, and water LOC, especially during the hours of darkness, commanders would support like RVNAF efforts. The concept also stressed maximum use of night patrols, ambushes, and the neutralization of VCI tax collection agencies along these routes. Following coordination with the appropriate GVN officials, land clearing operations would be conducted in heavily vegetated areas.

-- Training support. To further aid the RVNAF in reaching the highest possible combat effectiveness, FWMAF and US commanders were to actively assist in training programs. These included specialist MOS training, company level (officer and NCO) leadership training, and the continuing improvement of training doctrine, literature, and facilities.

-- Resources denial. To preclude enemy access to food and materiel and other war essential items, commanders were to support such RVNAF programs as the LOC checkpoint system, rice control operations, and the neutralization of enemy financial and economic organizations, and similar ventures.

-- Psychological operations. Commanders were to emphasize quick reaction psychological operations as a normal adjunct to combat operations. These efforts were to be limited, however, to communications dealing with enemy target audiences only. As requested, advice and back-up mass media psychological operations (PSYOP) material support would be provided to RVNAF and GVN agencies.¹⁵

SUMMER - FALL CAMPAIGN PLAN: MAY - OCTOBER 1971

(S) Published in March, the planned mission for MACV operations in the summer - fall period remained essentially unchanged from the winter campaign goal. However, the following points were stressed. Commanders were to:

- capitalize on the success of the RVNAF cross-border operations,
- assist in providing the requisite stability through the GVN national elections in October,
- further Vietnamese-American relations,
- continue to assist RVNAF in VCI elimination operations,
- assist in the destruction of an already weakened enemy logistics system.

Furthermore, in recognition of the anticipated continued diminishing presence of US/FWMAF units, tasking statements were more carefully worded than in the previous plan, specifically requiring commanders to support programs only in accordance with their capabilities.¹⁶

(S) By April, continued RVNAF emphasis on VCI elimination operations necessitated a change to the summer-fall campaign plan. Since territorial forces were to participate in massive countrywide area saturation efforts of short duration, MACV subordinate and component

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commanders where possible were to assume the security missions for these units. Furthermore, within capabilities, they were to provide combat support for blocking enemy escape routes, as well as furnish quick reaction forces. The latter, if needed, would assist in neutralizing enemy units fixed by the operating forces.¹⁷

DYNAMIC DEFENSE CONCEPT

(S) As US maneuver battalion strength diminished from 54 in January to 33 by 30 June, an additional refinement had to be made in the summer-fall campaign plan.¹⁸ With US redeployments continuing at a steady rate, the security of vital US installations would become a matter of grave concern. Accordingly in late June, the "dynamic defense" concept evolved, which envisioned US forces in concert with RVNAF and Territorial Forces defending vital installations. Areas of operation would include zones such as the rocket belts south and southwest of Da Nang and surrounding the Saigon-Bien Hoa-Long Binh complex. If COMUSMACV deemed it essential, a US maneuver battalion might be tasked to provide security for an isolated key installation such as Cam Ranh Bay.

(S) More specifically, artillery forces would provide shortfall support to the Vietnamese and combat back-up to US forces. As artillery redeployments continued, US artillery units would be relocated to assure availability of fire support for US installations. The same concept was to hold true for helicopter forces. Furthermore, with the scheduling of air cavalry troops and assault helicopter companies for the latest possible redeployment, HQ MACV sought to provide required mobility and firepower at a crucial period of the transition from low-level US to full-scale Vietnamese conduct of the war effort. Moreover, within authorized sortie rates and mission capabilities, USAF and USN elements would continue to provide combat support.

(S) The refined plan also cautioned commanders to use fire support prudently, and stressed maximum use of small unit actions wherever possible. (For a detailed discussion of the Rules of Engagement governing the use of firepower, see Annex D.) Finally, it emphasized that units scheduled for redeployment during most of this period would stand down in increments. Along with continuous ground and aerial reconnaissance efforts, it was hoped that these moves would facilitate a position of strength and stability complementing RVNAF cross-border operations during the period.¹⁹

(S) To insure that all subordinate headquarters understood MACV policy concerning ground operations under "dynamic defense," HQ MACV issued additional guidance in June. As US combat forces diminished, commanders were to turn from "combat operations," i.e., primarily large scale offensive operations, to "security operations," such as reconnaissance and ambush patrols to protect US installations and units.²⁰ In this regard, the following definitions applied:

- Security operations: those operations conducted as primarily defensive against enemy incursions of any kind which if permitted to proceed unchecked would threaten US installations, facilities, or units. These operations will normally include reconnaissance operations, ambush operations, reactions to local enemy contact, and other operations involving units of company size and smaller.
- Combat operations: those operations that are primarily offensive in nature and normally involving units of battalion size or larger operating against enemy formations beyond striking distance (35-50 km) of US installations, facilities, or unit bases.²¹

(S) The "dynamic defense" concept continued to be the MACV strategy during the latter half of 1971, with redeployment of units causing only minor adjustments in tasks at year's end.²²

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IV-10

GROUND COMBAT SITUATION IN 1971

(S) During 1971 the ground war continued to reflect RVNAF and US/FWMAF efforts to deny the enemy his ultimate objective, the conquest of SVN. Vietnamization of the ground fighting continued concurrently with redeployment of US/FWMAF elements. The year was characterized by a lower level of enemy activity than the previous 12 months; this was due to significant enemy personnel and supply losses, expansion of his area of operations outside SVN, and his concentration on the development of a secure logistical system. The enemy was forced to reduce both forces and capabilities in RVN, except near the DMZ. (For a detailed analysis of the enemy situation, see Chapter III.) Successful RVNAF cross-border operations (discussed separately in Annex E), while complementary to the air and naval Allied interdiction effort, played a major role in causing this reduction in enemy capability.

(S) Both the nature of ground operations and the roles of the participants changed in 1971, as the following statistics indicate.

- US maneuver battalion strength in RVN declined from 54 in January to 16 in December.
- US combat deaths declined from a monthly high of 272 in March to 17 by December.
- The number of RVNAF contacts on large unit operations was triple the 1970 figure (from 5,589 to 17,740).
- Total US helicopter sorties (combat, combat support, and noncombat support) in RVN were almost half the 1970 figure from 7,564 to 4,212).
- There was an overall decline in enemy initiated attacks in RVN compared to 1970, as shown by these statistics:²³

1971

<u>Attacks Against</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>
Population centers	19	33	25	24	36	33	15	15	11	21	14	14
RVNAF	33	58	68	57	57	97	24	60	56	34	26	23
Pacification	85	154	147	116	115	80	68	65	53	47	53	42
US forces	22	37	61	32	22	18	8	7	8	9	2	3
Other	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
Total	160	283	301	229	230	229	115	147	128	108	95	84

1970

<u>Attacks Against</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>
Population centers	18	17	21	35	60	37	24	35	27	22	15	20
RVNAF	74	40	33	125	101	54	34	84	76	45	33	66
Pacification	149	113	103	255	233	170	128	156	106	114	91	88
US forces	67	54	45	102	88	67	63	54	26	17	10	20
Other	1	0	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Total	309	224	204	518	482	328	250	329	235	198	150	194

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IV-12

FRIENDLY/ENEMY STRENGTH AND MANEUVER BATTALIONS - RVN (1)

Month	RVNAF (2)	US	Other FW	Friendly Total	Est Enemy VC/NVA (3) Total	Total Friendly (US/FWMAF/RVNAF) Maneuver Bns(4)	Est VC/NVA Maneuver Bns
JAN	1,054,325	334,850	67,433	1,456,408	224,028	273	244
FEB	1,049,163	323,797	67,791	1,440,751	223,568	273	245
MAR	1,057,676	302,097	67,513	1,427,286	222,263	270	248
APR	1,058,237	272,073	66,563	1,396,873	221,749	259	247
MAY	1,060,597	252,210	66,586	1,379,393	219,476	254	250
JUN	1,060,129	239,528	66,842	1,366,499	218,628	252	249
JUL	1,057,924	225,111	64,762	1,347,792	218,548	249	248
AUG	1,052,353	216,528	61,256	1,330,137	217,432	243	248
SEP	1,047,890	212,596	60,638	1,321,124	216,879	243	241
OCT	1,043,232	198,683	58,813	1,300,728	216,870	238	243
NOV	1,040,640	178,266	58,526	1,277,432	216,909	234	236
DEC	1,046,254	158,119	54,497	1,258,870	218,019	231	234

- Note: (1) All strengths are as of the end of the month
(2) includes ARVN, VNN, VNMC, VNAF, RF, PF
(3) Estimated VC/NVA strength in RVN
(4) Includes ARVN divisional armored cavalry squadron

Sources: JC'S Action Officer's Data Book - Jan 72; MACJ3,
Management of Progress, Jan 72; MACJ2, Order of Battle
Summary, 29 Feb 72, Volume II.

Figure IV-3

FORCES AVAILABLE

(S) Throughout the year, Allied forces continued to maintain a strength level capable of blunting the enemy's attempts to dominate RVN through battlefield action (see Figure IV-3.)²⁴ Although most RVNAF units were battle tested and continued to improve in combat effectiveness, certain chronic problems constrained the rate of progress. Leadership quality, especially in Vietnamese Army (ARVN) ranks, had generally improved but continued to be a problem among lower-ranking officers and noncommissioned officers. Other personnel problems such as high desertion rates and low replacement and recruitment inputs continued (see Chapter VIII). Failure to properly exercise the supply system also continued to have a negative effect on ground operations in all military regions. Nevertheless the ARVN and other RVNAF forces demonstrated, through their performance on the battlefield in 1971, the great distance they had traveled along the road of professionalism since the somber days of mid-1965.

(U) US/FWMAF units executed assigned combat missions throughout the year as professionally as they had done in the past, and made the transition from active offensive combat to "dynamic defense" with little difficulty. As redeployment progressed, the JCS and MACV continued working together on carefully programmed steps of filling the void with Vietnamese combat power.

(S) To carry out their missions as presented in CCP 1971, RVNAF, FWMAF, and US ground forces had the following major tasks:

- Conduct mobile operations in order to locate and neutralize enemy main force units, base areas, liaison communications and logistics systems, in clearing zones and along the DMZ and border areas.
- Prevent enemy incursion into consolidation zones and secure areas.
- Support RF and PF units, upon request of the province chief, by conducting reaction operations against enemy main force units on the fringes of cities, province and district capitals, villages and hamlets.²⁵

(S) Major units to carry out these tasks were deployed throughout RVN in 1971 as indicated in Figures IV-4 through IV-7.

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TACTICAL REGULAR AND TERRITORIAL FORCES

LEGION REGULAR AND TERRITORIAL FORCES													
MAY	MANEUVER ON					OFF				CROSS		TOTAL STR	
	ADV.	YAC.	ENG.	ARM.	TOTAL	CO	STRENGTH	FLAT	STRENGTH	CO	STRENGTH		
1	13	5	3	0	30	24,400	219	21,515	1,053	22,711	14	4,314	43,720
2	12	0	3	0	31	17,300	287	16,267	1,400	18,755	04	9,415	104,002
3	12	0	3	0	31	12,073	304	16,236	1,245	21,781	07	4,772	190,475
GRAND TOTAL	50	5	9	0	137	53,773	819	54,210	2,698	56,506	25	19,517	126,314
													1,332





Figure IV-4

3 4 1 4 2 4

SUPPORT ELEMENTS OF U. S. AND FREE WORLD GROUND FORCES IN R/M ^{1/}

JOB	SCHEDULED PAYROLL													TOTAL			
	1954								1955					1956			
	reg	adms	adm	supv	adm	supv	total	total	reg	adms	adm	supv	total	reg	adms		
1	12	10	9	0	1	1	2	6	17	27,315	0	0	0	0	3	2,915	
2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	10,950	0	10,950	
3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	9,060	0	9,060
4	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL	13	10	9	2	1	1	2	12	27,380	27	0	0	0	41	22,920	0	22,920



Assigned strength in-country as of 14 Dec 70. Manpower battalions distributed as of 15 Dec 70.
The 11th armored Cav (-) is OpCav to 11 PFR.
OnCav 11 PFR.

Source: USA, Army Activities Report - Dec 70


Figure IV-5

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RVN ARMED FORCES - JANUARY 72 **ARVN AND VMC UNIT LOCATIONS**

TACTICAL REGULAR AND TERRITORIAL FORCES


UNIT	MANEUVER					GP		PP		CHMD RESERVE BN		TOTAL	
	ARVN	VMC	VC	BN	CB	STRENGTH	CB	STRENGTH	PLAT	STRENGTH	BN	STRENGTH	STN
1	25	0	0	0	0	29,328	234	32,400	1,200	7,211	0	3,600	102,459
2	25	0	0	0	0	19,246	412	19,246	1,700	48,000	12	3,600	129,540
3	30	0	0	0	0	34,087	412	37,167	1,200	58,200	0	4,000	134,750
4	30	0	0	0	0	26,324	610	46,435	1,717	101,119	0	1,400	119,230
5	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
6	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
7	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
8	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
9	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
10	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
11	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
12	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
13	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
14	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
15	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
16	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
17	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
18	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
19	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
20	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
21	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
22	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
23	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
24	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
25	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
26	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
27	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
28	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
29	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
30	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
31	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
32	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
33	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
34	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
35	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
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38	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
39	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
40	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
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44	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
45	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
46	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
47	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
48	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
49	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
50	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
51	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
52	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
53	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
54	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
55	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
56	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
57	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
58	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
59	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
60	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
61	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
62	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
63	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
64	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
65	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
66	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
67	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
68	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
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83	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
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87	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
88	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
89	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
90	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
91	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
92	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
93	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
94	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
95	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
96	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
97	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
98	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
99	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716
100	0	0	0	0	0	12,716	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,716



Source: USA, Army Activities Report - Jan 72

Figure IV-6

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


DEPLOYMENTS AND REDEPLOYMENTS

JANUARY 1972

LOCATIONS OF MAJOR TACTICAL AND

SUPPORT ELEMENTS OF U.S. AND FREE WORLD GROUND FORCES IN RVN ^{1/}



- 1/ assigned strength as of 1 Nov 71; maneuver battalion distribution as of 1 Jan 72.
- 2/ The 1st ABN redeployed 21 Dec 71; 1st ABN standing down for redeployment.
- 3/ The 2/31st ABN (-) redeployed to 2/3 Div.
- 4/ 1st ABN, 24 ABN Marine Bde redeployed 24 Dec 71.
- 5/ 24 ABN standing down for redeployment.

Source: USA, Army Activities Report- Jan 72


Figure IV-7

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Source: MACV Command History 1970 E-4

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WEATHER

(U) In the first 3 months of 1971, under northeast monsoon domination, there was little rainfall and mostly good weather in the south and west of the Annamite ridgeline. In MR 1 and northern MR 2, the northeast air flow caused poor weather for an average 20 days of each month. The transition month of April is traditionally a period of good weather and 1971 was no exception. However, the following 4 months of May through August brought the onset of the southwest monsoon (17 May) with its increase in shower-type rains in the south and four major storm systems, which caused heavy rains and high winds to affect various parts of the Republic. May was the month of most frequent thunderstorms in MRs 3 and 4. In addition, tropical storm Wanda struck the Republic near Chu Lai on 1 May and brought bad weather to the coast of MRs 1 and 2. In July, typhoons Harriet and Jean and tropical storm Kim brought heavy cloud cover, strong winds, and extensive rainfall to the northern half of the Republic between the 5th and 19th of the month. The transition period, shifting from the southwest to the northeast monsoon, started on 16 September when air flow from both directions began to affect the Republic, bringing heavy rains and low cloudiness to areas east of the ridgeline, and at the same time much improved conditions in the south. By mid-October the northeast monsoon finally gained dominance over RVN and typhoon Hester brought very heavy rain and damaging winds to MR 1 around 23 October; on the 27th a strong surge in the northeast flow caused 15 to 20 inches of rain to northern MR 1. Rainfall gradually declined in November and December in the northeast exp. areas, but periodic surges in the air flow made low cloud ceilings with light rain and drizzle a common occurrence.

(U) The effect of these weather conditions on ground operations was minimal, except for a significant number of aircraft destroyed or damaged at Chu Lai during Typhoon Hester. Throughout the battle area limited visibility conditions frequently were a constraint on the full use of airmobile and tactical air assets by maneuver units in a given operation, but never to the point of placing friendly forces at a major tactical disadvantage. The essential small unit nature of the ground war, as well as the continued upward trend in LOC improvements throughout the RVN, offset the negative impact of wet weather conditions upon ground mobility.

(U) For a detailed discussion of RVN climate, see Volume III, 1969 MACV Command History.

THE GROUND WAR BY MILITARY REGION

(S) As in the past, Allied operations to counter enemy plans for RVN in 1971 varied from region to region according to the situation. Following is a concise summary of combat operations during the year by military region, preceded by a terrain description for each MR.

MR 1

(U) Comprised of the five northern provinces of RVN, MR 1 is bordered on the west by Laos, with the South China Sea to the east as a natural boundary (see Figure IV-8). Roughly comparable in size to the state of Maryland, the region encompasses part of the northern highlands of RVN and is characterized by three types of terrain: the wide belt of mountains in the west, a narrow transitional piedmont in the middle, and coastal plains in the east.

(U) Forming the eastern edge of the Annamite Mountain chain, interspersed with large trees on slopes usually no larger than 2,100 meters, the highlands meet the South China Sea just north of Da Nang. The narrow piedmont, densely vegetated rolling hills, is dissected by numerous river valleys. In the coastal plains dense grass marshes, wet land rice and some dry crops

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
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A US infantry mortar squad fires defensive concentrations in support of company rifle platoons in the highlands west of Hue, MR 1.



Troops of the 173d Abn Bde clean weapons following a long-range patrol in the Central Highlands, MR 2.



An APC of the 2d Sqdn, 11th Armd Cav Regt in operation north of Saigon, MR 3.



Troops of the 21st ARVN Inf Div on an air-mobile operation approach a landing zone west of Can Tho, MR 4.

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cover this relatively flat strip, which extends the length of the coast. The eastern edge of the plains is a belt of beach and sand dunes, averaging 200 meters in width, and 3 to 20 meters in height.

(S) There were more Allied forces deployed in MR 1 than other MRs at the beginning of the year, because of the large number of enemy forces that still posed a threat. The activation of an ARVN division by the year's end sought to offset the impact of US redeployment. Friendly maneuver battalions devoted considerable effort to anti-infiltration operations in the western foothills and mountain areas, traditional operating areas of enemy main force units. These forces used air power extensively to destroy or neutralize base areas, interdict enemy movement, and frustrate his plans for reinforcement. Concurrently, Territorial Forces operated along the coastal areas and into the foothills, as they further expanded government influence and provided military support to community defense and local development.²⁶

(S) During January, combat activity in the northernmost military region was nil. The Territorial Forces continued an intensified program of saturation type operations (DONG KHOI) in the lowlands and populated areas, seeking to maintain an already established momentum in the elimination of the VCI and protection of the harvest. Maneuver forces continued search and clear operations against enemy main force units. An example was GOLDEN DRAGON II from 4 to 21 January, in which four battalions and a reconnaissance company of the 2d ROK Mar Bde operated in the highlands of the Que Son Mountains. Results were one enemy KIA and four weapons captured. Against a backdrop of low-level enemy activity characterized by small scale attacks-by-fire (ABF) in-country, and a massive logistics buildup north and west of the DMZ, plans were made for LAM SON 719, an ARVN cross-border operation. Targetted against enemy LOC and logistical bases in Laos, the attack would be supported by US/RVNAF TACAIR, ARC LIGHT strikes, gunships, and other airmobile support beyond RVNAF capabilities. The in-country US support for the operation began with DEWEY CANYON II in western Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. This combined US/RVNAF effort had two objectives: to secure Route 9 to the Lao-tian border, and to acquire staging areas for RVNAF forces who were to participate in LAM SON 719. The operation commenced 300001 Jan 71, with elements of the 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech), 101st Abn Div (Ambl), and the 1st ARVN Inf Div.²⁷ For a more detailed account of LAM SON 719, see Annex E.

(S) During February and March, I Corps forces were concerned largely with LAM SON 719 and DEWEY CANYON II, while two brigades of the 23d Inf Div (198th and 196th) participated in MIDDLESEX PEAK and FINNEY HILL, search and clear pacification support efforts in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. In an attack against fire support base (FSB) Mary Ann, southwest of Tam Ky in Quang Tin Province, the 198th Bde suffered 22 KIA, 70 WIA, and one 155mm howitzer destroyed on 22 March. Enemy casualties were 10 KIA.²⁸

(S) With termination of LAM SON 719 in April, Allied commanders continued intensified operations against enemy BAs, supply, and infiltration routes with LAM SON 720, a combined (101st Abn and 1st ARVN) Div operation targeted in the Da Krong and A Shau valleys of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. In support of the Territorial Forces operating in Quang Nam Province, the 51st Inf Rgt (ARVN) sought in HOANG DIEU 107 to clear and destroy enemy local force units and protect the rice harvest.

(S) In May there was an increase in friendly initiated contacts on LAM SON 720, especially in the A Shau Valley. JEFFERSON GLEN, an on-going (since September 1970) three battalion effort of the 101st Abn Div, continued in Thua Thien and southern Quang Tri Provinces. The US units, working jointly with elements of the 1st ARVN Div and Territorial Forces together accounted for more than 500 enemy KIA by the end of May. In spite of Allied offensive operations the enemy continued to demonstrate his ability to effectively use economy of force tactics to achieve maximum results. Using 11 122mm rocket rounds, he launched an attack-by-fire against FSB Charlie-2

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TAOR FOR THE 3D ARVN DIVISION




Figure IV-9

Source: MACJ3 WIEU Briefing, 13 Nov 71

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in Quang Tri Province on 21 May, killing 29 US and wounding 33. He relied on this tactic with success again 1 month later. Starting with more than 1,500 rounds of mixed direct and indirect fire, followed by coordinated ground attacks by unknown size forces, the enemy overran an infantry battalion of the 1st ARVN Div. This enemy pressure forced the Vietnamese to destroy four artillery tubes and evacuate FSB Fuller in Thua Thien Province on 23 June. By 27 June two battalions of the 2d Regt were able to reoccupy the base, which had been untouched by the enemy. Three separate rocket attacks against Da Nang during the first 8 days of June accentuated the reduced security conditions following the final standdown of the 1st Mar Div. The end of June saw the termination of Operation QUYET THANG 20/B. The operation involved forces from each of the three regiments of the 2d ARVN Div and the 77th Border Ranger Def Bn in search and clear operations in the vicinity of the junctions of Quang Ngai, Quang Tin, and Kontum provincial borders. Since 3 May, the operation had accounted for a total of 622 enemy KIA along with 185 IW and 30 CSW captured.²⁹

(S) The mid-year point passed in MR 1 without significant change in the enemy picture; however, the declining force level of US/FWMAF maneuver elements stimulated MACV and JGS planners to study means of reinforcing the area either through activation of a new ARVN division, or the transfer of combat units from other less threatened regions.

(S) In a countrywide move to reflect the diminishing role of US combat forces, US operations were redesignated at the end of July. JEFFERSON GLEN was renamed OPORD 13-70. The six-battalion US contribution to LAM SON 720 (which had increased to 20 RVNAF battalions) was redesignated FRAGO-041. Throughout August, the 11th Bde, 23d Inf Div continued its "dynamic defense" operations with four infantry battalions in Quang Ngai Province. The units of the 11th assisted the 2d ARVN Div and Territorial Forces in a rice denial campaign (a continuation of Operation QUYET THANG) and attempted to locate and destroy the VC Quang Ngai Provincial headquarters and the 21st NVA Regt. Their efforts were unsuccessful. During the same period the 198th Bde of the 23d Inf Div performed the "dynamic defense" role as well, spending considerable time and effort in the rocket belt west of Chu Lai. Allied combat power in MR 1 further diminished in August with the departure of maneuver battalions from the 5th Inf (Mech) and the 101st Abn Div.³⁰

(S) Early in September RVNAF planners launched an ambitious 2-week campaign, LAM SON 810, in which more than 16,000 troops of the 1st ARVN Div undertook an interdiction effort in western Quang Tri Province. When the operation ended on 19 September, ARVN units had seized four 122mm field guns, 11,000 gallons of fuel, 10 tons of rice, and killed 125 of the enemy at a cost of 13 KIA. The entire division then returned to their regimental locations to provide security for populated areas during the pending October presidential election period. Meanwhile, the 2d ARVN Div terminated its Operation QUYET THANG in the three southernmost provinces in MR 1 with more than 1,000 enemy KIA in 3 months.

(S) October was a significant month for the ARVN in MR 1. On 1 October, JGS directed I Corps to activate a new combat unit, the 3d Inf Div, along with two of its organic infantry battalions. The remaining maneuver units were to be redesignated from then-current MR 1 assets. The action filled an imminent void; in mid-October, both the 198th and 11th Bdes of the 23d Inf Div had ceased "dynamic defense" operations and had begun final standdown operations, along with one US armored cavalry squadron. The 101st Airborne's Operation OPORD 13-70 terminated on 8 October after 13 months of operations in Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces. Final results included 2,026 enemy KIA compared to 158 US KIA.

(S) By mid-November the new 3d Inf Div (-) assumed a TAOR along the DMZ in northern Quang Tri Province, with completion of activation expected by March 1972. (See Figure IV-9.) With the departure of the 23d Inf Div, XXIV Corps assumed control of the 196th Bde, which in turn was redeployed for "dynamic defense" in the rocket belt around Da Nang. The 1st ARVN Task

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ROK Marine troops flush out VC suspects from a hiding place west of Qui Nhon, MR 2.



An ARVN patrol fords a stream during a long-range patrol south of An Khe in MR 2.

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Force terminated its Operation HOANG DIEU III in Quang Nam Province on 27 November. At year's end MR 1 had six regimental size operations in progress, a few in coordination with Territorial Forces, and the last US Army Division in-country, the 101st at Phu Bai, was in a standdown posture.³¹

(S) The following statistics provide additional details of military operations during the year in MR 1.

THE WAR IN 1971 - MILITARY REGION 1

F&F Strengths (000)/Maneuver Bn, MR 1

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
RVNAF-Reg	92.3	83.7	83.8	79.8	80.8	79.8	80.6	80.5	80.1	80.4	81.2	82.6
RF/PF	81.9	30.0	80.4	80.4	80.8	81.2	82.1	80.9	79.9	79.9	80.2	80.0
US	113.5	119.6	114.7	100.7	88.4	83.2	81.3	77.2	76.1	66.2	63.5	46.8
Third Nation	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	6.9	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.1	7.1	7.5	5.1
Total FWF												
Strength	289.7	290.3	285.9	267.9	256.9	251.2	251.1	245.6	243.2	233.6	232.4	214.5
RVNAF-Reg	43	55	58	46	44	45	45	46	46	46	46	47
US	32	32	31	29	25	23	22	19	19	17	31	9
Third Nation	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3
Total Mvr Bn	79	91	93	79	73	72	71	69	69	67	62	59

Battalion Days on Larger Unit Operations

MR 1-US	784	804	791	830	757	712	657	595	551	442	343	369
RVNAF	2,263	2,944	3,443	3,064	3,850	3,785	4,496	4,252	4,270	4,622	4,612	3,366
FWMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	3,047	3,748	4,234	3,894	4,607	4,497	5,153	4,847	4,821	5,064	4,955	5,635

VC/NVA Killed in Action

MR 1-KIA by												
US/FW	758	463	695	492	370	375	317	276	219	45	56	43
KIA by RVN	1,171	1,133	1,535	1,647	1,931	2,632	1,401	2,012	1,620	788	976	1,001
Total VC/												
NVA KIA	1,929	1,596	2,231	2,139	2,301	3,007	6,184	2,288	1,849	833	1,032	1,047

US/RVNAF/FWAF Combat Deaths


MR 1-RVNAF	146	452	1,254	377	407	472	221	335	244	194	157	208
US	73	120	189	116	39	63	42	43	48	11	5	9
FWMA	5	8	10	10	3	7	5	6	2	7	4	2
Total	224	580	1,453	503	409	542	268	384	294	212	166	214

Source: JCS, Action Officer's Booklet - Jan 72.

Figure IV-10

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Source: MACV Command History 1970 p. E-41

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Figure IV-11

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MR 2

(U) A predominantly mountainous region, truncated in the east with a narrow coastal plain along the South China Sea, MR 2 contains an extensive area of high rolling plains along the border with Laos and Cambodia, and in the west central area. (See Figure IV-11.) The MR comprises nearly half the geographical area of RVN. With an average elevation of 2,500 meters, the highest peaks are found in Kontum Province. Rolling or hilly high plains cover much of the central and southern sectors of the region, while the nearly level coastal plain has less than 30 meters of local relief. A series of relatively short streams drain the eastern portion of MR 2 into the South China Sea, while most of the western half is drained by tributaries of the Mekong River. Rice cultivation dominates the coastal plain, with a mixture of grasslands and heavily forested areas the major characteristics of the rest of the region.

(S) MR 2, as did MR 1, faced a significant enemy main force threat in 1971. Despite a lower density of friendly units, Allied forces operated here much as they did in MR 1. As elsewhere, MR 2 experienced a low level of combat activity at the beginning of the year, except for an attack-by-fire against an ARVN ammunition depot at Qui Nhon on 7 January, which caused extensive damage. In accordance with the campaign plan, allied maneuver battalions concentrated their efforts against enemy main force units, especially in the west, while Territorial Forces were targeted against the VCI. At the end of their TET truce period, the enemy attacked several cities by fire; Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, Phu Cat, and Tuy Hoa. By early February, three battalions of the 22d ARVN Div's 42d Regt and the 22d ARVN Ranger Bn in Operation QUANG TRUNG 22/4 were conducting reconnaissance in force against the NVA 66th Inf and 40th Arty Regt in western Kontum Province. ROK maneuver forces operated along the coastal areas in support of pacification with limited enemy contact as well. The picture changed, however, by the end of February when two battalions of the 42d Regt were heavily engaged, and remained so through mid-March as they fought enemy forces in the southern portion of BA 609 in western Kontum Province.³²

(S) Early on the morning of 31 March FSB 6, an ARVN base camp in Kontum Province southwest of Dak To, received an ABF consisting of an unknown number of artillery and mortar rounds, followed by a ground attack by an estimated enemy company. Elements of the 42d Regt and 63d Arty Bn of the 22d ARVN Div were forced to abandon the FSB by evening, leaving behind four nonoperational 105mm howitzers and suffering light casualties. Additional maneuver units from the 23d ARVN Div, with supporting artillery, deployed on Operation QUANG TRUNG 22/1 to assist the 22d ARVN Div. Following ARC LIGHT strikes, intensive artillery preparation, and a multibattalion attack, FSB 6 was retaken on 1 April. Combat activity in the area had largely subsided by mid-April. With heavy enemy pressure concentrated in early May on another Allied position, FSB 5, in western Kontum Province, MR 2 forces reacted with 14 maneuver units from the 1st Abn Bde, 2d Ranger Gp, and 22d ARVN Div. Activity diminished by mid-May, permitting the redeployment of several units from the operational area.³³

(S) By early June, in the face of a continuing threat in the western highlands and an expected increase in enemy activity to coincide with the dry season and the coming GVN elections, the II Corps Commander considered reinforcement operations. Influenced furthermore by the pending standdown of US forces, he proposed that at least one ROK infantry division be moved from the coastal area into Binh Dinh and Pleiku provinces, with Territorial Forces assuming their previous mission. When the JGS rejected this course of action as having too many disadvantages, the CG requested instead the allocation of another ARVN division.³⁴ This request was also denied with the rationale that the General Reserve was always available if needed in emergencies, and that raising the operating strengths of ARVN divisions in MR 2 through an intensive recruitment program would help solve the problem.³⁵

(U) The following statistics provide additional details of military operations during the year in MR 2.

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Moving through thick tropical vegetation, an ARVN soldier carries his 90mm anti-tank weapon.



An ARVN unit headquarters element moves along a trail in western MR 1.

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THE WAR IN 1971 - MILITARY REGION 2

FWF Strengths (000)/Maneuver Bn, MR 2

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
RVNAF-Reg	85.5	84.5	85.8	88.0	88.3	86.6	86.4	83.3	83.6	83.8	83.7	83.7
RF/PF	119.9	119.4	118.6	119.5	120.2	120.8	120.9	120.3	120.1	119.6	120.2	120.5
US	82.4	71.7	65.1	67.7	65.9	53.8	56.9	49.8	48.8	45.7	39.3	35.0
Third Nation	36.5	35.8	35.8	35.7	35.7	35.7	35.5	35.5	35.5	35.5	36.0	35.4
Total FWF												
Strength	324.3	311.4	305.3	310.9	310.1	296.9	299.6	288.9	288.0	284.6	279.2	274.6
RVNAF-Reg	34	34	34	37	35	37	34	34	35	34	34	35
US	6	6	6	6	5	5	4	3	3	3	2	2
Third Nation	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Total Mvr Bn	58	58	58	61	58	60	56	55	56	55	54	55

Battalion Days on Larger Unit Operations

MR 2-US	217	216	196	172	195	154	71	52	38	27	0	0
RVNAF	1,740	2,944	3,014	2,908	3,242	2,459	1,816	6,495	5,983	6,570	6,616	6,560
FWMA	168	280	306	264	161	81	256	124	233	57	26	81
Total	2,126	3,440	3,516	3,344	3,598	2,694	2,143	6,671	6,254	6,654	6,642	6,641

VC/NVA Killed in Action

MR 2-KIA by												
US/FW	582	669	760	1,064	855	350	373	377	453	365	169	190
KIA by RVN	345	242	473	2,005	750	331	372	403	390	577	545	784
Total VC/												
NVA KIA	927	911	1,233	3,069	1,605	681	745	708	843	942	714	974



US/RVNAF/FWMAF Combat Deaths

MR 2-RVNAF	175	353	744	586	328	304	186	260	208	203	210	275
US	16	29	25	39	11	16	8	4	4	1	1	2
FWMA	20	27	68	66	40	26	33	26	17	13	10	22
Total	211	419	867	691	379	346	227	290	229	217	221	249

Source: JCS, Action Officer's Booklet - Jan 72.

Figure IV-12

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Source: MACV Command History 1970 (S/NF) p. E-84

Figure IV-13

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(S) A low level of combat activity prevailed during July, punctuated by a slight rise in attacks-by-fire. A high point occurred on 2 August when elements of the 44th ARVN Regt were heavily engaged with an estimated enemy battalion west of Tuy Hoa. On the 26th there was a successful enemy sapper attack against the Tri-Service Ammunition Storage Area at Cam Ranh Bay. At the end of August the 173d Abn Bde (US) departed from Bong Son. II Corps' forces reacted to enemy economy-of-force tactics by continuing to maintain pressure through search and destroy operations. Such an effort was BAK JUE 2-14, from 9 to 23 October in Khanh Hoa Province. During this period the ROKA 2d Bn, 29th Regt accounted for 51 KIA, 14 IW and 3 CSW captured, with no friendly casualties.³⁶

(S) Toward the end of November, intelligence indicators pointed towards an increased enemy threat from the B-3 Front area in the western highlands, with a possible attempt to interdict Route 19 between Pleiku and Qui Nhon. Allied reaction was timely, and on 27 November II Corps began Operation QUANG TRUNG II/4. The concept of operation envisioned an increase in border surveillance through the establishment of artillery-supported operational bases for saturation patrolling and ambushing along infiltration routes. Participating units under II Corps control included the 42d, 45th and 47th Regts, the 2d Ranger Gp, the Ranger Border Defense Bns, and a task force of four RF companies. When the operation terminated on 22 December, results were 228 enemy KIA, 5 PW, 42 IW, 15 CSW, and 1 radio set. Friendly casualties included 17 KIA and 84 WIA. Though the expected enemy offensive never materialized, Allied commanders in MR 2 fully expected such an event early in 1972.³⁷

MR 3

(U) The MR 3 region is best characterized as a transition zone with relief ranging from flat delta lands in the southwestern portion through gently rolling plains in the northeastern section. (See Figure IV-13.) From sea level in the south, elevation ranges to above 700 meters in the northeast. In the southeast a dense mangrove swamp, the Rung Sat Special Zone, is dissected by open waterways, while in the southwestern section of the MR wetland rice cultivation predominates. Rubber plantations, some primary forest, and extensive areas of shifting cultivation characterize the center sector of the region. The rivers in the area are generally wide and slow moving, draining south to the South China Sea. MR 3 is strategically important for the seat of government, in Saigon, and as the center of population and industry.

(S) Until early fall the relatively low level of combat activity in MR 3 permitted counter-infiltration operations by most of the RVN forces across the border in eastern Cambodia. Concurrently, Territorial Forces pursued the objectives of the GVN's pacification program. By late September, however, an enemy threat in the northwest became a reality.³⁸

(S) At the beginning of 1971 there was little combat activity in MR 3 as III Corps progressively positioned ARVN maneuver units to replace US forces along the border areas of operation. This forward deployment of the ARVN divisions was designed specifically to block the return of enemy main force units and to interdict his traditional infiltration routes. Vietnamese and Australian maneuver units continued to target against the 274th and 33d main force VC regiments in the Bien Hoa, Long Khanh, and Phuoc Tuy Province areas. Meanwhile, the RVN III Corps continued planning its forthcoming dry season cross-border campaign. To support the RVN effort, US forces were authorized by CINCPAC to provide TACAIR, ARC LIGHT, rotary wing troop lift, and other combat and combat service support. COMUSMACV therefore on 28 Jan 71 dispatched a broad guidance message to the appropriate US subordinates, outlining ROE in Cambodia, special authority, and restrictions for US support.

(U) The following statistics provide additional details of military operations during the year in MR 3.

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Weapons and equipment captured by RTAVF forces during a contact with VC Regt in Base Area 303, MR 3.



A 105mm howitzer crew supports an airmobile assault of the 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (Ambl) in MR 3.

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THE WAR IN 1971 - MILITARY REGION 3

FWF Strengths (000)/Maneuver Bn, MR 3

	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>
RVNAF-Reg	249.9	248.7	248.6	249.6	251.2	252.9	254.5	251.6	251.0	248.6	247.8	250.4
RF/PF	122.1	123.3	128.3	128.1	127.5	127.1	121.5	121.0	120.7	119.9	114.5	115.5
US	118.1	116.8	106.6	85.4	87.4	83.6	75.0	74.9	73.9	74.3	66.3	66.5
Third Nation	23.9	24.0	24.2	23.9	23.9	23.7	21.2	18.3	17.5	15.9	14.9	13.4
Total FWF												
Strength	514.0	512.8	507.8	487.0	490.0	487.2	471.2	465.8	463.2	458.7	443.5	445.8
RVNAF-Reg	63	52	51	60	64	61	64	63	62	63	63	64
US	16	16	14	9	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Third Nation	8	8	8	8	8	8	7	5	5	4	4	3
Total Mvr Bn	87	76	73	77	77	74	76	73	72	72	72	72

Battalion Days on Larger Unit Operations

MR 3-US	1,080	892	494	603	598	560	575	523	436	406	342	198
RVNAF	518	212	747	328	370	327	366	197	211	189	170	533
FWMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	1,599	1,104	1,241	931	968	887	941	720	647	595	512	731

VC/NVA Killed in Action

MR 3-KIA by												
US/FW	350	180	199	164	192	196	190	114	145	348	36	29
KIA by RVN	382	305	260	302	320	281	251	239	469	964	341	226
Total VC/												
NVA KIA	732	485	459	466	512	477	441	353	614	1,312	377	255



US/RVNAF/FWMAF Combat Deaths

MR 3-RVNAF	208	617	497	285	418	297	204	186	261	310	119	180
US	34	45	16	25	9	19	6	8	14	12	12	5
FWMA	5	13	26	10	7	11	6	0	9	0	0	2
Total	247	675	539	320	434	327	216	194	284	322	131	187

Source: JCS, Action Officer's Booklet - Jan 72.

Figure IV-14

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Source: MACV Command History 1970 F-116

Figure IV-15

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(S) On 4 February, III Corps launched the 1971 dry season campaign, TOAN THANG 01-71 NB, a combined ARVN - FANK effort to disrupt the enemy's attempts to reestablish his logistics bases along the Mekong River in Cambodia. This operation is discussed in Annex E. A noteworthy tactical adjunct to the Cambodian cross-border effort during this period, until the end of June, was the continuation of Operation HIGH POINT (DONG KHOI). Similar to the saturation operations conducted against the VC and VCI in MRs 1 and 4, it involved the total efforts of the Territorial Forces, the National Police, the Provincial Reconnaissance Units, Phung Hoang agencies, and the People's Self-Defense Forces against known and suspected VC and VCI targets. Immediate exploitation of PW, interdistrict and interprovince border operations, and extended field operations for Territorial Forces were significant characteristics of these saturation operations.³⁹

(S) With combat activity largely cross-border, the enemy slightly increased his contacts in March. During the first week 60 percent of these contacts involved RF/PF outposts, possible evidence of an enemy return to the strategy of "self-sufficiency" practiced during the early 1960s. This concept envisioned the seizure of isolated outposts for the purpose of obtaining weapons and ammunition. Elsewhere, as two brigades of the 1st Air Cav Div and the remaining brigade of the 25th Inf Div continued redeployment operations, ARVN cross-border operations continued through March with 16,000 participating, with no significant results. By the end of April, the departure of the three US brigades and most of the 11th Armd Cav Regt necessitated an even larger assumption of the security role by Territorial Forces. Low level combat activity prevailed March through June. By 30 June the DONG KHOI operation, now in its fifth phase, had achieved the following results: 1,277 enemy casualties and 774 weapons captured at a cost of 317 friendly casualties and 49 weapons lost.⁴⁰


(S) Except for a rocket attack on Bien Hoa airbase on 16 August, limited ground contact continued through July and August throughout MR 3. A brigade of the RTAVF redeployed from Bien Hoa Province by the end of August. Although RVN forces continued sustained ground operations in Cambodia, by late September, enemy activity significantly increased in the adjacent area in the northwestern part of Tay Ninh Province. Main force units launched coordinated attacks against RVNAF manpower battalions. III Corps rapidly reinforced the Tay Ninh area against enemy forces that included the entire 7th NVA Div. These enemy forces were attempting to make an impact on the GVN presidential election scheduled for 30 October. Their efforts were to no avail, and as a result of timely ARVN reinforcement and an integrated fire support plan, the enemy had suffered heavy casualties and had withdrawn most of his forces from Vietnam by 26 October. By 31 December, TOAN THANG 01-71NB had entered its sixth phase; all Australian Task Force maneuver units had redeployed; the remaining Thai Inf Bde was standing down; and the 3d Bde, 1st Air Cav Div, was deployed in a "dynamic defense" posture in the Bien Hoa-Long Binh-Saigon rocket belt.⁴¹

MR 4

(U) A vast alluvial plain, MR 4 is made up of wetland rice fields. Because of its low terrain and high water table, this Delta area has an intricate canal and stream network. Accordingly, during the wet season (mid-May to early October) water travel is possible anywhere in the region. (See Figure IV-15.)

(S) ARVN initiated operations dominated the southernmost area, MR 4, as they saturated the enemy strongholds with a sustained effort of search and clear operations. The two most noteworthy operations of this type during 1971 were the 21st ARVN Div's U Minh campaign, and the 9th ARVN Div's Seven Mountains effort in the western sector of the MR.⁴²

TAOR CHANGE-9TH AND 21ST ARVN DIVISIONS



Source: MACJ3 WIEU Briefing 29 Nov 71

Figure IV-16

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(S) January was characterized by scattered contacts, isolated ABFs, and infrequent ground activity; however, ARVN operations made the level of activity higher in MR 4 than in any other region. ARVN were also active cross-border from MR 4, in operations designed to deny the initiative to the enemy. On 13 January IV Corps launched Operation CUU LONG 44/02. A combined RVNAF/FANK effort to retake the Pich Nil Pass and open Route 4 in Cambodia from Kompong Speu to Kompong Som, this cross-border operation included units from the 369th VNMC Bde, 4th Armd Bde, and 4th Ranger Gp. The operation is discussed in Annex E. The 21st ARVN Div's U Minh campaign, which began in December 1970, continued in Bac Lieu Province against three enemy regiments. With this ambitious program, IV Corps sought to grind down enemy strength, condense enemy operating areas, and sever ties with the population. By mid-February, the 21st ARVN Div units had begun to experience moderate contact. Territorial Forces and other security units were deeply involved in a saturation-type DONG KHOI operation. While the 7th ARVN Div operated in Dinh Tuong Province, the 9th ARVN Div continued search and clear operations along the Cambodian border. All of these efforts contributed to denying the enemy the ability to maintain his hold on the countryside and restructure his logistical posture, which had been so heavily damaged in 1970 during the Allied Cambodian cross-border forays.

(S) An alarming increase in the number of friendly outposts overrun by mid-March indicated a new trend in enemy tactics. A major factor was that the enemy used bogus Hoi Chanb returnees to assist the attacks from within. By 21 June, 66 outposts had been overrun in the Delta. This figure was significant in that only 65 had been taken in MR 4 during all of 1970. The enemy had apparently found such attacks a successful tactic of significant psychological value with a deleterious impact on RF/PF morale. Meanwhile, the CUU LONG series of cross-border interdiction operations continued. They involved search and clear and river security patrols along the Mekong River in the vicinity of Neak Long, Cambodia.⁴³

(S) During July and August there was limited ground contact as RVNAF continued sustained ground operations in MR 4 and cross-border. DONG KHOI forays also continued. The heaviest fighting in the 10-month old U Minh campaign took place from 4 to 21 September, with each maneuver battalion of the 21st Div eventually engaged with the enemy. In a major realignment of forces in November, IV Corps assigned the Khmer Republic boundary area, the cross-border AO, and the provinces of Chao Doc, Kien Phong, and Kien Tuong to the newly reconstituted 44th STZ. (See Figure IV-16.) Adjustments were made of the three infantry division AO's as well, in an effort to enhance their combat effectiveness.

(S) With the termination of the U Minh campaign on 26 November, some observers believed that the enemy had suffered his worst defeat in the Delta since TET 1968. Instead of a much-needed victory, the enemy had lost 4,903 KIA, 524 detained, and 1,170 IW and CSW captured. The cost to RVNAF forces was 490 KIA, 1,302 WIA, 9 MIA and 33 IW lost. At the end of the year, DONG KHOI and intermittent limited objective cross-border operations characterized RVNAF ground efforts.

(U) The following statistics provide additional details of military operations during the year in MR 4.

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THE WAR IN 1971 - MILITARY REGION 4

FWF Strengths (000)/Maneuver Bn, MR 4

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
RVNAF-Reg	98.6	97.8	99.5	98.7	97.6	97.5	98.1	97.9	97.0	95.6	95.5	97.3
RF/PF	213.9	211.6	212.6	214.3	214.1	214.2	214.8	216.7	215.5	215.4	217.5	216.2
US	16.7	16.4	15.4	16.2	8.5	18.6	11.9	14.0	14.2	10.1	9.5	8.5
Third Nation	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0
Total FWF												
Strength	329.3	325.9	327.6	329.3	320.3	330.4	324.9	328.6	326.7	321.1	322.5	322.0
RVNAF-Reg	49	48	46	46	46	46	46	46	46	46	46	45
US	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Third Nation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Mvr Bn	49	48	46	46	46	46	46	46	46	46	46	45

Battalion Days on Larger Unit Operations

MR 4-US	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RVNAF	2,108	1,680	1,708	3,413	4,593	6,222	6,159	7,064	5,298	5,493	4,143	5,281
FWMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	2,108	1,680	1,708	3,413	4,593	6,222	6,159	7,064	5,298	5,493	4,143	5,281

VC/NVA Killed in Action

MR 4-KIA by												
US/FW	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KIA by RVN	1,690	2,391	2,497	2,769	2,571	2,325	2,211	1,608	2,201	1,775	1,773	1,349
Total VC/												
NVA KIA	1,690	2,391	2,497	2,769	2,571	2,325	2,211	1,608	2,201	1,775	1,773	1,349

US/RVNAF/FWMAF Combat Deaths

MR 4-RVNAF	809	936	1,033	894	860	705	727	652	823	705	675	699
US	11	8	16	6	4	4	6	3	8	1	1	2
FWMA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	820	944	1,049	900	864	709	733	655	831	706	676	701

Source: JCS, Action Officer's Booklet - Jan 72.

Figure IV-17

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CHAPTER V

NAVAL OPERATIONS

(C) The US Navy combat mission in South Vietnam was steadily reduced during 1971, as the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) assumed an ever greater responsibility for naval operations. Yet the US Navy was still engaged in air operations, sea interdiction, gunfire support, and some brown water operations. Navy air contributed to the combined interdiction campaigns along with US Navy ships off-shore which guarded against infiltration by sea. Gunfire support ships off the coast of South Vietnam continued to support troops in combat as well as provide harassment and interdiction fire on targets of opportunity. Although operational control of the brown water interdiction campaigns on the Delta was transferred to the VNN during 1971, the US Navy was still engaged in air support and advisory assistance. Primary among the US Navy's mission, however, was the continuing Vietnamization program. The equipping and developing of the VNN in order to expedite the success of Vietnamization was the US Navy's major activity during the year.

ACCELERATED TURNOVER - ACTOV

US NAVY ROLE IN VIETNAMIZATION

(C) The process of making the VNN self-sufficient, one of the goals of Vietnamization, had begun in 1968 with the development of the Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese (ACTOV) plan. ACTOV provided for time-phased turnover of US equipment and responsibilities to the Vietnamese consistent with their ability to assume the responsibilities, properly utilize the equipment, and fulfill the newly assigned missions. The process was to be completed by the end of fiscal year 1972.

(C) The Vietnamese with the assistance of the US Navy had made significant progress prior to 1971. As the year began the ACTOV program was very close to schedule. Illustrative of the Navy's efficiency in conducting the ACTOV program was the reduction of its in-country strength. From November 1968 to January 1971 US naval strength had dropped from 39,265 to 16,757 and it seemed likely that the USN would meet its goal of less than 3,000 personnel in-country by 30 Jun 72. Although the turnover program would be completed by that time, some US naval advisors would still be needed to work with the VNN.

(C) ACTOV proved to be an enormous task involving far more than the simple transfer of US Navy responsibilities and materiel to Vietnamese ownership. It involved a comprehensive training program in every facet of naval operations from command and control functions to basic ship maintenance. The scope of the program was as extensive as the vast number of functions performed by the navy. Each system required its own specialized training. In addition to training, the ACTOV program required the establishment of a responsive supply system supported by long-term aid arrangements with the US.


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The "work horse" of the Delta, the PBRs are the only craft assigned to the 14 VNN patrol divisions, a far cry from their original pleasure boat design.



Training of young VNN officers includes orientation cruises aboard "blue water" ships of the US Seventh Fleet off the coast of Vietnam.

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DEVELOPMENT OF THE VNN

History of the VNN

(U) Originally the Vietnamese Navy was a part of the Army. In 1954 when the French relinquished control of Vietnam, the French Navy left the Vietnamese 14 ships, six Dinassauts (River Assault Groups), and a very small number of Vietnamese officers and petty officers. By 1961 the Vietnamese Navy had acquired a few additional ships and boats from the US Navy, the largest of which were Landing Ship Mediums (LSM): these acquisitions brought the VNN force to 23 ships and 197 boats, and the personnel strength to 5,000 men.

(U) The VNN expanded rapidly between 1962 and 1964. Training facilities, repair bases, and logistic support facilities were established, communications equipment and networks were improved, and organizational and administrative procedures were strengthened. The number of ships and craft increased to over 250 and the personnel strength to 8,100 men.

(U) By the end of 1965 the VNN had almost doubled its 1964 personnel strength. This was in part the result of having integrated the paramilitary junk force into the Navy. This force, an off-shoot of the small anti-infiltration fleet established by the GVN in 1956, had been taken over by the Ministry of Defense in 1960. By 1965 it had grown to well over 100 junks and the GVN ordered it reincorporated into the VNN. At the end of 1967 the personnel strength of the VNN had increased to 16,300. The number of ships had increased to 41 patrol craft, 24 logistic craft, 232 river assault groupcraft, 290 junks, and 52 miscellaneous craft.

(C) Throughout 1968 the VNN had placed greater emphasis on the improvement and the expansion of their training program, which began as additional naval craft arrived. By the end of 1968 long-range plans had been formulated under ACTOV for the turnover of the majority of US naval waterborne assets in Vietnam to the VNN. To meet the manpower requirements of its growing assets, the VNN increased personnel to 24,500 by the end of October 1969 and again to 40,689 by December 1970. As the VNN gained experience and graduated more officer trainees and enlisted recruits, they received additional craft and responsibilities.¹

(C) At the close of 1971 the VNN personnel strength was 42,267 and ships and craft numbered over 1,600. The VNN had made tremendous advances in all aspects of naval development. Even though some areas had failed to reach expectations, the small nucleus of personnel and assets in 1961 had become by 1971 a large and effective naval force.²


VNN Training

(C) The need for trained personnel for the VNN was met by the establishment of ambitious training programs. Naval training centers were located at Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon. In addition to these centers, special training classes were located throughout RVN. Also 12 classes of officer candidates from the VNN attended the USN officer candidate school (OCS) in Newport, R.I.; a total of 744 Vietnamese Navy personnel successfully completed the OCS training at Newport and became VNN officers over a 2-year period.³

(C) The training centers in Vietnam performed in an outstanding manner graduating personnel in a continuing flow from the various schools. The Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay training centers graduated 1,948 and 1,065 personnel respectively during calendar year 1971.⁴

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NEW FLAGSHIP - the Tran Hung Dao (HQ-1) formerly the USS Camp.

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(C) An example of a specialized class was the strenuous 16-week explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) course. VNN students, all volunteers, completed the course and in May 1971 assumed EOD responsibilities. The USN did maintain a two-man mobile EOD advisory element within each military region. The USN counterparts considered the VNN EOD personnel to be outstanding and very professional in the performance of duties.⁵

Craft Turnover

(C) The majority of US small craft scheduled for turnover to the VNN had been transferred prior to the beginning of 1971. During January there was another major transfer of ships. Two high endurance Coast Guard Cutters, USCGC Yakuta (WHEC 380) and USCGC Bering Strait (WHEC 382) were renamed Tran Nhat Duat (HQ-3) and Tran Quang Khai (HQ-2), respectively, on 1 Jan 71 in a ceremony at the Vietnamese Navy HQ in Saigon. These were the largest and most formidable ships in the VNN; they carried five inch guns and could reach speeds of over 15 knots. Training for the takeover had begun the previous January when 15 VNN enlisted men reported aboard each vessel. When all training was completed the twin cutters carried full crews of 154 men, including officers. Both of the ships were assigned to the MARKET TIME outer barrier operations, thus beginning the real "blue water" Vietnamese Navy.⁶

(C) A major event in the ACTOV program occurred on 13 February when the USS Camp (DER 251) was decommissioned by the USN, turned over to the VNN, and renamed Tran Hung Dao (HQ-1), in honor of the first hero of the Vietnamese Navy. The ceremony took place in Pearl Harbor, with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) of the Vietnamese Navy, RADM Chon, and COMNAVFORV VADM King flying from Vietnam to make the transfer. This ship was also destined to join the blue water VNN and support MARKET TIME operations.⁷

(C) By the end of March the status of craft turnover was 650 small combatants, 103 harbor and mine craft, 5 large combatants, and 67 logistics and support craft. Another 138 USN craft remained to be turned over to the VNN. The USS Garrett County (AGP 786) was transferred to the VNN in Guam on 23 April. This tender had made her initial appearance in Vietnamese waters in March 1967, supporting boats assigned to the River Division in the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ). After several years of supporting boats in various operations she was sent to Guam for overhaul in preparation for turnover to the VNN.⁸

(C) The craft turnover continued through mid-1971 with the first refrigerated storage craft, the YFR 889, turned over to the VNN in May. Craft turnover took place as the VNN had trained personnel to assume the responsibility to man them. In July another 15 craft were turned over, the majority being logistic support type. The yard repair craft, a 155 foot floating workshop, was also turned over to the VNN; this increased the boat repair capability considerably. Prior to the actual transfer VNN personnel were trained in the various repair skills needed to perform the mission of the YFR, and five US navymen remained onboard as advisors after the craft was turned over.⁹

(C) A total of 62 ships and craft were turned over in September 1971, a figure rivaling the December 1970 mass turnover of combat PBR. Included were the USS Forester (DER 334), USS Satyr (ARL 23), a Coast Guard lightship, two repair, berthing and messing barges (YRBM), 12 LCMs and assorted utility and small craft. The Forester became the Tran Khanh Du (HQ-4). The Satyr, a landing craft repair ship, was turned over at a ceremony at Long Xuyen support base. This ship, valued at an estimated US\$5.5 million, had been providing repair services and logistic support for VNN riverine assault and coastal patrol craft operating in the Mekong Delta. The Coast Guard lightship (WLV 523) became the VNN lightship Ba Dong. It was scheduled to be operational in February 1972 and to be used as the ACTOVRAD gap filler, between Vung Tau and

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Con Son Island where the coastal radars could not give adequate coverage. The two non-self-propelled barges, YRBM 16 and YRBM 21, were a most welcome addition to the VNN, which needed their repair capabilities.

(C) The ACTOV craft program in Da Nang exemplified the results achieved under the accelerated program. More than 2 years of concentrated effort ended in September 1971 when the last five boats of the Military Region (MR) 1 portion of the ACTOV craft program were turned over to the VNN. Since the first transfer in August 1969, over 100 boats had been transferred to the VNN at Da Nang. Warrant Officer Sorensen, Da Nang's ACTOV Division Officer, commented on the excellent condition of the craft:

All the boats that we've turned over are in as good a shape as they were when they were new. The boats are stripped down to bare metal and repainted, inside and out. All equipment is removed and overhauled, and all electrical circuits are checked and tested. They're good-looking craft when we're through with them and they run well.¹⁰

(C) In spring 1970 there had been about 275 US navymen in the ACTOV Division at Da Nang doing all turnover work on the boats. By September 1971 there were only 22 US navymen remaining as advisors in the division. As a result of the acceleration, the ACTOV craft program at Da Nang which had been projected to end June 1972 was completed in September 1971, 9 months early.¹¹

(C) During October extensive shakedown training for the VNN crews of the two US Coast Guard cutters took place at Subic Bay, P.I., while the Coast Guard personnel trained the VNN crews for the ships to be turned over later in the year. The turnover program continued with 21 remaining craft scheduled for transfer to the VNN in the ACTOV craft program.¹²

(C) Six Boston Whalers were turned over to the VNN in November. The VNN continued to maintain a steady input of trained personnel to take over the ships and craft as rapidly as possible.¹³ The ACTOV craft program neared completion during December as two US Coast Guard cutters, 10 more Boston Whalers, one LCU and one LCM3 (pusher) were transferred. On 21 December, after many weeks of rigorous training sessions under US Coast Guard supervision, the USCGC Castle Rock (WHEC 383) and USCGC Cock Inlet (WHEC 384) were turned over at ceremonies at the VNN shipyard in Saigon. This transfer of ships brought to an end the US Coast Guard participation in MARKET TIME Operations. The cutters became the Tran Binh Trang (HQ-5) and Tran Quoc Toan (HQ-6).

(C) During 1971 a total of six ships and 151 logistics and support craft were turned over to the VNN. Altogether 957 ships and craft had been turned over to the VNN since the ACTOV craft program commenced.¹⁴

Base Construction and Turnover

(C) Turnover of logistic and support assets was of paramount importance in 1971. As described by RADM Sailer in April when he became COMNAVFORV:

ACTOVLOG does not refer solely to construction of bases or portions of bases, but rather connotes the overall program building up the VNN logistic infrastructure including complete bases, transportation, supply, pay, subsistence, base and craft maintenance, and all other of the logistic program.¹⁵

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(C) Early in 1971 35 bases were programmed for turnover to the VNN. These included logistic support bases (LSB), intermediate support bases (ISB), operational bases (OPBASE), and advance tactical support bases (ATSB). As the ACTOV program moved forward it was reviewed continuously to insure that the needs of the VNN were being met and changes made when necessary. By the end of March it was determined that two of the bases could be eliminated, leaving a total of 33 bases to become VNN assets. In addition to these bases, there were 15 radar sites being constructed for direct turnover. The radar sites are discussed in the MARKET TIME section of this chapter.¹⁶

(C) The LSB at Cat Lo was turned over on 28 Apr 71, the first of seven LSB to be transferred. The Cat Lo LSB provided logistic support for coastal patrol craft of the VNN's Coastal Surveillance Flotilla Three which operated along the South China Sea coastline of MRs 3 and 4. It had the facilities and personnel necessary to provide major overhaul on patrol craft. The base also served as headquarters for the VNN's Third Coastal Zone Commander. Also, during the month the ISB at Ben Luc was turned over to the VNN. This base, located about 20 miles southwest of Saigon, was the first of twelve ISBs to be transferred. The ISB at Ben Luc provided logistic support and repair facilities for naval forces operating from the ATSBs around the Parrot's Beak region. The transfer of these support facilities signified the VNN's ability to assume responsibility of supporting their combat units. There were six ATSBs turned over to the VNN during April, as well as one OPBASE transferred on 30 April.¹⁷

(C) Another major achievement took place on 25 May when the LSB at An Thoi on Phu Quoc Island was turned over. The base, which supported coastal surveillance forces assigned to the VNN Coastal Flotilla Four, had for the past 5 years been a key base for allied coastal patrol forces operating along the Gulf of Thailand coastline of Vietnam.¹⁸ In June the ISB at Rach Soi was turned over to the VNN, the 19th base transferred under the ACTOV program. The mission of the ISB at Rach Soi was to provide logistic support and repair facilities for VNN forces operating in and around the U Minh Forest in southern MR 4.¹⁹

Conclusion

(C) The ACTOV program continued throughout the summer and fall of 1971, with LSB, ISB, ATSB, and OPBASE becoming the responsibility of the VNN as their personnel were trained to man them. At the close of the year, 29 of these support bases, of the 33 programmed, had been transferred to the VNN; the remaining four bases were to be turned over by mid-1972. Some changes in the program had taken place and more would occur as reviews were made, but in total the ACTOV program was a success. The challenge had been great for both the US Navy and the Vietnamese Navy, but through mutual cooperation and dedicated effort, the VNN had been developed in little more than 10 years into one of the 10 largest navies in the world.

VNN OPERATIONS

(C) Vietnamese naval operations in 1971 consisted of riverine operations, coastal surveillance and interdiction operations, naval gunfire support, point-to-point logistic sealift, civic action, and psychological warfare. Riverine operations included river and canal patrols, interdiction barriers, mine countermeasures, convoy escort, river assault, and underwater demolition team operations.

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VNN OPERATIONS DURING 1971

(C) The following summarizes the status of VNN operations during 1971:

<u>MR</u>	<u>VNN Name</u>	<u>Type Operation</u>	<u>USN Name</u>
4	TRAN HUNG DAO I*	A riverine operation along the Vinh Te Canal; replaced by THD XX on 10 Mar 71.	
3	TRAN HUNG DAO II*	A riverine operation conducted on the Vam Co Tay and Van Co Dong rivers; replaced by THD XXIV and THD XXV on 31 Jul 71.	GIANT SLINGSHOT
4	TRAN HUNG DAO IV**	A riverine and area pacification operation on the Cua Lon, Dam Doi, and Bo De rivers on the Ca Mau peninsula; formerly THD III: USN turned over operational command to VNN on 1 Apr 71.	SOLID ANCHOR (Formerly SEAFLOAT)
3	TRAN HUNG DAO V*	A riverine operation conducted on the upper Saigon and Thi Tinh rivers to interdict infiltration into Saigon area; replaced by THD XXVII on 1 Oct 71.	READY DECK
4	TRAN HUNG DAO VI*	A riverine operation conducted on a network of canals northeast of Rach Gia City; replaced by THD XXVIII 27 Nov 71.	SEARCH TURN
4	TRAN HUNG DAO VIII*	A riverine operation conducted on the Mekong River and associated canals in the 7th ARVN Div AO; replaced by THD XXVI on 20 Sep 71.	BLUE SHARK
4	TRAN HUNG DAO IX*	A riverine operation conducted on the Grand Canal between An Long and Tuyen Nhon; replaced by THD XXV on 1 Aug 71.	BARRIER REEF
4	TRAN HUNG DAO X*	A riverine operation conducted on the Ong Doc River along the southern border of the U Minh Forest; replaced by THD XVII on 5 Jun 71.	BREEZY COVE
4	TRAN HUNG DAO XIV*	A riverine operation in the lower Mekong River area; replaced by THD XIX on 26 Jan 71.	BLUE SHARK
NA	TRAN HUNG DAO XV**	A coastal surveillance and interdiction operation conducted along the RVN coastline to 12 miles seaward.	MARKET TIME (Inner Barrier)
NA		US interdiction operation conducted beyond the 12-mile limit seaward.	MARKET TIME (Outer Barrier)**

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MR	VNN Name	Type Operation	USN Name
4	TRAN HUNG DAO XVII*#	A riverine operation conducted on the rivers and canals in the U Minh Forest in support of RVNAF ground forces; replaced by THD XXI on 1 Jul 71.	
4	TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII*	A river escort operation with a mission to escort commercial and military water craft on the Mekong River between the RVN border and Phnom Penh.	
4	TRAN HUNG DAO XIX*	A riverine operation conducted on the Mo Cay Canal and the Ben Tre and Ba Lai rivers; expanded and superseded THD XIV on 25 Jan 71, replaced by THD XXVI on 20 Sep 71.	
4	TRAN HUNG DAO XX#	A riverine operation conducted on the lower reaches of the Vin Te Canal; replaced THD I on 10 Mar 71.	
4	TRAN HUNG DAO XXI	A riverine operation combining areas formerly covered by THD X and XVII; replaced by THD XXIX on 1 Dec 71.	
4	TRAN HUNG DAO XXII	Special convoy that took RVN Prime Minister to Phnom Penh (25-26 May 71).	
NA	TRAN HUNG DAO XXIII	PW repatriation effort (ended 4 Jun 71).	
3/4	TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV#	Replaced part of THD II; commenced 31 Jul 71.	
4	TRAN HUNG DAO XXV#	Replaced part of THD II and THD IX; commenced 20 Sep 71.	
4	TRAN HUNG DAO XXVI#	Replaced THD VIII; commenced 30 Sep 71.	
3	TRAN HUNG DAO XXVII#	Replaced THD V; commenced 30 Sep 71.	
4	TRAN HUNG DAO XXVIII#	Replaced THD VI; commenced 27 Nov 71.	
4	TRAN HUNG DAO XXIX#	Replaced THD XXI; commenced 4 Dec 71.	
3/4	RUNG SAT Special Zone (RSSZ)*#	VNN provided security for shipping transiting the Long Tau channel to Saigon. In addition a VNN commander exercised tactical control of all RF/PF in the RSSZ AO.	
1	CHI LANG I*#	A riverine operation conducted on the Cua Dai River.	SEA TIGER/ CLEARWATER
1	CHI LANG II#	A riverine operation conducted in the vicinity of Hue.	

* Operations on-going at the beginning of 1971

*# Operational control of TRAN HUNG DAO IV (SOLID ANCHOR) turned over to VNN on 1 Apr 71

*** MARKET TIME outer barrier combined operation under USN control

Operations continuing at the close of 1971


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SEA LORDS



Source: COMNAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary

Figure V-1

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SEA LORDS OPERATIONS

Background

(C) Operation SEA LORDS (Southeast Asia Lake-Ocean-River-Delta-Strategy) was initiated by COMNAVFORV in late October 1968. The operation ultimately included six subordinate operations.²⁰ (See Figure V-1.)

<u>USN Name</u>	<u>VNN Name</u>	<u>Map</u>
GLANT SLINGSHOT	TRAN HUNG DAO II	Figure V-2
SOLID ANCHOR*	TRAN HUNG DAO IV*	Figure V-3
READY DECK	TRAN HUNG DAO V	Figure V-4
SEARCH TURN	TRAN HUNG DAO VI	Figure V-5
BARRIER REEF	TRAN HUNG DAO IX	Figure V-6
BREEZY COVE	TRAN HUNG DAO X	Figure V-7

* Formerly SEA FLOAT/TRAN HUNG DAO III


(C) The SEA LORDS mission was to strike deep into previously secure enemy strongholds and interdict the network of rivers and canals which served as enemy LOC in MRs 3 and 4. These brown water operations were designed to achieve the following tasks:

- Interdict infiltration from Cambodia.
- Establish and maintain a patrol presence on the Cambodian border waterways.
- Pacify key trans-Delta waterways.
- Pacify Bassac Island complexes.
- Harass the enemy by river raids into areas formerly immune to attack from waterways.
- Ascertain the feasibility of interdiction on other waterways.

(C) Although SEA LORDS was initially a combined USN/VNN operation, the VNN gradually assumed control of the various subordinate operations as their military capability increased. All SEA LORDS operations except SOLID ANCHOR became VNN unilateral operations prior to January 1971.²¹

(C) SEA LORDS operations were similar in that the same type boats and watercraft were used in each operation to achieve mission objectives. The US Navy provided limited air assets through Light Helicopter Attack Squadron Three (HAL-3), with their UH-1 gunships (Seawolves), and Light Attack Squadron Four (VAL-4), with OV-10 Bronco aircraft (Black Ponies). Both made tremendous contributions to the success of SEA LORDS operations. The HAL-3 Seawolves were armed with a rapid firing mini-gun on each side, fourteen 2.75-inch rockets, and M-60 and .50 caliber door-mounted machineguns. The VAL-4 Black Ponies were armed with eight to 16 5-inch Zuni rockets, 19 2.75-inch rockets, one 20mm rapid firing cannon, and four internally mounted M-60 machine guns. These US Navy aircraft continued to provide support after the VNN assumed control of a particular operation. The squadrons were based at Binh Thuy, about 80 miles southwest of Saigon. HAL-3 had nine detachments located at strategic points throughout MR 4 and southern MR 3, including four detachments in the heart of formerly undisputed Viet Cong territory.

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GIANT SLINGSHOT

Source: COMNAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary

Figure V-2

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(C) In August, a typical month for the Seawolves, HAL-3 gunships flew 1,044 missions, in which 144 made enemy contact: 44 enemy were killed; and 192 structures, 151 bunkers, and 176 sampans were damaged or destroyed. That same month the Black Ponies flew 556 missions, killing 115 enemy and damaging or destroying 135 structures, 21 sampans, and 280 bunkers. A significant action occurred on 11 August in Kien Phong Province, where the 986th RF company encountered a heavily defended treeline. OV-10 aircraft were requested and provided rocket and machine gun fire, killing 24 enemy soldiers and contributing to the capture of various individual weapons and an 82mm mortar.

(U) Reversing the close ties between the naval air units and the SEA LORDS operations, Captain W. J. Crowe, USN, Senior Advisor/Deputy Commander to TRAN HUNG DAO (DEPCOMTHD), sent the following message to HAL-3 on the occasion of his relief:

. . . my deep appreciation for the outstanding combat support which the officers and enlisted men of HAL-3 have consistently furnished to the TRAN HUNG DAO campaigns. My close association with HAL-3 has been one of the highpoints of my tour in Vietnam and I have developed the greatest respect for your organization's courage and professionalism.²³

GIANT SLINGSHOT/TRAN HUNG DAO II/XXIV/XXV

(C) GIANT SLINGSHOT, the first of the SEA LORDS operations, was originally conceived in late 1968 as a 3-month interdiction effort against enemy LOC in the Parrot's Beak region. (See Figure V-2.) This area of operation lay between the Vam Co Tay and Van Co Dong rivers, penetrating deep into III Corps Tactical Zone toward Saigon. The concept of operation required close coordination between ground patrol reaction forces along river banks and VNN riverine forces. In May 1970 the Vietnamese assumed command and GIANT SLINGSHOT was named TRAN HUNG DAO II. The change of command caused no immediate change in operating methods.²⁴


(C) Enemy forces in the Parrot's Beak region avoided contact with VNN elements during the first several months of 1971. They concentrated on recruiting (especially for main force units), revitalization of the VC infrastructure, and attacks against the pacification program. Combat activity in the GIANT SLINGSHOT AO, with few minor exceptions, remained at a low level during the year.

(C) During January, VNN forces initiated five contacts to the enemy's four. Despite intelligence reports that the 7th NVA Div was infiltrating into Tay Ninh Province from Cambodia, a real threat never materialized, and Allied waterborne forces made few enemy contacts. Two significant noncombat accomplishments late in the month, however, demonstrated the versatility of the VNN. Harbor Clearance Unit One successfully raised two sunken fuel barges in the AO, an 11,000 gallon craft at Ben Keo and a 70,000 gallon barge at Ben Luc. In mid-February, VNN forces contributed 26 craft as a blocking force inside Cambodia on the Van Co Dong River. This VNN participation in III Corps operation TOAN THANG 01/71 (discussed in more detail in Annex E) posed no serious hindrance to Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT, since no more than 10 boats at a time were used.

(C) In July the enemy carried out five successful boat ambushes. One such action took place on the Vam Co Tay River, resulting in one VNN KIA, four VNN and one USN WIA, and one PBR extensively damaged. The incident confirmed the VNN intelligence analysts' suspicions that enemy elements had infiltrated an area through the MR 3 and 4 boundary line, to some tactical advantage. To correct the situation caused by divided responsibility, a decision was made to reorganize the AO. On 31 Jul 71, two new operations, TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV and TRAN HUNG

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Source: COMNAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary

Figure V-3

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DAO XXV, replaced TRAN HUNG DAO II. The TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV AO included the eastern portion of the Vam Co Tay River and the Van Co Dong River to the Cambodian border, all within MR 3. The TRAN HUNG DAO XXV AO, all within MR 4, included the western section of the Vam Co Tay River from the boundary line of MR 3 and 4, located 5 miles east of Tuyen Nhon, to the Cambodian border as well as the canals and waterways along the river. ²⁵

(C) Activity remained reasonably light in TRAN HUNG DAO XXIV and TRAN HUNG DAO XXV for the remainder of the year. The VNN, assisted by USN advisors, HAL-3 Seawolves, and Val-4 Black Ponies, progressively improved performance in their assigned mission.

SOLID ANCHOR/TRAN HUNG DAO IV

(S) Operation SOLID ANCHOR, a follow-on to SEA FLOAT, had the mission of establishing an operational coastal group junk/patrol craft fast (PCF) base at old Nam Can City, to assist expansion of GVN control throughout Nam Can District and An Xuyen Province. (See Figure V-3.) In addition the combined US/RVN forces were directed to conduct tactical combat and psychological operations against enemy forces. The Nam Can District had been under VC domination for many years, and until June 1969 the AO had been an area of VC infiltration, rest, training, propaganda, and extortion. Construction of the SOLID ANCHOR site at old Nam Can commenced in October 1969. This advance tactical support base (ATSB) was to replace SEA FLOAT Hq, at the mobile advance tactical support base (MATSB) in the Cua Lon River near old Nam Can. On 1 Sep 70 the SEA FLOAT base was moved ashore and became the headquarters for SOLID ANCHOR. ²⁶

(C) The new year presented a challenge to the combined US/VNN forces of Operation SOLID ANCHOR. This last US-controlled naval operation, functioning in one of the most hostile areas of South Vietnam, continued to suffer from supply and repair difficulties and incessant Communist harassment. The base was bombarded four times during January, and three Allies were killed and 40 wounded. Of the 10 PCF assigned to the Nam Can AO, normally only one boat was totally operational, with an average of four boats completely inoperative. The assault craft of the River Assault and Interdiction Division (RAID) presented an equally dismal record with an average of only 44 percent availability. Commander Naval Support Activity Saigon (COMNAVSUPACT), in attempting to explain this unsatisfactory performance, pointed out the lack of preventive maintenance by VNN boat crews, incomplete and untimely submission of work requests, and repair capability limitations of the Nam Can repair barge.

(C) The abrupt cancellation of regularly scheduled VNN resupply runs to the isolated Nam Can ATSB in early January forced the Commander Task Group (CTG) to adopt emergency measures. As artillery ammunition and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) supplies became dangerously low, the USS Park County (LST 1077) made a risky but uneventful voyage up the Son Go De River bringing emergency supplies from Saigon. By late January vital stores were depleted and supplies were airlifted to SOLID ANCHOR as a stopgap relief measure. Resupply difficulties remained a crucial factor in the lower Ca Mau peninsula area. Early in February, for example, the failure of an oil tanker to make a scheduled POL supply run caused a brief reduction in combat capability. ²⁷

(C) Early in January the SEALs had concentrated on interdicting VC supply routes and in training the newly arrived Lien Doi Nhoui Nhui (LDNN), the VNN underwater demolition team. Large quantities of supplies and materiel were captured or destroyed by the USN SEAL teams and the LDNN. Even though heavy contact with the enemy was avoided, one USN advisor was killed and several wounded. On the night of 25 January as TET started, the VC launched an intensive attack, lobbing 75 to 100 82mm rounds into the base. ²⁸

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SOLID ANCHOR HQ, a shore-based Advanced Tactical Support Base (ATSB) being constructed to replace SEA FLOAT HQ anchored in the Cua Long River.

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(C) In February several US advisors and Vietnamese sailors of the RAID boats and the PCEs were wounded in riverine ambushes during patrols. The Allied boats were operating in an area where for several months the VC had kept local woodcutters from using certain canals. Acting on Hoi Chanh intelligence, 24 SEALs, seven Kit Carson Scouts, and one LDNN squad were inserted along the Tac Ong Thay Canal. In several hours of patrolling, during which USCGC Rush (WHEC 733), USCGC Morgenthau (WHEC 722), Army helicopter gunships and Navy Sea-wolves saturated the area with fire, the SEAL team discovered and destroyed 45 hootches, confirming the area as a Communist stronghold.

(C) By March, intelligence sources indicated that large enemy units were being forced south from the U Minh Forest into the Nam Can AO by the 21st ARVN Division's operations (TRAN HUNG DAO XVII); VC ambushes damaged boats and caused light Allied casualties, but Allied forces did not remain idle. The SEAL team successfully struck at several VC supply and living areas in An Xuyen Province. One such operation took place on 1 March, when an eight-man SEAL squad and ten Popular Force soldiers, inserted by sampan at a canal about 30 km south-west of the base, made contact with the VC, killing five enemy, capturing four, and destroying many supplies.

(C) Meanwhile the Biet Hai (Vietnamese Naval Rangers) counter guerrilla force conducted numerous patrols in the immediate vicinity of the Nam Can ATSB, interdicting VC supply routes and increasing the security of the base.²⁹

(C) A significant milestone for both the US and Vietnamese Navies occurred on 1 Apr 71 as Operation SOLID ANCHOR, the last US Navy operation in Vietnam, was turned over to the VNN. In ceremonies at Nam Can Admiral McManus, COMNAVSUPACT, turned control over to Admiral Chon, VNN CNO. USN advisors and air assets continued to work with the VNN in support of the newly designated TRAN HUNG DAO IV.³⁰

(C) A large scale combined operation took place on 10 May about 10 km southeast of Nam Can where units of the 42d Rangers, Seawolf helicopters, Black Pony aircraft, and river boats took part in a well executed maneuver. After insertion the Rangers made immediate contact with an enemy force of unknown size. As the Rangers maintained pressure on the enemy, Seawolf helicopters provided support under the direction of the ARVN battalion commander and USN advisor. The Rangers were resupplied by air and remained in the area in night ambush positions. This operation accounted for six enemy KIA and two VC, 12 claymore mines, 24 grenades, 11 launch bombs with launchers, and 9 propellants captured. Two bunkers, four sampans, seven houses, five kilos of rice and four kilos of dried fish were destroyed. After this operation COMNAVFORV commented:


It is most gratifying to note the results of the 42d ARVN Battalion operation. Actions of this nature, utilizing all available assets, exemplify a high level of combat readiness and professional standards. Please extend a well done to all elements involved in the operation.³¹

(C) In late August a USN SEAL team officer led an 11-man group, which included Australian Air Service troops, one guide, and one interpreter, on an intelligence mission. Operating in support were two Seawolf and two SEA LORD helicopters, and Black Ponies from Binh Thuy. The point man, interpreter, and team leader entered a hootch and surprised the enemy; hand to hand combat with 10 VC ensued in which the SEALs killed eight VC and suffered only light casualties. The SEAL team was extracted by helicopters without further incident.

(C) A Coastal Surveillance Squadron moved to Nam Can in August, giving the TRAN HUNG DAO IV commander the distinction of being the only VNN naval commander to control riverine, coastal, and naval air assets, as well as ARVN Rangers.³²

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Source: COMNAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary

Figure V-4

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(C) By October enemy activity had reached a moderately heavy level. Early in the month an alert VNN mortar crew and watch tower personnel thwarted a possible probing attack on the Nam Can base, when about 30 people were observed moving near the base. Seawolves and Black Ponies were called in for support. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were undetermined. Also early in the month, a Cluster Bomb Unit (CBU) attack was made by a Black Pony in a mangrove forest in the AO. ARVN Rangers were inserted by boat to evaluate the drop. Eight secondary explosions were observed; although unconfirmed, they were thought to be booby traps. Three huts and two sampans were destroyed. Finally the CBU drop cleared to a radius of approximately 100 meters the densely foliated area which had restricted visibility.³³

(C) On 3 November two Assault Troop Craft (ATC) enroute to the base at Nam Can surprised and engaged a small force of VC. The VNN forces killed two VC and captured three launch bombs. In another encounter on 4 November a Patrol Gunboat Medium (PGM) enroute to its MARKET TIME patrol area cleared an ambush with 20mm and 40mm cannons, 81mm mortar, 50 caliber machine gun and M-79 grenade launcher fire, and then proceeded to her assigned patrol area. Later in the month, acting on a report of a sizeable VC weapons cache, an ARVN Ranger battalion swept an area about 20 km due east of Nam Can. In contact with the enemy the force killed seven VC with no friendly casualties. The Rangers located an arms cache consisting of two sampans, eight 20mm antiaircraft guns, five light machine guns, 184 individual weapons and 60 61mm mortar tubes, confirming the value of the intelligence originally reported to the VNN by a woodcutter.³⁴

(C) By December it was apparent that the VNN and the ARVN forces had greatly improved their effectiveness since April when the VNN had assumed operational control of the TRAN HUNG DAO IV AO. The enemy was still present in the area, but his influence was much less than it had been at the beginning of the year. The RVNAF continued to improve and work together as a team. Indications were that the local population would further develop confidence in the GVN by supporting and assisting the RVNAF.


READY DECK/TRAN HUNG DAO V/XXVII

(S) The Operation READY DECK AO included the upper Saigon River from Dau Tieng to the confluence of the Rach Tra and Saigon Rivers (see Figure V-4). The operation was the outgrowth of incursions on the upper Saigon River beginning in July 1968. In mid-October 1968 the mission was named READY DECK and designated TRAN HUNG DAO V by the VNN. This operation was the first of the SEA LORDS operations to be commanded by a VNN officer. The concept of the operation involved river patrols, visit and search, and waterway surveillance to carry out the interdiction efforts. Psychological operations were to be employed as well.³⁵

(C) Various incidents plagued the AO; communications problems attributable to distance and topography were a major concern. Patrol units operating in the "mushroom area" (approximately in the center of the AO) and beyond had no reliable direct communications with the Naval Operations Center (NOC) at Phu Cuong.³⁶

(C) During the first 3 months of 1971 TRAN HUNG DAO V PBRs failed to inflict a single enemy casualty during brief skirmishes on the upper Saigon River. There were several enemy-initiated fire fights during this period and the Allied units suffered several casualties. In April enemy activity increased significantly over the previous months and included two mining incidents, the first in over a year. Intelligence reports attributed the increased activity to units of the 101st NVA Regt and the 268th Main Force Group (MFGP), both very aggressive units. The enemy apparently was trying to force the return from Cambodia of the 25th ARVN Div, the ground unit traditionally responsible for the AO.³⁷

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SEARCH TURN

Source: COMNAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary

Figure V-5

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(C) Five firefights with the enemy were reported in May; VNN casualties were three killed and one wounded, with no enemy casualties reported. On 28 May, near Phu Cuong, three assault craft were in a waterborne guard post (WBGP) position when an explosion occurred amidships of the center craft. The boat was beached with extensive material damage, however no personnel casualties resulted. Later that morning boats arriving to assist in salvage operations came under attack, receiving B-40 rocket rounds and a command mine detonation. The mine sank one VNN French Patrol Boat (FOM) killing two VNN crew members; Seawolves were scrambled to provide air cover. These HAL-3 helicopters continued to provide support for river units in the AO, including responding with rocket and machine gun strikes when Phu Loi Base came under 107mm rocket attack on 31 May.

(C) The communications problem in the AO improved by 10 May with the establishment of a retransmission site at fire support base Phuoc. The site utilized two PRC 77 transmitters and two R-292 antennas on a 60-day loan from the Army. At the close of the month, boats north of the "mushroom area" and the NOC at Phu Cuong were utilizing the site satisfactorily.³⁸

(C) Activity in the AO was very light from June through August, with only 10 friendly initiated firefights during the period. By September ground activity in the AO was heavy. While VNN units had only light contact, USN Seawolves were in frequent contact in support of the 25th ARVN Div. The Seawolves flew 23 missions in the AO during the month.

(C) Intelligence reports continued to indicate VC and NVA infiltration into the AO, and it was believed that COSVN had directed an increase in military forces and activity around the Capital Military District to keep ARVN forces engaged and to launch additional attacks in case a political crisis developed during the GVN election campaign. While RVNAF were prepared to respond, no such attacks occurred.

(C) On 30 September, TRAN HUNG DAO V was reorganized as TRAN HUNG DAO XXVII to provide better liaison and cooperation between 25th ARVN Div and the VNN on the upper Saigon River.³⁹ Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO XXVII AO was relatively light throughout the remainder of the year as the VNN continued to pursue the anti-infiltration patrols and interdiction effort. The few enemy initiated attacks on boats in November caused no major damage to craft or personnel casualties. The US Navy Seawolves flew 13 strikes in the AO in November, but none for support of VNN during December.⁴⁰

SEARCH TURN/TRAN HUNG DAO VI/XXVIII

(C) A swift boat incursion of the Cua Lon River in October 1968 was the forerunner of SEARCH TURN/TRAN HUNG DAO VI. The first major campaign began in November 1968 with an attack on enemy positions along the Rach Gia - Long Xuyen Canal. The assault phase of the operation lasted 5 days, with the enemy suffering several casualties and loss of considerable amounts of arms and munitions. Although the assault phase was successful, mobile and air cavalry support was lacking when significant enemy contact was established. When the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) units assigned to this AO were withdrawn, subsequent operations were confined to the western end of the proposed barrier in Kien Giang Province. This operation consisted of modified patrols and later was named SEARCH TURN. In November 1970 it was turned over to the VNN and became TRAN HUNG DAO VI.⁴¹ (See Figure V-5.)

(C) Hostile activity in the Kien Giang Province AO declined at the beginning of the year. The VNN commander reported that his river patrol boats participated in 23 firefights during January; two VNN sailors and one US Navy sailor were wounded. The VC intensified a random terror campaign against the local population by firing mortar rounds and rockets into Rach Gia

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City and various other hamlets. SEALs were active in interdicting VC infiltration routes along the Dien An District coastline, destroying a VC district office and a weapons repair facility in late January. In the area just south of Kien An, after helicopter gunships had strafed the area, SEALs were inserted to sweep the area, searching hootches and destroying enemy ordnance; one SEAL was wounded. A small band of VC were driven from a hootch, but the SEALs were unable to pursue them because of a network of booby traps. When the SEALs were extracted by air, the helicopter gunships placed strikes on the enemy positions and received light and ineffective return fire.⁴²

(C) Hostile activity in the AO during February reached the lowest level since the VNN had assumed control of the operation the previous October. Communist terrorist harassment of the civilian population continued during the month. The only major riverine confrontation in the AO occurred when WBGP's northwest of Rach Gia encountered a group of people believed to have attacked two ARVN outposts. Seawolf helicopters and OV-10 aircraft supported the boats and several enemy were reported killed.⁴³

(C) During March the VNN commander reported that his force engaged the enemy in 23 firefights, a slight increase over the previous month. Casualties included one US sailor killed and three VNN sailors wounded; the enemy suffered 38 fatalities. VNN patrol officers continued to progress in their ability to control tactical air strikes during riverine operations. Vietnamese LDNNs and US Navy SEALs were especially active in Kien Giang Province conducting missions such as interdicting VC communication-liaison routes and VC reconnaissance teams, locating VC mortar teams, and capturing arms caches and VC tax collectors. One SEAL fatality occurred during a mission into the VC camp area on 29 March when a SEAL tripped a "Bouncing Betty" mine. Seawolves and Black Ponies were called in for an airstrike which caused two VC confirmed killed and six probables, plus five structures and bunkers destroyed along with 100 kilos of rice.⁴⁴

(C) During April the VNN engaged the enemy in 30 firefights in which one US helicopter crew man was killed when a Seawolf helicopter received enemy fire. The enemy suffered 35 killed in these actions. Throughout the month, boat units operated in conjunction with the 9th ARVN Div along the Luynh Quynh Canal. Although contact with the enemy was slight, patrols discovered fresh bunkers indicating the enemy was very active in the area. The senior advisor RPD 58 reported that VNN officer performance was excellent during air strike control training sessions, but that further training, especially in working out of narrow canals, was necessary prior to qualifying patrol officers in actual combat air controlling.⁴⁵

(C) During May the enemy took some of the heaviest casualties ever in the area: 160 were killed when the VNN engaged the enemy in 20 firefights; the VNN lost one sailor killed and three wounded. The VNN engagements were supported by ARVN artillery, US Navy Black Ponies and Seawolves. The overall impressive effort in the area prompted COMNAVFORV to make the following comment:⁴⁶

It is gratifying to note results of the WBGP conducted by the River Patrol Division's 58 units and the superior support provided by HAL-3 Det 8. . . Establishing ambushes and posts in areas of known infiltration cannot help but reap positive results.

(C) Several changes in assets took place in the AO during June, reducing effectiveness of the patrols because new boat crews were unfamiliar with the AO. Also the enemy had suffered heavy losses the previous month and were lying low to regroup and resupply. Even though activity was reduced somewhat, with only six firefights, the RVN patrols killed 95 enemy and captured 3 VC suspects, while the friendly forces suffered only 2 VNN wounded. The Seawolves

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were credited with most of the enemy killed in the AO, as 24 air strikes were made destroying 38 sampans and three structures. Indicative of Vietnamization progress was the fact that during boat operations and patrols, the Vietnamese patrol officers used the air brevity code to direct the Seawolf strikes under combat conditions, with no US advisors participating.⁴⁷

(C) Enemy activity in July was light as the assets of CTG 212.5 failed to make contact with the enemy. However, US Navy Seawolf helicopters of HAL-3 placed 31 strikes in support of boat operations. Early in the month SEAL Team One personnel stood down and departed Rach Soi for the United States. Their departure occasioned the US Army Province Senior Advisor to make the following comment: "Kien Giang will long remember the SEALs for their professionalism, devotion to duty, and mostly for their inexhaustible spirit."⁴⁸

(C) On 7 July a very unusual and spectacular fire occurred at ISB Rach Soi when a US Army 100,000 gallon JP-4 barge sank. The tide carried the JP-4 up the Rach Soi Canal. A fire started about 800 meters upstream from the barge, and burned down the hootch line and approached the barge. As soon as it became evident that the fire could not be prevented from reaching the barge, the base was evacuated. When no explosion resulted, VNN and USN personnel returned to the barge and put out the fire. There were no injuries or base assets damaged, but several PBRs were destroyed. The fire burned about 50 hootches, leaving several local civilians homeless. The ISB arranged to feed and shelter these civilian personnel who had lost their homes. The fuel barge was successfully refloated about a week after the mishap.⁴⁹


(C) Enemy activity was light during August, but TRAN HUNG DAO VI continued to be plagued by fires. Two US Army LCMs containing JP-4 fuel which were moored at ISB Rach Soi caught fire. The two boats were gutted; the fire also destroyed six civilian hootches, five sampans, and three PBRs erroneously reported destroyed in July. Another fire broke out in the engine compartment of a RPD boat while on patrol in Kien Giang Province. Indications were that the fire was started by a fuel line leak. When the crew was unable to extinguish the blaze, they flooded the engine compartment and removed the craft's weapons and radios. Upon successfully putting out the fire, the cover boat pumped out the water and towed the stricken craft to the ISB for repairs. This incident marked the fourth PBR from Rach Soi to be put out of action in less than a month, none by enemy action.⁵⁰

(C) Only one enemy initiated firefight was reported in the naval AO during September. The 21st ARVN Div in the U Minh Forest continued to pressure the VC and the NVA, forcing them into the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO where boats of the VNN provided a blocking force to cut off the enemy and where the US Navy Seawolves were active against targets of opportunity.⁵¹

(C) In October there were only two ambushes, one terrorist incident, and one booby-trapped sensor incident. In one of the ambushes, a US Navy advisor received multiple shrapnel wounds. Contact with the enemy in the AO was also very light during November. Seawolves flew 14 strikes within the AO. No surface contacts with the enemy were made by the VNN, but Allied forces continued to pursue anti-infiltration tactics. In addition to the usual patrols and WBGPs, additional boats were used to react to intelligence reports indicating a need for a blockade on the Rach Soi and Din Vam Cong canals. This blockade was conducted for 6 days to halt VC and NVA infiltration from Cambodia into the U Minh. No contact was made. Meanwhile units of the RPD provided continuing support to elements of the 16th ARVN Regt, 9th ARVN Div. This support took the form of a blocking force, ARVN night ambush insertion, and WBGPs missions.

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BARRIER REEF

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Figure V-6

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(C) The TRAN HUNG DAO VI operation was reorganized on 27 November as TRAN HUNG DAO XXVIII. The reorganization was made to better coordinate VNN and ARVN operations. The new AO included the waterways of An Giang, Kien Giang, Phong Dinh, and Chuong Thien provinces. The year ended with moderate contact with the enemy in the new TRAN HUNG DAO XXVIII AO.⁵³

BARRIER REEF/TRAN HUNG DAO IX/XXV

(C) BARRIER REEF was planned by COMNAVFORV in December 1968 as the fourth and last of the Delta interdiction barriers. BARRIER REEF would establish an unbroken chain of naval patrols along the Cambodian border from the Gulf of Thailand to an area northeast of the Parrot's Beak. The operation, reorganized in August 1970 when the VNN assumed tactical command, became known as TRAN HUNG DAO IX. In December 1970 the VNN assumed complete control of the TRAN HUNG DAO IX AO.⁵⁴ (See Figure V-6.)


(C) Because of Allied pressure on enemy forces in Cambodia, overt enemy activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO IX AO was almost nonexistent during January and February. The repair, berthing, and messing barge (YRBM 20) which was the command post (CP) for the AO became also the CP for the newly established Allied convoy operation escorting merchant vessels to Phnom Penh. The YRBM 16, which YRBM 20 had replaced as the afloat headquarters when the commander shifted to the western sector of the AO, departed the area after lengthy service. Operation TRAN HUNG DAO IX virtually ceased during March as the two assigned operating units, River Patrol Division 59 and Mining Interdiction Division 93, provided escort for merchant craft transporting petroleum to Phnom Penh.

(C) Action in the AO continued to be light during April, and early May. Intelligence reports of increasing infiltration by enemy units into the area were unsubstantiated. On the night of 23 May the Hoa Bien outpost came under attack; just as it seemed that the enemy was going to break through the inner defense perimeter, a heavy fire team of Seawolves of Detachments 5 and 9 arrived and succeeded in driving the VC back. When the Seawolves had exhausted their ordnance, Black Pony aircraft appeared to strike the enemy. The airmen of the Seawolves Detachments and Black Ponies were commended for their courageous and aggressive action by COMNAVFORV.

(C) Action on the waterways of the AO was again light in the TRAN HUNG DAO IX area during June and July. The Seawolf helicopters of Detachment 9, based on YRBM 21 at Tan Chau, continued support of outlying army and RF/PF outposts and engaged the enemy on 22 occasions during the month. The Seawolf strikes influenced the activity in the AO although they did not occur within it, since the outposts were all in adjacent infiltration areas.⁵⁵

(C) In July plans were made for a new operation and reorganization of the area. Effective 1 August, TRAN HUNG DAO IX was replaced with TRAN HUNG DAO XXV. The activity during September in TRAN HUNG DAO XXV was light as only two firefights occurred and four Seawolf missions were flown, with three naval incidents and eight Seawolf missions in October. Boats from RPD 63 arrived at ATSB Phuoc Xuyen, providing the assets to cover the reorganized TRAN HUNG DAO AO.⁵⁶ During November and December there were only six incidents with boat ambushes and VC canal crossings. The Seawolves flew just five missions during these last 2 months of the year in TRAN HUNG DAO XXV AO.

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Figure V-7

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BREEZY COVE/TRAN HUNG DAO X/XVII/XXI/XXIX

(C) A letter of instruction was sent to the First Sea Lord in September 1969 directing him to plan for the employment of naval forces which would be provided by COMNAVFORV and VNN CNO for operations in the Song Ong Doc area in support of the pacification program and to provide assistance to Ca Mau District, An Xuyen Province. The operation was named BREEZY COVE and designated TRAN HUNG DAO X by the VNN.⁵⁷ (See Figure V-7.)

(C) In early 1971 a new VNN commander was put in charge of TRAN HUNG DAO X. January intelligence reports warned of impending enemy attacks on the still incomplete Ca Mau Logistic Support Base (LSB) and the temporary headquarters at the adjacent Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) base. The US base commander therefore cancelled all other building projects and devoted total manpower resources to base defense construction. Despite extensive precautions, an enemy unit staged a brief attack on the PRU base on 15 January, but the combined effort of the Allies drove the enemy away. That same month firepower of two naval gunfire support ships (NGFS) steaming offshore in the Gulf of Thailand, the HMAS Perth (D-38) and USCGC Rush (WHEC 723), killed 64 and wounded 16 members of a NVA battalion which was poised near Trun Thuat hamlet.⁵⁸

(C) In February the Senior Naval Advisor to TRAN HUNG DAO XXI reported that the lack of coordination between PF, RF, and the VNN gravely weakened the security of Ca Mau. The PRUs patrolled nightly the area to the north of the base, but the PF forces never fulfilled their pledge to guard the southern approaches. The ATSB had been probed or attacked seven times from the south since late December 1970, but neither the PF platoons nor the People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF) units responsible for the security of the area reported any contact. Due to these circumstances, Deputy COMNAVFORV ordered that one USN and one VNN "advisor" would accompany all PF ambush teams in the future.

(C) In mid-February the Communist guerrillas shifted west and attacked the Song Ong Doc ATSB with 107mm and B-40 rockets and small arms fire. Within 5 minutes base personnel and Seawolf helicopters suppressed the fire, but four VNN sailors were killed, eight VNN and seven USN sailors were wounded, and seven boats were damaged.⁵⁹ Enemy pressure during March was focused on the river operations in TRAN HUNG DAO X AO rather than on the Allied bases at Ca Mau and old Song Ong Doc. The aggressive VC engaged the USN and VNN units in 24 fire-fights during the month. Intelligence reports throughout the month predicted enemy offensives against the vulnerable Ca Mau and Song Ong Doc ATSBs, but the attacks failed to materialize. However, there were several attacks by the VC on Allied river boats during the month. Several boats were damaged, several VNN personnel were wounded and one VNN sailor was killed when a PBR took a direct rocket hit on the Song Ong Doc.

(C) The SEALs were very active in March joining with the National Police Field Force (NPFF) and Special Branch Police to sweep through known Viet Cong territory 17 km southeast of Ca Mau. The operation netted six VC killed and four captured. Based on information provided by a local agent, SEALs departed Ca Mau on 15 March to raid a Viet Cong wedding ceremony. The SEALs burst into the hootch where the ceremony was taking place and caused the Viet Cong to flee. Covering helicopter gunships helped cause 26 Communist casualties and six captured.⁶⁰

(C) April began with the probing of the base defenses at Ca Mau by enemy personnel. Boat personnel spotted the enemy and a firefight followed without known casualties. Elsewhere the enemy attacked a PF outpost with rockets, mortars, and small arms; little damage was inflicted but some civilians living nearby were seriously wounded.

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The "swift boats" - PCFs and their crews added firepower and speed to TRAN HUNG DAO XXI.

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(C) SEAL Team Two, Detachment Alfa, 9th Plt based at Ca Mau, stood down on 10 April for rotation to the United States. Papa Plt replaced the 9th Plt and immediately went to work making forays deep into enemy territory, interdicting lines of communications and creating havoc with the VC.⁶¹

(C) Only 11 firefights were recorded in May. Intelligence reports that enemy sappers attached to C-7 Local Force Company and the U Minh 11th Bn was active on the Song Ong Doc proved highly accurate as five attacks-by-fire occurred on river traffic. There was also an attempted mining at the ATSB Song Ong Doc. The SEAL Team engaged in only one operation during the month, to capture VC personnel. With one interpreter and a national policeman, the SEALs were enroute to a tax collector's hootch, but became engaged in a firefight. The patrol was compromised due to the firing, the mission was aborted and the SEALs returned to base.⁶²

(C) TRAN HUNG DAO X was reorganized on 5 June and became TRAN HUNG DAO XVII. During almost 2 years of existence, units attached to the TRAN HUNG DAO X operation had killed 457 enemy troops, captured 143 personnel, and destroyed 728 sampans. Friendly losses during this time were 53 killed and 373 wounded. As the VNN and other RVNAF assumed more responsibilities in the Ca Mau area, fewer US personnel were required. Upon reorganization the only US Navy personnel left in the AO were the Seabees working on ISB Ca Mau, advisors attached to CTF 210 at the MACV compound, SEAL Team One personnel, and the HAL-3 Detachment at Ca Mau Long Strip.⁶³

(C) TRAN HUNG DAO XVII which replaced TRAN HUNG DAO X was again reorganized in July with the disestablishment of ATSB Song Ong Doc and ATSB Ca Mau. The new operation became known as TRAN HUNG DAO XXI.

(C) The waterways of TRAN HUNG DAO XXI were extremely quiet during July and August. There were two mining incidents in July and only four waterborne firefights during August. The Seawolves ranged over the northern An Xuyen and the southern Kien Giang provinces in support of TRAN HUNG DAO XXI and US Army Military Assistance Teams.⁶⁴


(C) Contact with the enemy was heavy during September in the AO. There were nine enemy initiated incidents, these included; six ambushes of VNN craft, two attacks on bases, and one mining incident. There were 19 VNN and three USN personnel wounded in these engagements. USN personnel assisted in six major salvage operations on the waterways of TRAN HUNG DAO XXI during the month. The most extensive of these operations was salvaging a VNN Assault Troop Carrier (ATC), a 56 feet long, 17.5 feet wide, steel-hulled craft with a cargo capacity of 11 tons.

(C) The salvage force arrived on the scene 5 September and successfully had the ATC raised and patched by 30 September.⁶⁵

(C) During October and November the naval forces in the AO encountered several mining incidents. The enemy was using command detonated mines, which were a serious threat to TRAN HUNG DAO XXI assets. To ensure the security of the boats the Commander of TRAN HUNG DAO XXI employed the following tactics: fixed wing aircraft and helicopters to provide air cover, prestrikes by air in known and suspected danger areas, artillery sweeps on cleared areas prior to boat transits, reconnaissance-by-fire with river assault craft (RAC), and chain drag sweeps by two or more craft. Bank security had formerly been provided by 21st ARVN Div troops on sweeps, but with the recent U Minh Forest operations and election security requirements, the bank security was provided by RF troops.⁶⁶

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Figure V-8

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(C) Contact with the enemy was moderate in November. There were three mining incidents, one ambush and one attack-by-fire resulting in two boats damaged and two USN and five VNN personnel wounded. Two special missions were conducted in the AO during the month. One was a coordinated ARVN artillery barrage, a USN Black Pony CBU-55 strike and a VNAF A-37 strike, followed by a troop insert in the target area along the Trem Trem River. After the coordinated strikes, one battalion of the 33d ARVN Regt was inserted by helicopter and RAC. The troops swept the area while boats provided a blocking force. The operation resulted in 40 bunkers, 60 structures and 20 spider holes destroyed with 1,000 rounds each of AK-47 and M-16 ammunition and 100 grenades captured. The second special mission was an attempted VC prisoner of war camp raid by ARVN troops led by a Hoi Chanh. The insertion of troops was made after Black Ponies flew strikes in the area located southwest of Quan Long City. Three VC were killed and five hootches destroyed, but there were no signs of any prisoners.⁶⁷

(C) On 4 December TRAN HUNG DAO XXIX replaced TRAN HUNG DAO XXI. The purpose of the change was to improve coordination of operations between VNN and ARVN forces. The new AO for TRAN HUNG DAO XXIX included the waterways of Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, and An Xuyen provinces.

(C) During December contact with the enemy was moderate. The Seawolves flew 19 missions in the AO and there were three reported incidents on the waterways. Additionally there was a mining attack which sank an ATC, an attempted mining of a support boat, and an ambush of a convoy resulting in one boat being damaged. There were no personnel casualties reported.

MARKET TIME/TRAN HUNG DAO XV

Background

(C) In February 1965 the Vietnamese attacked and disabled an infiltration trawler in Vung Ro Bay, Phu Yen Province MR 2. Salvaging of the trawler and finding a large cache of supplies in the immediate area confirmed what had long been suspected: that the North Vietnamese were infiltrating men and materiel by sea. COMUSMACV held a conference in late February 1965 to decide the best method of assisting the RVNAF to effectively control coastal infiltration. It was determined that the best method available was to establish a system of patrol.

(C) In March 1965 the MARKET TIME operation began with US Navy and Vietnamese Navy forces establishing a barrier specifically constituted to prevent infiltration via two routes: the first along the coast by junk from North Vietnam to the Republic of Vietnam, or within the RVN itself; the second by large vessels transiting well offshore, and when conditions were suitable, heading directly into coastal waters.

(S) As shown in Figure V-8 there were two barriers, separated at the 12-nautical mile (nm) limit. The inner barrier covered 1,018 nm of coastline including Phu Quoc Island, with the seaward boundary at the 12-nm limit. The barrier included nine major sections subdivided into about 20-nm long segments. The outer barrier consisted of a ship patrol, which was divided into nine sections extending seaward from the 12-nm limit to an average of 40 nm offshore, and an air barrier in which patrol aircraft flew a track 70 nm from the coast with random deviations of 50 nm either side of the track.⁶⁸ The air barrier continued from the Cambodian border near Phu Quoc Island and covered the RVN coast north to the 17th parallel.

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Events of 1971

(C) On 1 Jan 71 the Vietnamese Navy had the full responsibility for the MARKET TIME inner barrier. The VNN had assumed this responsibility on 1 Sep 70, at which time the operation was named TRAN HUNG DAO XV (THD XV). The US Navy continued to provide advisors to assist the VNN with the mission. Since there were over 64,000 craft licensed to operate in RVN waters, the task of inspecting all vessels for possible infiltrators seemed insurmountable, but the VNN had progressed to the point where it could accomplish the inner barrier task. The USN retained the responsibility for the outer barrier extending 12 to 40 miles off the RVN coastline, and USN aircraft patrolled the area beyond that. The USN and US Coast Guard ships also provided gunfire support missions when required.⁶⁹

(C) The VNN inner barrier coastal surveillance forces were very active during 1971. They inspected an average of approximately 135,000 craft per month along the coast of RVN, from the 17th parallel to the Gulf of Thailand. The ships in the outer barrier patrols inspected over 12,000 craft during the year.

(S) The main purpose of the barrier patrols was early detection and identification of enemy craft in order to position friendly forces and to retain the barrier continuity. It was known that coastal infiltrators could reach the coastline from 40 miles at sea in about 2 hours. All MARKET TIME/THD XV units had to be prepared at all times to proceed at maximum speed. The main objective of the barrier patrols was to ensure that no infiltration vessels delivered supplies to the VC or NVA. Capture of the infiltrator was the goal desired, but if necessary destruction of the enemy vessel was authorized in accordance with the rules of engagement to prevent materiel from falling into enemy hands.⁷⁰

(C) Seaborne infiltration was advantageous to the enemy: the same 100 tons of war materiel which took 170 days to move south overland took only a few days by a steel-hulled ship or several large coastal junks. The enemy especially preferred to use seaborne infiltration into MR 4, and many attempts were made to do so. From February 1965 until the end of 1970, 29 trawlers considered to be infiltrators were detected. The enemy aborted 17 of the infiltration attempts, 10 of the trawlers were either destroyed or captured, and in two cases contact with the trawlers was lost. It is possible that these two attempts to infiltrate were successful or else they could have been aborted.⁷¹

(S/NF) The first detection in 1971 by US Navy air surveillance of a NVN trawler infiltrator was made on 24 February. This infiltrator designated 24SO1, was an SL-8, the largest class trawler used by the enemy. The trawler was tracked into Indonesian waters, whereupon it turned back north. Surveillance was discontinued on 10 March when the trawler no longer posed an infiltration threat.⁷²

(C) On 22 March, US Navy aircraft sighted another SL-8 trawler. This trawler, determined to be an infiltrator, was designated 22SO1. Contact was lost for a few days, but on 26 March contact was regained when the trawler was found to be heading in a southerly direction. On 27 March another North Vietnamese trawler was spotted, identified as an SL-4 trawler, and designated 27SO1. Surveillance of both trawlers continued in a covert manner throughout March and into April. When no attempt was made by either trawler to penetrate the barrier and land supplies in the RVN, the attempts were considered to have been aborted.⁷³

(C) On 8 April another trawler (8SO1) was sighted by US Navy aircraft, and on 9 April the USCGC Morgenthau (WHEC 722) assumed covert surveillance as the trawler continued on a southerly course. As the trawler approached the Great Natuna Island it abruptly changed course skirting the southern coast of the island. It then proceeded north towards the coast of RVN.

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The USCGC Rush (WHEC 723) assumed surveillance responsibility on 11 April. At approximately 2318 local time, the trawler entered the territorial waters of the RVN. At 2345, after failing to respond to a challenge and warning shot fired across her bow, the USS Antelope (PG-86), assisting the Rush, initiated destructive fire on the trawler. A 2-hour running surface engagement ensued, as the trawler vainly tried to evade the MARKET TIME units and reach the mouth of the Cua Ganh Hao. The Morgenthau and Black Ponies joined the Antelope and the Rush to stop the trawler. Also assisting were VNN craft PGM 603 and PB 715. At 0145 on 12 April the trawler exploded in a huge ball of flame which the Black Pony pilots reported reached nearly 1,500 feet into the air. The trawler was reported sunk in about 30 feet of water in the vicinity of 08-53N 105-25E.⁷⁴

(C) The success of the combined forces in sinking this infiltrating trawler brought the following accolade from the Chief of Naval Operations of the US Navy:

The splendid way in which units of VNN, USCOGUARD, and USN combined to once again sink an infiltrating trawler will serve notice that major infiltration from sea is still not an alternative available to the enemy. Please convey my congratulations to all units involved in the action resulting in the sinking of 8S-01 and my strong hope for continued success in MARKET TIME operations.⁷⁵

(C) On 3 October the sixth trawler to be designated as an infiltrator in 1971 was reported by MARKET TIME aircraft surveillance. This SL-3 type trawler was tracked to the Paracel Islands, where it was considered no longer a threat and surveillance was discontinued. On 17 October an SL-4 trawler was sighted south of the Paracel Islands and tracked until it was no longer a threat. Again on 28 October an SL-6 type trawler was detected and surveillance was maintained until early in November.⁷⁶

(C) In December three more enemy trawlers were detected by US Navy aircraft. The trawler detected on 16 December was an SL-8 type, but contact was lost and it was considered the attempt to infiltrate was aborted. The other contacts designated as infiltrators, one on 19 December and one on 26 December, were aborted.

(C) There were 11 NVN trawlers designated as infiltrators during 1971 as follows:

<u>- 1971</u>	<u>Position Detected</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Disposition</u>	<u>Detector</u>
24 Feb	1-27N 111-39E	SL-8	aborted	aircraft
22 Mar	16-16N 115-17E	SL-8	aborted	aircraft
27 Mar	08-42N 110-44E	SL-4	aborted	aircraft
12 Apr	08-51N 105-24E	SL-8	destroyed	aircraft
21 Apr	17-05N 111-45E	SL-8	aborted	aircraft
3 Oct	16-35N 111-25E	SL-3	aborted	aircraft
17 Oct	13-24N 113-13E	SL-4	aborted	aircraft
28 Oct	09-38N 112-06E	SL-6	aborted	aircraft
16 Dec	04-51N 107-41E	SL-8	lost contact	aircraft
19 Dec	04-45N 108-18E	SL-4	aborted	aircraft
26 Dec	05-18N 110-25E	SL-4	aborted	aircraft

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(C) It appeared evident that NVN trawlers would continue to attempt seaborne resupply in the RVN. As the VNN continued to improve and with total RVNAF effort, the infiltration barriers should continue to be successful in blocking the resupply attempts by the NVN trawlers.⁷⁷

Evaluation of Effectiveness

(S) Even with the success MARKET TIME forces had in sinking the trawler in April, concern was expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington about the effectiveness of coastal surveillance and the inner barrier forces under operational control of the VNN. COMUSMACV responded to a JCS inquiry concerning effectiveness of MARKET TIME forces by stating that an increasing number of intelligence reports from the military regions indicated in April and May that infiltration "from the sea" in other than steel-hull trawlers may be occurring. Although this activity represented mostly coastal transshipment (i.e., point-to-point resupply by wooden junks and sampans of varying size), in some cases out-of-country points of origin were considered possible. These reports, although individually not confirmed, were collectively too numerous, too detailed, and in some cases, too closely spaced geographically to be discounted. The growing number of intelligence reports concerning seaborne infiltration and coastal transshipment, together with observed shortcomings in the VNN MARKET TIME units (such as poor material condition, lack of aggressive controls, or failure to conduct assigned patrols), caused COMNAVFORV to conduct a review of MARKET TIME operations. Major MACV conclusions of the MARKET TIME review were:

- Because of cross-border operations the enemy had to place increased emphasis on sea infiltration, particularly in MR 4.
- The mainstay of MARKET TIME operations was the P-3 aircraft.
- The present effectiveness of the VNN surface MARKET TIME forces against the transshipment threat was very low.
- After ACTOVRAD replaced the P-3 aircraft, only an estimated 13 percent of the infiltration trawlers would be successfully interdicted if current doctrines and practices were not changed. Additionally, warning time for reaction would drop from several days to 2 or 3 hours.
- The current organization and command control structure contributed to poor performance and inefficient use of resources.

(S) Based on these conclusions, COMUSMACV then recommended the inner barrier organization be changed and that task units should operate in a new way, limiting their area and systematically searching every junk and sampan in the area. This would be known as the "cloud concept." Cloud operations would last anywhere from a few hours to a few days. There would be a senior VNN officer in charge of each area of responsibility and emphasis would be on mobility. Further, a system should be developed to shift area patrol responsibility in the coastal zone border areas on a random basis in order to eliminate weaknesses inherent in geographical divisions. Outer barrier stations should be subdivided into segments about 30 miles long to provide greater flexibility in stationing ships and inner barrier task unit operations should be strengthened by coastal air surveillance. All operations should be supported by a strong intelligence collection program and PSYOPS effort.

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(S) In summary, COMUSMACV recommended restructuring the inner barrier as described and using the "cloud concept" of task units to cover the high threat areas more intensively. VNN craft would be placed under more competent VNN supervision and their effectiveness against the transshipment threat, as well as against the trawler threat, presumably would increase substantially.⁷⁸

(S) CINCPAC requested additional information concerning the observed shortcomings in VNN performance, withdrawal of US Navy advisors from VNN craft, surprise inspections by the VNN senior office, and the possibility of helicopters operating from WHEC's in MARKET TIME operations.⁷⁹ COMUSMACV, in reply, advised CINCPAC that a study of the boat riding advisor's effectiveness led to the decision to rescind the requirement that there be an advisor in every boat. It revealed that some VNN officers-in-charge were reluctant to accept advice from the enlisted advisors, and were not deterred from lax patrol procedures.

(S) The material readiness of the inner barrier patrol craft had been a source of concern because of the serious effect it was having on the ability of the VNN to man the inner barrier stations with operationally ready craft. The advisor effort was reoriented to concentrate on planned maintenance system (PMS), corrective maintenance, and improved damage control. This shift of emphasis was undertaken on a phased basis. Advisors continued to ride operational units on a random basis.

(S) The operational inefficiency of the VNN patrol craft inshore (PCF) and Coast Guard patrol boats (WPB) units was largely attributable to lack of motivation caused by weak leadership at the junior officer level. The task unit concept presented in the MARKET TIME 1971 Review was, in effect, an afloat command post concept in that the Task Unit Commander was in the immediate vicinity and was able to continuously direct the actions and performance of the units under his command.

(S) Periodic surprise inspections by Coastal Zone Commanders and their immediate subordinates were being conducted to a limited extent. This was accomplished by air reconnaissance by the Commander Task Group (CTG), his deputy, or a VNN Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer (NILO) on a random basis and by the CTG or a senior member of his staff embarking in a patrol craft and giving only short notice prior to departure on patrol. CNO, VNN had been urged to obtain JGS approval for VNAF to participate in coastal surveillance to include regular coastal surveillance flights with VNN observers embarked.


(S) With limited assets available, the implementation of VNAF coastal surveillance flights were as close to an airborne command post as could realistically be expected. The introduction of any US capability such as an airborne command post, which was not intended for or capable of Vietnamization, could diminish RVNAF motivation toward self-reliance. Helicopters operating from US ships would increase MARKET TIME effectiveness, however VNN ships were not equipped with helicopter platforms, thus precluding their participation in helicopter operations. The introduction of USN helicopters would not be useful in the long run because they were not programmed for transfer to the Vietnamese.⁸⁰

(S) In September COMUSMACV provided an update to CINCPAC on the status of MARKET TIME effectiveness. In summary MACV pointed out that intelligence estimates indicated MR 4 was still the primary trawler infiltration/coastal transshipment threat area. The VNN was proceeding with the planned reorganization to streamline the coastal surveillance and fleet organization. An analysis of "cloud" effectiveness indicated that the number of detections and searches had increased significantly. The performance of the US Navy P-3s had been sufficient to offset the remaining deficiencies in the surface barriers and had maintained a high overall system of effectiveness against trawlers. The coastal surveillance radar system was being

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**VIETNAMESE NAVY
COASTAL RADAR
SURVEILLANCE
SYSTEM**



Source: COMNAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary

Figure V-9

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phased in with three stations in operation, and the program to improve material conditions of VNN coastal craft began to show results. Overall, COMUSMACV considered the surveillance efficiency improved markedly since June, but it still had quite a distance to go. The future rate of improvement depended on the skill developed in employment of data from the coastal radar system, increased air support, and integrated ground force/naval antisub infiltration operations.⁸¹

MARKET TIME RADAR STATIONS (ACTOVRAD)

Background

(C) Early in 1970 COMNAVFORV investigated the feasibility of complementing MARKET TIME operations with a network of coastal radar installations capable of providing detection equivalent to that provided by US Navy P-3 aircraft. With the proposed radar installations, only detection was possible. Identification of contacts had to be done by other means. VNN inner barrier patrol craft would be limited in their identification efforts during foul weather. It was determined that during these periods or when there was an infiltration threat from a high speed contact, the VNAF or possibly land forces would have to provide detection and/or interception forces. The investigation also pointed out that when waterborne patrol craft were operating out of radar range of an infiltrator, the VNAF aircraft would have to provide the means of locating and tracking the contact. While aircraft detection proved most desirable, the coastal radar stations were also essential to fill in gaps and to provide all-weather coverage. The establishment and operation of these radar sites and their turnover to the VNN became part of the US-to-VNN turnover program known as ACTOVRAD or accelerated turnover to Vietnamese radar. This became one more important link in the gradual assumption of coastal protection and defense by the VNN.

(C) The investigation showed that each landbased radar installation would require a total of 18 personnel to man the station. Estimates indicated that four RF companies would be required for security purposes throughout the radar network.⁸² (See Figure V-9.)

Development of Radar Sites

(C) The ACTOVRAD project progressed with the construction and installation of equipment in 1971. US Naval Construction Forces and the commercial contracting firm (RMK) were working on the radar sites. In addition, an afloat station was to be positioned between Vung Tau and Con Son Island on the Ba Dong, the former USCGS lightship WLV523.

(C) The first of radar stations in the project commenced operation on 1 Jul 71 at Vung Tau. Upon completion of all the equipment checkout the site was turned over to the VNN on 7 Jul 71. The USN advisors noted that the VNN personnel were highly motivated during training.⁸³ The second in the series of radar sites was turned over to the VNN on 18 August. This radar station was located atop Monkey Mountain overlooking Da Nang Harbor.⁸⁴ The third radar station was turned over to the VNN at Mui Dinh on 8 September, and the fourth was completed and turned over to the VNN on 31 Oct 71.⁸⁵ In November, the fifth and sixth sites were turned over to the VNN. These sites were located at Cu Lao Re and Ta Kou.⁸⁶ On 15 December the seventh of the 16 radar sites was turned over to the VNN at Hon Tre. This was the last station to be turned over in 1971. The remaining nine stations were scheduled to be operational prior to 30 Jun 72.

(C) A series of unannounced penetration exercises were conducted during the last 4 months of 1971. The evaluation of these exercises indicated that the training progress was not as efficient as expected. Development of a high level of coastal surveillance system effectiveness

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would require additional VNN on-station training and experience in addition to USN advisor support. A formal training course in command and control procedures for VNN radar system officers was to be conducted at Naval Training Center, Nha Trang, commencing in February 1972.

(C) Experience indicated that there was much room for improvement both in watch-standing alertness at the radar stations and in patrol craft discipline. Five infiltration trawlers detected during the last quarter of 1971 along with increased intelligence reports of transshipment attempts indicated the NVA/VC were continuing their efforts to resupply by sea, especially in MR 3 and MR 4.⁸⁷

(C) The following shows the planned ACTOVRAD sites:

ACTOVRAD SITES

<u>US Navy</u> <u>Site No</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>VNN</u> <u>Site No</u>	<u>Radar Range</u> <u>(in nm)</u>
1	Nui Hon Vuon	103	44.1
2*	Da Nang	102	65.8
3*	Cu Lao Re	101	32.3
4	Duc Pho	104	30.4
5	De Gi	201	32.2
6*	Nui Chap Chai	202	49.1
7*	Hon Tre	203	54.4
8*	Mui Dinh	204	37.0
9*	Ta Kou	303	50.8
10*	Vung Tau	302	38.9
11	Con Son	301	60.2
12	Poulo Obi	401	44.3
13	Ba Dong	304	30.0
14	Hon Nam Du	402	43.6
15	Mui Dat Do	403	31.4
16	Hon Doc	404	22.3

* Operational by 31 Dec 71.

USN OPERATIONS

NAVAL CONSTRUCTION

Seabees

(C) As with most US Navy involvement ashore, the Seabees, Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCB), were very active in Vietnam. At peak strength in the summer of 1968, there were more than 10,000 Seabees in RVN. Not only did the Seabees work on military construction out on many projects in villages and hamlets; they assisted USAID in many projects throughout

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RVN. The Seabees also worked with and trained the South Vietnamese in various skills. In addition to construction projects and training efforts, the Seabees in many cases provided their own military defense.⁸⁸

Activities and Accomplishments

(C) During 1971 NMCB 3 personnel worked on various projects throughout RVN from the DMZ to the Delta. Some tasks were so large and complex that it required the majority of the personnel from a battalion to complete them; these included the construction of roads, radar sites, airfields, large naval bases and some VNN dependent housing. Only teams were required for smaller tasks such as repair and maintenance projects in hamlets, water well drilling, bridge repair, and some of the USAID projects. The Seabees completed construction of the Advanced Tactical Support Base (ATSB) at Tuyen Nhon and turned it over to the VNN in early January.⁸⁹

(C) NMCB 74 was tasked with the construction of ACTOVRAD facilities at Ta Kou in MR 3 and Mui Dinh in MR 2. In addition to the permanent base camps at the radar sites, the Seabees had to build access roads to the sites. These projects met some VC resistance, mainly from mine emplacements and ambush attempts, and thus involved the Seabees in their own defense.

(C) NMCB 74 personnel also worked on ACTOV bases at Nam Can, Long Phu, and Cho Moi. During February the Seabees completed 620 of the 1,758 units planned for the Dependent Shelter program, at six different locations. NMCB 3 personnel during March worked on the air strip at Ba To; drilled five water wells in Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang areas; worked on the road QL 1 between Than Quit and Tam Ky; assisted a Vietnamese contractor in upgrading the North Hue Loop; installed M8 A1 matting and made repairs to a pier ramp for Coastal Group 13 at the Vietnamese Naval Base; repaired storm damaged sea huts, and installed two 60 kw generators at Phuoc Trach. Seabee teams completed 28 projects during March; three schools, one electrical system, two water systems, seven road upgradings, one bridge, and 14 other projects in connection with the GVN pacification program.

(C) On 1 Mar 71, RADM F.M. Lalor, Jr. CEC, USN, relieved RADM A.R. Marschall, CEC, USN, as Commander Third Naval Construction Brigade. The first detail of NMCB 5 (235 men) arrived at Bien Hoa to relieve NMCB 74 personnel working on the ACTOVRAD project at Ta Kou. Other NMCB 5 personnel moved into the ACTOVRAD site at Mui Dinh, ultimately replacing NMCBs 3 and 74 which redeployed to the United States. NMCB 5 took over construction at ISB Tan An, 25 miles southwest of Saigon, which was expected to be the last major new construction for the Seabees in RVN.⁹⁰

(C) During May NMCB 5, a force of 362 men, continued work on projects begun in April at Ta Kou, Mui Dinh, and Ca Mau. CBMU 302 continued to give technical assistance to VNN self-help dependent shelter construction at various locations in-country and worked on several new projects. NMCB 10, the main body of which was in Okinawa, had two teams working in Vietnam on USAID community projects. One team was at My Tho and the other was at Go Cong City.

(C) An NMCB 5 detail at the Mui Dinh ACTOVRAD site completed 57 percent of the pending roadwork there during May. No hostile incidents were reported, however there was concern as to the logistics support of the remote site, located 15 kilometers south of Phan Rang. The unit was supplied repair parts, mail, and food by means of Phan Rang Sector helicopters, on an available basis. Bulk cargo arrived by Landing Ship Tank (LST) or Harbor Utility Craft (YFU). At landlocked Ta Kou, 15 miles southwest of Phan Thiet, all supplies came by truck convoy. During the monsoon season USN helicopters operating from Tan Son Nhut resupplied the USN and VNN units in MRs 3 and 4.

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(C) COMNAVFORV tasked Seabees with additional projects at ACTOV facilities where short-falls were discovered after acceptance by the VNN. Seabees of NMCB 5 worked with private contractors on these projects. Naval Support Activity (NSA) Public Works personnel assisted in the completion of base electrical distribution and generator systems. Vietnamese navymen stabilized the runway, installed a sewage lift pump, and completed a water catchment system with Seabee assistance. COMNAVFORV also recommended to the VNN officer-in-charge at Chau Doc that he use self-help for such projects as grating ports for stoves, stanchions on piers, cement splash blocks, and hose racks.

(C) During May, CBMU 302 personnel continued work on dependent shelter projects at Rach Soi, Quang Ngai, An Thoi, Thuan An, and Da Nang. At the Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay sites the VNN headed the projects with 169 and 110 sailors, respectively, with the assistance of 23 Seabees in Da Nang and four at Cam Ranh Bay. At the Cam Ranh Bay site, 575 dependent shelter units had been slated to be built and 187 were almost completed by the end of the month. Work on dependent shelters was also being done at Chu Lai as a self-help project.

(C) A CBMU 302 Naval Civic Action Team (NAVCAT) of eight men completed the assigned construction of seahuts at Don Tam and another NAVCAT team of 27 men completed a berthing facility at Rach Soi. The Seabees were also at work during the month on the administration building and perimeter lighting and flag mess hall at Binh Thuy, the Cam Ranh Bay mess hall, and a VNN warehouse at the Saigon Shipyard.

(C) Various detached Seabee teams completed 15 projects during May. These projects consisted of a warehouse addition in Kien Hoa Province, a dispensary, and an addition to a school in Kien Phong Province. Among the civic action activities, Seabees installed playground equipment at local hospitals and orphanages in Kien Hoa and Ba Xuyen provinces; graded roads and cleared land in Long Khanh; performed water system repairs, and installed four culverts in Go Cong Province.⁹¹

(C) A new project for the Seabee units was the rehabilitation and minor alteration to buildings at the MACV Annex in Saigon so that the offices of navy personnel processing, disbursing, and field issue activities could move into it.⁹²

(C) The NMCB 5 personnel continued to push on at a steady pace knowing their schedule of completed work had to be maintained in order the ACTOV turnover program to stay on the time-phased plan. There were some delays as sporadic combat action took the Seabee personnel away from their various construction jobs.

(C) The construction of the ACTOVRAD sites at Ta Kou and Mui Dinh were of high priority and the Seabees worked diligently to keep on schedule. It was not an easy task as logistic support problems, enemy harassment and mining incidents challenged the construction personnel. The ACTOVRAD sites were completed on schedule despite difficulties encountered.

(C) In August the Seabees were called upon to work on two large projects that were not scheduled but considered to be urgent. One was repairs to the runway at the LSB, An Thoi which had become unusable for C-130 aircraft. The other was construction of a huge ammunition bunker, capable of holding a 60-day supply, at the LSB Nam Can. The ammunition bunker was needed to supply the Nam Can LSB and the HAL-3 Detachment. The "Can Do Bees" had these projects well underway and progressing satisfactorily by the end of August.⁹³

(C) In September the Navy construction experts of NMCB 5 and CBMU 302 continued to achieve solid results at bases throughout RVN. Both major units and various small detachments of NMCBs worked on USAID projects located from Soc Trang to Xuan Loc. These detachments worked on roads, schools, a maternity clinic, and various other projects which when completed would raise the standard of living of the citizens of South Vietnam.

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(C) The Seabees' work on the ACTOVRAD site at Mui Dinh was completed on 26 September, but the NMCB personnel working at Ta Fou radar site missed their completion date by 2 weeks due to excessive rainfall and harassment by Viet Cong insurgents.⁹⁴

Redeployment and Decommissioning

(C) During November a substantial decrease in naval construction force personnel occurred as NMCB 5 redeployed and the Third Naval Construction Brigade was decommissioned. The brigade staff had supported as many as 12 NMCB during 1968. The decommissioning ceremonies were held at Bien Hoa Air Base on 6 November. As RADM Salzer, COMNAVFORV, had said on an earlier occasion:

. . . the Seabees can look back with pride and satisfaction with the knowledge that facilities they had constructed are helping to strengthen the capabilities of the Vietnamese to defend themselves against the aggression of world Communism . . .

Rear Admiral Foster M. Lalor, Jr, who had been Commander Third Naval Construction Brigade, remained in Vietnam to carry on his other duties as the Officer in Charge of Construction, Vietnam and Deputy Commander, Pacific Division Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southeast Asia.

(C) The contribution the Naval Construction Forces made in the RVN will long be remembered by all those who have benefitted from the "Can Do" attitude and spirit of the US Navy Seabee officers and men.⁹⁵

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

Mission

(S) The mission of the naval gunfire support (NGFS) ships firing into North Vietnam was to destroy vehicles transporting supplies, interdict lines of communications (LOC), and supplement aerial bombings during adverse weather or where terrain and AA hazards made air attack unfeasible. Along the 1,200 miles of South Vietnam's coastline the NGFS ships fired in support of land forces. The techniques of NGFS used in Vietnam were an expansion of those developed in World War II and the Korean conflict. The NGFS from allied ships operating in the coastal waters of both North and South Vietnam provided strong support to US, Free World Military Assistance forces (FWMAF) and the RVNAF fighting in RVN.⁹⁶

(S) During 1968 and 1969 the NGFS ships were very active in their assigned missions along the coast of Vietnam. In late 1969 and 1970 the emphasis of responsibility began to shift from US forces and FWMAF to the RVNAF, and the requirements of NGFS ships were reduced. For example in 1969 the NGFS ships fired 454,055 rounds of various types; in 1970 only 234,299 rounds were expended, an approximately 50 percent reduction in the 1 year period.⁹⁷

(C) For CY71, the total number of projectiles fired by naval gunfire ships was 113,600, a substantial decrease of over 51 percent from the CY70 total. Hard military targets within range of naval guns became increasingly difficult to locate since enemy units of significant size were either located away from the coastline in inaccessible regions or interspersed in populated regions.

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Organization

(C) The NGFS ships were primarily used in MR 1 and MR 4; the missions were limited in MR 2 and MR 3 in 1971. During the last 6 months of the year there were no missions required in MR 3 and only 76 missions fired in MR 2. The need for NGFS varied depending on the support required by the operating forces ashore.

(C) During 1971 there were usually two gunfire support ships in the MR 4 area to support the 9th and 21st ARVN Div in their U Minh Forest campaign. In December plans called for the 21st ARVN Div to move southward into the Ca Mau Peninsula, through the SOLID ANCHOR AO, from Song Ong Doc to south of Nam Can. Since artillery support was limited, naval gunfire was strongly sought for the campaign. The naval gunfire support was also limited, due to the presence of extensive shoal water around the southern portion of the Ca Mau Peninsula, a factor which had earlier caused suspension of naval gunfire support to Vinh Binh and Kien Hoa provinces.

(C) In MR 1 there was usually one ship available for NGFS missions and its assets were used for suppressive counter-battery fire. During December only nine ship days were assigned to southern MR 1, and the allotted assets were used primarily to fire high-priority intelligence targets.⁹⁸

(U) In coordinating naval gunfire, the ships were assisted by the Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO). The ANGLICO personnel consisted of 165 US Marine Corps and US Navy officers and men, who were trained, experienced gunfire spotters and ground observers. The mission of Sub-Unit One, 1st ANGLICO, in the RVN was to provide advice and assistance in planning, coordinating, and utilizing naval gunfire units assigned for all in-country support of all forces exclusive of Marine Corps elements. Additionally, Sub-Unit One provided personnel to coordinate and control air support for the 2d ROK Marine Bde. At the close of the year the ANGLICO personnel were still operating in small teams as ground observers with South Vietnamese and Korean forces.⁹⁹

Effectiveness

(C) There is no doubt of the value of naval gunfire support: it was a secure, mobile, available all weather, gun platform with quick reaction time and high rate of fire; it provided a surge capability to augment artillery. At the end of 1971 the VNN had four ships with NGFS capability, but those four "blue water" ships had limited firepower compared to the larger, heavily armed US Navy ships. Also the VNN ships indirect fire capability was severely limited in its installed gunfire control system (GFCS). The lack of a stable element in the GFCS made close support of friendly troops marginal.

(C) Although NGFS requirements had decreased in the last 2 years and RVNAF capability improved, a study by COMUSMACV indicated a requirement for at least three US Navy ships for the foreseeable future after 1971. In addition to NGFS missions those assigned ships would act as a deterrent to the enemy trawler infiltrators into the RVN waters as discussed in the MARKET TIME operation.¹⁰⁰

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NAVAL OPERATIONS - Chapter V

1. Bklt (S/NF), MACJ305, Feb 71, Subj: HQ MACV Measurement of Progress Dec 70 (U), p 5, Gp-3.
2. Bklt (S/NF), MACJ305, 17 Feb 72, Subj: HQ MACV Measurement of Progress, Dec 71 (U), p 28, Gp-4.
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4. Rpt (C), COMNAVFORV, 22 Feb 72, Subj: Monthly Historical Summary, Dec 71 (U), p 34, Gp-4.
5. Rpt (C), COMNAVFORV, 5 Jul 71, Subj: Monthly Historical Summary, May 71 (U), pp 112-116, Gp-4.
6. Rpt (C), COMNAVFORV, 6 Mar 71, Subj: Monthly Historical Summary, Jan 71 (U), p 77, Gp-4.
7. Rpt (C), COMNAVFORV, 1 Apr 71, Subj: Monthly Historical Summary, Feb 71 (U), pp 79-81, Gp-4.
8. Rpt (C), COMNAVFORV, 6 May 71, Subj: Monthly Historical Summary, Mar 71 (U), pp 84-87, Gp-4.
9. Rpt (C), COMNAVFORV, 12 Sep 71, Subj: Monthly Historical Summary, Jul 71 (U), pp 105-107, Gp-4.
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11. Same as #3, p 63.
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13. Rpt (C), COMNAVFORV, undated, Subj: Monthly Historical Summary, Nov 71 (U), p 45, Gp-4.
14. Same as #4, p 34.
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17. Same as #15, pp 103-110.
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23. Same as #22, pp 49-51.
24. Same as #21, pp F-29, F-31.
25. Same as #9, pp 14-24.
26. Same as #21, pp F-32, F-37.
27. Same as #7, pp 2-8.
28. Same as #6, pp 2-11.
29. Same as #8, pp 2-8.
30. Same as #15, pp 10-17.
31. Msg (U), COMNAVFORV to Commander Task Group 214.2, 111149Z May 1971, Subj: Search and Clear Operations, 10 May 71 (U), Gp-Not stated.
32. Same as #22, pp 4-9.
33. Same as #12, pp 6-7.
34. Same as #13, pp 5-7.
35. Same as #21, pp F-37 - F-38.
36. Same as #8, p 15.
37. Same as #15, pp 18-22.
38. Same as #5, pp 22-24.
39. Same as #3, pp 8-10.
40. Same as #13, pp 24-25.
41. Same as #21, pp F-39 - F-40.
42. Same as #6, pp 22-25.
43. Same as #7, pp 19-21.

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44. Same as #8, pp 17-20.
45. Same as #15, pp 23-25.
46. Same as #5, pp 26-30.
47. Same as #19, pp 18-20.
48. Same as #9, pp 30-32.
49. Same as #9, pp 30-32.
50. Same as #22, pp 13-14.
51. Same as #3, p 11.
52. Same as #12, p 8.
53. Same as #4, pp 15-16.
54. Same as #21, pp F-43, F-44.
55. Same as #22, pp 39-43.
56. Same as #22, pp 17-19.
57. Same as #21, p F-45.
58. Same as #6, pp 31-34.
59. Same as #7, pp 26-31.
60. Same as #8, pp 26-29.
61. Same as #15, pp 32-35.
62. Same as #5, pp 40-44.
63. Same as #19, pp 40-44.
64. Same as #9, pp 55-59.
65. Bklt (C), COMNAVFORV, Not dated, Subj: Ship and Craft of the Vietnamese Navy (U), p 23, Gp-Not stated.
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67. Same as #13, pp 14-16.
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71. Same as #21, pp F-7, F-10.
72. Same as #7, pp 62-63.
73. Same as #8, pp 63-64.
74. Same as #15, pp 74-78.
75. Msg (C), CNO to COMNAVFORV, 131818Z Apr 71, Subj: Trawler 8S-01 (C), Gp-4.
76. Same as #12, p 29.
77. Same as #4, p 51.
78. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 231125Z May 71, Subj: MARKET TIME Effectiveness (U), Gp-4.
79. Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 260412Z May 71, Subj: MARKET TIME Effectiveness (U), Gp-3.
80. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 301115Z May 71, Subj: MARKET TIME Effectiveness (U), Gp-3.
81. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 250944Z Sep 71, Subj: MARKET TIME effectiveness (U), Gp-4.
82. OPLAN (C), COMNAVFORV/CHNAVGRP, 4 Apr 70, Subj: ACTOVPLAN OPLAN No. 159-70 (U), pp I-1, I-II2, Gp-4.
83. Same as #9, pp 106-107.
84. Same as #22, p 93.
85. Same as #12, p 43.
86. Same as #13, p 43.
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88. MACV Command History 1969 (U), Vol I (TS), p V-183, Gp-1.
89. Same as #6, pp 33-88.

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
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91. Same as #5, pp 133-139.
92. Same as #19, pp 117-120.
93. Same as #22, pp 104-107.
94. Same as #3, pp 77-80.
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F-4Es on a combat strike in Southeast Asia.

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CHAPTER VI

AIR OPERATIONS IN SEA

AERIAL ASSETS IN SEA

(U) With the accelerated return of combat personnel to the US and a commensurate reduction in American presence throughout SEA, airpower in 1971 literally took up the slack in US offensive power. The USAF reduction affected both units and personnel, yet with fewer airplanes and people, the remaining organizations provided the same type of strike missions, reconnaissance, support, interdiction, and search and rescue that had been flown in previous years. The number of missions was down from 1970 figures, but technological advances and improved weapons made up the difference in firepower. During the year ground forces, both US and Allied, depended more than ever upon airpower to provide the vital support which departed forces had formerly furnished. The most significant accomplishment of all was the intensive interdiction effort which the USAF conducted against the Communist supply lines throughout SEA.


(U) The drawdown of US airpower in SEA in 1971 manifested itself by the 1st Marine Air Wing's redeployment to Japan; by the reduction during the year in the Navy's aircraft carriers on Yankee Station from three to two (and rarely only one), with occasional periods of overlap; by the redeployment of the USAF's F-100 fighter-bomber squadrons to the US; and by the turnover to the VNAF of some of the RVN air bases previously operated by the USAF. Despite the phasedown, the smaller number of sorties flown and fewer aircraft, the interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh trail took a serious toll of Communist trucks and supplies, thereby preventing any generally sustained ground activity by the enemy in 1971. In the final analysis the decrease in ground combat was the best indication that airpower was doing its most important job -- preventing enemy supplies from reaching the front. This was airpower's biggest accomplishment, among many splendid achievements, in 1971.

(U) The most noteworthy ground action during 1971 was LAM SON 719, the RVNAF incursion into Laos. TACAIR and ARC LIGHT sorties were increased during February and March to support this operation. Elsewhere, USAF, USN and VNAF aircraft performed escort duty on the Mekong River convoys to Phnom Penh, Khmer Republic. USAF tactical reconnaissance over North Vietnam increased during the dry season months. The increased retaliation to this reconnaissance by Communist SAMs, Migs, and AAA caused four major reinforced protective reaction strikes and several hundred immediate-response reaction strikes by the end of 1971. The US and world press saw this action as a step-up in the air war despite the fact that fewer total sorties were flown in 1971 than any year since 1968, and the month of August 1971 saw the fewest monthly attack sorties flown since 1968. In fact, the Communists persisted in pushing supplies south despite the wet weather during the spring and summer. This action, contrary to previous years, caused greater air activity during the "wet" months than normal. With the approach of the dry season in October and the initiation of COMMANDO HUNT VII, aerial sorties over the Laos panhandle and into NVN began a steady increase that continued into 1972.

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USAF AIRCRAFT ORDER OF BATTLE

31 DEC 71



* 31 NOV 71 FIGURES

Source: 7AF: Comd Status Rpt
USAF: Air Opns Review

Figure VI-1

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USAF AIR ORDER OF BATTLE

(S) USAF aircraft declined in number from 31 Oct 70's total of 1,584 to 31 Dec 71's total of 833 throughout Southeast Asia. (See Figure VI-1.) This decline represented the turnover or declining usage of several previously busy bases such as Ban Me Thuot, Phu Cat, Nha Trang, and Binh Thuy. From the remaining bases in SVN and from those in Thailand, the USAF continued to hit the enemy in Laos, Cambodia, and SVN while simultaneously drawing down and also training the Vietnamese Air Force to assume the aerial portion of the conflict.

US ARMY AVIATION

(U) The US Army, with its organic or attached aviation assets of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft, has used its air resources to overcome the difficult terrain and the irregular warfare experienced in SVN. Either as an integral part of a division, such as the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) or in attached units, helicopters especially have provided the ground units with a tremendously increased mobility in combat. During 1971 the US Army aircraft flew a total of 4,357,000 sorties in all of SEA with 3,188,000 of that total being by helicopters.

(S) US Army helicopter assets in RVN began a steady decline from a high of 3,358 in March 1970 to 1,962 in December 1971. Even though the number of helicopters was reduced the demand for their assistance continued to increase. Until the Vietnamese Air Force helicopter assets reached a point from which they could handle the demand for aerial support by the ARVN troops -- as of December 1971 the VNAF possessed only 532 helicopters -- this situation would continue to exist. (See Figure VI-2).

US NAVY AVIATION

(U) Naval air assets were located either aboard the aircraft carriers on Yankee Station off the SVN coast near the DMZ, or at operating fields in SVN. Land-based aircraft were chiefly the P-3 patrol planes supporting MARKET TIME, the UH-1 Seawolf helicopters and OV-10 Black Ponies. The latter two aircraft types were used to protect and support the "brown water" navy in the Delta and for aerial reconnaissance and firepower respectively. These aircraft were under the operational control of COMNAVFORV.

(C) Navy carrier aircraft flew attack sorties chiefly against targets in MR 1 and the Laos panhandle. During 1971 planes from the aircraft carriers on Yankee Station flew 31,041 sorties. (See Figure VI-3.)

US MARINE AVIATION


(U) The first Marine unit in RVN, a single helicopter squadron, arrived in April 1962. By 1965, the situation in RVN had deteriorated to the point that the Marines were brought in to provide combat forces near the DMZ. The 1st Marine Air Wing which had deployed to RVN in 1965 along with the III Marine Amphibious Force proceeded to fly 375,000 fixed wing sorties and 2.7 million helicopter sorties, to move 425,000 tons of cargo and 4.1 million people, and to expend 420,000 pounds of bombs before their activities ceased in June 1971.

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VI-3

US ARMY AND VNAF HELICOPTER STRENGTH



1971 ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIER (CVA)/OPERATIONS AT YANKEE STATION (NUMBER OF SORTIES FLOWN PER MONTH)

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
HANCOCK	1-14 24	20	8	9 18	10							
KITTY HAWK	14	4 21		10-25	4-16 30	23						
RANGER	23-31	3	16	1-17 26	18							
MIDWAY					18 9	30	20	1-16		27-10		
ORISKANY						16-10	25-7		4-26		30-19	
ENTERPRISE							16-31	16-4		11-2	19-10	
CONSTELLATION											3-21 30	31
CORAL SEA												18-31
SORTIES FLOWN PER MONTH	3,376	3,644	4,627	3,626	2,630	2,477	1,966	1,914	1,286	1,033	1,971	2,460

Source: MACJ3072

Figure VI-3

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(U) During the height of the fighting in the first part of 1969, Marine fixed wing aircraft averaged over 5,000 sorties per month, primarily in the I CTZ/MR I area. Air operations diminished steadily from January 1970 to May 1971. Both in- and out-of-country operations were reduced by more than 50 percent during 1970. As a result of the redeployment of Marine personnel, air operations were phased down and units redeployed. This redeployment proceeded gradually until the last helicopter flights in early June 1971. At that time the Marines completed their withdrawal from RVN having flown a total of 4,601 sorties in 1971.⁴

FREE WORLD AIR FORCES

(U) In response to President Johnson's 1964 appeal for the assistance of other nations in Vietnam, several countries sent contingents ranging from medical units to sizeable fighting units. Only a few of those nations responding to the call could provide air force units.

Republic of Korea

(U) The South Koreans had few aircraft in RVN and employed them chiefly in an administrative capacity. When air support for their combat units was needed the ROK soldiers were supported by US, VNAF, or Australian aircraft. Throughout most of 1971 the ROK units utilized three C-54 transport aircraft staged at Tan Son Nhut for shuttle between ROK and SVN.

Royal Australian Air Force

(U) The Royal Australian Air Force made its first contribution to the Allied effort in Vietnam in August 1964 with the establishment of a RAAF transport flight at Vung Tau consisting of six C-7 aircraft. This group became known as No. 35 Squadron. In June 1966 a UH-1 helicopter squadron (No. 9) arrived in SVN. By 1969 the RAAF introduced its own armored helicopter gunships to support the Australian troops. Elements of two C-130 airlift squadrons, based in Australia, were flown to SVN periodically to move personnel and cargo and for medical evacuation to Australia. Canberra twin jet bombers of No. 2 Squadron were deployed to SVN in April 1967 and were stationed at Phan Rang Air Base. They returned to Australia in June 1971. During 1971 the RAAF flew 237,950 sorties in SVN while losing two aircraft and having 35 damaged.

(U) On 18 Aug 71 the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. William McMahon, announced that the Australian contingent would be withdrawn in conjunction with the phasedown of American participation. Combat units with some supporting aircraft were withdrawn by the end of 1971 and equipment was to be removed by early 1972.⁵

Royal Thai Air Force

(U) The Royal Thai Air Force "Victory Flight" element in Vietnam stood down on 1 Nov 71. Thai personnel completed redeployment to Thailand on 15 December ending Thai air assistance to SVN that began in September 1964.⁶ While in Vietnam the Thais flew USAF and VNAF C-47 and C-123 aircraft in units of the respective air forces.

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VNAF BEDDOWN LOCATIONS (31 Dec 71)




Figure VI-4

Source: VNAF Status Review

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Vietnamese Air Force

(S) As of 31 Dec 71 the VNAF had 42 operational squadrons of all types. This figure was programmed to increase to 52 by FY74, which would make the VNAF the world's eighth largest air force. Helicopter squadrons (15) were the most numerous in VNAF followed by fighters (9), liaison (7), transport (4), and gunship (2) squadrons. During 1971 the VNAF activated one squadron of A-1 fighters and two squadrons of A-37s, all three of which became operationally ready. In addition they established two liaison squadrons (O-1/U-17), two airlift squadrons (C-123), one squadron of AC-119 gunships, nine squadrons of UH-1 helicopters, and one squadron of CH-47 helicopters. See Figure VI-4 for VNAF beddown locations. The VNAF flew 650,979 total sorties through December 1971 as compared to 383,240 sorties flown by all VNAF aircraft in 1970.

(S) The gradual monthly increase in the number of VNAF sorties flown during 1971, from 37,175 in January to 71,872 in December, is an indication of the increasing role and responsibility the VNAF has assumed. Despite their achievement the VNAF still relied heavily upon the US for aviation support, especially for airlift. See Figure VI-9 for attack sortie rate comparison.

AERIAL MISSIONS IN SEA

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

(S) Stringent rules of engagement continued to govern Allied air activity throughout SEA. See the Top Secret Supplement (pp 17-22) to MACV 1970 Command History for a detailed discussion. The rules of engagement generally remained the same during 1971 with only minor modifications such as the dates of cease-fire periods.

AIRLIFT

(U) The mobility of the war in Vietnam plus the lack of roads through much of the inhospitable terrain placed considerable demand upon airlift and more specifically, tactical airlift. The prompt resupply of troops in action; the transfer of wounded from the battlefield, and the transportation of troops from staging areas to the scene of action; even the routine hauling of passengers on official business involved airlift. Army and Marine units depended primarily upon helicopters for resupply and command control plus the "Dustoff" helicopters for the transport of wounded. For bases and hamlets that had so much as a usable dirt landing strip, tactical airlift provided the major share of the support.

(S) The redeployment of US forces materially decreased the number of missions flown during 1971. The three tactical airlift airplanes, the C-7, C-123, and C-130, flew 338,571 sorties within SVN during CY70 but in CY71 they flew less than two-thirds of that amount, 207,366 sorties. To this total for CY71 the VNAF added 16,708 sorties compared with 13,123 for CY70.

(S) As in previous years there was more demand for airlift than there were planes to accomplish it. Programmed phasedowns scheduled a reduction in the number of C-130 squadrons

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

VI-7

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USAF airlift aircraft used in South Vietnam:

top, C-7,
middle, C-123,
bottom, C-130.



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from ten to six by 1 Jul 71. In the face of expanding requirements in Cambodia, decreased VNAF capability during their C-123 transition program, and the loss of USAF C-123 capability during the transition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1971 authorized the use of Military Airlift Command (MAC) C-141 aircraft to relieve critical surge periods not involving tactical airlift.¹⁰

(C) On 1 Dec 71 the 834th Air Division (AD) was deactivated at Tan Son Nhut AB near Saigon. Since its arrival in RVN in 1966, the 834th had transported more than 20 million passengers and nearly 6 million tons of cargo. The airlift function formerly performed by the 834th AD was assumed by the airlift section of 7AF Headquarters.¹¹

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(U) One unusual use of tactical airlift which began in 1970 and continued in 1971 was bombardment. C-130 aircraft of the 463d Tactical Airlift Wing delivered BLU-82 bombs, generally referred to under the code name COMMANDO VAULT, to forested areas where helicopters were required to land. These 15,000 pound bombs were dropped from the opened cargo door of the C-130 and exploded just above the ground, leveling an area sufficient for one or more helicopters to touchdown. The COMMANDO VAULT weapon is the largest conventional bomb in the USAF inventory.¹³

ARC LIGHT

(C) ARC LIGHT (B-52) missions both at the beginning and end of 1971 were heavily committed to interdiction strikes in southern Laos and eastern Cambodia in a strong and continuing effort to slow down the flow of supplies on the Ho Chi Minh trail. The level of ARC LIGHT activity reflected the seasonal use of the trail by the NVA as well as the potent capability of the B-52 bombers to destroy targets such as truck parks, storage and bivouac areas, bunkers, roads and trails, pipelines, and concentrations of personnel. As of 31 Dec 71 a total of 8,816 sorties had been flown in Laos, slightly more than the total of 8,450 Lao sorties flown in 1970. By contrast, B-52 sorties in RVN at the end of 1971 were only 2,426, considerably less than the 1970 total of 5,112.¹⁴


B-52 Sorties

(S) In late March 1971 a proposal was made to have B-52s drop leaflet bombs over southern Laos and Cambodia. Attesting to COMUSMACV's continuing high regard for the striking potency of the B-52 was his prompt refusal of this plan. COMUSMACV considered the conventional firepower of the B-52 to be of such high value that any degradation of the bomb load to accommodate leaflet bombs was not desirable.¹⁵

(S) During the spring of 1971 it was discovered that the enemy had positioned significantly larger amounts of material throughout the NVN-Laos-SVN transportation network during the 1970-71 dry season than in the 1969-70 season. In addition to the material stored, new roads and trails were constructed. The authority to bomb these new areas was required to establish blocking belts across the central segment of the core route structure in the southern Laos panhandle. This action was designed to impede the flow of enemy logistics and channel it into more lucrative transit patterns.¹⁶


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OUT-COUNTRY ARC LIGHT SORTIES 1970-1971



1970 —●—
1971 - - -●- -

IN-COUNTRY ARC LIGHT SORTIES 1970-1971



1970 —●—
1971 - - -●- -

Source: MACV Measurement of Progress
Dec 70, Dec 71 pp 8-9

Figure VI-5

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(S) Since the beginning of B-52 operations in June 1965, recurring evidence has existed that classified target information was reaching the enemy prior to an ARC LIGHT strike. Several attempts were made through the years to improve the situation with some success, but enemy PW interrogation continued to indicate that prestrike data still reached the enemy. An ad hoc group was formed at MACV in June 1970 to study all facets of ARC LIGHT scheduling activity and the assistance of the RVNAF JCS was also solicited. In September 1970, with the report of the ad hoc committee completed, COMUSMACV sent a detailed list of the findings to all addressees involved, covering actions to be taken to tighten the security surrounding all aspects of planning, communication and execution of ARC LIGHT missions.

(S) Implementation of the committee's recommendations resulted in a decrease in the number of enemy B-52 alert messages noted by intelligence sources. By August 1971, however, intelligence analysts observed an upsurge of the messages revealing that security leaks were occurring once again in ARC LIGHT mission scheduling. A review of ARC LIGHT procedures was called for and the Operations Security Working Group was assembled in September 1971 for another review of B-52 security weaknesses. The group concluded that ARC LIGHT forewarning was chiefly a result of stereotyped patterns of operations scheduling and execution and initiated corrective action.

TACAIR

(S) As the ground war continued to wind down during 1971 due to troop rotation and reduced enemy activity, there was less demand for tactical air (TACAIR) sorties flown in support of US ground troops in action. Allied ground support continued with such campaigns as LAM SON 719 and the increased activity in Laos and Cambodia, but increasingly the troops supported were not US but ARVN, Forces Armees Nationales Khmer (FANK), and Lao. There was a significant reduction in the total number of aircraft, US and Free World, in RVN, again due to the winddown in the war. Along with the aircraft reduction, the authorized USAF TACAIR rates, reduced to 10,000 per month in August 1970, remained fixed at that figure with rare operational exceptions authorized by MACV. During the same period that Allied TACAIR forces were declining, their VNAF counterpart was increasing both in numbers and effectiveness.

(U) During 1971 the last of the F-100 "Super Sabres" squadrons stood down and departed for the US. The 35th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) ceased combat operations in June 1971 with a four-ship mission against an enemy bunker complex. The first F-100s had flown to SEA in 1964. The planes of the 35th TFW's four squadrons were based at Phan Rang AB, RVN. The departure of the F-100s left the F-4, with a few F-105G fighters in Thailand, as the main fighter aircraft for TACAIR in SEA other than USN carrier aircraft.

Air Support of LAM SON 719

(U) The best demonstration of the continued use of TACAIR took place during an RVN ground operation, LAM SON 719, early in 1971. In this operation RVN forces penetrated the Laos panhandle beyond supporting heavy artillery fire thereby becoming dependent upon close air support. The Laos phase of LAM SON 719 began 8 Feb 71 when RVN ground forces supported by US aviation moved westward out of RVN into the panhandle to seize the town of Tchepone, an important traffic hub adjacent to the Ho Chi Minh trail complex. This operation was the most significant single TACAIR ground support activity during 1971.

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
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US/VNAF ATTACK CAPABLE AIRCRAFT POSSESSED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA



* US INCLUDES ALL SERVICES

Source: USA, ACTION OFFICER'S DATA BOOK, DEC 71

Figure VI - 6

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(U) In addition to their normal interdiction role, B-52 strikes were employed to bomb landing zone areas prior to air assaults by RVN troops. This action was usually followed by TACAIR strikes directed by forward air controllers (FAC) flying overhead. Finally, prior to the helicopter air assault, TACAIR occasionally laid down smoke screens interspersed with casualty-producing cluster bomb unit (CBU) munitions. ¹⁸

(S) US airpower made feasible the RVNAF operation deep in an enemy area. Tactical strikes, tactical airlift, and the B-52s played a key role in the success attained, first by interdicting the battlefield area and then by close support of the troops. Use was made of the COMMANDO VAULT 15,000 lb bombs to blast out helicopter landing zones and on occasion for other suitable targets. The daily number of TACAIR sorties during LAM SON 719 ranged from just over 100 on 8 February to a high of 337 on 10 March. A total of 8,512 TACAIR sorties, 1,358 ARC LIGHT sorties, and 2,809 tactical airlift sorties flew in support of LAM SON 719.

(S) The RVNAF reported 13,642 enemy troops killed during the operation, of which 4,364 were attributed to aerial activity; it was possible that the actual total of air-killed casualties may have been much higher since RVNAF ground sweeps were conducted in a very small percentage of the areas struck. Also confirmed to air action were 61 enemy tanks destroyed and another 13 damaged.

(S) Most of the US air forces that supported LAM SON 719 were drawn from the aerial interdiction effort, COMMANDO HUNT V, in the STEEL TIGER area of the southern Laos panhandle. While this prevented the same level of interdiction efforts throughout the Ho Chi Minh trail the enemy concentration of trucks and supplies in the LAM SON area provided an abundance of lucrative targets. ¹⁹

Mekong River Convoy Protection

(S) The Mekong River is navigable from the Delta in RVN all the way to Phnom Penh, the capital of the Khmer Republic (GKR). In January 1971 POL supplies reached a critical low point in the capital city and immediate replenishment was essential. A combined Mekong Convoy Security Plan was implemented on 12 Jan 71. The plan called for air and surface protection for military and commercial convoys proceeding up the Mekong River for 70 miles from Tan Chau in RV to Phnom Penh. The Vietnamese Navy (VNN) named the plan TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII. Tankers, barges, and merchant ships assembled at Tan Chau in convoys escorted by VNN river vessels. Security along the banks was the job of the ARVN supported by FANK ground units.

(S) Air support was provided by Vietnamese and US aircraft. USAF and US Army assets were initially committed to the convoy's aerial defense with the 7AF directing the continuous aerial coverage of the convoy as ordered by COMUSMACV. This aerial coverage began on 17 Jan 71. USAF FACs provided night and day coverage of the convoy utilizing OV-10s and O-2As. As needed, AC-119 gunships were called in for convoy defense. Army aviation contributed UH-1H and OH-6A helicopters for command and observation and AH-1G (Cobra) helicopters for defense -- chiefly during the daylight hours -- although a UH-1H helicopter for command and communications provided continuous night coverage of the convoy. In February the US Navy was requested to provide UH-1 helicopter (Seawolves) support and later in the month Navy OV-10 (Black Pony) aircraft joined in the aerial protection effort. USAF A-37 aircraft provided TACAIR support from ground alert status.

(S) The CG 7AF provided centralized control and scheduling of all US and VNAF aircraft supporting the convoys. Once enemy contact was made, the permission of the surface convoy commander aboard the convoy command ship, and target validation by the KAF liaison officer (at BLUE CHIP or aboard the tactical air control center-airborne [TACC-A]) was necessary

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before air-to-ground ordnance could be expended. Such permission was usually granted only when the pilots could positively pinpoint the source of the in-coming enemy fire. In emergencies, the aircraft could expend on a source of enemy fire, if pinpointed, on the direction of the convoy commander.

(S) The Mekong River convoy and its triservice aerial cover was planned originally to last only long enough to insure the arrival of sufficient POL at Phnom Penh. On 1 May 71 it was extended for 2 months, extended again in June until 31 August and, at that time, until 1 Nov 71 at which time it was extended indefinitely into 1972.

(S) With the transfer of the AC-119 gunships to the VNAF on 11 Sep 71 greater participation was required by the VNAF. The ultimate objective was to have the Khmer Air Force secure the convoys but available assets and limited command and control capability, a critical factor in convoy operations, was assessed by COMUSMACV on 22 Aug 71 as below that necessary for safe action.

(S) In its 1971 phase the Mekong River plan was successful in that of the approximately 640 vessels attempting the round-trip to and from Phnom Penh, only one tug and one barge were lost to enemy action. It was an unusual aerial action, somewhat peculiar to the Vietnamese conflict, but one that demonstrated the versatility of small aircraft in a protective and strike support role. 21

INTERDICTION

(U) In assessing the TACAIR interdictive effort in 1971, Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans, after a December visit to SVN, stated that the USAF had been more successful in its interdiction effort during 1971 due to the more effective use of airpower. The continued use of the very effective AC-119 and AC-130 gunships, the addition of the computerized fire control system in the B-57G, and new armament such as the laser-guided bomb, provided more efficient means to accomplish the interdiction task despite fewer aircraft involved. Attack sorties in 1971 by all USAF aircraft, including B-52s, were no more than 40 percent of what they were in 1968, the biggest year of USAF air operations. 21

Vietnamization of Interdiction Operations

(S) In October 1971 Mr. Leonard Sullivan, Deputy Director, Defense Research and Engineering for SEA, visited SVN. During a meeting of the Combined Interdiction Coordination Committee (CICC) he emphasized to the participants that SECDEF Laird anticipated an increase in the tempo of withdrawal of the US air interdiction effort in Laos. The SECDEF requested Mr. Sullivan to determine the VNAF capability to handle the interdiction effort themselves. The US is "... still spending \$2 billion a year on conducting that effort. ... what will happen if we stop that campaign?" Throughout 1971 the CICC worked vigorously and closely with the RVNAF to develop their interdiction skills and capability so that in the event Mr. Sullivan's estimate became reality the RVNAF would be self-sufficient. 22

1.3(5) (S) Toward this end the VNAF interdiction role during 1971 was expanded to include coastal surveillance air patrols in April 1971 and limited TACAIR support of the Ho Chi Minh trail interdiction effort.

These VNAF efforts, together with a steady improvement in RVNAF command and control, upgraded the interdiction program while employing existing resources. RVNAF officials indicated a willingness to assume the mission of conducting combined interdiction operations both in and out of RVN, supported by available

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Free World Military Assistance Forces material. Much remained to be done by the RVNAF, however, to achieve the desired self-sufficiency.²³

CREDIBLE CHASE

(S) The CREDIBLE CHASE program, designed to provide a counterinfiltration air capability for RVN, envisioned the combined use of armed, short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft, orbiting relay aircraft, ground forces, and sensor equipment. To conduct aircraft tests under combat conditions, the SECDEF directed the establishment of a multiservice task force which was activated on 27 Oct 71. Testing was to begin in SVN on or about 15 Apr 72. COMUSMACV was to assume operational control of the tests through DEPCOMUSMACV for Air Ops and to integrate the test into the 1972 interdiction program. Tentatively involved in the testing were intelligence collection, sensor readout, both real-time and non-real-time, air interdiction, air support of ground forces, and border surveillance.

(S) As envisioned in the basic plan dated 15 Nov 71, a force of 30 STOL aircraft were to be equally divided between two competitive designs which the USAF had been testing for structural suitability and weapons system certification in the US. After suitable training of both USAF and VNAF pilots a squadron-size task force of the STOL aircraft was to be deployed into an area along the triborder section of SVN to conduct counterinfiltration operations. The plan called for operations to stage out of Pleiku AB, SVN.

(S) The USAF/VNAF personnel assigned to CREDIBLE CHASE were to conduct a combat evaluation of the two armed, lightweight, off-the-shelf, STOL, mini-gunship aircraft. The tested aircraft were to be armed with a 20mm gun, a sensor readout capability, and a night observation device. The one aircraft selected would be added to the VNAF inventory to provide them with a counterinfiltration capability to fill the void left by the departure of the USAF. Both Fairchild-Hiller "Peacemakers" designated the AU-23A and Helio "Stallion" designated the AU-24A aircraft were to be tested. Both aircraft are similar in performance and had been previously tested in the Air Force program PAVE COIN, initiated on 1 May 71 to find a suitable counter-insurgency aircraft to replace the aging T-28. Limited combat testing of the two aircraft under PAVE COIN was done in Thailand during June and July 1971.

(S) The Air Force Advisory Group (AFGP) worked closely with the VNAF who were to provide 50 percent of the pilots for CREDIBLE CHASE, one-third of the maintenance personnel and the use of six AC-47 aircraft as airborne command and control centers. Air America was contracted to train VNAF pilots. A period of 60 days was set aside for the actual testing under CREDIBLE CHASE running from 15 Apr to 15 Jun 72. The task force as constituted at the end of 1971 involved 108 VNAF and 278 USAF personnel. The RVNAF JGS had agreed to support and participate in the CREDIBLE CHASE test.

(S) In conjunction with the test of the aircraft the SECDEF directed that an evaluation of the ground sensor strategic readout systems (SRS) be conducted. Designed to measure VC/NVA infiltration into Cambodia and SVN the SRS was to be mounted in VNAF AC-47 aircraft with both real-time (RT) and non-real-time (NRT) capability.

(S) In December 1971 COMUSMACV protested the addition of the ground sensor strategic readout system testing as being counter to the originally established test procedures. Planned to integrate with the on-going interdiction program with a minimum of disruption and with a minimum impact upon the RVNAF logistic system and operations, the CREDIBLE CHASE plan grew rapidly "beyond the bounds of realism and threatens to be a burden on the RVNAF." The support requirements including furniture, vehicle, and facilities for the project at Pleiku and elsewhere expanded "out of proportion with the total task to be accomplished," forcing MACV to

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protest and to recommend that the SRS testing not be included. HQ USAF granted permission to delete the non-real-time testing of the SRS from the CREDIBLE CHASE evaluation on 20 Dec 71, and the message reiterated that the main point of the test was to develop a self-sustaining counter-infiltration capability for the RVNAF and the question of real-time data gathering by the SRS might exceed RVNAF capability. By the end of 1971, as advance party personnel began to arrive, coordination problems were still being worked out.²⁴

(S) On 17 Feb 72 the JCS directed that the CREDIBLE CHASE combat evaluation in RVN be cancelled. The Chief of Staff USAF directed that a CONUS test and evaluation of the STOL aircraft be conducted by Tactical Air Command at Eglin AFB, Florida with a maximum feasible participation by VNAF air and ground crews. On 24 Feb 72 MACV terminated all CREDIBLE CHASE planning and programming activities in RVN.²⁵

Gunships

(U) The AC-47, AC-119G and K, and the AC-130 gunships continued to play a vital role in fire support to ground operations in SEA and interdiction on the Ho Chi Minh logistical trail system in southern Laos. Already an accepted weapon for close ground support, the gunships (a weapon peculiar to the war in SEA) received greater emphasis in the refinement and sophistication of their weapons systems. During 1971 most of the USAF AC-119 gunship capability was turned over to the VNAF.

(S) The AC-130E (PAVE SPECTRE) gunship configuration incorporated the same sensor and gun array used in the specially configured AC-130A (SURPRISE PACKAGE). This was the first gunship to use the 40mm gun and the BLACK CROW sensor and digital fire control computer. All AC-130s are now alike in the armament and sensor configuration with two 20mm and two 40mm guns, an infrared set, low light level television (LLLTV), BLACK CROW (an ignition system detection system) and a base target designator. The AC-130E gunships were configured during 1971 to increase their loiter time over target by 2 hours, adding additional armor, greater ammunition-carrying capability and a digital fire control computer. Improved electronic countermeasure (ECM) capability was added with the installation of ALQ-87 pods mounted on the fuel pylon. AC-130s came under SAM attack in April and May 1971 when SA-2 missiles were launched from previously undetected sites in Laos. The ALQ-87 pods permitted enough warning to the AC-130 to withdraw from such a hostile environment.

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(S) In 1971 a USAF engineering development group conceived and demonstrated the mounting of a 105mm artillery piece in the aft end of an AC-130E gunship -- a program designated PAVE AEGIS. The cannon was located to fire through a hatch in the left side of the plane at the rate of three rounds per minute. Combat evaluation in SEA was scheduled for February 1972.²⁷

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RECONNAISSANCE

(S) The USAF conducted aerial reconnaissance in SEA, both strategic and tactical, with a number of different and sophisticated weapons. Strategic reconnaissance remained under the control of SAC and used SR-71 (GIANT SCALE) and U-2 (GIANT NAIL) aircraft as well as the BUFFALO HUNTER drones, used primarily for obtaining photographic information over NVN.

(S) Tactical reconnaissance, like all other US activities, was affected by the general wind-down of US participation in the SEA war. The 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, located at Tan Son Nhut was inactivated on 31 Aug 71. The wing flew RF-4Cs, RB-57s, and EC-47s. E
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(S) The linking of LORAN bombing techniques to photo reconnaissance enabled extremely accurate bombing without actually seeing the target. Tactical reconnaissance planes took pictures of a target and at the same time LORAN location indicators were imprinted on the film fixing the exact location in relation to the three LORAN stations. With these locations an accurate plot of the target could be made. This plot was fed into the data computer on board the strike aircraft which then indicated the proper time for the bomb release. Accuracy within less than 100 meters was consistently recorded giving US aircraft an all-weather, highly proficient bombing capability.

(S) The LORAN capability had vital application throughout the year as protective reaction strikes were flown with increasing frequency. Both in the obtaining of target data and in the battle damage assessment (BDA) after the strike, photo reconnaissance continued to be relied upon to be the "eyes" of COMUSMACV. After some of the special protective reaction strikes, MACV requested that strategic reconnaissance facilities such as BUFFALO HUNTER be diverted to assist in BDA. 28

(U) It was during their efforts to photograph NVA activity that photo reconnaissance aircraft began to receive increasing fire from SAMs as well as indications of enemy radar tracking. This enemy action, plus the attacks on US B-52 bombers by Mig aircraft, led to the aerial protective reaction strikes detailed in the "Air Operations in North Vietnam" section of this chapter.

FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS


(S) Another aspect of reconnaissance that developed remarkably during the SEA war was the forward air controller (FAC). Their continued visual reconnaissance of a specified geographic area, tactical strike direction and intelligence gathering has won praise from COMUSMACV. During 1971 there was no change in the type of aircraft used (O-1E, O-2A, OV-10A) and the FAC missions remained the same. The rules of engagement under which the FACs operated varied with the tactical situation and it remained the duty of the FAC to insure that tactical strikes were on the proper target and not in a restricted area. F

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SEA SEARCH AND RESCUE ACTIVITY




Combat Saves
Non Combat Saves

Source: 7AF, Comd Status Rpt

Figure VI-7

USAF AIRCRAFT LOST CY 1971



Source: 7AF, COMD STATUS RPT

Figure VI-8

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(S) During 1971 FAC OV-10A aircraft were teamed with F-4s (PAVE NAIL) in an improved night attack capability throughout SEA. Equipped with infrared (IR) target-locating equipment and a laser target-designator, the OV-10 FAC orbited his specified area until a target was located. The LORAN-equipped F-4 strike aircraft (PAVE SWORD), armed with laser-guided bombs (LGB) used the coordinates transmitted by the FAC to release the weapon, from either a dive (visual target acquisition) or level altitude (instrument conditions), so that it would fall into the "basket" (area where the receiver device of the LGB could acquire the laser beam of the OV-10). The OV-10, or illuminator, continued to orbit the area keeping the laser beam directly on target until bomb impact. The program, accepted on 30 Sep 71, was implemented immediately and met with spectacular success as the first three bombs dropped scored direct hits on vital bridges on the Ho Chi Minh trail. An additional use of the system was conceived by the FACs for search and rescue and was put to use prior to testing in the successful recovery during marginal weather conditions of the crews of an F-105 and two F-4s in December 1971.

(S) During August the initial combat employment of the PAVE NAIL ordnance delivery system was used involving the OV-10 and the F-4 delivering the LGB. Of six such bombs released in August, five destroyed bridges in the manner described above. The most interesting of these occurred 31 August when an F-4 released its LGB above the clouds. As the bomb fell through the clouds it picked up the laser guidance provided by the PAVE NAIL FAC and scored a direct hit.³⁰

SEARCH AND RESCUE

(S) In February 1971 the JCS authorized the use of the riot control agent CBU-19 in combat aircrew recovery operations in Laos. These CS-type agents had been used in 20 rescue missions in Laos since 1969. Aircrews reported CS to be particularly effective in operations where the enemy was in close proximity to the survivor. In combination with smoke and other ordnance the use of CBU-19 was considered by all reports to be "very effective" in deterring the enemy from interfering with rescue operations.³¹

(C) One of the best examples of US Army and Air Force air coordination is detailed in the following 101st Abn Div message, typical of the everyday work of rescue, FAC, US Army helicopter gunships and TACAIR:

At 201050H Aug 71 an OH6A from this headquarters was shot down in enemy territory. . . with three members of a scout platoon on board. Immediately aircraft were diverted to the area to assist in the extraction attempt, all aircraft entering the area came under intense enemy ground fire which included .51 cal fire and antiaircraft fire from adjacent ridgelines. Among these aircraft were Air Force TACAIR elements. By 1150 hrs the FACs "Bilk 34" and "Trail 21" were dropping sorties to suppress the enemy fire throughout the surrounding area. By 1210 hrs it was known that the members of the downed crew were still alive but facing approximately 40 NVA soldiers on two sides. Aware that the crew was still alive, "Bilk 34" and "Trail 21" repeatedly directed engagement of enemy targets in the immediate area, despite the continuing anti-aircraft threat. Because the FACs directed Air Force assets in a timely manner and with pinpoint accuracy, the rescue helicopter was able to maneuver into the area and extract the downed crew.

The value of the Air Force efforts in the above action cannot be adequately measured.³²

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(S) During 1971 the Air Rescue personnel succeeded in making 250 saves of which 142, or 56.8 percent, were combat saves (see Figure VI-7).

AIRCRAFT COMBAT LOSSES IN SEA

(S) USAF aircraft losses reflected the winddown in the aerial war and the withdrawal of Air Force combat units from the theater. Losses dropped from 292 in 1969, and 173 in 1970 to 81 in 1971. (See Figure VI-8.) The US Navy lost four aircraft in combat in 1971. The US Army lost 347 helicopters in combat in 1971 and 16 fixed wing aircraft in combat in the same period.³³

HERBICIDES

(U) The herbicide program was drastically reduced in 1970 to between 5 and 10 percent of the 1969 program. (See MACV 1970 Command History, Vol II, XIV, 5-16.) Of the three types of defoliants previously used in RVN, Orange, Blue, and White, only Blue and White remained in use in 1971. The use of herbicides for all crop destruction operations was terminated by COMUSMACV on 27 January in response to the DEPSECDEF's memo of 16 Jan 71. A joint announcement by US Ambassador Bunker and COMUSMACV, General Abrams, of the termination was made 20 Feb 71. Limited use of defoliant agents Blue and White continued around Allied fire support bases and installations. Such use was restricted to helicopter or ground-based spray and was designed to prevent enemy use of ground cover.³⁴

(S) The JCS directed that defoliation by helicopter and ground spray be terminated in SVN as of 1 May 71. COMUSMACV sent a message to CINCPAC requesting the option to continue using agents Blue and White to clear perimeters of Allied bases, especially since mines, booby traps, and other ordnance remained in place preventing manual clearance. At the time the RVNAF had no unilateral herbicide capability other than manual spraying.³⁵

(S) On 13 May the SECDEF requested Presidential authority to continue use of agent Blue or White as needed around fire support bases and installations until RVNAF possessed a herbicide capability or until 1 Dec 71 whichever was sooner. By 4 August, with no decision in hand, COMUSMACV alerted CINCPAC that conditions around fire support bases due to vegetation growth were becoming critical. Immediate defoliation using chemical herbicides was considered essential to the security of US bases. The temporary halt of 1 May also precluded the establishment of an RVNAF capability.³⁶

(S) Public Law 91-441, 7 Oct 70, required the SECDEF to contract with the National Academy of Science (NAS) for a comprehensive study and investigation of the ecological and physiological effects of herbicides in SEA and to issue a report to the Congress in 1972. To assist the SECDEF in obtaining a balanced and complete report, the US Army Engineer Strategic Study Group (ESSG) was assigned the task of providing information on the military applications of the use of herbicides. JCS controlled the mission with the concurrence of the NAS Herbicides Steering Committee. A group of six people from ESSG arrived in Vietnam 27 May for a stay through 24 Jun 71. The final report of the ESSG was made 15 December with release to the NAS by the SECDEF scheduled for no later than 1 May 72. The ESSG failed to clearly establish a military value for defoliation based upon solid evidence. On this basis, the US Embassy, Saigon, felt the GVN had no need for military use of defoliation.³⁷

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(S) On 10 August the American Embassy, Saigon, reiterated its approval of the use of herbicides to clear perimeters around American and RVNAF installations. It cautioned against aerial spraying or equipping the RVNAF/GVN with such capability, stating that the Vietnamese generally believe that herbicides are an American weapon and dangerous to health and food crops. 38

(S) On 20 August a message from SECSTATE announced the 19 August Presidential decision on defoliation to be one of continued phaseout of its use, to be accomplished not later than 1 Dec 71. It granted joint authority to the American Embassy, Saigon, and COMUSMACV to use herbicides around fire bases and US and Allied installations where other means were not possible or available. As heretofore, only helicopter or ground-based spray equipment was authorized and it was used only when alternative means were not feasible. This authority was granted only until December 1971. No decision was made on developing a herbicide capability for SVN. The suspension of agent Orange remained in effect and the authority to dispense agents Blue and White applied only to existing stocks. 39

(S) Herbicides remained a politically sensitive issue in the US throughout 1971. Scientists continued to visit RVN to inquire into the program pending the SECDEF's report to Congress in 1972. Extremely tight restrictions continued to govern the use of herbicides, especially around populated areas. Nevertheless, to US troops still occupying bases throughout RVN the use of herbicides for vegetation control past the Presidential deadline of 1 Dec 71 was necessary. On 29 September CINCPAC recommended to JCS that authority to use agents Blue and White be continued beyond 1 December or that substitute stocks of growth inhibitors be made available. 40

(S) With the curtailed use of herbicides the biggest problem became one of what to do with the stores of the three agents that remained in RVN. The DEPSECDEF requested a plan for the disposition of agent Orange by April 1971. JCS directed that any projected use of herbicides in SEA outside the geographic limits of SVN be submitted to Washington for approval.

(S) By December 1971 stocks of agent Orange were being redrummed for shipment to the US at an early date. The SECDEF tasked the Air Force with retrograde shipping. No decision was reached on continued use of herbicides by the end of the year, but it appeared almost certain that aerial flights with herbicides were at an end. Symbolic of the end of the Air Force defoliation effort was the announcement in July that "Patches," the C-123 that received over a thousand hits during its defoliation flights for the 12th Special Operations Squadron (RANCH HAND), was to be retired to either the Air Force Museum at Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio or the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C. 41

Riot Control Agents

(S) Riot control agents (CS) were used in rescue work as noted earlier and in emergency situations against enemy attacks. The use of CS was authorized US forces participating in LAM SON 719 operations over Laos and in RVN. 42 The use of CS agents became as politically sensitive in the US as was the use of herbicides. In December 1970 the SECDEF announced that the RVNAF would be supplied with CS agents to assist in contaminating large caves, clearing bunkers, breaking up enemy attacks, for search and rescue, and to aid in reconnaissance for concealed enemy troops. The RVNAF troops were trained in the ground use of CS but needed additional training in helicopter and fixed wing delivery systems. 43

At the same time the JCS went to the SECDEF for Presidential authority to continue the use of riot control agents.

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
(C) Because of their effectiveness, MACV Directive 525-13 permitted and encouraged the use of riot control agents in RVN by stating:

Riot control agents will be used to the maximum extent possible. CS agents can be effectively employed in inhabited and urban area operations to flush enemy personnel from buildings and fortified positions, thus increasing the enemy's vulnerability to Allied firepower while reducing the unnecessary danger to civilians and the likelihood of destruction of civilian property.⁴⁵

AERIAL OPERATIONS IN SEA

(S) The 1970 trend toward fewer US sorties flown in SVN continued during 1971. A notable aspect of this was the increasing number of sorties flown by VNAF squadrons. Ground action remained at a low level throughout the year with the most significant activity taking place outside RVN, such as the LAM SON 719 operation in Laos. Allied preemptive activities plus logistical difficulties prevented the enemy from accomplishing more than sporadic attacks-by-fire and occasional small-scale ground actions. Because of this, and the standdown/return of air units to the US, the air war in Vietnam declined overall in 1971. (See Figure VI-9.)

USAF ATTACK SORTIES AND VNAF STRIKE SORTIES REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, 1970-71



Source: 7AF, COMD STATUS RPT

Figure VI-9

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(S) Air operations in 1971 differed in several respects from preceding years. In March 1971 four air bases came under attack but only on two were aircraft lost: eleven O-2s, two OV-10s, and two VNAF A-1s were destroyed by a ground attack on Pleiku and two Air America Beechcraft were destroyed at Da Nang. From February through early April most of the aerial activity in SVN centered around support for LAM SON 715, and a corresponding rise in the number of sorties flown by the VNAF was evident. In May the last missions were flown by the US 1st Marine Air Wing which was redeployed during the same month. In June the familiar FAC/F-100 strike combination flew their last mission and the F-100s were redeployed during July. Also during June the last USAF O-1 was turned over to the VNAF.

(S) By August the VNAF assumption of TACAIR sorties in-country became more evident. In September an increase in the overall sorties flown was due to LAM SON 810, a 14-day operation in MR 1. Weather began to deteriorate during October east of the mountains and on 23 October, with winds up to 120 kms, Typhoon Hester hit the coast of SVN near Chu Lai. The radar site on Monkey Mountain was extensively damaged and out of commission for 21 hours. Minor damage was suffered by the USAF at Da Nang, while VNAF facilities there were more seriously hit and 26 helicopters, 2 gunships, 4 O-1s, and one U-17 were damaged. US Army aircraft losses due to the typhoon were 11 helicopters and one OV-10 damaged.

AIR OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA

(S) In January a sapper attack on the Pochentong Airfield at Phnom Penh destroyed or damaged 69 aircraft (52 KAF and 17 VNAF). This threat to Phnom Penh plus a major Cambodian/RVN operation which opened Route 4 from the coast at Kompong Som north into Phnom Penh significantly raised the military activity in Cambodia and brought aerial activity to its highest level since June 1970. USAF FACs directed TACAIR and AC-119 gunship strikes in direct support of Cambodian and RVNAF ground forces.

(S) This aerial support was particularly needed by the ARVN during their operation TOAN THANG 1/71 launched 4 February along the Cambodian border opposite SVN's MR 3. In providing this support USAF sorties increased, with the daily average going from 53 in January to 64 in February while VNAF daily sorties rose by one from 45 to 46 during the same period. On 10 Mar 71 the rules of engagement applying to Cambodia were changed to permit ground fire to be returned in all areas of Cambodia where USAF strikes were authorized. This did not remove the requirement that TACAIR strikes be FAC-controlled throughout Cambodia, and validated by a FANK control officer at the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC call sign BLUE CHIP) at Tan Son Nhut or the airborne TACC (BATCAT and later RAMROD).⁴⁶

(S) During the early months of 1971 the Communists generally prevented any major logistics movements by road. Mekong River convoys under USAF, USA, USN, and later VNAF aerial escort became the major source of resupply for Phnom Penh. By April ground activity slowed somewhat and the upward trend in attack sorties dropped back slightly. FACs flew O-1, O-2, and OV-10 aircraft while directing strikes for FANK troops in eastern Cambodia near the Kratie area. USAF pilots flew F-4s, F-100s, A-37s, and AC-119s primarily while B-52 bombers made over 100 raids per month into Cambodia during the spring months in support of FANK operations.

(S) By August ground activity in Cambodia slackened and TACAIR activity lessened accordingly. Air effort was then directed primarily at supply lines with the remaining sorties used in support of light ground action. E
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[REDACTED] (See Figure VI-10.)

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TOTAL SORTIES - RVN - ALL SERVICES - 1971

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
USAF	35,247	31,825	33,922	33,401	32,097	27,646	27,450	24,999	22,189	19,368	15,943	15,074
VNAF	34,087	34,954	38,007	42,362	44,476	45,125	53,337	58,376	63,745	59,477	64,148	66,713
USN	60	118	222	250	119	418	461	370	281	30	9	0
USMC	28,778	26,626	20,293	16,413	3,279	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
USA	457,371	430,760	435,020	387,702	392,175	357,845	357,471	369,962	339,135	293,982	250,763	213,792
RAAF	1,272	1,119	1,254	1,164	1,192	592	623	645	576	579	478	403
TOTAL	556,835	525,402	528,718	481,291	473,338	431,626	439,351	454,352	425,926	373,436	331,341	295,982

TOTAL SORTIES - CAMBODIA - ALL SERVICES - 1971

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
USAF	4,776	3,886	3,936	3,834	3,347	3,612	2,470	2,237	2,230	2,126	2,283	2,485
VNAF	1,400	1,772	1,751	1,727	2,076	1,906	2,039	446	1,583	2,163	2,200	3,110
USN	-	-	23	83	-	34	6	2	-	11	20	-
USMC	6	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
USA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,589	4,757
RAAF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	6,182	5,658	5,710	5,644	5,431	5,552	4,513	2,685	3,813	4,300	11,092	10,352

Source: PACAF, Summary of Air Ops

Figure VII - D

TOTAL SORTIES - LAOS - ALL SERVICES - 1971

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
USAF	13,299	11,823	13,953	12,066	10,072	5,208	2,970	2,444	2,374	7,161	9,462	8,962
VNAF	-	-	-	16	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	108
USN	4,382	5,023	5,763	5,108	2,396	2,056	1,562	1,545	1,148	1,223	1,980	2,131
USMC	831	811	737	483	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
USA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RIAP	-	-	-	4,286	3,369	2,616	2,568	2,863	3,345	-	4,136	4,545
TOTAL	18,512	17,657	20,453	21,960	15,859	9,884	7,092	6,852	6,807	9,095	16,153	17,196

TOTAL SORTIES - NORTH VIETNAM - ALL SERVICES - 1971


	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
USAF	977	835	894	1,159	958	617	575	641	671	293	1,21	1,135
VNAF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
USN	745	841	859	1,051	1,301	1,095	1,346	1,226	1,089	909	650	1,892
USMC	36	16	-	77	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
USA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RAAF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	1,758	1,692	1,753	2,287	2,288	1,712	1,921	1,867	1,760	1,202	1,836	3,027

Source: PACAF, Summary of Air Ops

Figure XI-II

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SOURCE: USAF, AIR OPNS REVIEW

FIGURE VI-12

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(S) During the remainder of the year the dry season conditions allowed stepped-up ground operations. The increased capability of the VNAF saw these forces dramatically increase the number of sorties flown in October while USAF sorties increased slightly. Major USAF activity during the last few months of 1971 centered around Route 6 north of Phnom Penh. While the general situation improved slightly in Cambodia during the summer months, by year's end the enemy had scored numerous successes in the Phnom Penh area and was threatening the capital city area. USAF and VNAF support and interdiction efforts upset the Communist timetable but could not stop the advance of enemy troops.⁴⁷

(S) In an end of the year assessment of the Cambodian situation, COMUSMACV considered that TACAIR and B-52 sorties had produced significant results and cited the example of an 18 December series of strikes that accounted for 150 to 200 bunkers, two trucks, numerous huts and fortifications, and palletized supplies; fifteen secondary explosions and ten fires were observed.⁴⁸

AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS

(S) The air war in Laos divided into two almost separate conflicts, each of which had a common enemy but was fought in a different manner. US ground forces were not permitted to operate in Laos so the primary US contribution to this two-part war was airpower. The first conflict had been fought for sometime in the northern part of Laos with Major General Vang Pao's Meo guerrilla forces alternatively taking or being pushed off the Plain of Jars. TACAIR support for Vang Pao's forces continued to be provided by USAF fighters and gunships and by the Royal Lao Air Force's (RLAF) T-28s. The northern Laos area is known as BARREL ROLL for aerial operations.

(S) The second conflict was the intense aerial interdiction battle fought in the Laos panhandle known as the STEEL TIGER area. It is in this area that the USAF COMMANDO HUNT operations took place in an effort to prevent North Vietnamese supplies from reaching central Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. For 1971 STEEL TIGER sortie figures, see the Top Secret Supplement; for other sortie data see Figure VI-11.

Air Operations in Northern Laos (BARREL ROLL)

(S) The best flying weather of the year in the BARREL ROLL area occurred during January and February of 1971. During this period USAF A-1Es, F-4s, B-52s, and AC-119Gs provided interdiction, armed reconnaissance, and ground support to MAJ GEN Vang Pao's tribesmen. The ground situation was critical as GEN Pao was swept off the Plain of Jars and back almost to Luang Prabang, the royal capital of Laos. The seriousness of the situation caused an increase in the number of sorties flown in BARREL ROLL to 1,160 for February, and 1,723 in March, the highest number of sorties flown since May 1970. Most of these sorties were during daylight and were concentrated near the Plain of Jars, an area that continued to receive the majority of air strikes during the dry season.

(S) By May airpower and the change in weather altered the balance in favor of the friendly forces. The seriousness of the situation in northern Laos had subsided and GEN Pao's forces were retaking ground lost earlier in a repeat of the see-saw, east-west warfare of previous years. By August Lao forces had retaken the Plain of Jars.

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(S) In September the emphasis in TACAIR sorties switched once again from interdiction to ground support as the Communists readied their forces for the annual dry season push back across the Plain of Jars. A Lao proposal of a cease-fire was rejected by the North Vietnamese who countered with a proposal that all bombing be stopped, an indication of the effect of air support upon their forces. This proposal was rejected by the Lao Government and the stage was set for another dry season offensive. This offensive began in November and by December had swept MAJ GEN Vang Pao's forces off the plain and into hastily-erected defensive positions to the south.⁵⁰

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(U) For a discussion of rules of engagement in Laos see the Top Secret Supplement.

Air Operations in Southern Laos (STEEL TIGER)

(U) The most crucial single area for aerial operations in Southeast Asia during 1971 was the southern panhandle of Laos, code named STEEL TIGER. Within this area the Ho Chi Minh trail ran through four passes in the Annam Mountains, Ban Raving, Ban Karai, Mu Gia, and Nape, from North Vietnam into Laos and then southward. With the incessant bombing of the trail by USAF, USN, and USMC aircraft since 1965, the North Vietnamese had expanded the original trails into a complex and complicated network of roads, trails, and paths. Since nearly every supply LOC had been blocked except the trails, the NVN depended upon this vital route to facilitate the flow of supplies from North Vietnam into southern Laos and from there into South Vietnam and Cambodia. It is in this area that the COMMANDO HUNT interdiction missions were flown, as described in the section which follows. Within this area also, the greatest percentage of ARC LIGHT and TACAIR missions in 1971 were flown. In the STEEL TIGER area the greatest aerial interdiction effort of the SEA war has been waged with great effectiveness in diminishing the flow of enemy supplies southward.

(S) The Royal Lao Army (RLA) stepped up its operations in the STEEL TIGER area during 1971 with less than dramatic results. The actions called upon TACAIR for support; these air attacks, plus the COMMANDO HUNT effort resulted in the majority of TACAIR missions flown in 1971 being in the STEEL TIGER area.

(S) In February and March RVN forces, with US support, launched Operation LAM SON 719. This major effort by the ARVN troops to interdict temporarily the Ho Chi Minh trail near the town of Tchepone resulted in a total of 2,518 strike sorties flown into the area by the USAF (1,947 TACAIR, 76 gunship, and 495 ARC LIGHT) during February alone. In March the air strikes in STEEL TIGER increased 15 percent in support of the RVN operation and against interdiction in the NVN's LOC.⁵⁰

(S) The aerial interdiction support given to this RVN effort by the USAF contributed greatly to its success. Prior to LAM SON 719 about 10 percent of the strike sorties allocated to STEEL TIGER were for ground support throughout the Laos panhandle. With the invasion there was a major shift in the TACAIR effort from interdiction to close support. During peak periods the TACAIR fighter forces surged to a rate of 1.5 sorties per day per aircraft and for a week during March the US Navy augmented these strikes with planes from three carriers off Yankee Station. While the results of LAM SON 719 were not as great as hoped, they did hamper enemy supply efforts and inflicted sufficient casualties to prevent any later large-scale tactical activity. By forcing the enemy to concentrate his troops and supplies, LAM SON 719 aided in their destruction even though the normal pattern of COMMANDO HUNT interdiction raids was interrupted.⁵¹

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(S) During the 1971 monsoon season (May to November) the NVN began to move their Mig aircraft south into more threatening locations. SAMs and antiaircraft were a menace to US aircraft all year and concentrations of these weapons increased as the winter months approached in an apparent attempt not only to protect the NVN LOC but also to shoot down B-52s. On 4 October there was an attempt by a Mig aircraft to intercept a B-52 cell of three bombers, but the attack failed. In November two more Migs attempted unsuccessfully to intercept B-52s and the pattern continued, still unsuccessfully, in December. It was attacks such as these, plus additional SAM firings on unarmed reconnaissance aircraft, that caused the dramatic upsurge in US "protective reaction" strikes into NVN.⁵²

COMMANDO HUNT

(S) With the bombing of NVN halted in 1968, the air emphasis shifted to interdicting the enemy's overland logistics route, the Ho Chi Minh trail. Seasonal weather conditions over the entire area made it expedient to break up the aerial effort into semi-annual campaigns, code named COMMANDO HUNT. The first operation under this name began in November 1968 and ran through April 1969, roughly equivalent to the dry season. COMMANDO HUNT III followed during the dry season of 1969 - 1970 and COMMANDO HUNT V covered the 1970-1971 period. TACAIR strikes, gunships, B-57 bombers and B-52 ARC LIGHT strikes combined to seriously restrict the flow of supplies southward, thereby preventing the enemy from mounting any serious ground offensive during these years. Figure VI-13 indicates the gradually increasing effectiveness of the COMMANDO HUNT air effort.⁵³

(S) The projected movement of supplies from North Vietnam into southern Laos during the dry season 1970 - 1971 was estimated to be larger than that of previous years. Paradoxically, the US air effort, due to redeployment and a limitation of fighter-attack sorties to 14,000 per month (50 percent below that authorized in COMMANDO HUNT III), was smaller than that for previous campaigns. The increase in the AC-130 force as well as the addition of the B-57Gs greatly enhanced the truck-killing capability of the USAF.⁵⁴


(S) COMMANDO HUNT V was based upon 7AF Operation Plan 715. It began 10 Oct 70 and ended 30 Apr 71. Its basic objective was twofold: to reduce the flow of men and material into RVN and Cambodia and to make the enemy pay an increasingly greater cost for his attempts to dominate SEA. Seventy percent (9,800) of the authorized 14,000 TACAIR sorties were allocated to the interdiction area. COMUSMACV directed that most of the 1,000 ARC LIGHT sorties per month would be made available to hit the entry points from NVN into the STEEL TIGER area.

(S) COMMANDO HUNT V's opening phase was the saturation bombing of the entry points from NVN into STEEL TIGER. Chiefly these routes were the Mu Gia, Ban Karai, and Ban Raving passes and the western edge of the DMZ. Bombing began on 10 October in an effort to beat the enemy movements through these choke points. B-52s supported by F-105 IRON HAND and EB-66s for SAM protection did most of the saturation work. In addition, F-4 aircraft provided flak suppression and flew high-altitude cover for other aircraft in case Mig aircraft were sighted (Mig-CAP). Each of the entry points was designated a target box, an area generally 1 by 2 kilometers in size, sufficiently large to cover any existing supply routes plus any locations where bypass routes could conceivably be constructed. Most of the bombing took place during hours of darkness when most of the enemy truck activity took place. The opening phase was considered successful in that it upset the enemy timetable, forcing him to expend extra efforts to rebuild his roads.

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ESTIMATED SUPPLY INPUT VS OUTPUT LAOS PANHANDLE



SOURCE: PACAF: SUMMARY OF AIR OPNS
7AF: COMMANDO HUNT V RPT

FIGURE VI-13

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(S) After the entry interdiction came the truck-killing phase utilizing specialized night time, truck-killing weapons. The AC-119 and AC-130 (SURPRISE PACKAGE) were equipped with 40mm guns and improved sensor systems including night observation devices and low light level TV (LLLTV). The AC-119K aircraft (there were 16 initially) mounted 20mm guns, forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensors and a night observation sight. The B-57Gs used M-36E1 and laser-guided MK-82 bombs and were equipped with LLLTV and FLIR also. During the daylight hours fighter and attack aircraft patrolled the roads to hit any traffic spotted.

(S) While COMMANDO HUNT emphasized the STEEL TIGER area, 30 percent of the sorties were planned for the remainder of SEA. In Cambodia the primary effort was to deny freedom of movement to the enemy and as nearly as possible maintain the status quo through the support of friendly ground operations.

(S) At its conclusion COMMANDO HUNT V was considered a success. Although not all Communist supplies were interdicted, the enemy logistics effort was sufficiently disrupted to prevent any major attacks from occurring, thereby assisting the Vietnamization program. During the entire COMMANDO HUNT V operation 20,926 trucks were destroyed or damaged with the peak month coming in April 1971 when 5,699 were reported in one of the two categories. March was the peak month for aerial sorties, partly due to LAM SON 719 operations and the following enemy build-up and truck movements to compensate for the LAM SON disruption. COMMANDO HUNT V was the major US and Allied air effort from October 1970 to April 1971 as evidenced by the figures below:

SORTIES FLOWN SEA/STEEL TIGER⁵⁶
(Oct 70 - Apr 71)

(S) Although COMMANDO HUNT V terminated 30 Apr 71, air strikes were still directed against the continuing Communist supply effort. The follow-on air activity was designated a separate campaign, COMMANDO HUNT VI which began 15 May 71 (7AF Operations Plan 730). Monsoon weather prevented the extent of activity that had been experienced during the dry season, but the mission and functions of both sides remained generally unchanged. On 1 Nov 71 COMMANDO HUNT VII for 1971 - 1972 began, a month later than its 1970 dry season predecessor, COMMANDO HUNT V, due to heavy rains experienced in October.

COMMANDO HUNT VII


(S) COMMANDO HUNT VII was the 7AF plan for the air interdiction campaign in southern Laos for the 1971-72 dry season. As with previous campaigns, the major goal was to restrict the flow of men and supplies to the Communist forces in Laos, Cambodia, and RVN. Because of the reduction in US forces in RVN, the number of strike sorties was reduced by almost 30 percent from COMMANDO HUNT V while enemy road networks had been increased 27 percent in the intervening year. As before, the principal effort of the campaign was concentrated in the STEEL TIGER area of the Laos panhandle.

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JET AIR ORDER OF BATTLE **NORTH VIETNAM**

(31 Dec 71)



Source: TAF, CMD STATUS RPT -
USAF, AIR OPNS REVIEW

Figure XI-14

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(S) There were three phases to the 1971-72 campaign. Phase I was directed against the major entry routes or passes through the mountains in an attempt to deny the enemy access to Laos and delay the logistics input. Phase II began with attacks on the stepped-up truck traffic itself, major emphasis being placed on the southern passes and entry points to force the enemy to use the longer northern pass routes. The aim of Phase II was to destroy trucks and storage areas. Phase III was planned to hit the exit areas of the LOC in an effort to force the enemy to expose his efforts more, prior to the onset of the 1972 rainy season.

(S) Despite the fact that USAF forces were smaller, newer technology assisted in closing the gap. Laser-guided bombs (delivered by F-4s instead of only B-57s as in COMMANDO HUNT V), a better ground-based sensor system (ignition activated engine detectors (EEDTS) and commandable microphones), and new bomb munitions (the CBU-52 and CBU-55) were introduced. All AC-130 gunships were configured with LLLTV, improved infrared sensors, laser illuminators, and a PAVE MACE beacon (offset ignition system detection) capability. Externally the AC-130s had electronic countermeasure (ECM) pods to inhibit enemy radar detection.

(S) The plan for Phase III of COMMANDO HUNT VII called for increased participation in the interdiction attack sorties by the VNAF. By assuming a portion of the interdiction role with their A-1Es and A-37s, plus an ever-increasing role in the TACAIR effort in RVN, the VNAF worked closer to self-sufficiency and freed US aircraft for interdiction and for eventual redeployment.⁵⁷

AIR OPERATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM

(S) Since the bombing halt in November 1968, US aerial activity over North Vietnam has been limited generally to reconnaissance by SR-71 (GIANT SCALE), U-2 (GIANT NAIL), BUFFALO HUNTER drones, and RF-4 aircraft. The North Vietnamese moved their Mig aircraft southward during the year to bases in southern NVN from where they openly challenged US aircraft on several occasions. Most of the Mig attacks took place over the panhandle border area between Laos and NVN. These Mig attacks increased with the advent of the dry season, which caused more US air activity in Operation COMMANDO HUNT VII.

(S) The North Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF) had at least 90 Mig-21, 34 Mig-19, and over 130 Mig-15/17 aircraft based at ten airfields within NVN during 1971 (see Figure VI-14). Bai Thuong, Vinh, and Quang Lang, those bases nearest to the DMZ, were used as operating locations during the last 6 months of 1971 and it appeared that the NVAF intended to make the runway at Dong Hoi jet-capable. Mig-21 aircraft launched from any of these fields were capable of penetrating the DMZ area in less than 17 minutes. The NVAF, by its actions during the latter part of 1971, indicated an increased willingness to conduct air operations beyond NVN borders.⁵⁸

(S) One obvious target of the Mig aircraft was the B-52, and the bombers reported several sightings of Mig aircraft during November and December. In addition to Mig sightings and attacks, none of which were successful, SAM activity increased noticeably, a trend that had been developing throughout the year. The missile sites, normally moved northward during the rainy season, were instead left in place and additional missiles brought southward and placed along the LOC. The frequency of trackings by the FANSONG radar system of the SAM sites, followed by SAM firings at US unarmed reconnaissance aircraft on authorized missions over North Vietnam, grew alarmingly. This latter challenge, coupled with the Mig sightings, brought about "protective reaction" strikes by US aircraft against these sites, airfields, and other military targets. Normally these reaction strikes were limited to the SAM sites and adjoining radar sites which were detected preparing to fire missiles at reconnaissance or TACAIR planes. From the time of the bombing halt in November 1968 until 30 Nov 71 there were 692 protective reaction strikes made against missile and AAA sites.⁵⁹

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Reinforced Protective Reaction Strikes

(S) A few of these protective reaction strikes were preplanned and reinforced, both in size and target scope. These raids, flown throughout the year, garnered considerable interest in the US and world press. The strikes were planned by MACV and 7AF and approved by the JCS. The initial ones were aimed almost exclusively at SAM sites. Mig attacks in November and December 1971 caused a broadening of the target scope during these months.⁶⁰

(S) The first of the reinforced strikes, the 7AF Operation LOUISVILLE SLUGGER, began on 10 Jan 71. The operation initially entailed reconnaissance aircraft flying along specified LOC in North Vietnam accompanied by two escort aircraft and a "fast FAC" F-4. When SAM radar sites were detected, prestrike photography was accomplished by the recon plane which then returned to base. The FAC identified the location and, with the two escorts, left the area for refueling. This accomplished, the FAC, having provided his escorts information on the target while refueling, returned to the target where the escorts proceeded with the strike. Due to poor weather and a lack of target sightings, strikes in this first reinforced protective reaction strike of 1971 were made on only 3 days; 20, 21, and 28 February. The 67 strike sorties destroyed or damaged five SA-2 missiles, 15 SA-2 transporters and 14 vehicles.⁶¹

(S) While the objectives of LOUISVILLE SLUGGER were achieved, it did not prevent the Communists from continuing the SAM attacks on Allied aircraft in Laos. On 14 March an Australian (RAAF) Canberra bomber was hit by an SA-2 missile near the DMZ. Five days later a USAF F-4 was also hit by an SA-2 over Tchepone, Laos but it was able to return to base. Shortly thereafter B-52s supporting LAM SON 719 sighted two SA-2 missiles fired at them; both missed. With this clear evidence that the enemy intended to continue using his AAA and missile capabilities to disrupt Allied interdiction in the STEEL TIGER area, a reinforced protective reaction strike was launched. FRACTURE CROSS ALPHA was conducted on 21 and 22 Mar 71. A total of 234 strike and 30 armed reconnaissance sorties were flown by the USAF and US Navy destroying eight SA-2s, two SA-2 transporters, one FANSONG radar, six control vans, 64 buildings, and 45 trucks.⁶²

(S) As the rainy season approached during the spring and summer months, Allied aerial activity lessened, reducing SAM firings accordingly. By September 1971, however, as the approaching dry season permitted more aerial activity, it was clear that the Communists intended to contest the Allied planes to a greater degree than in previous years. This led to the MACV-directed Operation PRIZE BULL flown on 21 Sep 71 against targets within 35 nautical miles of the DMZ. In this one operation 200 combat sorties were flown in North Vietnam over only three targets: the Thu Thu, An Bo, and Xuan Duc petroleum storage areas just south of Dong Hoi. Poor weather made PRIZE BULL the first all-instrument strike of such magnitude ever conducted using the LORAN bombing system exclusively. Despite the poor bombing conditions Thu Thu was 40 percent destroyed, An Bo 75 percent and Xuan Duc 25 to 50 percent destroyed. A total of eighty-three 5,000 gallon and eight 7,000 gallon storage tanks were destroyed or damaged, which was estimated to have had a major effect upon the enemy's 1971-72 dry season logistic effort. The entire strike force of over 200 sorties suffered no losses and no battle damage.⁶³

(S) Once again, in late December, MACV obtained authority to hit targets in NVN as SAM attacks increased in intensity. One additional factor made the new Operation PROUD DEEP ALPHA important -- the increased sightings and occasional attacks by Mig aircraft against B-52 and TACAIR aircraft. Between 26 and 30 Dec 71, USAF and USN TACAIR planes flew 1,025 strike sorties against varied targets in NVN below 20 degrees north, making PROUD DEEP ALPHA the biggest attack and deepest penetration since the bombing halt in November 1968. Weather was persistently poor throughout the 5 days of the limited duration operation necessitating all-weather bombing systems for a majority of the targets. The targets consisted chiefly of POL dumps, transportation points, barracks, and airfields. Three aircraft, one USAF F-4, one USN F-4, and one A-6 were downed with one of the two-man crew of the A-6 rescued. All three aircraft were lost due to SAMs.⁶⁴

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AIR FORCE ADVISORY GROUP (AFGP)

(U) COMUSMACV continued to exercise command over the Air Force Advisory Group (AFGP) with operational control vested in 7AF. AFGP teams, stationed at eight different air bases within RVN were charged with assisting and advising the VNAF as it grew, and with improving the quality of its combat readiness.

(S) It was the duty of the AFGP to conduct the Consolidated Republic of Vietnam Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP) as it applied to the VNAF. The ultimate goal was a self-sufficient and combat-ready VNAF. By early 1971 five VNAF air divisions were activated with units based at Tan Son Nhut, Pleiku, Da Nang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, Binh Thuy, and Soc Trang. (See Figure VI-4.) In addition to improving the VNAF equipment by substituting new and higher performance aircraft for older equipment, the AFGP began in 1971 to phase out the training of VNAF personnel in the US. This offshore training, involving language schooling as well, was slow and kept the VNAF dependent upon USAF facilities. Accordingly, a major effort was made during the year to translate technical orders into Vietnamese and construct training aids so that training could be accomplished within the RVN. Mobile training teams were sent from the US with specially-built training aids to expedite the teaching of VNAF maintenance personnel. All helicopter pilot training for VNAF students was shifted to RVN in June 1971, leaving only 120 fixed wing student pilots entering training in the US. The lesson was clear that instead of the expensive and time-consuming effort of training foreign nationals in the US, the most productive method in the long run was to train a few instructors in the US and establish a school in-country, teaching in the students' native language.⁶⁵

(S) The growing role of the VNAF in close air support was a convincing indication of VNAF capability. With the reduction of USAF squadrons the growing VNAF was able to assume an increasing portion of the attack sorties flown in RVN during 1971. Preparations were underway to gradually increase the VNAF role in COMMANDO HUNT VII during 1972.

CONCLUSION

(U) In January 1971 after his return from a trip to SEA, SECDEF Laird stated to the press that the remaining air and sea resources of the US in SEA would be used to protect the lives of the men who remained during the phasedown. The SECDEF stated:

We will use airpower, and as long as I am serving in this job, I will recommend that we use airpower to supplement the South Vietnamese forces. . . . to reduce American casualties and protect American lives as we continue to withdraw and reduce the American presence in Southeast Asia and particularly in Vietnam.⁶⁶

(U) While the phasedown during 1971 severely reduced USAF strike capability, a sufficient force remained in SEA to carry out the expressed wishes of the SECDEF.

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"And the children shall inherit. . ."

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CHAPTER VII

RVN DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

(U) Pacification changed its emphasis during 1971. In past years the pacification effort had been concerned almost totally with increasing the security of the towns, villages, and hamlets in South Vietnam, thereby providing the people with a more secure environment in which to live and work. Total security was not realized during 1971, but sufficient areas were secured so that the thrust of the effort could be diverted into the complex task of nation building. This meant that more attention could be paid to the economic, social, and political development of the nation -- vital problems which hitherto had been forced to yield priority to development of security.

(U) Development became the watchword for 1971, and self reliance -- Tu Cuong -- the theme. Throughout the year great strides were made toward the goal of self-sufficiency in economic matters, in political activities, and in the social well-being of the individual South Vietnamese citizen. Economically the GVN sought to stabilize critical prices on foodstuffs and instituted wage reforms affecting a large segment of the military and civilian population. The Government initiated social welfare programs benefiting war veterans and victims, educational institutions, ethnic minorities, and public health. Politically there was less reform but existing structures were tested twice in national elections and found to be at least satisfactory to achieve the desired aims.¹

(U) Since 1967 MACV support to the pacification effort had been implemented through the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) staff and advisory structure. CORDS efforts had included planning the MACV participation, developing systems to carry out the program, measuring progress and monitoring results, supplying and administering material support to Government of Vietnam (GVN) agencies, and, in general, bearing much of the responsibility for the entire pacification effort. As the GVN stabilized and became more capable, the MACV CORDS function changed. With the theme of self-reliance dominating the GVN effort in 1971, the CORDS function became increasingly advisory.

(U) Most significantly, in formulating the 1971 pacification and development program, the Vietnamese demonstrated an increased desire and capability to develop and carry out their own plans. Self-reliance encouraged improvement in self-government, one of 1971's basic objectives. Advancement of self-defense came about through improvement in Territorial Forces and the National Police; while programs such as land reform, more rural banks, extended credit, and public works demonstrated the increased efforts at self-development.

Organization for Pacification


(U) Self-reliance started with the leadership. GVN emphasis on stronger leadership was made evident by the interest and activity shown by all officials from the President through the ministries, province leaders, and all the way down to the local level.

(U) The GVN's Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC) had the ultimate responsibility for pacification efforts and for coordination of the national plan. President Thieu headed the CPDC and provided leadership for the many GVN ministries and agencies involved.

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ORGANIZATION FOR COMMUNITY DEFENSE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT



Source : MACCORDS

Figure VII-1

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The subordinate Region and Province Pacification and Development Councils provided the local officials with an expeditious route for bringing their problems to the attention of the President and the Prime Minister. By 1971 more and more of the problems were being solved at a lower level by coordination between the provincial services and the Provincial Pacification and Development Councils. To advise the GVN at each level of the pacification structure, CORDS had the parallel advisory organization shown in Figure VII-1.

(U) COMUSMACV was charged with the US civil and military responsibility for the GVN pacification effort, under the overall authority of the US Ambassador. (MACV responsibilities and functions are discussed further in Chapter II.) Under the Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, the ACoF CORDS continued to supervise the MACV pacification and development effort in 1971.² As the planning, support, and implementation of security and development programs became more and more a Vietnamese function, MACV CORDS advisory assistance was reduced.

Vietnamization of Pacification Effort

(U) One reason that CORDS advisory personnel could be reduced was that pacification programs had shown remarkable improvement in securing the countryside. Beginning with the cross-border operations into Cambodia in June 1970, self-defense activity increased within the Vietnamese Government as well as among the people. This heightened interest hurt the enemy infrastructure and helped to strengthen the security of the country. By early 1971 increased success in providing security sparked efforts throughout all the developmental programs and provided the enthusiasm which carried over so successfully into the year's activities.

(C) In terms of transferring management techniques and program innovations to the GVN, Vietnamization has been underway since MACV CORDS' inception in 1967. This transfer had followed a consistent pattern: first, development of an awareness within the GVN leadership of the scope of its responsibilities followed by establishment within the GVN of the requisite programs and management tools, supported by combined US and GVN funding. The eventual objective was complete GVN control and organization of the programs with 100 percent GVN funding.

(C) Reduction in US advisors. The accelerated US drawdown speeded the process of Vietnamization. MACV underwent a reduction in advisory strengths from the FY70 peak personnel levels; however, by end-1971 this reduction affected the advisors' method of operation more than it affected the programs themselves. Between 3 Mar and 31 Dec 71, the reductions occurred mainly among military personnel who advised the various security programs. This change in the number of CORDS military advisors is indicated below:

	<u>30 Jun 67</u>	<u>30 Jun 68</u>	<u>30 Jun 69</u>	<u>30 Jun 70</u>	<u>30 Jun 71</u>	<u>31 Dec 71</u>
Authorized	339	5,943	6,154	6,876	4,752	3,201
Assigned	NA	NA	5,951	6,465	4,924*	2,671

* 11 Jul 71

(C) The greatest reduction of military advisors occurred at the district level and in the Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT). Some district teams were eliminated, leaving only a liaison officer in the province. In other cases only a one- or two-man advisory team remained in the district. In the more contested areas, where security remained a problem, teams were maintained pending further force reduction requirements. While the size of province and district teams decreased, the quality of the advisory effort did not seriously diminish. In some cases,

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Although primarily a defensive force and not expected to engage the enemy decisively, PSDF units do patrol actively.



Checking traffic that enters a village is part of the job of the PSDF.

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smaller teams freed senior advisors from burdensome administrative duties allowing them to spend more time in the field.

(C) The MATs were reduced from 487 on 1 Mar to 66 on 31 Dec 71, with their tasks shifting gradually from training of units to training their Vietnamese MAT counterparts. The reduction forced cancellation of plans to utilize US MATs to upgrade PSDF units.

(C) The civilian advisory effort was reduced along with the military as shown below:

Authorized	<u>30 Jun 67</u> 1,255	<u>30 Jun 68</u> 1,683	<u>30 Jun 69</u> 1,324	<u>30 Jun 70</u> 1,198	<u>30 Jun 71</u> 1,031	<u>31 Dec 71</u> 747
Assigned	<u>15 May 67</u> 829*	<u>1 May 68</u> 1,172*	<u>29 Jun 69</u> 1,152	<u>16 Jan 70</u> 1,127	<u>30 Jun 71</u> 744	<u>6 Jan 72</u> 728

* Number of assigned DOD civilians not available; only 4 were authorized.

(C) In general, there was a tendency to consolidate the advisory effort at a higher command level. As a result, there was a shift in functions of advisors from close supervision and technical advice for on-going activities to program monitoring and broader managerial advice. This shift resulted in some reduction of technical support; the withdrawal of medical advisors, for example, curtailed the medical civic action program (MEDCAP) for the rural population and ended the monitoring of medical supplies in district and village dispensaries.

(C) During 1971 JUSPAO phased out its advisory role to the Vietnam Information Service (VIS), and as a consequence, the military advisory effort increased. Province PSYOP, POLWAR, Civic Action, and VIS advisors filled the void. The main thrust of their efforts was directed more toward advisory assistance to military POLWAR activities than to civilian VIS functions.

(C) Evaluation and reporting. The reduction of military and civilian CORDS personnel in the field had an impact on the evaluation and reporting through US channels of various 1971 defense and development programs. CORDS' capability to provide independent evaluation of programs was significantly curtailed at all levels, since some reports were Vietnamized and others eliminated. Further reductions in reports would be necessary as CORDS manpower was further reduced.

(C) The Vietnamization of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) began on 1 Jul 71 when the GVN took over from US advisors the reporting for 39 districts. As of 31 Dec 71, 103 districts were reported on by Vietnamese HES officers. Generally, it appeared that the Vietnamese were reporting conditions realistically, although there were isolated instances of misunderstanding of HES questions. CPDC and the Military Region Pacification and Development Councils reacted promptly to discrepancies noted, and initiated corrective action to insure the integrity of the system.

(C) In early 1970 the GVN and US Government concluded that a third-generation computer center should be established so that the GVN could prepare to take over data processing for 11 CORDS and 9 USAID joint-use management information systems, a function that was formerly accomplished by the MACV Data Management Agency and the USAID Information Systems Center. During 1971 this group completed its planning and work began for automating a program management system. Some training took place during 1971 but formal agreement between the US and GVN for funding the project was not reached until early 1972.

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PACIFICATION PLANNING

(C) Since the success of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign in late 1968, pacification planning in Vietnam had demonstrated two characteristics: evolutionary development and increased GVN direction and initiative. With each new plan the success of previous plans was consolidated and actions taken to overcome weakness.

(C) Pacification efforts in 1971 were launched in the optimistic wake of the 1970 momentum. The 1970 program had been marked by significant improvement in the security situation and in the GVN's handling of various political, social, and economic programs. Enemy initiatives had been forestalled throughout the country. GVN political growth was evident at all levels. By the end of 1970, 95 percent of all villages and hamlets had elected officials, and these officials were being made more effective by an aggressive training program. All provinces had elected province councils, who were participating in decision making. Money to complete development projects which had been decided upon by the villagers, was reaching the villages. People were moving about freely as they gained confidence in the new atmosphere of safety.³

(C) In an effort to complete 1970's unfinished business and to make a smooth transition from the 1970 to the 1971 plan, a Supplementary Pacification and Development Campaign was devised to cover the period from 1 Nov 70 to 28 Feb 71. This would permit a new annual planning cycle, coinciding with the Vietnamese lunar year. The supplementary campaign focused on five special interest programs which required additional attention.

- Destruction of the VC infrastructure (VCI) through the Phung Hoang Program. Results were not entirely successful, since the enemy's penetration capability remained.
- A special Chieu Hoi campaign was launched to induce 12,100 more enemy soldiers to change sides. The goal was not reached, due in part to reduced military activity.
- The identification card program proved to have too ambitious a goal. By 28 Feb 71, only 57.3 percent of those persons registerable countrywide were actually registered, and ID cards had been issued to 53.5 percent of those estimated to be registerable. The importance of the ID card program lay in the isolation of the VCI and the tighter control it gave the Government over the population.
- The special information program suffered from lack of interest by local officials, and thus did not achieve its purpose of stimulating the various programs through publicity.
- The program to eliminate VC controlled hamlets was the most successful of the special interest programs. By assigning Territorial Forces to the V category (VC controlled) hamlets, 160 of 206 hamlets were upgraded, leaving only 46 V hamlets as compared to 602 the year before.

(C) The last 2 months of the Supplementary Campaign were notable for the emphasis placed on preparing the 1971 province pacification plans; heretofore the TET holiday period had been marked by a general letdown in pacification activity. The GVN was also active in upgrading leadership throughout the country: 12 changes were made in province chiefs and mayors in January. At the same time the National Police Directorate was upgraded to a National Police Command at the ministerial level; a new, aggressive Director General was named; and 15,975 additional men recruited during January and February. Overall, the 1970 Supplementary Campaign provided the impetus to complete the 1970 goals and prepare for implementation of the 1971 plan.⁴

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VII-6

Figure VII-2 summarizes the results of the Supplementary Campaign.

SUPPLEMENTARY CAMPAIGN RESULTS
(1 Nov 70 to 28 Feb 71)

<u>Program</u>	<u>Supplementary Plan Goal</u>	<u>Attainment End February</u>
Territorial Security	Upgrade 160 VC controlled hamlets	206
Protection from Terrorism	Neutralize 7,200 VCI	6,676
	Reduce Terrorist incidents to a maximum 1,432	2,972
	Expand NP force to 108,000	103,875
PSDF	Organize and train 1,500,000 combat forces	1,329,375
	Issue 600,000 arms to province logistics centers	602,547
	Form 14,290 Key Inter-teams	13,576
Local Administration	Elect 2,151 village governments	2,096
	Elect 10,522 hamlet governments	10,235
<u>Chieu Hoi Program</u>	Rally 12,100 <u>Hoi Chanhs</u>	9,560
Brighter Life for War Victims	Pay benefits in place to 203,681 victims	146,262
	Pay return-to-village benefits to 373,514 victims	408,126
Land Reform	Distribute 200,000 ha of land to farmers under Land-to-the-Tiller program	215,638 ha
	Distribute 29,650 ha of squatter land to the people	27,150 ha
	Survey and distribute 40,000 ha of land to Montagnards	38,569 ha
Miracle Rice Cultivation	Plant 500,000 ha of miracle rice	508,000 ha
Rural Banks	Establish 29 rural banks	5
Rural Credit	Grant \$VN6.6 bil in ADB loans	\$VN6.2 bil

Source: MACCORDS Rpt to CINCPAC


Figure VII-2

The 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan

(U) Planning for the 1971 pacification and development campaign had begun early in 1970. For the first time the GVN had taken the lead in preparing the plan, while MACV CORDS served increasingly in an advisory role. In a time phasing which permitted a natural integration with the Vietnamese lunar year and the realities of the GVN budgetary process, the plan covered the period 1 Mar 71 to 28 Feb 72. The 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan (CD

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COMMUNITY DEFENSE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT-1971



- SPECIAL PROGRAMS**
- URBAN PROGRAM
 - ETHNIC MINORITIES PROGRAM

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and LD Plan) was actually published 2 months in advance of its effective date, to allow time for subordinate plans to be written. As distributed on 7 Jan 71, the GVN plan carried with it the strong endorsement of COMUSMACV, who requested full support in its implementation.

(C) Participation of all the people was the keynote. Building upon the successes of the past, the 1971 CD and LD Plan devoted additional resources to advance the process of self-defense, self-government, and self-development. Thus the plan emphasized local as opposed to national initiative, recognizing the fact that the GVN had extended control over nearly all of the population and populated areas of Vietnam. A great share of the burden of defense was to be borne locally. The term "pacification" was dropped from the plan title, since pacification in its original sense of wresting the populace from enemy control had practically been achieved. The former program of pacification and development had advanced into a far more complex development stage. The 1971 plan reflected a shift in emphasis to the political, social, and economic efforts needed to consolidate government control.

(C) The 1971 CD and LD Plan was simplified by replacing the eight objectives of 1970 with three broad objectives: Self-Defense, Self-Government, and Self-Development; see Figure VII-3. Under these broad objectives were a number of individual programs, including certain new ones. The programs were organized under the three objectives in order to clearly place focus on the three primary purposes of the entire effort, i.e., maintenance of a permanent security for the population, participation of the population in government, and development of a better life for all the population.

- The goal for the Local Self-Defense objective was to provide security to all the population of the RVN and produce an environment in which all national programs would be successfully completed.
- The goal of the Local Self-Government objective was to increase the effectiveness of local administration through better organization and management and increased awareness of the meaning of democracy.
- The third objective, Local Self-Development, rested on the achievements of the military, the people, cadre, and officials through the past years. It aimed at committing all the people to the effort of developing the economy and the society so that progress toward self-sufficiency could be obtained.

Two special programs, the Urban Program and the Ethnic Minority Program, were dictated by recognition of the fact that population was increasing in the urban areas and necessary improvements would be required in the living conditions of these people. The problems of the ethnic minorities were to be handled through special development programs which would be based on the traditional customs as well as on the special characteristics of the particular group.

(U) Figure VII-3 shows the organization of the individual programs under the three broad objectives which they supported. Subsequent sections of this chapter describe each of the programs and progress made in 1971.⁵

Planning for the Future

(U) Ever since the GVN produced its first annual Pacification and Development Plan in 1969, these plans had been developed for only the ensuing year. This was realistic in the rapidly changing situation which marked the early years. By 1971 the situation had stabilized to the point where longer range planning was both feasible and necessary. Recognizing this, the GVN began developing a four-year plan, in which they introduced an increasing amount of their own

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original planning. The resultant Four-Year Community Defense and Local Development Plan (1972-1975) continued the three broad objectives of the previous 1971 CD and LD Plan: Local Self Defense, Local Self-Government, and Local Self-Development. Of the 29 individual programs which fell under these broad objectives, five were entirely new: Administrative Security, Local Revenue Improvement, Finance, Eradication of Social Evils, and Administrative Reform.

(U) Initial planning began with preliminary discussions in May 1971, and progressed throughout the year. Most of the programs were completed by February 1972, but the official start of the 4-year program was held in abeyance by the delayed issuance of Presidential guidance. Nevertheless the plan began to be implemented in March 1972 as the provinces began producing their plans.

LOCAL SELF-DEFENSE

Local Self-Defense Programs

(C) The first of the three basic objectives in the GVN 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan was Local Self-Defense. Its goal was to provide security to all the population of the RVN so that an environment would exist in which all national programs could be successfully completed. Local Self-Defense consisted of five programs.

(C) Territorial Security. Using RVNAF and civil forces to the best advantage, the goal was to provide A and B category (generally adequate) security to 95 percent of the total population in hamlets and to eliminate all V category hamlets. Additional goals were to deny the enemy use of roads, national manpower, and materiel; develop fully manned, well equipped, trained, and aggressive Regional Forces units; and reduce the divisional tactical areas of responsibility so as to increase mobility of major units.

(C) People's Self-Defense Forces. The second of the 1971 security-related programs was improvement of the People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF), which along with the National Police provided the internal defense of populated hamlets. A strong training program was planned, and the strength of combat PSDF was to be increased to 1,500,000 combat PSDF members (this strength increased the hardcore PSDF members to 1,000,000 plus the 500,000 regular combat members). The one million hardcore PSDFs were to be equipped with 500,000 weapons in varying ratios based on local requirements, and would be grouped into 15,000 hardcore Inter-Teams, each supported by a Development Inter-Team on a one-for-one basis. In addition to the internal defense of populated hamlets, PSDF members were to actively participate in the campaign against the VCI, in the People's Information Program, and the Youth Program.

(C) National Police. The key element in the fight against the VCI and in reduction of terrorism and sabotage was to be the National Police with the support of the PSDF. To carry out this program, manpower, operational effectiveness, and individual motivation would have to be improved. The general goals set for the National Police were to increase personnel strength to 122,000; provide further training for all policemen, including political education; and substantially increase personnel in village police stations.

(C) Phung Hoang Program. The major effort in protecting the people from terrorism was the Phung Hoang Program, designed to eliminate the VC infrastructure. The main objective of this continuing program was to neutralize Communist cadre in categories A (Communist party members) and B (probationary members and cadre in positions of leadership). Priority targets were listed as key VCI elements, especially finance/economy, sapper, communication/liaison, and troop proselyting elements, and those organizations subordinate to the Communist provisional

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government. Photographs of confirmed VCI were to be collected and posted prominently. Effective implementation of the program was to be achieved through accurate targeting of suspects, however the program's efficiency was to be maintained only within the framework of the law.

(C) Chieu Hoi Program. The final major program which would help achieve the Local Self-Defense objective was the Chieu Hoi Program. Its purpose was twofold: to decrease the enemy's potential and to increase that of the RVN. Kalliers would be used in operations attacking the VCI and also exploited for information.⁶

Territorial Security Program

(C) The underlying principle of territorial security, according to the CD and LD Plan, was that the most effective way of assuring security was to keep enemy forces away from the Vietnamese people and neutralize the VCI. All of the organized and armed forces of the GVN, assisted by FWMAF, were to conduct operations to develop and maintain stability and security required for the success of the CD and LD Plan. The Regional Forces (RF), Popular Forces (PF), and National Police (NP) were the primary forces responsible for territorial security.⁷

(C) The mission of the RVMAF/FWMAF continually moved away from the static local security associated with pacification. During 1971, regular force support to pacification continued in the training of Territorial Forces, clearing operations into the last of the VC strongholds and major base areas, and interdiction of enemy supply routes. By preventing an enemy large unit threat, these operations made it possible for territorial and local forces to maintain local security consistent with the "area security concept."

(II) Trends in Territorial Security. The area security concept and the role of civil and military forces is described in Annex H, "Trends in Territorial Security." This annex also discusses achievements in security by force and military region.

(C) Territorial Forces Assessment. Significant progress was made during 1971 in the redeployment of excess forces from secure areas to insecure areas. This was the dominant theme in Territorial Forces improvement during the year. To provide better information on security requirements and deployment of forces, a computerized system was introduced. The data were used to stimulate command attention to areas of potential misemployment of RF/PF units. As operations became routine and less enthusiastic, the RF/PF statistics generally reflected some degree of stagnation among these forces.

(C) Regional Forces operations from March to December 1971 showed an overall decline in the percentage of operations with contact, although the number of RF operations did increase during the period. The enemy to friendly KIA ratio dropped from 4.5:1 in January to 2.8:1 in December. The weapons exchange ratio varied with an average of 4.7:1 for the year; this represented a decrease when compared with the 1970 average of 5.4:1. The percentage of Popular Forces operations with contact remained consistently low. The number of PF operations decreased during the first 5 months of the year and then increased sharply during the next 6 months. The average enemy to friendly KIA ratio and weapons exchange continued to decline from a high point reached in May.⁸

(C) The objective of providing A and B category security to 95 percent of the total population in hamlets and khoms (urban subdivision) was not met, but gains made were nevertheless significant, as shown in Annex H. Countrywide the percentage of population living in hamlets rated A or B (generally adequate security) was 84.3 by the end of 1971, compared with 73.9 in January 1971. The reduction of VC controlled hamlets and the reduction in the attacks-by-fire (ABF) and

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terrorism also attested to improved security. Only 10 VC hamlets remained countrywide as of 31 Dec 71, with the elimination of all VC hamlets by 29 Feb 72, a real possibility. The goals of reducing ABF below 2,000 by 29 Feb 72 was also attainable, since there were only 1,649 by the year's end.⁹

People's Self-Defense Force Program

(C) The People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF) increased in importance during 1971 due both to the emphasis on self-defense in the CD and LD Plan and on the reallocation of forces. The PSDF was a militia force made up of men and boys above or below draft age, and women. All were unpaid and served on a part-time basis in defense of their own hamlets. Improvement of the PSDF was to be achieved under the 1971 CD and LD Plan through a strong training program and an increase in personnel. Attesting to the increasing GVN interest in PSDF was the Lower House approval of \$VN1,070,826,000 for the PSDF program, two and one-half times the 1970 appropriation.

(C) The 1971 CD and LD Plan established quantitative goals for PSDF; it also required improvement in the quality of training for Key Inter-Teams (KIT) (the core element of PSDF organization); organization and training of additional combat teams to augment KIT; and organization of support PSDF into Development Inter-Teams (DIT). In 1971, PSDF in conjunction with the National Police and Popular Forces, assumed responsibility for security in 4,822 A, B, and C hamlets or 40 percent of the HES hamlet base. Additional major emphasis was placed on development of PSDF youth programs, concentrating on athletics, camporees and rallies, and on PSDF participation in the People's Information and Local Self-Development programs.

(C) Of 14,879 organized Key Inter-Teams, 14,365 or 96 percent had been trained by the end of 1971. Of the 14,214 DIT organized, 66 percent had received some training. However, due to the provisions of Ministerial Circular No. 1196, dated 2 Sep 71, a problem evolved in meeting the requirements of the CD and LD Plan for KIT leaders. The circular provided for drafting all eligible PSDF members and specifically forbade the training of 17 year olds as KIT leaders. To help maintain the KIT leadership through the end of the year, an agreement between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior was reached allowing for deferment of 65,000 of the training KIT leaders until January 1972. In the opinion of the Ministry of Interior, the provisions of Circular No. 1196 seriously limited the number of persons available to become Inter-Team leaders and the agreement did not solve this problem. Consequently during the last quarter of the year, leader training declined and only 47 percent (49,551) of the 1971 training goal (106,022) was reached. The overall training status of the PSDF was as shown below.

	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Number Organized</u>	<u>Percent Attained</u>	<u>Number Trained</u>	<u>Percent Attained</u>
Combat PSDF	1,500,000	1,393,156	93	1,322,500	88
Support PSDF	2,500,000	3,035,980	121	2,508,101	101
Key Inter-Teams	15,000	14,869	99	14,365	96
Development of Inter-Teams	15,000	14,214	95	9,966	66
PSDF Leaders	106,022			49,551	47

(C) Youth received increased attention within the PSDF program. As of 31 December, the Directorate General of Youth conducted 23,153 youth meetings and held 4,212 youth campouts and rallies. By the end of the year 2,470 youth councils existed. A Youth Council Handbook was published in Vietnamese and English.¹⁰

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(C) PSDF operational results for the year are shown in Figure VII-4.

PEOPLE'S SELF DEFENSE FORCE EFFECTIVENESS
(as of 31 Dec 71)

1971 Month	En KIA	Fr KIA	En to Fr KIA Ratio	En Wpn Losses	Fr Wpn Captured	En to Fr Wpn Loss Ratio
Jan	90	197	0.46:1	63	228	0.28:1
Feb	110	99	1.11:1	66	212	0.31:1
Mar	89	94	0.95:1	63	132	0.48:1
Apr	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
May	71	110	0.65:1	35	278	0.13:1
Jun	89	158	0.56:1	779	223	3.49:1
Jul	33	54	0.61:1	39	55	0.71:1
Aug	89	138	0.64:1	86	153	0.56:1
Sep	70	90	0.78:1	54	128	0.42:1
Oct	47	58	0.81:1	34	120	0.28:1
Nov	71	68	1.04:1	22	112	0.20:1
Dec	31	52	0.60:1	33	31	1.06:1

Source: MACJ3, Measurement of Progress

Figure VII-4

National Police Program

(U) National Police (NP) contributions to the improvement of security extended throughout the country reaching each village. The Local Self-Defense objective of the 1971 CD and LD Plan specified that the National Police, in association with the RF and PF, would become the force responsible for insuring territorial security and elimination of the VCI. Specific duties under the CD and LD Plan were to:

- Consolidate law enforcement and maintenance of order in both cities and rural areas in order to protect the people's lives and property.
- Play the main role in the neutralization of the VCI with the support of the ARVN, RF, PF and PSDF in order to improve territorial security.
- In coordination with the PSDF, assume responsibility for the protection of completely pacified areas so as to release RF and PF for operations in the outer perimeter of those areas.¹¹


(U) National Police organization. The National Police was assigned responsibility throughout RVN for law enforcement; maintenance of security and public order; crime prevention, detection, and investigation, and detention of offenders; collection of all information considered detrimental to national security; and disaster relief. The National Police Command (NPC) comprised the following levels:

- A National Police Command headquarters at the central level.
- Regional Police commands and a Capital Police Command headquarters.

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NATIONAL POLICE COMMAND



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Figure VII-5

Source: MACCORDS

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-- Province, city, district, village, and precinct commands under their respective area headquarters.¹²

(U) Since its inception in '62, the National Police organization had grown from a force level of 20,900 to 113,686 on 3 Dec 71. During its brief history, the NP had been subject to several reorganizations in response to emergency service requirements, but changes had never been so sweeping as during 1971, when there were many major changes in the areas of reorganization, personnel, and expansion. The organization of the National Police Command as of end-1971 is shown in Figure VII-5. Additional minor changes were expected during 1972.

(U) Particularly responsible for coalescing GVN thinking on the organization of the National Police was Sir Robert Thompson's "Report on the National Police, Republic of Vietnam," which was based on a study commissioned by President Nixon and financed by USAID. Sir Robert, a recognized expert on counter-insurgency because of his experience in Malaysia, visited Vietnam with a study group between January and March 1971. The group's final report was made available to the GVN, MACV, and the American Embassy on 29 Mar 71 and its 157 recommendations carefully scrutinized. Although all of the proposals were not considered feasible, the study proved valuable in the GVN reevaluation of the NP, and to the related US advisory effort.¹³

(U) The Thompson report recognized certain basic facts concerning the needs of South Vietnam in the transition period between destructive war and working peace. A majority of the recommendations were not new, nor were the problems they represented. The report recognized the need for changing emphasis toward rebuilding the discipline and moral fiber of the nation, and noted the significance of the police in this endeavor. In his letter to Prime Minister Khiem, Sir Robert pointed out that the police, who are in daily contact with the people, should be the starting point for building discipline and correcting the moral erosion caused by the war. The most important recommendations were summarized in the reports as:

- Making the National Police role of law enforcement independent from political influence;
- Making the police station the basic unit of the Police Force;
- Insuring integrity of command from top to bottom, and full support for the individual policemen;
- Improving personnel quality, including a smaller trained professional core;
- Assuming total GVN internal security intelligence responsibilities.¹⁴

(U) The National Police Command was formed in March 1971 with the abolishment of the Police Directorate General. On 12 Jan 71, the NP had received a new commander, MG Tran Thanh Phong. He was replaced on 4 September by Col Nguyen Khai Binh, an experienced intelligence officer who had been head of the Vietnamese CID.

(U) Command/control matters for the new NPC were oriented through the Prime Minister. On 1 June the President approved and directed the reorganization of the NPC into a more viable institutional structure and one better able to handle the changing tasks of the police throughout the nation. In the June reorganization was a requirement for establishment of Police operation centers at the national, regional, provincial, and district levels. The Capital and the National Police Command operation centers were inaugurated in September, and began to develop fully operational centers at the regional level.

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National Police contingent welcomes delegates to Tan Phu Trung hamlet.

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(U) The June reorganization actions increased both the capabilities and prestige of the NPC and permitted improvements in centralized support to all subordinate police headquarters and patrolmen. One major change affecting each member of the NPC was the police rank conversion decree of 22 Jun 71, which provided for the more familiar military-type rank insignia, merit promotions, and logical progression of salary increases. Lateral entry into the police service would be permitted only at the second lieutenant and lowest patrolmen levels. In general, the rank conversion was designed to benefit all members of the NPC in terms of pay, status, and public acceptance.

(U) After several years of manpower starvation, the NPC was given the opportunity on a one-time basis, to recruit 34,000 persons in early 1971. For the first time the police could recruit draft-age persons. This was tantamount to draft exemption, and recruitment had to be halted in April after approximately 28,000 new recruits were received. Unfortunately, few quality recruits were available since only persons with less than 11 years of formal education could be recruited. Many recruits had as little as 5 years of formal education. The NP faced a major training problem in developing quality from quantity.¹⁵

(C) Evaluation of the National Police Command. Because of its importance to the future stability of the GVN, a year-end evaluation of the NPC by MACV CORDS is of interest.

(C) Organization. Although the change in the NPC and late 1971 preoccupation with the elections were factors that tended to delay achieving viability in the new command, reports from the regions concerning village police operations and the implementation of foot and mobile patrols indicate that directives were reaching the village level, and compliance was noted. The lack of competent staff and line officers throughout the NPC indicated that development of overall organization and operational effectiveness would be slow.

(C) Leadership. Leadership in the NPC was weak, particularly at the middle and lower levels of the organization. Where competent leadership existed and men adequately trained and equipped, performance was generally suitable. The late 1971 infusion of 50 field grade officers into the NPC staff and command structure, and 484 company grade officers into field operations and command positions, proved helpful. The NPC was authorized to absorb 665 additional company grade ARVN officers during 1972, and expected to gain 1,000 police officers through civilian recruitment and by granting commissions to qualified police sergeants and sergeant-majors. This was expected to have a major impact on strengthening NPC leadership, but not until a useful level of experience had been accrued. The 428 police cadets who entered training in June 1971 were graduated on 12 Jan 72 as police second lieutenants. These officers represented the first group, since the adoption of the new rank structure, to be selected from the ranks by special examination and trained as police commissioned officers.

(C) Police performance. There were major problems other than lack of competent leadership which affected police performance. Poor security in remote areas and assignment of police to posts distant from home resulted in poor performance and a substantial number of desertions. Another factor affecting morale, and consequently performance, was the arrogance displayed by RVN military personnel toward the police. In many cases the police were reluctant to investigate persons who were, or appeared to be, RVN personnel, even though many deserters, draft dodgers, and common criminals were known to don the RVN uniform for criminal or other reasons.

(C) Training. The massive training effort to support the sudden and major increase in NP strength in 1971 was impressive, but the low educational level of recruits, size of the classes, and quality of the instructor cadre left much to be desired. Training would be emphasized in 1972 in order to develop quality from quantity. Of special interest during 1971 was the training of police representing ethnic minorities. The first detachment of 126 Montagnard recruits, out


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NATIONAL POLICE



Source: MACCORDS

NP BRANCH COMPOSITION

FIELD POLICE	15%
SPECIAL BRANCH	17%
MARINE 2%	
UNIFORMED POLICE	66%

Figure VII-6

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of a total of 600, entered training at Pleiku in August 1971. The training was given in the Montagnard language, and the successful graduates were to be assigned regular police duties in their own local areas.

(C) Deployment. The NPC was convinced that the police should be brought closer to the people in both rural and urban areas, if civil security was to be achieved and maintained. Progress during 1971 was encouraging, as substantial numbers of police were assigned to the villages, and the NPC showed an increasing interest in establishing foot and mobile patrols in rural villages and hamlets, as well as in the cities. ¹⁶

(C) Achievement of 1971 goals. The 1971 CD and LD Plan set a high standard for the performance of the National Police. Moreover, it encouraged cooperation between the police and other organizations. The NP were to "promote and maintain a spirit of cooperation among the people, between the people and the government, and among government agencies." Another significant element of the NP Program was employment of the villages and hamlets "as the foundation for the improvement and consolidation of security and order for the enforcement of national laws." Clearly, the NP were an important link between the Government and the people.

(C) Statistical goals in 1971 for the National Police were prescribed in the CD and LD Plan as follows:

- Recruit 30,000 additional personnel to bring total NP personnel strength in 1971 to 122,000; . . . recruitment priority will go to local inhabitants, including the ethnic minorities
- Strengthen the organization and personnel of 2,051 existing village NP substations . . . additional village NP substations will be set up within 45 days of village elections.
- In comparison with 1970, terrorism and sabotage incidents are to be reduced by 50 percent in areas undergoing pacification and by 75 percent in secure areas.
- Complete the issuance of 3,175,489 ID cards to citizens aged 15 and older. Priority to MR 4.

(U) Achievement toward attaining goals was mixed. The desired end-strength of 122,000 by 29 Feb 72 would not be reached, principally because the authority to hire had been terminated in April 1971. NP strength as of end-December 1971 was 113,686. End of the year developments were more promising, with recruitment of an additional 5,000 men authorized on 1 Jan 72 and 485 ARVN officers detached for duty with the NPC. National Police strengths since 1963 are shown in Figure VII-6.

(U) There had been a significant increase in village police strengths during 1971, with 31,618 at year's end. Another of the NP goals had been to establish police substations in every village that had an elected government. Following are year-end results by MR:

	<u>Villages</u>	<u>Village Police Stations</u>
MR 1	462	461
MR 2	613	568 + 19 substations
MR 3	348	314
MR 4	754*	759

* Official number

Also strengthening the village police was the fact that in certain selected villages in MRs 1, 2 and 4, the province chiefs had appointed village police chiefs to the additional responsibility of deputy village chief for security, and placed the PSDF under police operational control for civil security matters.

(U) The NP was also active in the war against the VCI and terrorism. Operations with other military forces increased, but the number of VC/VCI eliminated decreased markedly due to a decrease in the number of VC/VCI targets assigned to the Field Police by the Phung Hoang Program. The important National Identity Registration program, which helped isolate the VCI, neared completion at the end of 1971, as shown below.

NATIONAL IDENTITY REGISTRATION PROGRAM (as of 1 Jan 72)

	<u>Registerable</u>	<u>Registered</u>	<u>Issued</u>
MR 1	1,347,452	1,353,222	1,268,142
MR 2	1,573,683	1,594,380	1,544,051
MR 3	1,973,351	1,981,038	1,938,703
MR 4	3,234,253	3,476,893	3,300,910
Saigon	<u>1,034,916</u>	<u>989,595</u>	<u>973,193</u>
Total	9,127,655	9,395,128	9,024,999

(U) In general National Police achievements during 1971 consisted of strengthening the NPC organization, assuming increased responsibility for local security under the "force transition concept" (described in Annex H), improving the law enforcement system, increasing activities in drug suppression and apprehension of draft evaders, and improving the NP image and prestige. 18

Security Related Programs

(C) Terrorism was one of the most important and effective tactics in the Communist effort to take over South Vietnam. The GVN's ability to protect the people from terrorism therefore was a measurable indicator of progress in security, especially as the war gradually phased into a more subdued and protracted struggle. The decrease in terrorism in 1971 was attributable to the increased efficiency in the GVN effort in counter-guerrilla/anti-VCI activities. Statistics comparing terrorism incidents between end-1970 and end-1971 are shown below:

TERRORISM IN RVN: 1970 - 1971¹⁹

	<u>1970</u> <u>Wkly Av</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>Wkly Av</u>	<u>1970</u> <u>Total</u>	<u>1971</u> <u>Total</u>
Incidents	223	171	11,600	8,899
Killed	114	77(19*)	5,924	4,038(992*)
Wounded	242	148	12,593	7,692
Abducted	131	105	6,836	5,338

* Selective assassinations

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(U) The declining trend in terrorist incidents in populated areas was significant. In 1969, 36.1 percent of the population lived within 1 km of a terrorist incident; in 1960, 32.6 percent; and in 1971, 28.5 percent. (Figures are for second quarter each CY, the annual peak period). This downward trend was true in all regions except MR 1 where terrorism increased during 1971, particularly in Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and Thua Thien provinces. MR 2 showed a decline in terrorism, with a substantive decrease over 1970, even though the troublesome provinces of Binh Dinh and Phu Yen continued to have a high incident rate. MR 3 continued to have the lowest incident rate, probably reflecting the large GVN presence in and around the capital. The most dramatic decrease in terrorism in 1971 occurred in MR 4. There the proportion of people living close to a terrorist incident was only 17 percent, compared to a countrywide average of 28 percent.²⁰

Phung Hoang Program

(C) A key GVN program for 1971 was the Phung Hoang Program, designed to protect the people from terrorism. The 1971 CD and LD Plan prescribed that first priority was to be given to the Phung Hoang Program which was designed "to coordinate, guide, and supervise all efforts of military and civilian intelligence and operational agencies in the neutralization of the VCI." Operations directed against the VCI included identifying and confirming VCI members; collecting intelligence on them, and inducing these members to abandon allegiance to the VC and rally to the GVN under the Chieu Hoi Program; and capturing or detaining suspected VCI and bringing them before province security committees or military courts for legal proceedings. Phung Hoang training emphasized the desirability of obtaining VCI members alive since they represented valuable sources of information.²¹

(C) Monthly VCI neutralization results showed a steady decline during 1971 even though the yearly goal was exceeded, with 17,690 neutralized compared with the calendar year goal of 15,600. The 1971 CD and LD Plan goal (March 71 through February 1972) was 14,400, of which 12,000 was for the 10 month period March through December 1971. Neutralizations by MR for this period were:

	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Neutralized</u>
MR 1	3,000	2,361
MR 2	2,000	2,438
MR 3	2,000	1,824
MR 4	5,000	6,565
Total	12,000	13,188

The results by month in terms of types of neutralizations, with comparison to 1970 totals, are shown in Figure VII-7.²²

(C) Emphasis was placed on quality rather than quantity in prescribing the goals. VCI were counted as neutralized when they rallied, were captured and sentenced for a period of at least 1 year, or were killed. It should be noted that the CD and LD Plan provided that 50 percent of the total neutralization goal was to be composed of sentenced VCI. To stimulate improved collection of information on the VCI, a goal was set to identify 30 percent of the estimated VCI by name.²³ In recognition of the weakness of the quantitative goal system used in 1971, plans were drawn up for 1972 implementation of a qualitative, VCI neutralization goal system. A concentrated effort was to be placed on neutralizing key VCI cadre by using specific targeting more extensively.²⁴

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VCI NEUTRALIZATIONS
(1971 compared to 1970)

<u>Month</u>	<u>Rallied</u>	<u>Sentenced</u>	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Totally Neutralized</u>	<u>Percent District Level or Higher</u>
Jan	672 (559)	789 (64)	761 (595)	2,222 (1,218)	23.4 (24.0)
Feb	855 (536)	557 (84)	868 (523)	2,280 (1,143)	24.8 (22.2)
Mar	684 (565)	508 (322)	730 (595)	1,922 (1,482)	28.8 (24.0)
Apr	377 (574)	531 (423)	640 (694)	1,548 (1,691)	26.5 (22.0)
May	329 (667)	421 (508)	653 (610)	1,403 (1,785)	24.9 (28.3)
Jun	393 (699)	342 (759)	541 (699)	1,276 (2,157)	27.1 (27.7)
Jul	459 (577)	529 (310)	479 (542)	1,467 (1,629)	20.3 (26.8)
Aug	462 (738)	316 (1,141)	609 (660)	1,387 (2,539)	21.6 (23.1)
Sep	396 (725)	388 (595)	549 (708)	1,333 (2,028)	24.8 (23.0)
Oct	260 (722)	266 (514)	461 (864)	987 (2,100)	26.0 (27.2)
Nov	427 (672)	180 (484)	383 (816)	990 (1,974)	22.7 (23.3)
Dec	307 (709)	185 (1,001)	383 (885)	875 (2,595)	28.0 (25.4)
Total	5,621(8,417)	5,012 (7,194)	7,057 (8,952)	17,690 (24,563)	23.9 (24.9)

Note: Figures in parenthesis are 1970 figures

Source: MACCORDS

Figure VII-7

PERCENTAGE OF VCI NEUTRALIZATIONS
BY FORCE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANTI-VCI ACTIVITIES

<u>Month</u>	<u>RF/PF</u>	<u>PRU</u>	<u>Chieu Hoi</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>NP</u>	<u>Other</u>
Mar	*	*	*	*	*	*
Apr	50.2	5.5	14.4	7.6	17.4	4.9
May	48.9	7.5	15.0	7.4	14.6	6.6
Jun	47.8	8.0	13.7	7.9	20.5	5.1
Jul	49.8	5.5	19.2	5.8	15.7	4.0
Aug	47.1	6.3	14.7	6.0	19.2	6.7
Sep	44.4	10.1	17.1	4.0	17.3	7.1
Oct	48.7	7.5	15.5	5.5	17.8	5.9
Nov	44.1	9.2	20.0	4.8	17.8	4.1
Dec	42.5	11.0	19.0	5.8	16.7	5.0
Av to Date	47.1	7.8	16.5	6.1	17.4	5.4

* Data not reported due to inaccuracy of figures

Source: MACCORDS

Figure VII-8

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(C) The Phung Hoang Program regularly exceeded its annual neutralization goal, but the question of its actual ability to weaken the VCI was never measurable. Enemy documents indicated that the program was detrimental; on the other hand, a lack of qualified and trustworthy personnel did permit some corruption in the system.²⁵ The program did receive considerable criticism from various sources during 1971, particularly the High Value Rewards Program. MACV maintained no direct control over the program, but used its influence through the US Phung Hoang advisors (who extended to district level) to improve the program's efficiency and discourage unlawful, immoral, or inhuman conduct in connection with the program. MACV Directive 525-36, Phung Hoang Operations, dated 5 Nov 71, prescribed the legal and moral constraints and specifically prohibited engaging in assassinations "or any other acts in violation of the rules of land warfare," and to object to that kind of behavior by the Vietnamese and to report such to higher US authority.²⁶

(C/NF) The High Value Rewards Program (HVRP), designed to improve the Phung Hoang Program was implemented as a pilot program in Quang Nam, Binh Dinh, Bien Hoa, Vinh Binh, and Vinh Long provinces. Rewards from \$VN1 to \$VN3 million were to be offered for information leading to the location of selected key VCI; these were to be nominated by each province for review and final selection by the Phung Hoang bloc. To heighten operational interest and effectiveness, a special incentive award was established under HVRP which would pay up to \$VN-200,000 to the unit which compiled the information and captured the targeted VCI. Initial funding for the program was to be provided by MACV, since no source of funds was currently available within the GVN. If successful, the GVN planned to include allowances in future budgets for a HVRP. The program was to have been implemented in July 1971, but was postponed until 4 Nov 71 due to inability of field elements to meet criteria established for the selection of candidates. During this delay, the CORDS Phung Hoang Directorate attempted to advise and assist the GVN in perfecting administrative details involved in the program; however, RVN radio and TV broadcasts informing the RVN citizens of HVRP were noted by the international press and by US Congressmen. Several unfavorable articles appeared in US press releases calling the program a "bounty system," several US Congressmen voiced their concern, and one Congressional inquiry was received. It should be noted, however, that to prevent HVRP from becoming a bounty program, only one-half the reward would be paid if a targeted VCI were killed. HVRP was designed primarily to obtain information from mercenaries who profited from and worked for the VCI to volunteer information, or to loyal GVN citizens who would face probable death by volunteering information but would do so knowing that their families would be economically secure. During a last minute MACV/Embassy policy review of HVRP it was decided that operational and political reasons militated against direct US financial involvement in HVRP and consequently US financial support was withdrawn. Thus the HVRP ended before it was implemented. Discussions with GVN officials indicated their interest in implementing a modified version of the HVRP, but due to budgeting limitations the GVN could not do so in 1971. Nevertheless, there was a possibility that the GVN would implement this program on a modest scale in the future.²⁷

(C) Another attempt at improving the Phung Hoang Program arose from a MACV (CORDS) reevaluation study of Phung Hoang. Conducted in connection with the Vietnamization of the program the study, entitled "Phung Hoang Re-Examination Study (PHREEX)", cited the short-comings of the program summarized as follows:

- The Phung Hoang committees and centers established from national to district level do not serve as an effective coordination mechanism.
- GVN personnel assigned to the Phung Hoang centers are generally poorly qualified and poorly motivated.
- The Phung Hoang Center is not a secure repository for intelligence information. This fact results in a high probability for compromise of sensitive sources and information makes agencies reluctant to share intelligence with the center.

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- A direct line of authority and responsibility for implementing the program has not been firmly established.

Because of these findings the MACCORDS study recommended:

- Transferring national level responsibility for the full anti-VCI mission to the NPC, on a time-phased, province-by-province basis during CY72.
- Providing the NPC with an improved, more efficient intelligence coordination system devoid of the Phung Hoang committees and centers.
- Increasing the emphasis on the anti-VCI responsibilities of the province and district chiefs within their respective areas.
- Utilizing the National Police as the primary operational element for the attack on the VCI commensurate with their capability.
- Withdrawing US military advisory support to this program as the NPC assumes operational responsibility.

The recommendations of the plan were presented to approved by COMUSMACV on 23 Sep 71 and Ambassador Bunker on 6 Oct 71.

(C) As a result of a 19 Nov 71 briefing, the Prime Minister, who acted as Secretary General of the Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC), issued directive No. 3738/PTL/BDPT/KH 7 on 2 Dec 71 to all MRs, provinces, and cities. This directive, entitled "Implementation of the Phung Hoang Mission," representing the GVN response to the MACV recommendation, did not incorporate all of the recommended changes but did produce certain beneficial modifications. The key points of the directive were:

- The Phung Hoang centers and committees will be retained.
- In 1972 the National Police will assume overall responsibility for the Phung Hoang Program.
- Special emphasis on the Phung Hoang Program must be applied at all echelons.
- Wide and active publicity of the Phung Hoang Program must be made so that the people clearly understand the importance of their support to the GVN.²⁸

(C) Following the issuance of the GVN directive, a revised US position based on and consistent with the PHREX Study and the guidance of the Prime Minister was reached and two new proposals were presented to him by CORDS' Phung Hoang Directorate on 27 Dec 71. The two new recommendations were:

- To strengthen GVN Phung Hoang Committees at all levels (national to district). This would be accomplished by modifying the committee membership and by establishing an executive with a small administrative staff to perform day-to-day management of the program. The role of the executive would be to monitor the program and . . . to enforce interagency cooperation and coordination and to bring command emphasis to bear where necessary. A District Phung Hoang Committee would be established.
- To consolidate the functions of the Province and District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (PIOCCS/DIOCCS) with the Police Operations Centers (POC) as

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the latter becomes operational. The POC would be charged with day-to-day police actions against all subversive and lawless elements, including the VCI.

The Prime Minister agreed with the US proposals and implementation planning began immediately.²⁹

Chieu Hoi Program

(U) Continuing one of the most successful of the pacification programs, the CD and LD Plan established the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program as one of the major means of achieving the Local Self-Defense objective. The plan set a yearly goal of 25,000 Hoi Chanh (ralliers), or 2,083 per month, and prescribed five basic objectives:³⁰

- Publicize the Chieu Hoi policy and urge enemy cadre and soldiers to rally.
- Exploit information on the enemy volunteered by ralliers.
- Help ralliers to create a new life and to be fully reinstated in the national community.
- Motivate and provide opportunity for ralliers to contribute their abilities to anti-Communist struggle and to nation building.
- Guarantee ralliers security.

(U) Since its inception in 1963, the Chieu Hoi amnesty program generated over 195,000 ralliers to the side of the GVN. The program employed extensive use of psychological operations to induce the enemy to rally. Once rallied, they received 6 to 8 weeks rehabilitation training at one of the nations' 51 centers before being reintegrated into society. In addition to the ralliers, a selected group of war prisoners (3,741) of South Vietnamese birth, at their own request, were given rallier status during the year.

(U) The benefits of the program were many over the years. Besides weakening the enemy's combat strength, the returnees provided an excellent source of intelligence at a minimal cost in manpower and resources. They were also a source of recruits for the Vietnamese armed forces. In the paramilitary area, Luc Luong 66 (Kit Carson Scouts) and Armed Propaganda Teams, all ex-returnees, utilized Hoi Chanh knowledge of enemy tactics and propaganda methods to neutralize their former comrades. The Kit Carson Scouts, who operated with Free World Forces assisting in the collection of intelligence and working as guides, were decreased in number during 1971 due to the redeployment of parent units. Those who remained continued to provide valuable service with the Allied units. The Armed Propaganda Teams' (APT) primary mission was neutralization of the VC and VCI through rallying. The APT worked closely with the Phung Hoang Program; each province had APTs assigned for inducement operations directed at targeted VCI.³¹

(U) Despite intense PSYOP efforts on the part of the GVN Ministry of Chieu Hoi and related agencies, the Chieu Hoi total for 1971 (20,357) was less than previous years; in 1969 there had been 47,023 returnees and in 1970, 47,023; the 1971 decline came after the third month of the year and continued to the October low (869). At mid-year the original goal set by the CD and LD Plan was revised from 25,000 to 20,000, a realistic and attainable goal.³²

(U) Part of the reason for the decline was the decrease in number of enemy base areas. In past years, friendly military operations into base areas had generated large numbers of Hoi Chanh. Since the transfer of population masses away from the VC areas slowed to a stop, another traditional source of returnees dried up during 1971. The Communists' shift of tactics from military to political initiatives lessened the number of military contacts which normally


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Hoi Chanh under the Chieu Hoi program learn to be mechanics at the indoctrination center in Da Nang.



Boy Scout leaders in discussions with a Rural Development officer at a rally in Phan Rang.



Cash An villagers in Binh Dinh Province build a bridge, a project made possible through joint financial efforts of the GVN and the villagers themselves.

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generated ralliers; besides fewer opportunities for the enemy to rally, the quantity of lower level VC/VCI which made up the primary Chieu Hoi potential had greatly decreased due to attrition and the lack of replacement. The remaining VC/VCI were hard core and difficult to rally. Further, troop replacements were more frequently from the NVA, who had always been reluctant to rally, since it would seem to preclude their eventual return to their families and villages.

(U) The accuracy of classifying and separating Hoi Chanhs improved during 1971, and the criteria for attaining Hoi Chanh status was more rigid; this reduced the total number to some degree. Tighter enemy control over potential defectors had also contributed to lowering the Chieu Hoi rate. On the other hand, dissatisfaction among some ex-military cadre, who had been switched to political functions or transferred to fill vacancies at lower echelon position, produced some ralliers.³³

(C) There was some difference of opinion between the US Embassy in Saigon and the US State Department as to the amount of information/PSYOP support given the Chieu Hoi inducement phase, with the US Mission position being that the information support had been maintained during the year. Preoccupation with the electoral campaign had only a minor effect on this aspect of the GVN performance.³⁴

(U) Figure VII-9 shows the monthly results of the Chieu Hoi Program and a comparison of averages for 1970 and 1971. Trends since 1968 are shown in Figure VII-10.

NUMBER OF CHIEU HOI RALLIERS
(Jan - Dec 1971)

<u>Month</u>	<u>MR 1</u>	<u>MR 2</u>	<u>MR 3</u>	<u>MR 4</u>	<u>Total</u>
Jan	367	291	162	909	1,729
Feb	245	272	245	2,308	3,070
Mar	194	145	174	2,100	2,613
Apr	68	145	121	796	1,130
May	32	133	127	837	1,129
Jun	36	269	136	1,145	1,586
Jul	23	176	110	1,073	1,382
Aug	24	211	122	696	1,053
Sep	19	119	114	617	869
Oct	9	76	555(a)	842(b)	1,482
Nov	206	402	974	1,800	3,382(c)
Dec	19	89	90	734	932
	1,242	2,328	2,930	13,857	20,357*

<u>Year</u>	<u>Yearly Average</u>				<u>Nation-wide</u>
1971	104	193	244	1,155	1,696
1970	383	208	493	1,637	2,721

- (a) Includes 444 prisoners of war who had been granted returnee status early in the year but who had not been officially documented until October.
- (b) Includes 270 Hoa Hoa who mass-rallied in Chau Doc Province.
- (c) Includes 2,297 prisoners of war who have been granted amnesty and entered the Chieu Hoi Program (MR 1 197, MR 2 256, MR 3 873, and MR 4 971).

Source: CORDS -CHD

Figure VII-9

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LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

Local Self-Government Programs

(U) One of the primary purposes of the entire GVN effort was participation of the people in government. This concept, Local Self-Government, was embodied as a basic objective of the 1971 CD and LD Plan. Building on the progress made during 1970, the GVN planned to increase the effectiveness of local administration through better organization and management. This would be achieved by developing self-government capabilities in the administrative, economic, and financial fields. Thus the Local Self-Government objective encompassed four programs: People's Administration, People's Information, People's Organization, and the Youth Program.

(U) People's Administration. The key means of improving local level administration was to be better training of officials. This, combined with elections in 100 percent of the villages and hamlets and adequate staffing, would make for more effective, better organized, village administration. One tool to aid self-management was to be the Village Management Book, a GVN-published guide to village administration. A further means of improving administration would be development of better revenue-raising methods, with the village retaining more of the taxes collected.

(U) People's Information Program. The mission of the People's Information Program was to motivate and educate the people to build strong nationalist anti-Communist convictions. The program was designed mainly as a counter to the enemy's political offensive, and especially supported political education, Phung Hoang, and the PSDF programs. It was expected to raise the morale of the people, vigorously develop community awareness, and gain active participation in government programs. It was hoped that the program would create a strong feeling of confidence in the GVN's ability to bring about genuine and lasting peace with complete security, freedom, and prosperity. As explained in the CD and LD Plan, past efforts would be continued " . . . to make the people fully aware of the benefits and responsibilities of a citizen, so that they are eager to participate in the objectives of self-defense, self-government and self-development."

(U) People's Organization Program. The People's Organization Program was an important part of the Local Self-Government objective in that it was designed to strengthen the development of a healthier society, making the people clearly understand their responsibilities to the village, district, and province. The intent of the program was to provide the people with the opportunity and means to undertake tasks that would be in the common interest and would generate social awareness and a sense of community responsibility. People's organizations could assist in all areas of local development: for example, farmers' cooperatives would join individuals to work together to solve their common problems.

(U) Youth Program. Originally begun in 1970, the Youth Program's purpose was to provide a new generation of aware and useful citizens who could contribute to the nation-building process. Besides encouraging sports programs and youth organizations, the 1971 Youth Program was to emphasize educational and technical training.³⁵

Progress in Local Self-Government

(U) With the stimulus of the CD and LD Plan, progress was made in the Local Self-Government objective during 1971, particularly in local administration. Elections were held for the Lower House and Presidency, with some 79 percent of the eligible voters casting their ballots in the House election and a turnout of almost 88 percent of the registered voters in the presidential

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referendum. By the end of the year free elections had been held in 98 percent of the villages, but progress fell short of the planned goals. First time elections could not be conducted in the number of villages planned because of the uncertain security situation in the areas concerned: by end-December only 12 (out of a goal of 31) villages and 203 (out of 328) hamlets had held elections for the first time. Reelections were programed to be conducted in 13 villages and 216 hamlets, but these were actually completed in only one village and 203 hamlets.

(U) Training to improve local administration moved ahead during 1971. The National Cadre Training Center (NCTC) at Vung Tau [called the National Training Center (NTC) prior to July 1971] completed training for an additional 13,623 village and hamlet officials, despite cancellation of several training cycles to permit training instead of 24,117 National Police. NCTC trainees in all categories totalled 47,242 for the calendar year 1971, while an additional 5,000 attended special short seminars. US advisors were withdrawn from the National Training Center on 30 Jun 71. All staff employee salaries were then adjusted to the lower GVN scales, and local procurement replaced former US direct supply channels. Mess and housing standards declined, which affected both staff and student morale. By 31 Dec 71 the NCTC had been totally Vietnamized, with all support in 1972 to come from the GVN national budget.

(U) Increasing emphasis during 1971 upon province in-service training centers expanded both the capacity and effectiveness of training at this level. Some 46,121 trainees of a planned goal of 52,315 completed courses in province centers in 1971. Since US air transport for NCTC ceased at the end of 1971, it was anticipated that the trend toward local (province) training would continue. The National Montagnard Training Center at Pleiku trained 4,672 students in 1971, exceeding the 4,400 goal. Facilities and staff there were being upgraded.

(U) A significant factor in improved village and hamlet government were the Province Mobile Assistance Teams (PMAT) which emerged during the latter half of 1971. The PMAT concept had first been developed in 1970 in An Giang Province, MR 4, as an effort by the province chief and the CORDS province team to structure and make more effective the visits by province officials to their villages. This concept was extended to each Delta province, upon direction of the MR 4 commander, and in April 1971 the CPDC directed that PMATs be established nationwide. MR 2 published a PMAT directive later in 1971. The 1972 CD and LD Plan was to contain a detailed section on the PMATs.

(U) Operational self-sufficiency goals established for villages in 1971 encountered many difficulties. The CD and LD Plan originally aimed at achieving degrees of self-sufficiency ranging from 25 to 100 percent in 1,000 villages; by mid-year the goal had to be adjusted downward to 900. Of these 900, 627 villages succeeded; 175 of the 206 planned, achieved 100 percent self-sufficiency; 181 of 271 planned, 50 percent self-sufficiency; and 271 of 423 planned, 25 percent self-sufficiency.

(U) Improvement of tax collection and public knowledge of budgets were additional tasks in the Local Administration Program. In order to put an end to corruption and economic speculation, the people were to be kept informed of governmental programs, projects, and their village budget. For this purpose, posters would be put up in public buildings and community centers and news bulletins posted announcing government activities. One significant achievement in the local income improvement program was the training of tax collection cadre completed during the war, and action was underway to update tax rolls and increase tax levels in 1972.

(U) The People's Information Program improved in 1971 but was generally viewed overall as a failure. The program was designed to support all sections of the 1971 CD and LD Plan, with priority to the Phung Hoang, PSDF, Land-to-the-Tiller, Chieu Hoi, and Veterans and War Victims Programs. Election diversions hindered the attainment of program goals; for example, People's Information training courses were delayed by the elections and of 148 courses planned,

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An RF soldier candidate for a village council position explains his platform.



Citizens of Binh Nhut hamlet in Long An Province cast ballots for their own hamlet chief and councillors.

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only 116 could be completed by year's end. A total of 11,921 information cadre were recruited during the year, but the performance of hamlet cadre was marginal and further recruiting was discouraged, so that the goal of 14,065 was not reached.

(U) In the People's Organization Program, the people were encouraged to organize at all different levels, from village to province, in private associations free from direct government control. All types of groups were envisaged: economic associations, groups joined by avocations, culture-education, entertainment, etc. During 1971 there was a three-fold increase over 1970 in the number of people's organizations. Though no goals were set, by year's-end 5,676 organizations existed with 1,666,883 members. A GVN Ordinance (#10) hindered the program during the year by making it excessively cumbersome to organize and legalize organizations.

(U) The Youth Program, which was similar in nature, did well during 1971 with all goals expected to be reached by the end of the CD and LD Plan, i.e., 29 Feb 72. The end-December figures showed 2,166 village youth councils in existence, out of a goal of 2,258; 257 district councils, of a 262 goal; and 47 out of the 48 province council goal for provinces and autonomous cities.³⁶

Regional Variations

(U) MR 1. Progress in local self-government was evident in MR 1 during 1971. Some large improvements were made in local administration and in RD cadre activities, according to Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) measurements. Law enforcement rated high although terrorism still plagued certain areas. HES ratings showed a decline in information and PSYOP activity even though several new radio stations had been established. Political mobilization and control in the populated areas improved, but organized VC communities remained in the rural areas of western Quang Nam and Quang Ngai.

(U) An indication of the progress in local self-government was the number of elected village councils and hamlet chiefs; there were 426 elected councils out of the 462 official villages, and 1,939 elected hamlet chiefs in the 1,958 hamlets. An indication of healthy political stability was apparent in the Lower House elections when opposition candidates won 19 of 24 available seats.³⁷

(U) MR 2. Most local self-government programs showed improvement in MR 2 during 1971, but the region was plagued by a lack of trained hamlet and village officials, particularly in the Highland regions. Candidates were reluctant to run for positions made vacant by terrorist assassinations in Binh Dinh Province. Generally throughout the region vacancies were filled by elections, as required by the CD and LD Plan. RD cadre activities especially improved, even though these were still insufficient. The Vietnam Information Service increased activity, and late in the year the Youth Program became more active especially with ethnic minorities. In meeting the goal of attaining 100 percent budgetary self-sufficiency for 16 targeted villages, success was relatively good; 13 out of the 16 reached the 100 percent level. Local revenues were affected by the loss of revenue from village land appropriated under the Land-to-the-Tiller law.³⁸

(U) MR 3. Local self-government had progressed significantly in MR 3 to the point that VC interference in local elections was rare in 1971. Village and hamlet administration and law enforcement in MR 3 were the most effective in Vietnam; nearly 100 percent of the villages and hamlets had elected governments and these were almost 100 percent staffed by year-end. Training of local officials was close to schedule, contributing greatly to the quality of local administration, as provided in the CD and LD Plan. In the latter half of the year the People's Information Program was diverted to election activities in MR 3 as elsewhere in the country.

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The People's Organization Program and the Youth Program did not progress well due to lack of support and clear direction.³⁹

(U) MR 4. Considerable progress in local self-government was made in MR 4 during 1971. As of 31 December, 748 of 754 villages (99 percent) and 4,117 of 4,247 (97 percent) had elected governments. There had been four village and 14 hamlet elections in Hieu Le District, Kien Giang Province, once the heartland of VC strength in the northern U Minh Forest. The training program for village/hamlet officials was 85 percent complete by 31 Dec 71, with the prospect of meeting CD and LD planned goals by 29 Feb 72. Virtually all of the villages targeted for 100 percent budget self-sufficiency achieved their goal, and by December those villages targeted for 50 and 25 percent budget self-sufficiency were 94 and 98.5 percent successful, respectively. Local administration, according to HES ratings, was very good with large gains made during the year in law enforcement and political mobilization. The greatest improvement was in Rural Development cadre, while the greatest hindrance to progress in local self-government was the targeting of local officials by the enemy.

(U) An especially promising area in MR 4 was the People's Information Program, which proved to be very active and effective during 1971. The program concentrated on informing the people about the Land-to-the-Tiller, Chieu Hoi, and Phung Hoang Programs, and specifically on exposing 100 percent of the confirmed VCI. The program also worked to improve the morale and motivation of the RF/PF in an effort to improve their effectiveness. After a good start, the Youth Program ran into problems when responsibility for it was turned over to the PSDF Directorate in Saigon, since the GVN had been concerned over PSDF units' lack of cooperation in some areas. As in other MRs, the People's Organization Program achieved only minimal success due to burdensome administrative requirements.⁴⁰

LOCAL SELF-DEVELOPMENT

Local Self-Development Programs

(U) The third and most comprehensive of the "three selfs" of the 1971 CL and LD Plan was Local Self-Development, the development of a better life for the people. A wide variety of programs were aimed committing all the people in the effort to develop the economy and society: Land Reform, Agriculture and Fishery, Local Economic Development, War Veterans, A Brighter Life for War Victims, Public Health, Education, Manpower Development, Public Works, Post and Communications, Rural Credit, Province/Municipal Development Program, and the Village Self-Development Program.

(U) Land Reform Program. The key program for land reform was the Land-to-the-Tiller Program continued from 1970. This program, which provided that land worked but not owned by the farmer would be given to him, was considered most important as a symbol of government policy. Indicative of the GVN interest in ethnic minorities was the program of land survey for Montagnard people, designed to give the Montagnards a legal claim to the land they occupied and to prevent misappropriation of these lands. A third program called for the distribution of land to people in resettlement camps. Land reform would also be achieved through the regularization of the status of squatters tilling government land.

(U) Agriculture and Fishery Program. Improvement in food production was an important element of the self-development programs. The Agriculture and Fishery Program was designed to stimulate and improve the production of rice, sorghum, corn, livestock, and fish to meet food consumption needs, to provide an agricultural surplus for export, and at the same time improve the farmers' standard of living. The key to increasing rice production was the

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increased use of miracle rice particularly. Seeds were to be made readily available on loan to the farmers, as well as fertilizer and insecticides. An animal husbandry program was planned to include training, seminars, instruction in methods of improving animal breeds. The program for increasing the annual fish yield included inland fish and shrimp breeding, sea fishing equipment improvement and modernization, creation of cold storage facilities, and dredging river mouths for easy passage of fishing boats.

(U) Local Economic Development Program. Under the direction of the Ministry of Economy, the Local Economic Development Program provided the large national level initiatives to stimulate the economy and thereby affect local economic development. This included steps to stabilize the local cost of living, expedite increase of personal incomes for the local people, carry out an "appropriate" rice policy, grant specific support to an industrial development program relative to the agriculture and fishery industry, and actively support the ministries and related agencies in local development.

(U) War Veterans and War Victims Programs. To support war veterans, disabled soldiers and war widows and orphans, the War Veterans Program provided for pay and allowances, physical and social rehabilitation for invalids; medical care, education, and help with employment; and housing or construction material to disabled soldiers. The Brighter Life for War Victims Program aimed toward providing relief and offering new opportunities for refugees, widows and orphans, families who suffered casualties or damage to homes, and other war victims.

(U) Public Health Program. "Community cooperation" was to be the guiding principle for the Public Health Program, an extensive and detailed program which contained many projects for preventive medicine, environmental sanitation, health education, mother and child protection, and eradication of malaria, venereal disease, tuberculosis, and leprosy.

(U) Educational Program. Based on progress during 1970, the Ministry of Education developed an Educational Program designed to improve technical and vocational guidance programs, which would thus raise the productive capacity of the nation. Special attention would be given to veterans, refugees, and ethnic minorities.

(U) Manpower Development Program. The problems of underemployment, unemployment, and the labor supply in a developing economy were addressed in the Manpower Development Program. Tasks were to monitor employment needs, disseminate information to the labor forces, help regulate the labor market, improve labor relations, and develop improved vocational education. Indicative of the need for the program was the CD and LD Plan statement that the percentage of technical and professional workers was very low, and the percentage of skilled workers 32.7 percent compared with 29.4 percent of unskilled workers. The latter represented the GVN's greatest employment problem.

(U) Public Works Program. The 1971 Public Works Plan was designed to improve the standard of living, with long-range objectives of helping achieve national self-sufficiency and self-development. The Ministry of Public Works was to encourage the local population to take private action such as offering loans for housing construction and helping form electricity and water consumers' cooperatives. The Ministry of Public Works would undertake projects which were beyond local means.

(U) Post and Communications Program. Several areas were covered in the Post and Communications Program: state-controlled railroads; dredging activities; and post, telephone, and telegraph.

(U) Rural Credit Program. Much of the success in agriculture development rested on a good rural credit program. There were three sources of rural credits; money provided under

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the Village Self-Development Program, which would be available for loans under \$VN50,000, while the rural banks and the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) would provide larger loans. Since the amount of funds available for loans from the ADB had previously been insufficient, in 1971 the bank was to concentrate on creation of additional capital. The ADB total 1971 loan fund of \$VN8,900 million would be distributed for loans for production of miracle rice, support to land reform operations, mechanization of agriculture and fishery industries, purchase of agricultural material and equipment, and similar developmental activities.

(U) Province/Municipal and Village Self-Development Programs. The Province/Municipal Development Program and the Village Self-Development (VSD) Program were similar in that they both provided funds to local governments to help carry out local development programs. They differed in the types of projects funded. The Province Development Program centered around large, contracted construction projects; the Municipal Development Program emphasized self-help, urban improvement projects; and the VSD Program accomplished small local projects through the Rural Development Credit Program and local, voluntary labor. Under the Province/Municipal Development Program two funds were made available: the National Fund for Local Development, which financed such projects as improvement of the highway system, irrigation projects, education programs, and the support of other development projects, such as the agricultural program; and the Province Development Fund, under which capital, province, and city councils proposed and voted on projects to be financed by this fund. A related program, the VSD Program, was designed to stimulate local initiative for self-development in the rural areas.⁴¹

Evolution of Rural Development Cadre

(U) Rural development (RD) cadre had long been a key organization in implementing the GVN's rural development program. The cadre were formed in 1965 and in January 1966 they were organized along paramilitary lines into 59-man groups. The objective was to motivate and organize the people to take care of their own defense against the Viet Cong and to raise living standards of villages, with some assistance from the government.

(U) In early 1969 RD cadre were reorganized into 30-man groups and assigned to work under the direction of the village chiefs in about 1,400 contested villages. Their activities mainly emphasized defense and military training of villagers. The political role of the RD cadre was restored in 1970, under the Pacification and Development Plan, as increased emphasis was shifted to gaining maximum popular support for and active participation in the Village Self-Development Program.⁴²

(U) In 1971, because of improved security in rural areas, the RD cadre were again reorganized into smaller units. A Presidential decree that at least 50 percent of the villages throughout RVN must be assisted by the RD cadre prompted the Ministry of Rural Development to reorganize the 30-man groups into 10-man groups, effective 1 Mar 71. Under the leadership of the village chief, these new smaller groups assisted the village and hamlet administrative committees in carrying out government programs for the three 1971 national objectives, self-defense, self-government, and self-development. More emphasis was placed on developmental programs such as Village Self-Development, Land Reform, Resettlement of Refugees, and War Victims. The new smaller teams proved to be very effective in 1971.

(C) Total RD cadre strength had been steadily reduced since 1969, and US support for the program was to be phased out by the end of FY74. Starting with an initial reduction on 1 Jul 71, US support would be reduced in yearly increments of 25 percent. Confronted with this phase-down and ultimate ending of US support, the GVN recognized the need to continue a modified program and by end-1971 had planned to continue a permanent RD cadre program at a strength of 16,400. The reduction of US support on 1 Jul 71 had reduced authorized strengths of 48,804 RD

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VII-34

cadre to 37,250, and the Montagnard (Son Thon) cadre from 7,800 to 5,200; funding was reduced accordingly.⁴³

(C) Son Thon Rural Development Cadre. At the time the RD cadre were formed in 1965, the Son Thon RD cadre (STRDC) were formed to bring RD support to the Montagnards. This cadre gave the Ministry for Development of Ethnic Minorities the mechanism for implementing GVN programs affecting ethnic minorities. In March 1971 the Ministry reorganized the STRDC from 30-man groups into 10-, 20- or 30-man groups, dependent upon the needs of their assigned village, as revealed by their HES ratings. The intent was to convert the the cadre from para-military troops to developmental cadre, with individual cadre becoming "specialists" with a specific role, e.g., medic, economic, information, as well as continuing the security and intelligence role. Few cadre had ever received other than basic training, and little guidance was provided. Morale reached a low point in May, especially since the STRD cadre were aware of future reductions. Conditions improved later in the year with the reopening of the National Montagnard Training Center and the organization of province or local training. With changes in Ethnic Minority Services at province and ministry level, leadership improved and by late 1971 the approximately 5,000 remaining STRD cadre were performing creditably.

(C) Specific Son Thon RD cadre accomplishments were their success in assisting many Montagnards in resettlement and return to village moves; in organizing local defense forces, and assisting in numerous successful defensive actions; undertaking innumerable civil action and development projects, including participation in the Village Self-Development Program; and improving local health and education. All this resulted in significant changes in the ethnic minority people. They voted, organized committees, cooperated within the villages to protect and advance themselves, and generally became active and concerned, moving closer to being part of the GVN.

(C) Although reduction in US support was necessary, the GVN, at MACV's suggestion, began to provide for a more sophisticated and permanent STRD program. This reflected the fact that the GVN, by the end of 1971, recognized the Son Thon cadre as potentially the most viable force among ethnic minorities to further the aims of the people and goals of the government.⁴⁴

Land Reform


(C) One of the key Local-Self-Development Programs, Land Reform, made significant progress in 1971. The Land-to-the-Tiller Program gathered particular momentum. During the plan year the GVN changed the indicator for evaluating progress; instead of the number of applications, a more realistic measure of success would be the number of hectares (ha) of land for which titles were distributed. From 1 Mar to 31 Dec 71, titles were distributed for 312,345 as compared to the goal of 400,000. It was estimated that the goal would not be met until April 1972, due partly to the fact that a considerable number of titles would not be distributed until Farmer's Day, 26 March. The number of landlords compensated for land expropriation under the act increased during the last months of the year. Through 31 December, compensation was paid to 12,014 claimants for 119,928 ha of land.

(C) In the program for land survey for Montagnard people, the Montagnard Hamlet Identification Program got off to a slow start in 1971. This was caused by lack of awareness of the program by the Montagnards, as well as inexperienced management and difficulties in coordination. These problems were being solved, and by the end of December, main living areas had been identified for 214 of the planned 379 villages. The goal of 20,000 hectares of individual plots planned for survey was considered attainable by 29 Feb 72 since 15,542 ha had been surveyed at year's end.⁴⁵

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RICE PRODUCTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM



Source: MACCORDS

Figure VII-10

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(C) One of the Land Reform Programs, land claim grievances, presented problems which MACV CORDS, in cooperation with USAID land reform experts, was able to help solve by developing procedures for handling grievances in the Village Land Committees and in the land courts.

(C) The distribution of land in resettlement camps and land development centers progressed well during the year. Between 1 Mar and 31 Dec 71, 11,027 plots totaling 8,567 ha were distributed. Since the beginning of the program in 1967, 61,137 plots or a total of 58,430 ha had been distributed. In the squatter regularization program, which gave squatters on government land legal title to the land they till, 7,592 ha of the 10,000 ha goal had been achieved by year's end. This land was apportioned into 5,418 plots. The cumulative totals since the start of the program were 35,938 plots and 28,372 ha of land.⁴⁶

Agriculture and Fisheries

(U) Consistent with its objectives to stimulate and diversify farm production, the agricultural program proved very successful during 1971. Rice production increased throughout Vietnam and the Delta had the most prosperous year in its history. Planting of miracle rice fell short of the 751,000 ha goal, with a year-end status of 588,873 ha. The shortfall resulted largely from the preference of the farmers to grow local rice, which was preferred by Vietnamese consumers and could be sold for a higher price. Local rice was expected to meet or surpass the 2,039,713 ha goal, since 1,941,205 ha had been planted by 31 December. Because the rice season did not correspond with the planning year, the actual yield from the 1971 planting period would not be known until April or May. Figure VII-10 shows the relationship between rice production and the level needed for self-sufficiency.

(U) Corn and sorghum production reached the CD and LD goals with over 2,000 hectares of grain sorghum harvested in 1971. Enough improved seed corn was produced to plant 10,000 hectares in 1972. The corn harvested in 1972 would be used mainly for feed grain. In the area of crop diversification, legumes and oil crops provide an excellent potential both to supplement the farmers' income and to meet increased national demands. Most of the natural seed-oil needs was met in 1971 through importation, since the large-scale production program was just beginning. However, the increased demand for seed oil meal in feed mixtures for the commercial swine and poultry industries was expected to be met within a few years by the expanded production of peanuts and soybeans. About 8,000 ha of soybeans were grown during 1971, most of which was used for human consumption.⁴⁷

(U) The animal husbandry projects were largely successful; training seminars were completed in 35 provinces of MRs 1, 2 and 3 and were continuing in MR 4. The improvement of animal breeds and protection of domestic animals projects were also instituted in some areas. The planned national livestock training center failed to materialize due to a delay in construction. A problem with bidding on the project caused the delay, but money had been appropriated.

(U) The fisheries projects did not progress as expected. During the year four new Japanese trawlers were acquired with the aid of ADB loans, and four additional ships were on order from the US. ADB loans were made available for modernization of the Vietnamese fishing fleet, however at the end of the year, bids had not been taken for the purchase of the necessary equipment. Land fishing projects did not generate much interest, and inland shrimp breeding proved unsuccessful. The Federal Republic of Germany made some money available for construction of cold storage and ice making facilities but the bids were still pending. Dredging of Ninh Thuan harbor was nearing completion by the end of the year, with work scheduled to begin on Phan Thiet Harbor immediately thereafter. To pay for the projects \$VN60,000,000 (\$VN40,000,000 provided by the GVN and \$VN20,000,000 provided by the fishermen themselves) was spent.⁴⁸

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This modernized equipment was obtained with Agriculture Development Bank loans.



A Vietnamese family enjoys a fish dinner.

An Agricultural Development Bank borrower fills the hold of his boat with a substantial anchovy catch which will be made into nuoc-mam fish sauce.



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Local Economic Development

(U) The objectives of the Local Economic Development program were the same as those of the national level effort, i.e., to stabilize and improve Vietnam's economic situation. The Ministry of Economy, charged with introducing measures to stabilize the cost of living, increase personal incomes, and further industrial and agricultural development, encouraged local administrations to apply programs to achieve those objectives at the local level. Since each village's progress in economic development cannot be covered, the best indication of the success of the Local Economic Development program is a review of the status of the national economic development. This is discussed in detail in Chapter VIII. The cumulative effect of all the local advancements produced the national economic growth.

Veterans and War Victims

(U) The GVN gave high priority in 1971 to care and assistance for war veterans and their dependents, as well as to war victims. The latter were defined by the GVN as those civilians who suffered casualties or whose homes were damaged or destroyed as a result of military activity by either enemy or friendly forces.

(U) During the year the system for paying retirement pensions, and special compensatory allowances to veterans and their dependents, was improved and began to achieve satisfactory results. More people entitled to aid were assisted, with case loads increasing during the year from 465,000 to 640,000. Veteran rehabilitation programs were developed along with vocational guidance and training programs for disabled soldiers. General and technical education courses were offered to better prepare the soldier for a civilian vocation. To further assist disabled veterans, 9,587 housing units were completed of which 3,561 were occupied by the end of the year. To assure the widest dissemination of benefit and allowance information, 111,256 booklets were distributed to veterans and dependents, far more than the 1971 goal. The overall veterans' program suffered from lack of Ministry of War Veterans personnel to administer the program at the province level.⁴⁹

(U) In the Brighter Life for War Victims Program, steady progress was made in assisting refugees during 1971, with the GVN showing ever-increasing skill. Emphasis was still given to return of refugees to their home as the most preferred solution to the refugee problem. From 1 Mar to 31 Dec 71, about 266,000 refugees received full return-to-village allowances. During the same period, 127,116 refugees who were unable to return home received full GVN assistance in settling elsewhere, without losing eligibility for assistance in returning to their home villages at a later date. The refugee development program received increased emphasis and funds, the 1971 budget of \$VN619 million being triple that of 1970 (\$VN171 million). In May the GVN stimulated province action to submit requests for refugee development funds. During 1971 the GVN also took new initiatives to solve refugee problems. Special consideration was given to those who were resettled, i.e., paid all resettlement allowances, but who were living in sites that afforded little hope of social and economic viability. A pilot project was undertaken to move those refugees who so desired from the unviable resettlement sites of Ha Thanh and Cam Lo in Quang Tri Province (MR 1) to fertile land in Phuoc Tuy (MR 3), where they could begin a new, more hopeful life. During 5 to 9 Jan 72, 1,364 refugees, all volunteers, made the move in a well organized GVN operation, with MACV CORDS' assistance. Other such programs were then planned.

(U) New refugees were being generated even as previous refugees' problems were being solved. The declining military activity should have meant fewer new refugees, but there were special circumstances dictating otherwise in MRs 2 and 4. In the latter region, about 60,000 refugees were generated during military operations in the U Minh Forest in late 1970 and early

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Women mourners place burning joss sticks on graves at a national cemetery.



An American nurse at a Vietnamese health center devotes her attention to a 4-year old polio victim.

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1971. These refugees were generally not in critical circumstances even though most of them were unable to return home during 1971. The Ministry of Social Welfare did provide some assistance. In MR 2, 65,000 people (about 50,000 of whom were Montagnards) were relocated from insecure to more secure areas. This was contrary to the general GVN policy of extending security to the people, and was in some cases contrary to the wishes of the people. The GVN, partly due to US prodding, later took remedial measures; thereafter any population relocations had to be fully justified by overriding security considerations, properly planned to minimize hardship to the people, and have the prior approval, not lightly given, of the CPDC.

(U) Figure VII-11 gives a sampling of 1971 monthly statistics for refugees and war victims.

MONTHLY STATUS OF REFUGEES AND WAR VICTIMS

<u>CY71</u>	<u>Temporary Status</u>	<u>In Resettlement Process</u>	<u>In Return To Village Process</u>	<u>War Victims Paid Benefits</u>
Jan	144,580	71,802	216,851	5,557
Feb	180,309	70,898	241,594	8,221
Mar	196,231	48,816	279,396	11,667
Apr	202,121	51,687	271,561	6,026
May	188,361	57,900	306,522	25,298
Jun	178,092	72,085	337,027	12,678
Jul	162,084	63,953	343,729	27,889
Aug	133,268	83,592	339,513	10,613
Sep	114,720	75,939	336,422	18,525
Oct	103,319	73,614	322,557	10,897
Nov	94,967	69,996	306,208	18,154
Dec	94,262	64,217	300,260	12,226

Source: MACJ05 Measurement of Progress Dec 71.

Figure VII-11

(U) Planning for long-range social welfare programs was begun during 1971 by the GVN Ministry of Social Welfare, advised and particularly funded by MACV CORDS. A new National School of Social Work, funded mainly by the United Nations, was formally established during the year. Programs supported by US resources included the establishment of a Regional Social Services Referral Center in Da Nang for the rehabilitation of war victims; development of a network of community and day-care centers; vocational training for refugees and other war victims; and participant training, which was of particular importance for the staffing of the National School of Social Work. Vietnamese voluntary agencies also assisted in social welfare projects during 1971.⁵⁰


Public Health

(U) The Public Health Program focused the greatest attention on sanitation. Projects such as the sanitary hamlet/khom (urban subdivisions), water purification, inoculation, and health information all received maximum attention. A part of the public health effort for 1971 was the Sanitary Hamlet Program. Under this program hamlets were to attain certain basic conditions of sanitation and public health, such as a potable water supply, suitable sanitary facilities, and 100 percent immunization against communicable diseases. By the end of the year the goal of 150

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Figure VII-12



Source : MACCORDS

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such hamlets was nearly met: the GVN reported 133 sanitary hamlets throughout Vietnam and five sanitary khoms in the Saigon area.

(U) Rather than emphasizing inoculation, the GVN, with USAID advice, emphasized sanitation throughout the country as a means of eliminating disease. Consequently, a strong health information campaign was conducted. The only inoculation administered on a large scale was smallpox; 2,643,657 vaccinations were reported. Many more vaccinations were given and not reported. Indicative of the health program's success was the declining plague and cholera rate, a factor directly attributable to improved sanitation.

(U) Other health projects also showed favorable results. The number of therapeutic beds increased from 18,000 to 19,972. Energetic campaigns were initiated to eliminate or reduce the occurrence of malaria, and tuberculosis, but the campaign against venereal disease fell far short of being effective. Much progress was made in the building and repair of medical facilities. Water purification did not meet expected goals due to a shortage of USAID-provided water pumps and chlorinators. In all 63 pumps and 51 chlorinators were issued by USAID.

Education

(U) The education program made significant progress with most of the CD and LD Plan goals in technical, vocational and teacher training being met. Planned technical schools were completed, and construction was begun on the Nguyen Truong To Education Center in Thu Duc near Saigon. Its completion date was set for July 1972. The goal of constructing 600 additional secondary classrooms was exceeded with a total of 644 completed. Enrollment in technical schools increased from 10,000 in 1970 to 13,500 in public technical schools by end-1971, and from 42,000 to 45,000 in the private schools. The percent of students admitted to the sixth grade was 59.9 percent of those taking the elementary exam, just short of the 62.5 percent goal; the 1970 achievement had been only 48 percent. Teaching staffs were increased by more than 10 percent over 1970 and the number of secondary school teachers increased from 16,270 to 19,772. Special vocational training programs were provided for special interest groups such as refugees and veterans. In all 4,000 special group students were enrolled during the year. To assist in the education of Montagnard people, textbooks were written in 12 Highland dialects, but printing was not completed by the year's end. Special training courses in agriculture and animal husbandry were conducted for ethnic minorities as well. Summer in-service training courses were conducted as programmed for two hundred technical teachers.

(U) The only real shortfall was in the decentralization of school administration; 14 planned educational sectors were not created, but planning was completed for the decentralization and sector chiefs selected. The sectors were scheduled to become operational during the first half of 1972. Accomplishments in education are shown in Figure VII-12.51

Manpower Development

(U) The most significant accomplishment of the manpower development program was in the area of short-term training. The original goal for this training was 131 courses presented for 4,800 workers. By 31 December, 6,504 workers had taken part in 228 courses and an additional 116 classes for 2,745 more workers were to be taught by 29 Feb 72. Of greatest importance was the level and applicability of the courses. The focus of the manpower development program was on the disadvantaged Vietnamese who were untrained and thus unemployable. The training program was designed to generate workers, not supervisors. Prior to beginning courses the Ministry of Labor conducted surveys to ascertain the needs of the labor market. Courses were thus designed to meet these needs which meant the trainees were almost assured of a job.

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(U) In addition to the short-term training accomplishments, the Manpower Development Program achieved the following during 1971:

- A top-level National Manpower Committee was being planned.
- Collection of essential statistical data was begun.
- An amended CY72 budget to provide for a national employment service had been requested by the Ministry of Labor (MOL).
- Over 5,000 workers graduated from MOL training centers in 1971, up 1,500 over 1970.
- Training of occupational analysts was begun; these could be used to provide an employment placement and job counseling service.
- The problem of finding employment for workers released as a result of US/FWMAF drawdowns was being investigated, and some jobs located.⁵²

Public Works

(U) During 1971, in spite of difficulties caused by the war, Vietnam was able to increase electric capacity, add miles of pipes for water distribution, increase postal and telecommunications earning, continue construction and restoration of highways, bridges, and rural roads, and increase dredging activities. By the end of the year the total installed electrical capacity throughout the country was approximately 340 megawatts (MWEs). The goal of a 200 MWE increase proved overly ambitious as only 51 additional MWEs were added (an estimated 99 MWEs was expected to be the total added output by 29 Feb 72). In the Saigon area additional gas generators increased the metropolitan electrical supply from 220 to 259 MWEs and work was started to extend the transmission of this power to include the city of My Tho, 50 km south of Saigon. Based on future plans and needs, the 1972 capacity of the Vietnam Power Company was expected to increase from 340 to 634 MWEs.

(U) Progress in increasing the supply of potable water to the Saigon area was noteworthy. The Saigon Metropolitan Water Office delivered an average of 96.2 million gallons of water per day, added 45.3 miles of pipe to the distribution system, and installed an additional 18,305 house connections. Water sales resulted in a profit and the water company was current in its repayments of the USAID loan for water facilities. Other water purification projects were implemented outside the Saigon area.

(U) The repair of national and interprovincial roads showed a fair degree of success with 2,913 km of the 3,200 km goal completed. By the end of the plan year repair of 2,937 km of road was expected to be completed. During the year approximately 50 km of new rural roads were constructed and over 1,180 km maintained or repaired. About 3,980 m of new bridging were erected and over 2,500 m were maintained. The national highway system was 77 percent complete by the end of the year with a total of 3,012 km of highway. About 730 km of highway was restored and 1,900 m of bridging was replaced.

Post and Communications

(U) The success of projects under the Post and Communications Program was mixed. An unsatisfactory security situation resulted in discouragement of railroad projects, though some service was restored. Dredging operations moved along ahead of schedule and it was anticipated

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that by the end of February 1972, 4,200,000 cubic meters (cm) of dredging would be completed. Completed by the end of the year was 3,361,000 cm of dredging. The goal of installing 30 post stations in districts would not be met. Sixteen stations were completed by 31 December and five additional stations were due for completion of 29 Feb 72. The village post substations projects likewise fell short of expectations. Of the 502 station goal, 227 were completed with 40 more due for completion before the plan year ended. The project to provide telephones to prefectures failed to reach its goal of 4,000 telephones in the four targeted cities, however 3,500 were added bringing the total number of subscribers to approximately 23,500.

Rural Credit

(U) The success of the rural credit program could be measured in the volume of business. Loans from private rural banks totaled \$VN959 million by year's end, which was far above the goal of the \$VN400 million. The same situation existed with Agriculture Development Bank loans. \$VN10.067 billion was loaned with the goal for the calendar year set at \$VN9 billion. These loans included village self-development loans of more than \$VN1.130 billion. By end-1971, 24 additional rural banks, village credit committees, and private credit organizations were established and the planned ADB suboffices were completed. It was significant that loans were being repaid ahead of schedule, indicating improved prosperity in the country. One reform, instituted to prevent misuse of rural credit loans was the upward adjustment of interest rates. This adjustment prevented borrowers from being able to invest borrowed money in regular banks at a profit.

Province/Municipal/Village Self-Development Programs

(U) The Province/Municipal/Village Self-Development programs provided stimulation and capital assistance for local level implementation of various other development programs such as public works, education, public health, agriculture, etc. The secondary roads and highways projects were among the more noteworthy projects initiated and good indicators of the success of the program. Of the 284 projects planned, 185 were completed; \$VN1.6 billion of the \$VN2.1 billion authorized for these projects was expended by end-December. It was estimated that 98 percent of the projects would be completed by 29 Feb 72. In 1971 the National Fund for Local Development was funded with approximately \$VN3 billion, roughly 80 percent of which went into the critical secondary roads program. This program was a major vehicle for repopulating newly secured areas and providing security, communications, and market links to rural areas; it resulted in completion of 77 bridges and over 400 kilometers of new or rehabilitated secondary roads. Other projects completed through use of the national fund included 115 secondary school classrooms, 34 maternity dispensaries, and 40 irrigation structures. The Province Development Fund enabled elected province councils to meet at least some of the valid developmental needs of their constituents. During the year 357 classrooms, 33 maternity dispensaries, 35 small irrigation structures, 30 bridges on the secondary road net, and 198 km of road repair were accomplished with the use of this fund.

(U) By 1971, many of the original problems of the Village Self-Development programs were solved, particularly in management. Increased administrative experience, improved educational background of village officials, greater security, and a greater sense of social responsibility within the Vietnamese society contributed to the program's improvement. During 1971 there was a significant increase in the people's participation. The first steps were taken to make the program self-sufficient by placing income-producing projects on a repayable loan rather than a grant basis. Loan funds were made available by allocating money from village budgets, from central government funds, and from the Agriculture Development Bank. The program enabled


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AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK LOANS PROVIDED



Fishing nets and boat repairs for
Nguyen Dien and his wife.



An 80-horsepower marine engine for
Cai Van Nhin.



New high-yield rice varieties for farmers in Doan De, Binh Thuan Province.

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rural people to obtain collateral-free loans up to \$VN50,000 for crop production, handicrafts, and fisheries projects. In addition, a total of 11,022 public use projects such as community houses or community wells, were approved for 1971. The planning and organization of the various projects was carried out almost entirely by the Vietnamese with only peripheral US technical support and guidance.⁵³

SPECIAL PROGRAMS

(U) In addition to programs relative to the three objectives -- self-defense, self-government, and self-development -- the 1971 CD and LD Plan provided for carrying out two special programs. These were incorporated separately because of their special identity as unique areas of interest. The Urban Program addressed the fact that the population was growing in urban areas and required improvements in urban living conditions. The other special program dealt with the ethnic minorities, particularly to eliminate indifference to and misunderstanding of the Montagnard people.

(U) Both of these programs adapted the other programs in the CD and LD Plan to their specific needs. For instance, the PSDF, in carrying out the self-defense objective in the urban environment, would receive training applicable to that environment. Likewise, special adaptations were made in various other programs of the CD and LD Plan to adapt to the Montagnard people and other ethnic minorities.⁵⁴

Urban Programs

(U) The problems of urban areas would only be solved on a long-term basis, but the CD and LD Plan addressed priority tasks to achieve self-defense, self-government, and self-development within the urban areas. In the self-development area, attention was given to traffic control, housing development, public health and sanitation improvement, improving utilities, and reorganizing urban administration.

(U) During the year, the Government of Vietnam became increasingly aware that the nation's hopes for political stability and social-economic growth depended to a great extent on the orderly development of the urban areas, since approximately 40 percent of the entire population live in cities. To assist in the development of South Vietnam's urban areas, the mission of the Saigon Civil Assistance Group was changed in July 1971 to include coordination of US advice and assistance to all major urban areas in South Vietnam. At the same time the group was redesignated the Municipal Development Directorate (MDD). This directorate assisted GVN officials to develop a 4-year urban program designed to strengthen the role of the GVN Central Committee for Urban Affairs and to produce a trained body of urban administrators and technicians. As a result of MDD efforts and support, urban problems were being solved. Revenue collection increased 25 percent, with five new district tax offices to be opened which would increase future revenues. Saigon developed an active preventive medicine program which included a large immunization effort, annual physical examinations for all city employees, and an expanded home visit program by health nurses. US assistance in the area of refuse collection improved sanitation, eliminating a serious health hazard. In education, 64 classrooms were opened, and an additional 133 were under construction. In the past, because of the crowded construction of combustible dwellings, a small fire in Saigon often would sweep through blocks of houses, leaving hundreds homeless. Through US assistance in providing portable pumps, 78 volunteer fire fighting units were established (28 in 1971). Elsewhere city zoning maps were completed for Can Tho and Da Nang, and educational and public works facilities were expanded in all the urban areas of Vietnam.

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Ethnic Minorities

(U) The inclusion of the Ethnic Minorities Program as a special program in the 1971 CD and LD Plan gave it special emphasis as a GVN project. Further impetus was given to the program in June 1971 when President Thieu appointed a new Minister for the Development of Ethnic Minorities. The new Minister, Nay Luett, initiated a reorganization which resulted in far greater effectiveness and closer cooperation with other GVN ministries.

(U) During 1971 the focus of the ethnic minorities plan was on training of Montagnards; revising and helping to expand the GVN education and agriculture programs for minorities; and monitoring the implementation of other programs, including Highland Land Reform, refugee support, and the Son Thon cadre. The Son Thon RD Cadre Program was reoriented early in the year to focus the cadre's efforts on assisting the Montagnard to improve their own living conditions. From January through December 1971, the new National Montagnard Training Center at Pleiku trained a total of 5,541 Montagnards. These included highlander village and hamlet officials, Son Thon cadre, People's Self-Defense Force leaders, and an initial group of candidates for the National Police. To help eliminate illiteracy among ethnic minorities, 52 mass education classes were established through the region, in addition to the regular education program. Beginning in 1972 an intensive 4-year anti-illiteracy campaign was to be implemented.⁵⁵



Montagnard students from one of the RVN's 2-year teacher's colleges in Ban Me Thuot.

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RVN DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT - Chapter VII

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11. Same as #5, pp 1-C-1 & 2.
12. Brief (U), CORDS-PSD, 29 Sep 71, Subj: National Police Command.
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15. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 260942Z Aug 71, Subj: CORDS Public Safety Directorate Monthly Report for July 1971, pp 13-14.
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35. Same as #5, pp 4-5.
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52. Ltr (U), R.E. Burgess, AD/LAB to Dr. W.P. Niblo, A/ADLD, 21 Jan 72, Subj: Year-End Assessment of the 1971 CD and LD Program; Ltr (U), R.E. Burgess to Mr. S.J. Siegal, 28 Feb 72, Subj: Expansion of the Labor Ministry Employment Service in the Saigon-Gia Dinh Area; Fact Sheet (U), USAID/LAB, Jan 72, Subj: Congressional Presentation - Fiscal Year 1972, Manpower Development, Project #730-15-460-327.
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Defense Minister Nguyen Van Vy lights sacred flame at Bien Hoa National Cemetery on 19 Jun 71, marking the first Vietnamese Armed Forces Day since 1967.

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CHAPTER VIII

VIETNAMIZATION

(C) The Republic of Vietnam (RVN) was the test case for implementing the Nixon Doctrine and a new US planning approach to Asia. "Vietnamization" was both a goal and the program through which that goal would be achieved at the earliest practical time. The constituent elements of Vietnamization -- Improvement and Modernization of RVNAF, Pacification, and Combat Operations -- were inseparably interwoven and every effort was made to maintain and strengthen their natural mutual dependence. In fact, it would have been counterproductive to the basic premise of Vietnamization to attempt division of these elements. One aspect of the Nixon Doctrine anticipated that threatened nations would provide the necessary manpower for their own defense. Vietnamization referred only to that portion of the war effort which had been carried by the United States and did not refer to the total war effort which the South Vietnamese themselves had carried as a large and heavy burden for so many years.¹

(U) The Vietnamization program was cast in three phases: Phase I consisted of turning over to South Vietnam the ground combat responsibility against VC/NVA forces; Phase II developed the air, naval, artillery, logistics and other support capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVNAF) to the degree that effective independent security could be maintained; Phase III, the ultimate measurement of the success of Vietnamization, called for reducing American presence to a military advisory mission and finally withdrawing as South Vietnam became capable of handling the threat without US military presence.

(U) During 1971 Phase I was completed, Phase II progressed ahead of schedule, and Phase III began.² These were milestones in MACV's history and in essence marked the beginning of the end for the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

1971 GOALS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

(S) To guide Vietnamization to the edge of success in 1971, COMUSMACV's objectives and progress in the Republic of Vietnam were keyed to the goals of the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). The 1971 CINCPAC goals for Southeast Asia, issued 12 Dec 70, established for the Republic of Vietnam:

- Goal I. Assist the GVN (Government of Vietnam) to improve and modernize the RVNAF to enhance RVNAF effectiveness.
- Goal II. Assist the GVN to defeat the subversion and aggression and develop a secure environment that will promote self-government within the RVN.
- Goal III. Assist the GVN to protect and further develop national resources, with emphasis on economic stabilization, economic growth, and improvement of social conditions, to provide a better life for the people and win support of the people for GVN.³

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(S) In pursuance of CINCPAC goals, COMUSMACV established related subgoals which directed and measured 1971 progress in all activities:

-- RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (RVNAF I & M):

- Improve RVNAF force structure
- Intensify RVNAF training
- Improve status of mission essential items of equipment
- Improve RVNAF combat effectiveness

-- Develop a Secure Environment:

- Reduce enemy capability and subversion
- Reduce enemy logistical capability
- Expand territorial security
- Improve local government

-- Natural Resources and Economic Growth:

- Secure lines of communication (LOC)
- Stabilize and strengthen Vietnamese economy
- Promote socio-economic development⁴

(U) This chapter reflects MACV's role in improving and strengthening the RVNAF and in fostering stabilization of the RVN economy during a period destined to be one of the most significant in the era of US involvement in Southeast Asia.

RVNAF IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION

PLANNING THE RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE

Background

(C) The Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP) evolved in several stages from a basic plan submitted by MACV in May 1968. CRIMP was designed to provide an improved balance of RVNAF combat forces with an increased capability in the areas of firepower, tactical mobility, and logistical support. Planning factors, outlined in a CINCPAC message on 23 Nov 69, resulted in the establishment of a combined MACV/RVNAF Joint General Staff (JCS) Improvement and Modernization Planning Committee. The key factor influencing the action of the committee was SECDEF's guidance that the objective of Vietnamization was the progressive transfer of increased combat responsibility to the GVN. The committee provided recommendations concerning GVN force structure increase proposals which were presented by President Thieu to COMUSMACV and Ambassador Bunker on 12 Jan 70. Implementation of the proposals included phasing of RVNAF requirements over the FY71-73 time frame considering availability and complexities of equipment and the extensive lead time required for training in certain skills.⁵

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(S) The following programs and associated RVNAF force ceilings were subsequently approved by the Secretary of Defense. °

<u>Program</u>	<u>Date Approved</u>	<u>Force Ceiling</u>
Program I	23 Oct 68	801,215
Program I Modified	1 Nov 68	850,000
Program II	18 Dec 68	855,594
Program IIA	28 Apr 69	875,790
Program II Midway	12 Aug 69	953,673
Program II Midway Accelerated	6 Jan 70	986,360
Program III (CRIMP)	5 Jun 70	1,078,315 (FY71)
		1,092,087 (FY72)
		1,100,000 (FY73)

FY72-73 Force Structure Reviews

(S) The FY72 and FY73 force structures were subjected to a combined Mission/GVN review during the second quarter of FY71; a combined MACV/JGS review of the structures was completed in December 1970. Force structure proposals resulting from that review were submitted to MACV on 11 Dec 70, concurred in by COMUSMACV on 29 Dec 70, and forwarded to CINCPAC on 6 Feb 71. The basic assumption in reviewing the RVNAF force structure was that the GVN would assume a much greater responsibility for the conduct of the war at an accelerated rate as US redeployments continued. Accordingly, the primary proposal was to accelerate the 7,913 force structure increase, planned for FY73, to FY72.

(S) The combined MACV/JGS review identified and analyzed the RVNAF shortfalls which would impact on their ability to shoulder the majority of the war effort. As a result of this review, revisions to the CRIMP were proposed to correct existing shortfalls and provide RVNAF with a logistical self-sufficiency. Primary consideration was given to RVNAF's capability to assume those support functions performed by US forces. The major force structure changes recommended by COMUSMACV:

- Reorganize armor units in FY72 to add a 4.2 inch mortar platoon (SP) to each of the 10 divisional cavalry squadrons and a cavalry squadron in Military Region 2 (MR 2).
- Add 10 military police companies to the Vietnamese Army (ARVN) to provide an MP company to each infantry division; one MP battalion per corps and the Capital Military Region, plus one general reserve battalion; and two additional companies for the Central Prisoner of War (PW) Camp, Phu Quoc Island.
- Restructure ARVN infantry regiments to a 3 battalion/4 company organization vice the 4 battalion/3 company structure, for a total reduction of 34 battalion headquarters.
- Reduce ARVN rifle companies in MRs 1 and 4: eight in FY72, four in FY73. These companies would come from standardizing the size of the 2d Rgt, 1st Div and the 51st Rgt (SEP), which were augmented by 8 and 4 companies respectively.
- Add 17 Regional Forces (RF) battalion headquarters in FY72.
- Reduce Popular Forces (PF) platoons from 35 to 32 man platoons in FY72. Also form 363 additional PF platoons (144 to be activated in FY71; the remainder in FY72).

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-- Reduce the PF by 216 platoons in FY73.

-- Increase the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) logistics and maintenance (base and depot level) capabilities in FY73.

-- Increase the riverine force of the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) by 29 patrol boats in FY72.

-- Augment VNN logistical units by 400 spaces in FY72.

-- Add 13 radar sites to the VNN Coastal Surveillance Radar System (ACTOVRAD) in FY72.

(S) In addition to the force structure increases, the combined MACV/JGS review identified specific trade-off reductions in ARVN, VNN, and Territorial Force units in order to remain within the 1.1 million force ceiling. The 5 Jun 70 and 6 Feb 71 Force Structure Plans are compared below:⁸

Program III: CRIMP (Auth 5 Jun 70)			Proposed Plan (6 Feb 71)	
	<u>End FY72</u>	<u>End FY73</u>	<u>End FY72</u>	<u>End FY73</u>
ARVN	441,829	447,456	444,237	445,981
VNN	39,611	39,611	40,681	40,681
VNMC	13,462	13,462	14,072	14,072
VNAF	44,712	46,998	46,998	52,171
RF	294,446	294,446	295,985	295,985
PF	<u>258,027</u>	<u>258,027</u>	<u>258,027</u>	<u>251,110</u>
Total	1,092,087	1,100,000	1,100,000	1,100,000

(S) On 10 Jun 71, SECDEF approved the recommendations contained in the FY72-73 force structure reviews. Approval was granted to accelerate the expansion of the RVNAF to achieve a strength of 1.1 million during FY72. In addition, those force structure modifications proposed for FY72 were approved and the proposed modifications for FY73 were approved for planning.⁹ Respective RVNAF space modifications were as follows:¹⁰

Program III: CRIMP (increases auth 5 Jun 70)				Proposed Plan (6 Feb 71)		
	<u>FY72</u>	<u>FY73</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>FY72</u>	<u>FY73</u>	<u>Total</u>
ARVN	7,810	5,627	13,437	10,218	1,744	11,962
VNN	-0-	-0-	-0-	1,070	-0-	1,070
VNMC	-0-	-0-	-0-	610	-0-	610
VNAF	5,932	2,286	8,218	8,218	5,173	13,391
RF	-0-	-0-	-0-	1,539	-0-	1,539
PF	<u>-0-</u>	<u>-0-</u>	<u>-0-</u>	<u>-0-</u>	<u>-6,917</u>	<u>-6,917</u>
Total	13,742	7,913	21,655	21,655	-0-	21,655

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Force Strengths

(C) At the beginning of CY71 the authorized RVNAF force ceiling was 1,078,315. On 31 Dec 70 RVNAF strength, including ARVN, VNN, VNAF, RF and PF, was 1,054,125. On 10 Jun 71 the 1.1 million force ceiling was approved for FY72. By 30 June RVNAF force strength had increased to 1,060,129.¹¹

(C) To meet the CY71 goal of 1.1 million set by JGS, 168,300 volunteers and 66,900 conscripts had to be obtained for the RVNAF. From January through June RVNAF procured only 89 percent of the accessions programmed for the period; 96 percent of the volunteers were obtained, but only 61 percent of the conscript goal was met. This meant that RVNAF would have to garner 72,596 volunteers and 40,416 conscripts during the remaining months of 1971, an actuality which was of great concern to COMUSMACV and the GVN Ministry of National Defense.

(U) The problem in manpower procurement was primarily in conscript accessions. The RVNAF normally met its total accession goals, but conscript fill for the infantry battalions posed a major obstacle since few volunteered for this duty.¹²

(C) On 11 August the Minister of National Defense, Nguyen Van Vy, submitted a report on manpower procurement to the GVN Prime Minister, Tran Thien Khiem. The report conservatively estimated there were approximately 150,000 draft dodgers within the PSDF and that sector chiefs were harboring local manpower resources for various reasons such as utilization in Regional and Popular Forces. To remedy these situations and hopefully obtain the needed manpower for RVNAF, the Minister of National Defense recommended that stringent controls be instituted to insure that local authorities procured the manpower to meet the conscript quotas established by the respective Military Region Hq. He further recommended that the PSDF be placed under strong control, be carefully screened, and identified draft dodgers be brought into the services.

(C) On 29 August, COMUSMACV solicited Ambassador Bunker's assistance in obtaining the Prime Minister's favorable response to the report and implementation of the Defense Minister's recommendations.¹³

(S) Prime Minister Khiem immediately issued Ministerial Circular #1196 on 2 Sep 71 directing province chiefs to make available for conscription those PSDF personnel who were in an illegal draft status. This eliminated one of the methods which had been used to avoid the draft.

(S) On 29 Sep 71 Circular #3097 was published issuing province personnel procurement quotas for 1972 and directing province chiefs to bring Regional and Popular Forces to 100 percent of authorized strength by 31 Dec 71. Thus, RF/PF was given priority procurement through CY71 and the Regular Force/RVNAF would receive priority during first quarter CY72.

(S) A change in the National Defense requirement necessitated a modification to Circular #3097; on 13 Nov 71 Circular #3570 directed Saigon Capital City and Gia Dinh Province to provide conscripts immediately to the Regular Forces. Other provinces and cities in which the RF strength was at 98 percent were to do the same.¹⁴


(U) These circulars caused conflicts of interest among the province chiefs and region commanders. The line of command authority from military region to province to district to village was unclear in this respect. The province chiefs were appointed by and responded to the Minister of Interior. They also wore a military hat and were responsive to some degree to the region commander. Their military interest however was in territorial security and they

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
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
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were not particularly interested in providing conscript personnel for RVNAF. The region commanders, concerned with the Regular Forces, were responsive generally to the Ministry of National Defense and looked to the RVNAF Joint General Staff for guidance. The circulars addressed to the province chiefs, were issued by the Ministry of the Interior over the signature of Prime Minister Khiem, thus placing the region commander in the rather awkward and ill-defined position of attempting to get province chiefs to obey directives from their headquarters and provide personnel to ARVN instead of, to the Territorial Forces. The region commanders responded well and issued implementing directives, insisting on compliance with the attempt to bring illegal PSDF into the RVNAF.¹⁵

(C) December 1971 brought a significant and encouraging rise in both conscripts and volunteers. ARVN conscripts, who had averaged less than 3,000 per month through November 1971, rose to 4,960. ARVN volunteers, having averaged less than 7,000 per month through November, numbered 8,145 in December. The increases developed too late to offset the serious deficits of the previous months and the strength of the RVNAF failed to meet the goal of the 1971 strength program by nearly 60,000 personnel. On 31 Dec 71 the RVNAF strength was 1,046,254.¹⁶

RVNAF MONTHLY STRENGTHS: CY71¹⁷

Jan	1,054,125	Jul	1,057,924
Feb	1,049,163	Aug	1,052,353
Mar	1,057,676	Sep	1,047,890
Apr	1,058,237	Oct	1,043,232
May	1,060,597	Nov	1,040,640
Jun	1,060,129	Dec	1,046,254

RVNAF includes ARVN, VNN, VNMC, VNAF, and RF/PF

ARVN Strength and Force Structure


(C) Strength. On 31 Dec 70 the ARVN force ceiling was 433,989 as opposed to an assigned strength of 414,074. When the new force ceilings were approved in June 1971, the ARVN force ceiling rose to 444,237. On 30 June ARVN strength was 411,693.¹⁸ As previously stated RVNAF failed to meet its 1971 strength goal by nearly 60,000 personnel. Of this shortfall the majority were in the combat maneuver elements with approximately 30,000 vacancies in the army infantry battalions. From 1 Jan 71 through 31 Oct 71, strength decreased by over 13,000 personnel and ARVN was 46,000 personnel short of the end of year strength goal. The net result was that the strength of the infantry battalions declined from 73 percent of authorization in January 1971 to 65 percent of authorization at the end of November.

ARVN MONTHLY STRENGTHS: CY71¹⁹

Jan	416,609	Jul	412,549
Feb	411,958	Aug	405,745
Mar	414,069	Sep	404,704
Apr	412,035	Oct	401,526
May	412,705	Nov	402,107
Jun	411,693	Dec	407,963

(C) High casualties, excessive desertions, and manpower procurement affected the ARVN strength level. Casualty rates increased proportionately as the army assumed greater responsibility for ground combat operations. From January through March, the number of casualties rose significantly, peaking at 4.4 per 1,000 men during LAM SON 719. See Figure VIII-1 for CY71 casualty rates and pages VIII-33 through VIII-35 for desertion statistics.

MONTHLY ARVN CASUALTIES (KIA) RATE PER 1,000 ASSIGNED (1970-1971)



Source: MAC J14 Monthly RVNAF Casualty Reports
Mar 71 - Mar 72

Figure VIII-1

(C) Manpower procurement was an area of frustration for ARVN. The majority of personnel who volunteered did so for specific units and usually for other than combat units. Because of this, conscripts were the primary source of replacements for infantry division combat units and only 53 percent of the 66,900 conscript goal was met in CY71. As a result the combat infantry battalions were between 52 and 77 percent of assigned strength on 30 Nov 71 while all other division organic units were between 96 and 121 percent of assigned strength.²⁰

(C) Despite the issuance of the ministerial circulars, the ARVN strength posture did not improve sufficiently. On 24 November, COMUSMACV advised the Corps Senior Advisors of his continued concern and requested them to report the problems, effectiveness and impact of the circulars.²¹ The major problem areas subsequently identified by the Senior Advisors were:

-- Inadequate population control.

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- No incentive to provide manpower to central authority.
- Conflict of interest RF/PF versus ARVN.
- Insufficient manpower resources.
- Failure of GVN to severely enforce the Draft Decree Law.
- No punitive action for failure to meet quotas.²²

(C) During December the conscript input increased appreciably and ARVN strength rose by 5,856 to 407,963 -- its highest manning level since July 1971. Unfortunately the desired goal of 90 percent manning level in the infantry battalions was not attained and the increased number of conscripts would not affect the battalion strengths until February 1972, when their basic training cycle would be completed.²³

(C) On 28 Jan 72 COMUSMACV offered four short-term recommendations to Ambassador Bunker with the request that he broach the subject with President Thieu at the earliest possible time in an effort to increase manpower procurement during CY72:

- Convert RF and PF personnel to ARVN on a voluntary basis.
 - Enlist those personnel whose units have been inactivated.
 - Strongly encourage RF/PF to volunteer to serve in local ARVN units.
- Enforce rigidly the ministerial circular #3097 (dated 29 Sep 71) which provided quotas to provinces for conscription of illegal PSDF.
 - Monitor and take necessary action to insure compliance.
- Stop RF/PF recruitment in those provinces determined by MR commanders to have adequate RF/PF strengths, which should make large numbers of men available.
 - Make majority of 18 year old youths go into ARVN.
- Continue emphasis on regular police round-ups.
 - Keep pressure on; do not give draft dodgers and deserters opportunity to evade service.²⁴

(S) COMUSMACV believed that the extant manpower programs were adequate to upgrade the combat unit manning levels to desired strength provided the GVN enforced the programs aggressively. The rise or decline of the ARVN CY72 strength would reflect the extent to which GVN officials were willing or able to influence the manning posture of the Vietnamese Army.²⁵

(S) Force Structure. On 9 Apr 71, General Cao Van Vien, Chief, Joint General Staff, submitted certain proposals to MACV for improved ARVN equipment and force structure changes. On 27 May 71, General Vien was advised of COMUSMACV's position regarding the proposals:²⁶

- Proposal: Replace all M41 tanks with M48A3 tanks in FY72 and activate three new M48A3 tank battalions for MRs 1, 2, and 3.

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- Position: Introduction of the new and complex M48A3 tank would be costly and could not be supported by the ARVN logistic system. Total replacement of the M41 tanks was not considered feasible. The activation of new tank battalions would overtax the ARVN logistic system and exceed the authorized manpower ceiling. Activation of one M48A3 tank battalion would be considered for MR 1 to defeat the NVA T54 and T53 tanks and provide a deterrent to larger, more powerful tanks introduced by the NVA.

-- Proposal: Provide RVNAF with A-LAW and 105mm and 155mm HEP and HEAT rounds.

- Position: A-LAW not available. 105mm HEP rounds, available in RVN in limited quantities, would be made available to ARVN upon request. The 105mm HEAT round was not available in RVN or CONUS. The 155mm HEP and HEAT rounds were not in the inventory of the US Army.

-- Proposal: Activate four new armored infantry battalions.

- Position: Not considered essential. All infantry battalions should undergo training with armor units.

-- Proposal: Activate five new artillery group headquarters.

- Position: Not considered essential. As an alternative MACV recommended strengthening of present artillery headquarters and activating one artillery group in MR 1 by reallocating existing personnel spaces.

-- Proposal: Activate four new target acquisition battalions.

- Position: Requires radars which were not available, therefore activation could not be supported.

-- Proposal: Activate four new self-propelled 155mm howitzer battalions.

- Position: Consideration would be given to activating three new 155mm (SP) battalions and assigning one battalion to each of the northern MRs to provide direct support to ARVN armor. (COMUSMACV believed that these battalions would replace, in part, the mobility which ARVN would lose when US helicopter airlift assets redeployed.)

(C) In July the JGS forwarded a plan to standardize ranger units, activate one battalion of M48A3 tanks, activate three 155mm (SP) howitzer battalions, and activate an artillery group in MR 1.²⁷

(S) M48A3 tanks. As a reinforcement for MR 1 and as a hedge against the NVA introducing larger and more powerful tanks, the JGS authorized the addition of one battalion of M48A3 tanks. The battalion, designated the 20th Tank Sqdn, activated on 15 Aug 71 with an authorized strength of 879 (including an infantry augmentation of 270 riflemen) and 54 M48A3 tanks. The squadron was scheduled to deploy to MR 1 during January 1972.²⁸

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(S) 155 (SP) howitzer battalions. MACV continued to study the feasibility of the additional 155 howitzer battalions during July and August. On 23 Aug 71, General Abrams informed General Vien that the activation of the three new battalions was not feasible and that . . . "introduction of this new weapon into ARVN will overtax the training base and the logistics system, which is not now prepared to cope with the maintenance difficulties presented by this weapon. . . ."29

(S) New ARVN infantry division. On 2 Sep 71 JGS submitted a proposal to COMUSMACV to activate a new division in MR 1. This in essence preempted the July 1971 JGS proposal to "activate an artillery group in MR 1."30 COMUSMACV agreed to the concept of activating the new division at the earliest opportunity, around the nucleus of the 1st Div forward headquarters and the 2d Regt. General Abrams advised General Vien . . . "Your solution appears to be the most workable in view of the overall requirements of the RVNAF. . . ." COMUSMACV stipulated, however, that the activation had to be accomplished within the 1.1 million ceiling and existing equipment/material authorizations.31

(S) To fully man the new division, 7,948 new spaces were needed. To acquire the needed spaces, JGS proposed to deactivate 114 PF platoons in MR 4 (3,150 spaces) and reduce each MR 4 RF company by 4 spaces (2,500 spaces). This left a shortfall of 2,298 spaces for which additional trade-offs would have to be identified.32 On 31 Dec 71, the matter of specific space trade-offs was still under negotiation with RVNAF/JGS.33 (See TS Supplement for subsequent action.)

(S) On 4 Oct 71, JGS signed the order activating the 3d ARVN Inf Div effective 1 Oct 71. The new division was organized around a nucleus of units then operational in MR 1 with additional units, including key command and control headquarters, to be newly activated. JGS planned to form the division in two phases: Phase I, commencing 1 Oct 71, consisted of reassigning existing units plus activating other key elements. During Phase II, to begin on a date to be determined, the remaining support elements would be activated.34

(S) The redesignations and activations planned during the respective phases were:35

Phase I:

-- Redesignation: 3d ARVN Inf Div Hq formed from 1st ARVN Div Fwd CP.

- 2d Inf Regt: reassigned existing 2d Inf Regt Hq with 1st, 2d, and 3d Bns from 1st Inf Div.
- 56th Inf Regt (-): reassign two existing bns, 5/2d and 4/51st, 1st Task Force and redesignate 1/56th and 2/56th respectively.
- 57th Inf Regt (-): reassign existing 4/2d and 2/6th, 2d Inf Div and redesignate 1/57th and 2/57th respectively.
- 30th Arty Bn (155mm): 48th Arty Bn, I Corps, redesignated.
- 31st Arty Bn (105mm): 62d Arty Bn, I Corps, redesignated.
- 32d Arty Bn (105mm): 64th Arty Bn, I Corps, redesignated.
- 11th Armd Cav Sqdn: reassign 11th ACS.
- Electronic Combat Detachment: reassign detachment from Quang Da Zone.

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-- New Activations:

- Two regimental H & HS companies
- Two infantry battalions (3/56 and 3/57)
- One signal battalion
- One medical battalion
- One division headquarters company
- 3d Div Arty H & HS Co
- 33d Arty Bn (105mm)
- One transportation company
- Three reconnaissance companies
- One intelligence detachment

Phase II:

-- Major units to be activated

- One engineer battalion
- Logistic support battalion
- Special technical detachment
- Scout dog platoon
- Band
- Division training center
- MP company

(C) The 3d Inf Div Arty was activated on 1 Oct 71. The unit completed training on 30 Nov 71 and deployed to Quang Tri (MR 1) on 7 Dec 71. Deployment was by battalion with the 30th Arty Bn located in Quang Tri, the 31st in Dong Hai, and the 32d in Da Nang. The 33d Arty Bn was activated on 1 Dec 71, filled with personnel and equipment during December and was scheduled to begin unit training on 17 Jan 72. The 33d was scheduled to deploy to Quang Tri (MR 1) on 1 Apr 72.³⁶

(C) By 31 Dec 71 all redesignations and activations scheduled during Phase I had been completed.³⁷

(C) Standardization of the ARVN Ranger organization. The Ranger units evolved from the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), a paramilitary force composed of civilian mercenaries. The CIDG converted to ARVN Ranger Border Defense Battalions (RBDB) on a phased basis during the latter months of 1970. In the wake of the conversion, the Ranger Group Hq and Ranger battalions were understrength and ill-equipped. The composition of the various groups was not uniform and nearly all the Ranger battalions had insufficient quantities of 81mm mortars and M60 machine guns. With a view toward increasing efficiency, optimizing use of personnel and equipment, and improving command and control, the JCS on 8 Jul 71 submitted a proposal to standardize the Ranger units.

(C) Conceptually, seven mobile ranger groups would exist, each consisting of three standard battalions of 661 men. The 3d, 5th, and 7th Ranger Groups (the 7th group to be newly organized) would be designated as General Reserve. The remaining four would be designated as mobile strike units, with one unit assigned to each MR. The proposal required 402 additional spaces, some of which would come from deactivating the 88th Ranger Border Def (RBD) Bn in MR 2 and reorganizing the 85th Bn in MR 4. On 29 Sep 71 COMUSMACV concurred in the proposal provided the space requirements were met within the 1.1 million manpower ceiling and maximum use was made of existing ranger equipment assets.

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(C) The original standardization plan was refined by JGS in January 1972 and implementation was scheduled for 1 Feb 72. The new plan reflected the following changes:

- No General Reserve Ranger Group would be designated. The 3d and 5th Ranger Groups would be assigned to the III Corps/MR 3. The 7th Group would be assigned to IV Corps/MR 4.
- Two RBD battalions, the 71st in MR 2 and the 75th in MR 4, would be deactivated in lieu of the 88th at Dak Pek, MR 2.
- A new Ranger Tactical Hq would be activated in Kontum/MR 2 with 25 spaces taken from the MR 2 Ranger Hq and 34 spaces acquired by reducing the strength of all MR Ranger signal companies.³⁸

(S) When SECDEF approved the FY72-73 force structure review on 10 Jun 71, 5,627 spaces were added to ARVN to accelerate activation of certain units from FY73 to FY72:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TOE</u>	<u>UNIT/SPACES</u>
Armored Brigade Hq	8-212	1/95
Air Defense Artillery Weapons Bn	New Unit	1/527
ICS long lines companies	None	*/660
Facilities Signal platoons	None	7/140
General Hospital, 1,800 bed	18-521	*/834
Station Hospital, 400 bed	18-525	3/1,611
Field Hospital, 400 bed	18-627	*/372
Hospital augmentation, 200 bed	18-834	*/400
Station Hospital, 600 bed	18-524	*/605 (1)
Pipeline	None	*/338

* Denotes space augmentation to existing or approved force structure unit.

(1) Pipeline addition is due to adjustments in unit activations planned for FY73.

(S) Activation of the above units was expected to be completed by the end of FY72 with the exception of the ARVN ICS long lines companies.³⁹

(S) Major ARVN Units as of 31 Dec 71:40

<u>Combat Units</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Activated</u>	<u>Deployed</u>	<u>Auth Unit Strength</u>
Inf Bn	105	105	103	826
Abn Bn	9	9	9	865
Ranger Bn	21	20	20	683
Ranger Border Def Bn	36	36	36	461
Army Cav Sqdn				
w/o tanks	6	6	6	753
w/tanks	12	12	11	692
M48 Tank Bn	1	1	0	879
Guard Bn	2	2	2	624
81st Gp	1	1	1	806
Total	193	192	188	

Combat Support Units

105mm How Bn (Div)	33	33	32	500
105mm How Bn (Sep)	5	5	5	508
105mm How Bn (Abn)	3	3	3	485
155mm How Bn (Div)	11	11	11	542
155mm How Bn (Sep)	4	4	4	550
175mm Gun Bn	2	2	1	613
ADA Bn	2	1	0	572
Sector Arty Plt	176	135	100	29
Ranger Bn Def Arty Plt	28	28	28	18
Engr Bn (Div)	11	10	10	437
Engr Bn (Abn)	1	0	0	482
Engr Bn (Cmbt Spt)	12	12	12	540
Sig Bn (Div)	11	11	10	512
Sig Bn (Abn)	1	1	1	390

Combat Service Support

Engr Const Bn	17	17	17	605
Engr Spt Bn	4	4	4	676
	1	1	1	771
Area Sig Bn	8	8	8	560 to 1288
Corps Sig Bn	4	4	4	440
Sig Spt Bn	1	1	1	437
	1	1	1	416
	1	1	1	463
Sig Spt Gp	1	1	1	813
	1	1	1	963

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VNN Strength and Force Structure

(C) Strength. The force ceiling for the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) on 31 Dec 70 was 39,611; VNN force strength was 40,709. On 30 Jun 71 VNN strength was 40,808 and the authorized ceiling had raised to 40,681. By 31 Dec 71, VNN strength had increased to 42,267.⁴¹

VNN MONTHLY STRENGTHS: CY71 ⁴²

Jan	40,855	Jul	41,259
Feb	41,565	Aug	42,291
Mar	41,430	Sep	42,918
Apr	41,392	Oct	43,236
May	41,184	Nov	42,766
Jun	40,808	Dec	42,267

(S) Force Structure. The major VNN force structure changes for FY72 raised the number of authorized watercraft from 1,591 to 1,620, established a mobile operations staff, 13 additional coastal surveillance radar system sites, and provided 400 additional spaces to the Navy Logistical Support Command.

(S) Watercraft. The increase in the number of watercraft facilitated addition of 29 river patrol boats (PBR) in the VNN River Patrol Division. This increase made it possible for the VNN to assume responsibility for waterborne security in and around Saigon, Qui Nhon, Vung Tau and several other major river ports, without adversely affecting other VNN patrol craft which were employed on interdiction barriers.⁴³ Under the new force ceiling VNN was authorized the following craft:⁴⁴


Riverine craft	688
Harbor defense and mine warfare craft	126
Logistic and support craft	428
Coastal Craft	404
Offshore craft	<u>34</u>
Total	1,680

(S) Mobile Operations Staff. This staff was principally required to coordinate complex riverine operations in the Delta area of MR 3 and MR 4. The remoteness of operating units from Naval Hq in Saigon made it necessary to have a senior commander with a highly capable, mobile staff to exercise overall command and coordination of the various riverine commands.

(S) Coastal surveillance radar sites. The projected withdrawal of US air and surface patrol craft required additional surveillance capability for the VNN to monitor the outer coastal barrier. Considering that the VNN had insufficient large ships to control the outer barrier and would not have dedicated air assets to augment surface patrols, increasing radar sites from three to 16 provided the most efficient and economical means of assuring continuous coastal surveillance.

(S) Logistic support command. The 400 space increase was to be distributed among the various VNN logistic support bases (7) and intermediate support bases (12) to increase maintenance of operational craft and bases.⁴⁵

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THE FIGHTING JUNKS-the Yabuta, the newest and most numerous of the Navy's junks is used as a patrol craft, troop carrier, or a blocking craft during joint operations.

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(C) VNN craft as of 31 Dec 71:⁴⁶

Type of Craft	Authorized	On Hand	Type of Craft	Authorized	On Hand
<u>Logistic and Support</u>			<u>Coastal Surveillance</u>		
Admiral's			Coastal Raiders	50	18
Barge/Gigs	3	3	DER (Offshore)	2	2
AGP	2	2	Junks (Yabuta)	154	154
AKL	1	1	Junks ("A" & "K")	65	65
APL	2	2	PC	2	2
ARL	1	1	PCE (Offshore)	8	8
Barge, Fuel	4	4	PCF	107	107
Barge, Refueler	4	4	PGM (Offshore)	20	20
Boston Whaler	52	52	WHEC (Offshore)	4	4
KSB	4	4	WPB	26	26
FNC (Club)	1	1	Subtotal	438	406
HSSC	7	7			
LCM-3/6 Pusher	10	10	<u>River Security</u>		
LCM-6 Fireboat	1	1	PBR	324	323
LCM-3/6	122	122	Subtotal	324	323
LCM-8	47	47			
LCM-8 Mini-dock	5	5	<u>River Assault</u>		
LCPL	1	1	ASPB	84	84
LCU	14	14	ATC	99	99
LCVP	73	73	CCB	9	9
LSIL	5	5	CDT	14	14
LSM	5	5	Douche	2	2
LSMH	2	2	Monitor	15	15
LSSL	7	7	Monitor (LCM-6)	24	24
LST	6	6	Monitor (Zippo)	7	7
UTB (100 ft)	6	4	RPC	28	28
UTB (50 ft)	2	2	STCAN	44	44
WLV 523	1	1	Vedette	22	22
YC	7	7	Refueler (LSM)	10	10
YD	1	0	Recharger	6	6
YFR	1	1	Subtotal	364	364
YFU	1	1			
YLLC	3	3	<u>Harbor Defense/</u>		
YOG	6	6	<u>Mine Warfare</u>		
YR	3	3	Boston Whaler	26	26
YRBM	3	3	LCM-3/6 (Mine)	19	19
YTL	10	10	LCMM	6	6
YTM	3	0	MLMS	12	12
YWN	2	2	MSM	8	8
Subtotal	428	421	MSR	6	6
			LCPL	24	24
			Pickets	25	25
			Subtotal	126	126
			Total VNN Craft	1,680	1,641

VNAF Strength and Force Structure

(C) Strength. The Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) had a force ceiling of 38,780 on 31 Dec 70 and an assigned strength of 44,997. On 30 Jun 71, the force ceiling was increased to 46,998 and VNAF assigned strength had reached 50,925. By Dec 71 VNAF had reduced its strength to 49,475.⁴⁷

VNAF MONTHLY STRENGTHS: CY71⁴⁸

Jan	45,844	Jul	51,192
Feb	47,783	Aug	51,709
Mar	48,885	Sep	50,411
Apr	48,989	Oct	49,888
May	50,245	Nov	49,229
Jun	50,925	Dec	49,475

(S) Force structure. The major force structure changes for VNAF during CY71 focused around the activation of the 5th Air Div, the last of five authorized divisions, converting H-34 aircraft to UH-1 assets, and introducing C-123 and AC-119 aircraft into the VNAF inventory. Concomitant with the increases in aircraft, liaison squadrons increased from five to seven squadrons, helicopter squadrons increased from 10 to 16, transport from two to five, and a new gunship squadron was added to the one which existed in December 1970. By 31 Dec 71 the VNAF CRIMP authorization had increased to 1,336 aircraft and 476 additional planes had been placed in the VNAF inventory during the year.⁴⁹

(C) The 5th Air Div, activated on 1 Jan 71, was composed of two tactical wings with seven squadrons, an air base wing and a maintenance and supply wing. By 17 Feb 71, all wings and squadrons had been activated except the 53d Tactical Wing and the 819th (AC-119) Squadron.⁵⁰ the 53d activated on 1 Mar 71 and 819th on 17 Aug 71.⁵¹

(S) When SECDEF approved the FY72-73 force structure review on 10 Jun 71, 2,286 spaces were added to the FY72 VNAF force structure pipeline to accomplish recruiting and training for activation of certain units in FY73.⁵²

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Spaces</u>
1 F-5-21 Fighter Squadron, 18 aircraft	533
1 A-37 Squadron, 24 aircraft	285
1 A-1 Squadron, 24 aircraft	419
1 EC-47 Squadron, 20 aircraft	842
9 RC-47 aircraft	207
1 O-1/U-17 Squadron (25 O-1; 7 U-17)	0
Total	<u>2,286</u>

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
(S) VNAF aircraft as of 31 Dec 71:⁵³

Type Aircraft	Authorized Sqdn/Acft	Squadrons Currently Activated	Squadrons Operationally Ready	Remarks
<u>Fighter Attack</u>				
F-5 (F-5A)	1/18	1/18	1/18	
A-1	4/96	3/60	3/60	Last activation Nov 72; Last O/R May 73.
A-37	6/144 11/258	5/90 9/168	5/90 9/168	Last activation Oct 72; Last O/R Apr 73.
<u>Air Defense</u>				
MAP Fighter (F-5E)	3/54	0/0	0/0	Activation During FY75, O/R FY75
<u>Gunships</u>				
AC-47	1/18	1/16	1/16	
AC-119	1/18 2/36	1/18 2/34	0/0 1/16	O/R May 72.
<u>Helicopters</u>				
UH-1	16/496	15/465	13/403	Last activation Feb 72; Last O/R Dec 72.
CH-47	2/32 18/528	1/16 16/481	1/16 14/419	
<u>Special Missions</u>				
Composite VC-47, UH-1, U-17	1/10	1/10	1/10	
<u>Reconnaissance</u>				
Composite EC-47, RC-47, U-6, RF-5	1/28	1/19	1/19	
EC-47	1/20 2/48	0/0 1/19	0/0 1/19	Activation Dec 72; O/R Jul 73.
<u>Liaison</u>				
Composite O-1/U-17	8/256	7/195	7/195	Last activation Dec 72; Last O/R Mar 73.
<u>Transport</u>				
C-47	1/16	1/16	1/16	
C-119	1/16	1/16	1/16	
C-123	3/48	3/48	1/16	Last O/R Apr 72;
C-7	3/48 8/128	0/0 5/80	0/0 3/48	Last activation Jul 72; Last O/R May 73.
<u>Training Squadron</u>				
T-41	1/18	1/18	1/18	
Totals	54/1,336	42/1,005	37/698	

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Projected Organization of The VNMC (MARINE DIVISION)



Source: MACMA, RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE
Review, Fy 72-73

Figure VIII-2

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VNMC Strength and Force Structure

(C) Strength. The Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) had a force ceiling of 13,462 on 31 Dec 70 and an assigned strength of 13,635. The FY72 force ceiling for the VNMC was raised to 14,072 on 30 Jun 71; it was not until December 1971 that the new force ceiling was attained and exceeded.⁵⁴

VNMC MONTHLY STRENGTHS, CY71⁵⁵

Jan	13,156	Jul	13,646
Feb	13,485	Aug	13,714
Mar	13,451	Sep	13,679
Apr	13,651	Oct	13,761
May	13,806	Nov	14,044
Jun	13,422	Dec	14,312

(S) Force structure. The 610 spaces added to the VNMC force ceiling permitted reorganization of the Marine Division to improve command and control, upgrade maintenance capability, and increase overall combat service support to the degree required for a full division. The major force structure changes during 1971 were the conversion of the existing Service Battalion to an Amphibious Support Battalion and the creation of new signal and engineer battalions.

(S) Amphibious Support Battalion. The Amphibious Support Battalion was built around the former Service Battalion and combined the functions of USMC service and shore party battalions which had totally redeployed in April 1971. The new battalion consisted of a Headquarters and Service Battalion with a Logistics Support Company, a Shore Party Company, and a Maintenance Company. The battalion was designed to operate as stock control center and provide third echelon maintenance for ordnance and quartermaster items. The organic Shore Party Company assumed operation of logistics support areas for brigade operations. The conversion from Support Battalion to Amphibious Support Battalion took place during the first quarter, FY72.

(S) Signal battalion. During the FY72-73 Force Structure Review it was determined that a full signal battalion was required to adequately support three Marine brigades and one division command group. The new battalion, converted during the first quarter, FY72, evolved from the existing division signal company. Designed to have third echelon maintenance capability, the organic units consisted of a Headquarters and Service Company, Command Operations Company, and a Field Operations Company.

(S) Engineer battalion. The formation of a separate engineer battalion reflected the shift in emphasis from construction work to combat tasks. The engineer battalion, formed during the second quarter, FY72, consisted of one construction company and three combat engineer companies; the construction company and one combat engineer company were former elements of the old service battalion.

(S) The major increases in the VNMC force structure were expected to be completed by the end of FY72. The organization of the Marine division upon completion of the increases is shown in Figure VIII-2.⁵⁶

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(S) Major VNMC units as of 31 Dec 71:⁵⁷

<u>Units</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Activated</u>	<u>Deployed</u>	<u>Unit Strength</u>	<u>Total Strength</u>
<u>Combat</u>					
Inf Bn	9	9	9	875	7,875
<u>Combat Support</u>					
Arty Bn (105)	3	3	3	493	1,479
<u>Combat Service Support</u>					
Hq Bn	1	1	1	1,063	1,063
Div Arty Hq	1	1	1	73	73
Amph Spt Bn	1	1	1	490	490
Motor Trans Co	1	1	1	216	216
Engr Bn	1	1	1	405	405
Sig Bn	1	1	1	468	468
Med Bn	1	1	1	671	671
				Subtotal	12,740
				Training Center	300
				Pipeline	1,032
				Total	14,072

Strength and Force Structure of the Territorial Forces

(U) President Thieu reorganized the RVNAF in July 1970 and made the RF and PF part of the ARVN. This move improved the "second class" image which had plagued the Territorial Forces and provided the medium through which the RF/PF were modernized, trained, reallocated, and redistributed to replace the regular ARVN forces in the pacification and territorial security roles. The missions and employment of the Territorial Forces are covered in detail in Chapter VII.

(C) Strengths. Significant CY71 ceilings and assigned strengths of the RF/PF are reflected below:⁵⁸

	<u>31 Dec 70</u>	<u>30 Jun 71</u>	<u>31 Dec 71</u>
<u>RF</u>			
Ceiling	294,446	295,985	295,985
Assigned	283,106	295,744	283,680
<u>PF</u>			
Ceiling	250,027	250,027	250,027
Assigned	250,889	247,537	248,557

(S) Force Structure. The major FY72 force structure changes, proposed and approved for the Territorial Forces, provided 17 new battalion headquarters for the RF and 219 additional platoons for the PF. These additional units were related to the new "transition concept" introduced in the 1972 Combined Campaign Plan (CCP). The concept applied to economy of force principles (deployment, reallocation, and redistribution) and was designed to provide the additional RF and PF elements required to maintain the momentum of the pacification effort.⁵⁹

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(S) RF battalion headquarters. The addition of 17 battalion headquarters increased the RF total to 46 battalions. The additional units, activated during the first 10 days of September 1971, relieved ARVN battalions in the mission of mobile reaction forces. Personnel spaces were obtained by incorporating the existing RF heavy weapons platoons (17) into the new battalion headquarters.

(S) PF platoons. PF platoons in MRs 2 and 4 were reduced in size from 35 to 32 men. The spaces generated from this reduction were used to establish 219 additional platoons to support the pacification and development program. As an adjunct to this initial reduction in size, PF platoons in all MRs were subsequently reduced to 29 men to support the activation of the 3d ARVN Div in MR 1. The reductions began on a phased basis during the first quarter FY72 and were still in progress on 31 Dec 71.⁶⁰

(S) Major RF/PF units as of Dec 71.⁶¹

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Activated</u>	<u>Deployed</u>	<u>Unit Strength</u>
<u>RF</u>				
<u>Combat</u>				
RF Co	1,679	1,679	1,679	123
RF Bn HHC	46	46	46	85
Mech Plt	51	51	51	42
<u>Combat Spt</u>				
Intel Plt	45	45	45	28
Intel Sqd	256	256	256	12
Mil Sec Svc (MSS) units	249	249	249	varies (6 or 10)
<u>Combat Svc Spt</u>				
SM&DSL Ctrs (Sector Maintenance & Direct Support Logistics Ctr)	44	44	44	varies (between 236-537)
<u>PF</u>				
<u>Combat</u>				
PF Plt	8,493	8,356	8,356	35/32/29

Women's Armed Forces Corps

(U) On 1 Jan 65 the Women's Armed Forces Corps (WAFC) was formed around the nucleus of the 600 women enrolled in the Women's Auxiliary Corps. A training school was built on the outskirts of Saigon and active recruiting started. By the end of 1967, just before the Communist's TET offensive, the force had grown to 2,700 women.

(U) After the 1968 TET offensive a bill was introduced in the National Assembly to draft women between the ages of 18 and 25. The bill was subsequently rejected. The creation of a home guard -- the People's Self-Defense Forces (PSDF) of teenagers, women and over-draft-age men -- gave civilian women the opportunity that they wanted, to be of service and to protect themselves. Nevertheless, women in increasing numbers could be found in almost all of the defense forces in Vietnam. The statistics as of September 1971 were 4,200 WAFC, 300

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Women's Armed Forces Corps, June 1971.

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National Policewomen, 365 female Revolutionary Development workers, and more than a million volunteer women in the PSDF. Including the PSDF, 20 percent of Vietnam's population was involved in defense in one way or another; of these forces, at least 30 percent were women. The fact that the women in all these services were volunteers made the numbers even more impressive.

(U) The majority of women in the different forces were in a support activity, but jobs, training, and problems varied. There were no women in the WAFC trained as combat troops. The purpose of the WAFC, according to Colonel Tran Cam Huong, its Director, was to release men for assignment to combat areas. Most of the women served as typists, supply clerks, switch board and teletype operators, social workers, nurses, and medics. ✓

(U) In October 1966 an officer training course was started. Officer candidates first completed an 8-week basic training course, then began a 20-week officer training class. The future officers received 780 hours of instruction in staff functions and organization, leadership and command, drill and ceremonies, methods of instruction, history, first aid and sanitation, military justice, political and chemical warfare, weapons familiarization, and the arms and services of the Armed Forces. Both enlisted and commissioned women then attended military schools for advanced training a specialty field: communications, social welfare, adjutant general, medics, finance, supply and others. A significant highlight of 1971 was the assignment of the first WAFC officer to the XIII Basic POLWAR officers course at the Political Warfare College, Dalat, on 15 October.

(U) After graduation and advanced training, the WAFCs were assigned to different units, usually close to their homes. Of the 4,200 WAFC, 120 were attached to the Air Force, 50 to the Navy and 30 to the Marines. The others were divided among regular units of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and militia units of the Regional Forces. In September 1971, 1,400 WAFCs were based in the Saigon area, 500 in MR 1, 450 in MR 2, 650 in MR 3, and 1,000 in MR 4.

(U) WAFC end of the year strengths were as follows:⁶²

1965 - 1,436	1968 - 3,918
1966 - 2,203	1969 - 3,832
1967 - 2,701	1970 - 4,139

1971 - 3,892

Review of FY73 Force Structure

(S) On 23 Oct 71 CINCPAC requested that MACV accomplish a Force Structure Review for FY73 and out-years, to reach CINCPAC not later than 15 Jan 72. CINCPAC provided the following guidance for conduct of the review (see TS Supplement for additional CINCPAC guidance):

The consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program should be reevaluated in light of the current and developing situation to ensure that RVNAF has the capability of assuming increasingly greater responsibility as US and other FWF redeployments continue. Increases, reductions, and shortfalls for the force structure for FY73 as well as specific recommendations for high-cost, long lead time changes should be identified within the existing constraints of the 1.1 million manpower level and MASF monetary baseline.

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
The FY73 Force Structure Review should consolidate planned and projected changes, including the known or proposed later year force structure which would necessitate initiating lead time action to support follow-on programs. Units considered to be marginally effective should be identified and eliminated, and manpower and equipment trade-offs identified in order to maximize more productive RVNAF capabilities in other units.⁶³

(U) The first meeting of the combined MACV/JGS RVNAF FY73 Force Structure Review Committee was held on 4 Nov 71 cochaired by the Deputy Division Chief, Force Development, MACJ3-03 and the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, J3/JGS.⁶⁴ On 2 Dec 71 COMUSMACV provided guidance concerning RVNAF force development policy which specified that proposed changes to the RVNAF force structure would:

- Coincide with US and GVN national policy.
- Result in significant improvements.

RVNAF FY72 FORCE STRUCTURE OBJECTIVES

(as of 31 DEC 71)



Source: MAC J3-05

Figure VIII-3

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- Maintain a force that was balanced against a validated threat or requirement.
- Develop trade-offs that support the long-range objectives of security and force reduction.
- Minimize costs to GVN and US.
- Consider mobility of resources as an alternative to creation of additional resources.
- Minimize introduction of overly sophisticated equipment.
- Assure adequacy of logistics base to assimilate equipment and support RVNAF operations.⁶⁵

(U) On 6 Dec 71 MACV received the JCS FY73 force structure proposals which included certain RVNAF trade-offs in the FY72 force structure. Changes included the reinforcement of MR 1 with the new ARVN 3d Inf Div and the 20th Tank Sqdn, and the standardization of mobile ranger battalions.⁶⁶ The combined review, divided into two phases, would continue through fourth quarter FY72. Phase I, to examine the RVNAF force structure for FY73 only, was scheduled to be completed on 15 Jan 72. (See TS Supplement for related information.) Phase II, a long-range review, would examine the RVNAF force structure out to the posthostility period. It was anticipated that the Phase II review would be completed on 15 Apr 72.⁶⁷ The points of departure for the Phase I examination were the RVNAF FY72 force structure objectives and progress shown in Figure VIII-3.

RVNAF LEADERSHIP

(S) RVNAF executive leadership assets have traditionally been overtaxed. Accelerated unit activations and strength increases during CY71 compounded the problem, and although it was highly desirable to assign competent military leaders at all levels, higher priorities often precluded placing the best qualified officers in combat units. Fortunately, at the end of 1970 the Joint General Staff was performing in an eminently satisfactory manner and competent and experienced leaders had been placed in the MRs and were performing well.⁶⁸


(S) Governmental requirements for top level leaders were numerous and lessened the availability of leaders for purely military duties. On 31 May, the JCS J1 reported that 8,792 military officers were performing duties with civilian agencies, e.g., the National Police, Ministry of Interior, and Public Health, or were serving as elected national or local officials. Of necessity, the military had virtually held the country together during its period of crisis. This requirement had a significant impact on the number of available RVNAF officers with leadership background and potential.

(S) On 23 Jun 71 SECDEF again addressed this long-standing problem when he expressed his concern regarding RVNAF performance and suggested an urgent review of the leadership and promotion situation.⁶⁹ In July COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC that US efforts to improve RVNAF leadership during 1971 were directed at influencing the removal and replacement of ineffective leaders, redistributing leadership assets among key positions at all levels, and continuing the refinement and expansion of leadership training programs.

Replacing and Redistributing Leadership Assets

(S) The approach taken to exert US influence in the removal of a given official was dependent upon the sensitivity and delicacy of each case. With few exceptions, the GVN officials took action

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Source: SAC J2, New Orleans, LA

on recommendations for removal of ineffective leaders or reassignment of strong leaders to areas and commands which were in need of immediate reinforcement or increased efficiency.⁷⁰

(C) The momentum in redistributing RVNAF leadership assets began on 1 Jan 71 when Colonel Phan Hoa Hiep, Commander of the First Task Force (formerly Quang Da Special Zone), was transferred to Saigon to assume command of the Armor Corps; Col Nguyen Trong Luat, Deputy Commander of the ARVN 2d Div was his successor.⁷¹ Before the month had elapsed 17 changes in military commands and province chiefs had occurred: MG Tran Thanh Phong, Minister of Rural Development became Director-General of National Police (DGNP); the former DGNP, BG Tran Van Hai, took command of the 44th Special Tactical Zone (MR 4); BG Nguyen Huu Hanh, Deputy Commander (Dep Cdr) of MR 4 became Dep Cdr of MR 2; Col Tran Dinh Tho replaced Col Pham Quang Vinh as JGS J3; and 12 new province chiefs were appointed in MRs 2, 3 and 4.⁷² The incumbent JGS staff as of 15 Jan 71 is shown in Figure VIII-4.

(C) On 8 Feb 71 Col Tran Ngoc Thong became Acting JGS AG. On 23 February LTC Dao Cao Tri, Commanding General of MR 3, was killed in a helicopter crash near Tay Ninh City. As a result, LTC Nguyen Van Minh assumed command of MR 3 and also retained his position as Cdr, Capital Military District and Governor, Saigon-Gia Dinh.⁷³

(C) By 31 Dec 71 the new 3d Inf Div had been activated and eight major changes had been made in key RVNAF command and training assignments:

I Corps

Col Vu Van Giai from Dep Cdr, 1st Inf Div to Cdr, 3d Inf Div

III Corps

Col Le Van Hung, former Phong Dinh Province chief to Cdr, 5th Inf Div

Province Chiefs, MR 4/IV Corps

Phong Dinh Province: Col Chuong Dzinh Quay vice Col Le Van Hung

Vinh Binh Province : Col Chung Van Bong vice LTC Nguyen Van Tai

Central Training Command

Dong Da NTC - Col Le Trong Dam vice Col Le Tan Phuoc

Van Kiep NTC - Col Vo Van Ba vice Col Le Minh Quy

Chi Lang NTC - Col Ma Sanh Nhon vice Col Le Ngoc Day

Cao Lanh TC - Col Nguyen Huu Phuoc vice LTC Hua Yeu Len⁷⁴

(C) Numerous other exchanges were imminent as the year closed. Significant among them were the pending transfer of BG Soan from the Artillery Command to Dep Cdr, MR 1 and the exchange of positions between MG Nguyen Van Toan, Cdr, 2d Inf Div, I Corps and Col Hiep, Chief Armor Command.⁷⁵ BG Soan assumed his new post in January 1972 and was killed on 25 February when his helicopter crashed in Da Nang harbor after takeoff from a US destroyer.⁷⁶ The JGS staff as of 1 Mar 72 is shown in Figure VIII-5.

(S) The overall 1971 program for removing ineffective leaders and redistributing capable and experienced officers was considered successful.⁷⁷ The changes had impact on combat effectiveness, security, pacification, and development -- only with good leaders could the GVN successfully meet the demands of Vietnamization and counter future enemy offensives.⁷⁸

Promotion of Officers and NCOs

(C) The rapid expansion of the services did not permit the promotion system to keep pace with leadership requirements; as a result, there were serious deficiencies at the middle management level, O6 through E5.

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Figure 3. Vapour-3

(S) Promotion policies and progress. In 1968 the JGS had implemented a promotion policy designed to recognize and accelerate leaders who consistently distinguished themselves on the battlefield or served meritoriously in noncombat positions. At the same time, a 3-year officer and NCO realization plan was developed which set 90 percent fill as the level which should be maintained through promotions to grades 06 and below by end CY70. The goal was unrealistic and the JGS set the following promotion goals for 1971:⁷⁹

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Army/RF (Percent)</u>	<u>Navy (Percent)</u>	<u>Air Force (Percent)</u>	<u>Marine Corps (Percent)</u>
06	85	50	45	85
05	85	50	55	85
04	85	60	65	85
03	85	70	80	85
E8	85	70	60	85
E7	85	75	65	85
E6/E5	102	111	119	102

(C) Authorized strengths by grade were developed by the JGS on the basis of the approved force level. Promotion goals were then determined based on the projected strength by grade. By 31 Jan 71 the JGS had established the following plan for CY71 promotions:⁸⁰

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Authorized Strength</u>	<u>Promotion Goals/ Promotions Auth</u>	<u>Actual Grade Changes</u>
06	835	130	36
05	2,843	848	326
04	7,371	1,999	839
03	15,646	4,792	2,047
Total	26,695	7,739	3,248
E8	7,448	1,799	1,799
E7	22,082	4,806	4,806
E6	41,973	10,271	10,271
E5	78,531	10,362	10,362
Total	150,034	27,238	27,238

(U) RVNAF promotion policies were reviewed in June 1971 by a MACV study group. The opinion of the group was that the policies were sound and met the needs of the RVNAF, but there were certain areas which could be changed and improved:

- Rescind the article which provided for automatic promotion after 7 years in grade.
- Increase emphasis on battlefield promotions.
- Delegate authority to appropriate subordinate commanders to promote entitled personnel upon completion of a service school and second lieutenants and aspirants upon completion of time in grade requirements.
- Apply grade/skill factors in selecting VNN and VNAF personnel for promotion.⁸¹

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(U) On 16 Sep 71 JGS ammended the RVNAF promotion policies and adjusted the parameters designed to recognize and accelerate promotion for able leaders, awarded extra promotion points to personnel serving in combat and combat support units, and reduced time in grade requirements for battlefield and nonbattlefield (meritorious) promotions.⁸²

(C) On 31 Dec 71 regular officer strength, 06-02, had reached 50,850 -- an increase of 4,017 during the year. Within that increase 1,083 were among the 06-03 grades. NCO strength raised steadily from 118,511 on 30 Dec 70 to 125,166 on 31 Dec 71. During the year 4,107 officers (06-03) and 46,640 NCOs were promoted. Promotions in excess of those authorized by the promotion board (859 officers and 16,172 NCOs) were battlefield promotions.⁸³

(C) The RVNAF fulfilled the 1971 regular officer and NCO promotion goals and middle management assets had increased. However, sheer numbers and accelerated promotions alone did not necessarily insure that the most effective leader was selected or that the overall leadership was upgraded.⁸⁴

(C) Grade shortfall in the maneuver battalions. Despite significant emphasis on officer fill and promotions, commanders of maneuver battalions remained generally below the authorized field grades. On 31 Dec 70, 37 percent (49) of the battalions were commanded by captains. On 18 Jan 71, at the request of the Ministry of National Defense, JGS promoted to the next higher grade the battalion and company commanders who were permanent captains or lieutenants and also those second lieutenants and aspirants who were in command of combat platoons.⁸⁵

Promotions to:

Major	91
Captain	273
1st LT	145
2d LT	48
Total	557

(S) Although 91 captains had been promoted to field rank, increased combat responsibility and resultant casualties took their toll, and by 31 May 71, 46 of the 133 infantry maneuver battalions (35 percent) were still commanded by captains, 80 of the 133 battalion commanders had been in command 1 year or less and 52 of those, less than 6 months.

(S) To compound the situation, MACV's ability to accurately monitor RVNAF leadership at the battalion and lower levels diminished as the US advisory effort was reduced in conjunction with the withdrawal of American forces. The activation of the 3d Inf Div in October 1971 increased the number of units to be assessed by US advisors and created additional units for which seasoned RVN commanders were in demand. To maintain optimum assessment capability with dwindling assets, the monitor category was changed from "infantry maneuver battalions" to "infantry division battalions" during the last quarter CY71. Thus, the number of units to be evaluated was set at 136 and assessment efforts focused on those elements which were strictly combat mission oriented. By 30 Nov 71, grade and experience imbalances still prevailed in the division infantry battalions; 50 captains were in battalion command positions and 72 of the 136 battalion commanders had been in command 1 year or less.⁸⁶

(S) In general, RVNAF leadership assets increased at a satisfactory rate quantitatively and qualitatively during 1971. The policies for the removal of ineffectives and rapid promotion of proven leaders were sound and offered the best solutions for future improvement in RVNAF leadership and middle management resources.⁸⁷

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
Desertion

(S) Desertion, the largest single manpower loss to RVNAF, continued to be a matter of concern during CY71. JGS desertion control programs were considered sound, however some factors affecting desertions were beyond the capability of JGS to resolve. While the JGS continuously emphasized the need to enforce the provisions of Decree Law 15/66 (prescribing punishment for deserters) as a desertion control measure, the GVN gave no indication of concern and the courts continued to show clemency to deserters. Probably the most important single factor in the desertion problem was the lack of motivation of Vietnamese men to serve and perform well in combat units. To resolve this situation a strong GVN position had to be developed which did not condone draft evasion, harboring of deserters, and nonenforcement of desertion laws. The progress made toward this goal is treated elsewhere in this chapter.

(C) No major decline in the high number of desertions occurred during the year, although a slight downward trend was evident in the third and fourth quarters. Gross desertions during 1971 were 168,997 for an average monthly desertion rate of 13.4 per thousand. This represented an increase of 18,528 deserters over CY70 when 150,469 deserted for an average monthly gross rate of 12.3 per thousand.

RVNAF GROSS DESERTION RATE

1971



Source: Measurement of Progress Report, Dec 70,
MACJ14 Selected RVNAF Personnel Data

Figure VRI-6

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MONTHLY ARVN GROSS DESERTION RATE PER 1,000 ASSIGNED (1970-1971)




Figure VIII-7

Source: MAC J14 Monthly Reports, Subj: Selected

RVNAF Personnel Data, Mar 71-Mar 72

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(C) Total deserters returned to duty during CY71 (28,720) resulted in an average net desertion rate (net loss) of 11.1 per thousand. In 1970, 23,716 deserters returned giving an average net rate of 10.3 per thousand. It is significant that the CY71 increase was very slight despite the shift of major combat responsibilities to RVNAF during this 2-year period.⁸⁸ RVNAF gross desertion rates are shown in Figure VIII-6.

(C) The Army desertion rate during CY71 was consistently higher than CY70 and crested at 23 per 1,000 men in March 1971 during LAMSON 719. ARVN monthly desertion rates are reflected in Figure VIII-7.

(C) The desertion rate in the Vietnamese Marine Corps jumped from 29.6 per 1,000 men in January 1971 to 59.7 at the end of June, even though the actual number of deserters was the lowest among the ground combat units. The rate remained high through the end of October and dropped significantly to 43.0 per 1,000 men at the end of December:

VNMC GROSS DESERTION RATE: CY71
(per 1,000 men)

Jan	29.6	Apr	31.7	Jul	53.9	Oct	58.6
Feb	29.6	May	47.3	Aug	55.3	Nov	45.7
Mar	30.1	Jun	59.7	Sep	53.6	Dec	43.0

(C) The Air Force and Navy experienced very little desertion turbulence during the year. The average monthly gross desertion rates were respectively 3.6 and 3.9 per 1,000 men.⁸⁹

Desertion Reduction Measures

(C) During 1971 MACV and JGS studied measures to reduce high RVNAF desertion rates and focused attention on areas which were controlled at the GVN level -- pay and allowances, terms of service, and dividing service between regular and reserve (territorial) components.

(U) Pay and allowances. The low base pay and allowances set for RVNAF had a direct influence on desertion and morale. The base pay for single personnel was well below the average standard-of-living pay scale in Vietnam and in August 1971, single members were accounting for 65 percent of the total desertions in combat units. The GVN had taken action early in the year to provide incentive pay for combat personnel. On 9 Feb 71 the Prime Minister prescribed a temporary special allowance of 100 piasters per day (37¢) for military personnel and Ministry of Defense (MOND) civilians who were participating in operations and support missions outside of the RVN. On 8 Mar 71, the GVN increased the high cost of living allowance for Regular and Regional Forces, giving an additional 100 piasters per month for the service member, his legal wife, and each of his supported children. The base pay for PF members was increased by 100 piasters per month and the high cost of living allowance for his legal wife and each of his supported children was increased by a similar amount.⁹⁰

(C) Recognizing that a substantial pay increase was needed for the armed forces and government employees, MACV in coordination with the US Embassy and USAID conducted a study of the RVNAF pay scales during August 1971. Addressing the grave problem of procurement and retention within the infantry combat battalions, MACV recommended across-the-board percentage increases (28 percent) in base pay, incentive pay for ARVN combat units (4,500 piasters) and Regional Force mobile battalions (2,000 piasters), and an increase in death gratuity payments.⁹¹ COMUSMACV submitted the pay proposal to the Minister of National Defense on 7 Sep 71.⁹²

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(U) On 15 Nov 71 the GVN issued Ministerial Decrees #149 and #1119 which increased the cost of living allowance for all service members and civil servants by 1,200 piasters (\$2.80) per man per month and authorized incentive pay as proposed by MACV.

(C) Subsequently the Chief, JGS on three separate occasions between 19 November and 6 December sought COMUSMACV's assistance to obtain the 4,500 piaster (\$11.00) incentive pay for other "crack troops" who were excluded from the framework of the new pay measure. In response, General Abrams counselled that "in determining the best application of the military pay raise, primary consideration was given those units (combat infantry battalions) experiencing grave procurement and retention problems" and that "any deviation to the current list (of authorized units) would be in contradiction of the stated purpose of the allowance and invite requests for exceptions from other services and arms."⁹³

(C) On 15 Dec 71, Ministerial Decree #1215 extended the incentive pay, without COMUSMACV's sanction, to reconnaissance companies, shock companies, and scout companies subordinate to the 81st Ranger Airborne Group, and to certain personnel assigned to the Technical Directorate.⁹⁴

(U) Terms of service. General Mobilization Order #3 of 1968 suspended terms of service for RVNAF. On 5 May 71 the GVN Lower House passed an amendment to the mobilization order which provided for discharge of all RVNAF reserve personnel who had over 8 years of service. The Upper House amended the proposal to 10 years and included a provision for release of all servicemen 39 years of age or older. On 1 Oct 71 the bill was again in the Lower House for review. On 23 December the proposal was with the Defense Committee of the Lower House and the prognosis for its passage or final provisions was unknown.

(U) MACV and JGS anticipated that approximately 70 percent of the NCOs and EM, and a somewhat smaller number of officers, would apply for discharge. The following depicts the number of personnel, based on end CY70 data, who would be eligible for release under various term-of-service criteria:

<u>RVNAF*</u> <u>Reserve Personnel</u>	<u>Over 8 Years</u> <u>Service</u>	<u>Over 10 Years</u> <u>Service</u>	<u>Over 12 Years</u> <u>Service</u>
Officers	6,601	3,344	2,531
NCOs	6,183	3,616	2,575
EM	3,783	3,210	1,899
Total	18,567	10,170	7,005

* Popular Forces excluded

(S) Divided service. The JGS plan for future reserve forces was submitted to the Ministry of Defense on 31 Oct 70. The plan provided for establishment of an Active and Territorial Reserve. The Active Reserve would consist of units to be identified as "production troops," would be engaged in national development, and would consist of those who had completed their regular military obligation. The Territorial Reserve would consist of squads and platoons in hamlets or villages, with battalions or regiments organized in the geographical sectors. The plan obligated the draftee for 12 years, thus removing the "in for duration" syndrome which existed in the RVNAF. Under this proposal the first 4 years would be served in ARVN, the second in the Regional Forces, and the last 4 years with the Popular Forces. (Traditionally, the VNAF, VNN, and VNMC remained volunteer services.)

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(S) The GVN considered the concept but at the end of CY71 no decision had been made. The consensus among the JGS was that execution would be dependent upon cessation or significant decrease of hostilities and be in conjunction with a phased reduction in the size of RVNAF. ⁹⁵

SUMMARY

(S) Steady progress was realized throughout 1971 toward the attainment of the authorized force structure. Target dates for activation of new units were met or excelled throughout the year. The major changes included the addition of one ARVN division, the turnover of six major ships to the VNN (two DERs and four WHECs), and the addition of four squadrons to the VNAF. The expansion of RVNAF was virtually completed, and MR 1 was reinforced to compensate for the reduction of US forces and counter future enemy attacks. The GVN and JGS took significant steps to increase manning levels, improve distribution of available experienced manpower, and improve personnel management policies, practices and incentives. The progress made was indicative of the will and resolve of the Vietnamese people and the strict, yet patient guidance and counselling of MACV. ⁹⁶

RVNAF TRAINING

MACV Training Assistance

(C) The 1971 Combined Campaign Plan published jointly by MACV and JGS in October 1971 set the pace for dynamic changes and improvements in the RVNAF training capability. Emphasis during previous years had been placed on rapidly expanding the RVNAF to meet established force goals. In CY71 with numerical goals nearly reached, the emphasis changed to increasing the quality of training and to guiding the RVNAF toward training self-sufficiency.

(U) COMUSMACV continued to provide detailed advice and assistance to the JGS Central Training Command (CTC). Significant improvements and refinements were made in management techniques, leadership and combat training, and training facilities.

(U) Middle management training. To develop and train RVNAF middle management assets, MACV tasked the OSD/Advance Research Projects Agency (ARPA) to develop a specialized training program for key management personnel in communications and selected support areas. On 15 Dec 70, a 1-year contract was awarded to Booz-Allen Applied Research, Inc., to implement the ARPA program and develop the Middle Management Training (MMT) Program for selected officer groups in RVNAF. Advanced courses were to be developed as follow-on training to the existing RVNAF basic management training course [Program Review and Analysis Improvement System Evaluation (PRAISE)], taught at the RVNAF Logistics Management School. The program was to be documented to serve as a prototype for future training programs in Vietnam or other areas with similar culture, and from the outset plans had been made to turn over to the RVNAF as part of Vietnamization. ⁹⁷


(U) The specific technical fields selected for the pilot program were supply and maintenance, transportation, and communications-electronics. ⁹⁸ On 4 Mar 71 Booz-Allen briefed MACV and MG Phan Trong Chinh (Chief, Central Training Command) on the scope, general content, and schedule of the program. The advanced courses were to be for 7 weeks, presented in three cycles, two in English and the third in Vietnamese. General Chinh approved the plan and the first course, in communications, began on 21 Jun 71.

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(U) The first supply/management course given at the RVNAF Logistics Management School and the first transportation course at the RVNAF Transportation School began on 5 July, each with 20 students. The first communications-electronics MMT class graduated 9 Aug 71. The supply maintenance and logistics MMT classes were completed 21 Aug 71. The remaining two classes for each course were completed on 11 Dec 71, after which the program became a Vietnamese responsibility.

(U) Training Objective and Management System. A new training Objective and Management System (TOMMS) was implemented late in 1970 as a tool through which US advisors could evaluate the status and progress of the RVNAF training system. The first measurement of ARVN/RP/PF training programs by TOMMS occurred in Jan 71. An evaluation of the results indicated that refinement of TOMMS was necessary to more accurately portray both training progress and status of the CTC training base. A revision was made in March which amended grading objectives and modified scoring of several objective areas. By August it was determined that TOMMS duplicated data being received from other sources and was not effective as a management tool; it was therefore cancelled on 22 Sep 71.⁹⁹

(U) Training management. In June 1971, MACV began a series of briefings designed to acquaint the faculties of the RVNAF training centers and service schools with a proposed Training Management System (TMS). The key element in the proposal was a systematic approach to curriculum development called Instructional System Development (ISD). ISD was in essence an eight-step model in the development of a course of instruction.

(U) The CTC was responsive to the proposal and on 27 July MACV presented a new 2-week Curriculum Development and Management Course to selected members of the CTC staff. Subsequently, MACV prepared 21 related draft directives and manuals for CTC; these training materials were essential for the proper implementation of TMS and ISD within RVNAF. The first of eight CY71 classes started in August, teaching staff officers and training managers of the service schools and training centers the fundamentals of ISD techniques.

(U) By 13 Jan 72 eight classes had been completed and 102 Vietnamese officers had graduated from the courses. CTC was writing a workable Vietnamese version of ISD and also supervising, in coordination with US advisors, the system engineering of a pilot program at the RVNAF Ordnance School. Approximately 70 percent of the directives and manuals had been translated and 15 percent of the pilot program had been completed by 31 Dec 71. The goals for the immediate future were to complete the instructor training so that CTC officers could take over the presentation of the Curriculum Development and Management Course and conduct the first ISD course entirely in Vietnamese.

(C) Facility consolidation and upgrade. A consolidation of the training centers began in 1970 as a measure to increase training center capacity at the lowest possible cost. MACV was vitally concerned with the facilities upgrade and water system improvement programs connected with this consolidation, and also those improvements planned for service schools. The 1970-71 Military Assistance Service Fund/Military Construction (MASF/MILCON) Program apportioned \$28 million for these projects.

(C) There were 22 national, RF, PF, and Ranger training centers (TC) which were to be improved, modernized, and consolidated into 10 selected centers by the end of CY72. The consolidation plan proceeded on schedule and five PF training centers were closed by the end of the first quarter, CY71.

(C) During the second quarter of CY71 the completion date was accelerated from end-CY72 to end-CY71 due to increased Khmer training requirements, an accelerated construction program, and the additional training commitments generated by the 357 new PF platoons which had been


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RVNAF TRAINING CENTERS

(as of 31 DEC 71)



SOURCE: MACT MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARIES

FIGURE VII-8

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formed in MR 4. At the end of December the consolidation program was 92 percent complete. Three Popular Forces Training Centers remained active beyond their scheduled training termination date: Ninh Thuan in MR 2, and Vinh Long and Dinh Tuong in MR 4. These centers were rescheduled to end all training within the first 2 weeks of January 1972, and the entire program was targeted for completion on 31 Jan 72. Upon completion, 12 substandard training centers would have been consolidated at 10 residual, greatly improved training sites with a concurrent increase in total training capacity from 58,400 to 65,300. Active training sites as of 31 Dec 71 are shown on Figure VIII-8.

(C) The facilities upgrade program for the centers was designed to complement the consolidation program. Minimum additional facilities were to be constructed to accommodate increased training loads, existing facilities were to be rehabilitated, and 12 potable water supply and distribution systems were to be installed. By the end of December the training center upgrade program was also 92 percent complete with total completion expected by the end of the third quarter, FY72. 100

(U) The MASF military construction projects for the service schools totalled \$9,319,000. The facility upgrade projects (\$7,845,000) consisted of rehabilitation and new construction of barracks, classrooms, mess halls, kitchens, latrines, ranges, and other buildings. Water upgrade projects (\$1,474,000) included drilling additional wells, laying water distribution lines, building water storage areas, and providing necessary water pumps. By 31 Mar 71, all facility and water upgrade projects were underway.

(U) During March the MACV MASF Military Construction Review Board approved a project for construction of an RVNAF Infantry School at Bearcat Camp, MR 3, at a projected cost of \$7 million. Because of funding constraints and higher priority projects, this decision forced cancellation of a previous plan to form a Combined Arms School at Bearcat and construct both a new armor school and an infantry school.

(U) By August, eight of the 22 facilities upgrade projects were completed as were 15 of the 18 water projects; the design work on the Bearcat Infantry School had been completed, contract negotiations were in progress, and the notice to proceed was received in November 1971. 101 When 1971 ended the \$28 million construction program for 27 installations was 96 percent complete in dollar value; 22 of the 27 projects were finished and the remaining five were programmed for completion by spring 1972. 102

Free World Forces Assistance to RVNAF Training

(C) Australia and New Zealand training efforts were devoted primarily to the training of RF and PF leaders in leadership and counterinsurgency skills.

(C) Australian night operations assistance teams. The Australian program to train RF and PF leaders in night operations techniques began in December 1970 at the Pleiku Training Center, MR 2. On 11 Feb 71 the fourth 2-week course was completed. The course was lengthened to 3 weeks on 22 February and training for RF instructors was added to the curriculum. The RF instructors were to return to their local sectors after graduation and establish Vietnamese Night Operations Assistance Teams (NOAT) to train local RF/PF leaders. Also on 22 February NOAT 2-week program were initiated in MR 4 at the Bac Lieu PFTC and at Dong Tam, MR 1.

(C) The MR 2 course moved on 12 July from Pleiku to Phu Cat. By the end of November, 1,236 students had received training in night operations, and the instruction at Bac Lieu and Dong Tam had been transferred to the Vietnamese with NOAT acting as advisors. By 14 December all three training sites were manned by NOAT-trained ARVN instructors, and the NOATs

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were withdrawn by the Australian Government. During their year's service the NOATs trained 1,296 RF/PF leaders. On 31 Dec 71, two Free World Forces Assistance programs were still in effect: the Australian Jungle Warfare Training Center (JWTC) and the New Zealand Counterinsurgency Course.

(C) Australian JWTC. In June 1970 the Chief of Staff, Australian Forces, Vietnam (AFV) received approval to provide advisors for Jungle Warfare Training Center to be established at Nui Dat, Phuoc Tuy Province, MR 3. The first course began on 30 Nov 70 as a cadre training course for the Vietnamese. On 8 Feb 71 the first 6-week student course began for 40 RF leaders; 772 RF officers were trained at JWTC during CY71. On 6 Oct 71 the JWTC was moved to the Van Kiep National Training Center.

(C) New Zealand Leadership Course in Counterinsurgency. In February 1971 a group of New Zealand instructors arrived in RVN to develop a program of instruction for a 5-week RF/PF Leadership Course which the New Zealanders were to conduct at the Chi Lang Training Center, MR 4. The primary New Zealand instructor group arrived on 19 March to conduct eight annual courses, each consisting of 150 students. The first class began in May 1971, and 438 RF leaders graduated from the course during CY71. On 31 December, eight courses of 150 students each were programmed for CY72.¹⁰³

RVNAF Training Self-Sufficiency

(U) The RVNAF, after 2 years of dealing with an almost explosive expansion of its forces, was able to pause in 1971 and introduce sound fundamental management practices in the training field. The CTC under the dynamic leadership of MG Phan Trang Chinh made many significant and innovative improvements in training management, supervision, and curriculum.

(U) Central Training Command: Master Training Directive. Many fragmented and inconsistent training directives existed within CTC, and the lack of a single master directive precluded uniform doctrinal guidance or standardization of CTC policies. Recognizing the need to correct this problem, a combined MACV/CTC working group was established to develop a comprehensive training directive. The first draft was completed in December 1970 and staffed with 10 selected training centers and service schools during February 1971. The directive, the first of its kind to be issued by CTC, was published and distributed in April. The Master Training Directive consolidated all significant policy, guidance, and instructions pertinent to the training of RVNAF forces into one meaningful document.¹⁰⁴

(U) RVNAF 5-year Training Plan. In September 1970 MACV published a comprehensive long-range training plan, TP 1-70, to support force structure changes brought about by CRIMP. As a result, JGS/CTC published the first RVNAF long-range training directive on 30 Jul 71, marking a milestone achievement in CTC training management.¹⁰⁵

(C) Combined Arms Doctrine. In June, as MACV was developing the training annex to the 1972 Combined Campaign Plan, AB 147, a problem arose regarding the RVNAF capability to employ air support and effectively direct air-ground operations. Based on lessons learned during mid-high intensity operations in Laos and Cambodia it was evident that the RVNAF staffs all levels above battalion needed strengthening in the functional areas of planning and coordinating fire support, air mobile operations, and logistical support. To ensure that this was given proper command emphasis, COMUSMACV in August 1971 admonished his US advisors to urge counterparts to conduct command post exercises and war games, to include exercises in multi-regiment operations at corps level and multibattalion operations at regiment level.¹⁰⁶ Concurrently COMUSMACV recommended that the Chief, JGS direct RVN corps/military region commanders to place command and staff emphasis on measures to strengthen battlefield reporting procedures.¹⁰⁷

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(U) In late August, a joint combined committee was approved by the Chief of Staff, JGS and formed under the supervision of the Chief, CTC to develop a combined arms doctrine suitable for the Vietnam environment. Also in August, the RVNAF Armor School conducted 8 hours of combined arms training for four airborne battalions, marking the start of a program for all service schools which would increase the effectiveness of combined arms operations.

(S) Throughout September the joint combined committee was dedicated to the development of a Combined Arms Doctrinal Manual, the first effort by the Vietnamese to produce a formal doctrine. The proposed draft, suitable for RVNAF application on the battlefield and for use as a training guide, was reviewed by Chief, CTC and approved by Chief, JGS in November. In advance of document publication, COMUSMACV advised field elements that the doctrine was forthcoming and that "... proper meshing of air, artillery, naval gunfire, infantry, and armor in accordance with the new doctrine will do much to enhance RVNAF supremacy over the NVA/VC. Advisors and commanders of each US service were expected to give dynamic support to the early introduction of this new mode of tactics on the Southeast Asia battlefield." ¹⁰⁸

(U) On 22 Dec 71, 500 copies of the combined arms handbook were distributed and the remaining 4,500 copies were to be delivered by mid-January 1972. This new doctrine and the supporting instructional program were milestones in RVNAF progress and effectiveness. ¹⁰⁹ The first application of the new tactical approach took place with the RVNAF Airborne Division in mid-December during its push through Krok-Dumbee to the Chup rubber plantation. The results were favorable and the RVN division and corps commanders indicated firm acceptance of the new doctrine. ¹¹⁰

(U) With these and other related training directives and schedules CTC developed the plans and programs designed to provide increasing modernization of the training base, greater self-sufficiency, and the basis for expansion to support changes in the force structure. In December 1971 the requirement for MACV to maintain TP 1-70 or to promulgate a succeeding plan no longer existed. MACV Training Plan 1-70 was eliminated on 7 Jan 72. ¹¹¹

(U) Combat specialty skills. During 1971 the RVNAF increased the use of in-place training to upgrade combat skills; 48,000 trainees received on-the-job (OJT) instruction in new combat skills during the year. When OJT was not practical, nor formal schooling feasible, ARVN Mobile Training Teams (MTT) took the school to the trainee.

(U) RF companies and RF platoons were required to undergo refresher training every 3 years. By 31 Dec 70, 790 RF companies and 2,250 PF platoons had not received the required training. Recognizing this problem, and in an effort to supplement the existing refresher program, CTC directed the formation of 32 Mobile Training Teams for CY71 which would conduct in-place training for 121 RF companies and 1,254 RF platoons. Each team consisted of 15 men and was capable of training two RF companies or eight PF platoons simultaneously. Refresher training by MTTs began on 8 Feb 71. On 31 Dec 71, 172 RF companies, 895 PF platoons, and 18 ranger border battalions had been trained by the MTTs. The shortfall in PF training was due partially to priority training given to the 553 new platoons, which were activated in 1971 as part of the increase in the FY72 force structure. ¹¹²

(U) Several new combat specialty programs were introduced in 1971 to emphasize small unit operations and discourage reliance on US support:

- An improved basic rifle marksmanship program was instituted by CTC on 15 Feb 71.
- A sniper program began on 5 Feb 71 for Ranger border battalions.
- A 72-hour live-fire field training exercise was introduced during the first quarter, CY-71 for company and platoon size units engaged in refresher training.

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-- Artillery fire control practice utilizing operational artillery firing units as instructor units commenced on 15 Mar 71.

(U) Basic technical training. The RVNAF training network made significant progress in 1971 in developing technical skills essential to nation building. The key to technical skill was English language proficiency. In the RVNAF English Language School, the 1971 thrust was toward having the courses taught by Vietnamese instructors. In January 1970 the school staff had consisted of 649 US language instructors. By January 1971 the US instructional staff had been reduced to 500; 1 year later only 229 US instructors remained. At that rate of progress this instruction would be totally Vietnamese-sustained by July 1973, at which time only one US training manager will be required.

(U) The RVNAF Transportation School trained more than 6,000 drivers in 1971 for the rapidly expanding RVNAF transportation system. This training was supplemented at the O. dnanee School with 28 transportation-related courses which directly applied to the civilian market as well as military efficiency. The Advance Automotive Maintenance and Heavy Engine Repair Course alone graduated over 2,500 in 1971.

(U) Advanced technical training. Progress in 1971 was also promising in the development of the technically sophisticated and applied production skills. The first class in advanced engineering (28 students) began at the Military Technical Engineering School, Saigon, on 7 Aug 71. This school had a staff of contract university professors, and would produce many times more graduate engineers than all of the civilian universities in Vietnam. The engineering course included such vital skills as advance construction, public works, and road and bridge construction.

(U) The RVNAF opened a bridge design school on 6 Sep 71 which would produce trained construction experts, thus increasing the number of completed bridges throughout the country. Each class had a maximum capacity of 14 students, who were required to design and supervise the actual construction of a bridge as part of the curriculum. Two classes would graduate in CY-72.

(U) The RVNAF capability to operate sophisticated equipment was exemplified by their progress in the Integrated Communications System (ICS). ICS required trained personnel in the fields of microwave, tropo-scatter radio, fixed plant carriers, and the countrywide dial telephone system. Training in support of this system was conducted in the RVN and the United States. In Vietnam, US civilian contract instructors taught basic, intermediate, and advance electronics to operators of the system. In the United States, RVNAF students received special training as fixed station technical controllers, dial central office repairmen, and communications traffic managers.

(U) On 3 Feb 71 the first class of 11 microwave repairmen graduated from the ICS training facility located at the RVNAF Signal School in Vung Tau. Between February and December additional communications instruction was progressively transferred to the RVNAF Signal School from the US Crypto-Log Support Center, Saigon, the RVNAF 60th Sig Dep, Saigon, and the US 1st Sig Bde, Long Binh.

(U) The first class of the Dial Control Repair Course graduated at Vung Tau on 16 March. On 25 August the first group of 3d echelon crypto repairmen completed training and in September the 4th echelon Radar and Switchboard Repair Courses were transferred to Vung Tau. By December the 4th and 5th echelon Teletypewriter Repair Course and the 4th echelon Signal Repair courses were also being conducted at the RVNAF Signal School. The majority of courses were still being conducted by US civilians at the end of December, but the target date for RVNAF to assume the ICS mission was 1 Nov 72. 113

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(U) Pilot training program. English language training of VNAF helicopter pilots was completed on schedule with the last group of 1971 leaving for the US in April 1971. US helicopter pilot training was scheduled for completion in July 1972. At that time a total of 1,642 helicopter pilots would have been trained in flight procedures, including 341 who would have received instrument qualification training.

(U) The total VNAF off-shore pilot training requirement, including helicopter, fixed wing, and high performance aircraft, was 3,334. During 1971, 1,007 students departed for off-shore training as opposed to the programmed 1,021. On 31 Dec 71 the forecast had all English speaking pilot students departing for CONUS by 30 May 72, some for 18 months training. Completion date for the major portion of the off-shore program was scheduled for September 1973, at which time 34 F5 pilots would remain to be trained. The anticipated completion period for these pilots was CY74. ¹¹⁴

(U) Air ground operations training. In June 1971, MACV at the request of JGS commenced plans to provide Air Ground Operations training for senior ARVN officers (LTC/COL). On 8 Aug 71 the first student entered the Special Operations Course, at the Air Ground Operations School, Eglin AFB, Florida. ¹¹⁵

Formal Leadership Development

(U) To support the increased emphasis on RVNAF leadership, priority attention was given in this area at all levels of the training complex.

(U) Combat experienced instructors. On 23 Apr 71 the JGS conducted an appraisal of instructor positions to determine which required combat experienced personnel and directed certain reallocations. The number of positions was reduced from 1,685 to 710 and the criteria for the replacement of long tenure officers in key training center and service school positions were strengthened and enforced. As a result, 138 combat experienced instructors were added during the year in those areas dealing with command, operations, tactics, and weapons. Recognizing that combat experience alone did not guarantee a good instructor, CTC introduced a 6-week method of instruction (MOI) course in June at Quang Trung Training Center. In addition, a 1-week MOI refresher course was established at the remaining training centers and in 13 of the 23 service schools. The appointment of combat experienced senior commanders to the key RVNAF training installations added strength and validity to the training program. ¹¹⁶

(U) Advanced officer courses. The Infantry Officer Advanced Course was transferred to the Infantry School at Thu Duc during the first quarter of CY71 thus relieving the Command and General Staff College (C&GSC) of the responsibility of conducting intermediate courses of instruction. In August the Advanced Armor and Artillery Courses began, and by 31 December, advanced courses were underway for the first time at all Combat Arms schools and at the Engineer, MP, Transportation, and Finance schools. This intermediate training for RVNAF captains and majors consisted of 16 weeks of classroom and field training in subjects and techniques pertinent to the respective professional areas. Additional advanced courses were planned for the Quartermaster, Medical, AG, and Signal schools in 1972.

(U) Academic accreditation. The Vietnamese National Military Academy was the source for a well-educated, regular officer corps, but unfortunately was not an accredited degree-granting institution. The Academy received extensive top level support during 1971, and legislative approval was sought for VNMA graduates to be awarded an accredited academic degree. A modern library and heavy engineering laboratory were completed during the first half of CY71 to help provide the required study environment and round out the academic curriculum. At the end of December, it appeared possible that the 1972 VNMA graduates would receive accredited degrees.

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(U) Officer candidate training. The RVNAF Officer Candidate Training at the Infantry School in Thu Duc was the principal source of junior officers. Quality screening procedures were instituted for the first time in the third quarter, CY71. Under the new concept, all RVNAF recruits with a Baccalaureate I degree or a 10th grade level of academic completion received basic and advanced combat training at the Infantry School instead of the Quang Trung National Training Center. The following shows comparative US and Vietnamese academic levels:

<u>Vietnamese</u>		<u>United States</u>
	<u>Elementary</u>	
Kindergarten		Kindergarten
5th Grade		1st Grade
4th Grade		2d Grade
3d Grade		3d Grade
2d Grade		4th Grade
1st Grade		5th Grade
		6th Grade
	<u>Junior High School</u>	
7th Grade		7th Grade
6th Grade		8th Grade
5th Grade		9th Grade
4th Grade		
	<u>High School</u>	
3d Grade		10th Grade
2d Grade (tested for Bach I)		11th Grade
1st Grade (Bach II)		12th Grade
University		University

(U) During the initial training weeks, the poorly motivated of these selective trainees and those of little demonstrated potential were screened out and reassigned to other training areas or units, thereby introducing the first element of selectivity. Those ultimately selected to attend the 22-week OCS program at the Infantry School were subject to continual evaluation by a leadership review panel throughout the period of training. Poor leadership performance resulted in dismissal and reassignment to other units. The new system eliminated many weak performers and the candidates who were ultimately commissioned were considered to be reasonably capable and well motivated. 117

(U) Motivational training. The Chief, CTC established a Morale and Motivation Board on 1 Aug 71, with representation from CTC, the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD), and MACV to review and improve motivational training methods and design other training methods to improve the RVNAF soldiers' "will to fight." The Morale and Motivation Board met at regular intervals and developed specific tasks which were approved by the Chief, CTC. A seminar system was developed for training center and school use to improve soldier participation and create an atmosphere conducive to improved indoctrination. The first seminar was held on 16 Oct 71 at the JCS compound.

(U) A 2-week POLWAR officers course was established by the RVNAF POLWAR Training Center to train officers to perform as POLWAR officers in the student cadre brigades at RVNAF training centers. Ninety officers entered the first course on 10 Dec 71 at Thu Duc.

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(U) Five motivational training handbooks were developed and produced during December, entitled Company Command and Leadership Development, Company Political Indoctrination, Troop Motivation, Questions Classification, and Troop Benefits and Answers. On 17 December, 20,000 copies of each handbook were distributed, to include copies to each RVNAF unit down to the company level.

(U) On 31 Dec 71, other POLWAR training programs were still in progress. The significant ones were:

- A "pilot program" was virtually completed to test a new technique of using POLWAR cadre down to company level in the student cadre brigade. Previously the training was conducted by a small POLWAR section in the training branches of the training centers. Under the new plan the POLWAR cadre in the student brigade would provide motivational training in the barracks, on road marches, in the field, and at other periods of informal instruction. The pilot program was scheduled to start at the Van Kiep NTC in January 1972.
- A motivational film was in the offing, with a "before and after" theme, depicting the progress of RVN and RVNAF. The scheduled completion date for the film was 15 Jul 72. ¹¹⁸

Khmer Armed Forces Trained by RVNAF

(U) In May 1970 Vietnamese and US units began training the armed forces of the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR). The RVNAF contribution to the Khmer FY70-71 training program totaled over 25,000 trainees. At the end of FY72 RVNAF was to have trained in excess of 41,000 members of the Forces Armees Nationales Khmers (FANK), ranging from battalion and brigade commanders to recruits and patrol boat crewmen. This support to the Khmer Republic was but one more indication of greater RVNAF strength, capability, and self-sufficiency.

(U) Company training. The major RVNAF effort was concentrated on training the Khmer troops in all positions from company commander to rifleman. Through a phased series of interrelated courses, company commanders, platoon leaders, squad leaders, and recruits were trained at the Lam Son National Training Center, MR 2. At the end of individual periods of training the various elements were molded into separate companies and given 3 weeks of intensive basic unit training (BUT). The trained companies then returned to Cambodia to form new battalions, fill understrength battalions, and man outposts along the Mekong River.

(C) The first 20-company increment started basic unit training at Lam Son NTC on 15 Feb 71; on 6 Mar 71, 39 company commanders, 300 platoon leaders, 353 NCO squad leaders, and 1,977 EM recruits graduated. The final contingent of the FY71 program completed training in August.

(C) The FY72 company training program began when 496 platoon and squad leaders entered training in August. The first increment of 45 company commanders arrived at Lam Son NTC on 6 September and 1,509 recruits arrived on 5 Oct 71. Sixteen companies completed basic unit training in November. By February 1972, 32 of the 80 companies to be trained in FY72 had finished. The RVNAF had trained a total of 205 Khmer companies since the program began.

(C) Logistics and maintenance training. To help restore the Khmer logistics and maintenance base, the RVNAF trained specialists in quartermaster, signal, medical, transportation, and ordnance. On 23 Jan 71, a 10-man Khmer driver cadre completed training at the RVNAF Transportation School as did 20 second echelon wheeled vehicle mechanics on 18 Feb 71.

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(C) In February 1971 planning began to formulate the program through which 607 FANK logistics specialists would be trained in RVNAF service schools beginning in the second quarter, CY71. During March the number was refined to 587 and training began in April for 302 Khmer trainees. On 20 November the FY71 Logistics Specialist Program ended when 25 artillery repairmen completed training at the RVNAF Ordnance School. The RVNAF had trained in excess of 500 Khmer students during CY71 and were programmed to teach 1,111 during FY72.

(C) Small unit leaders. Another important aspect of the Khmer training program was the small unit leader (SUL) course conducted by RVNAF. The first SUL course began in June at Lam Son for 500 of the 3,000 students programmed for this instruction. By February 1972, 800 Khmer platoon and squad leaders had completed basic leadership training under this program. ¹¹⁹

(C) Training center cadre. During the first quarter of CY71, when the Khmer Government expressed a desire to establish its own in-country training capability, it obtained RVNAF support to train 205 training center cadre. The first 10-week course began at Lam Son in April 1971 and ended in June. An additional 400 students were programmed for FY72; by the end of February 1972, 194 had been trained. ¹²⁰

(C) Training FANK brigade and battalion commanders. In July 1971, 53 FANK field grade officers began a special course at the ARVN Infantry School in Thu Duc. The 7-week course was specifically tailored to provide officers with the minimum essential training to prepare them to serve as brigade and battalion commanders or staff officers. Emphasis was placed on staff procedures and combined arms operations. The course was taught to three contingents in 1971; the first contingent (53 officers) graduated on 14 August, the second (38 officers) completed on 8 October, and the third (46 officers) finished on 5 December. The third group was taught by 11 members of the first class who would subsequently become the training cadre for a similar program to be taught in the Khmer Republic. There were no further contingents scheduled for training in RVN. ¹²¹

(C) Khmer Navy training. The VNN 211th Amphibious Task Force trained Khmer crews for river patrol boats, mine sweepers, command and control boats, and monitor craft. During FY70-71, 184 men were trained for 29 Khmer river patrol and assault support boats. The last CY71 crew of 72 men completed training in December. During FY72 the VNN was programmed to train in excess of 300 crewmen who would subsequently man 56 Khmer craft. ¹²²

(U) In addition to these major undertakings, the RVNAF graduated one Khmer Armored Cavalry Troop in March 1971, the 7th Pioneer Engineer Battalion on 30 Oct 71, and also trained 16 Khmers in English (7) and Vietnamese (9) languages throughout the year. ¹²³

Summary

(U) The RVNAF self-sufficiency effort reached a promising achievement plateau during 1971 with principal progress being made toward achieving training self-sufficiency. MACV was satisfied that the effort was going well and that even greater progress would be made in 1972. ¹²⁴

RVNAF LOGISTIC IMPROVEMENT

(U) 1971 was the year of logistics; the year in which every effort was made to fully equip RVNAF, upgrade the support capability of all services, and provide them with the facilities required for military self-sufficiency.

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Equipment Delivery and Turnover

(S) Providing and delivering mission essential equipment was a continuing effort in enhancing the effectiveness of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. In August 1971 a decision was made to expedite the delivery of all FY72 and prior year equipment which was due RVNAF. To accomplish this, MACV developed plans and programs which would: (1) accelerate the delivery of new equipment arriving in-country by using any and all transportation resources, (2) speed up in-country transfers, (3) expedite transferral and turnover of long haul communications system, and (4) build up 1-year requisition objective stocks plus 3-year permissive overstockage of secondary items that were excess to USARV. Project 981/982 identifies this effort which had significant impact on the RVNAF logistical system, and for which the entire DOD logistic system was mobilized.

(S) A MACV Logistic Operations Center was established on an around-the-clock basis on 15 Aug 71 and functioned through 8 Nov 71. During this period the requirements for and complete distribution of major items were intensively controlled and managed in the Logistic Operations Center. Periodic supply reconciliations of ARVN major items was conducted with the US Army Materiel Command. As the tempo of equipment deliveries lessened, the operations center was phased out on 8 November and activities were returned to normal logistics channels. 125

(S) Delivery of mission essential equipment. Overall improvement in the status of RVNAF major items of equipment was substantial during 1971. By 31 December only one item was less than 90 percent of the TOE/TA authorizations. The authorizations did not reflect requirements for maintenance time, repair cycle time, or attrition: 126

STATUS OF MISSION ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT (as of 31 Dec 71)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Rifle, M16	97
Grenade launcher, M79	89
Howitzer, 105mm	100
Howitzer, 155mm	100
Tractor, medium	100
APC, M113	100
Tank, M41	100
Truck, 1/4-ton	100
Radio, AN/PRC 25	100%
* Includes AN/PRC 10 as suitable substitute	

(U) Transfer of in-country equipment. In addition to the new equipment furnished to RVNAF, other equipment became available for transfer as US redeployments and inactivations occurred. As a result, MASF supported equipment was transferred to RVNAF from in-country US components both intraservice and interservice. Maximum transfer of these assets expedited Vietnamization, decreased US retrograde requirements, and reduced demands on CONUS supply and transportation systems.

(U) To facilitate transfer of in-country assets and RVNAF "Want List" was provided by MACV on a monthly basis for use by in-country US service components to screen excess equipment, long supply assets, and materiel in the hands of redeploying or inactivating units. Intra-service transfers were given priority and were consummated by coordination between the owning US service and the advisory element of the Vietnamese counterpart service. Interservice transfers were coordinated through MACV and ultimately approved at US service departmental level.

(C) A major problem in the in-country equipment turnover was the amount of maintenance required to put transferable items in the condition required by US Military Standard Requisition and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP), i. e., issuable without qualification, issuable with qualification, and priority issue. ¹²⁷ Maintenance upgrade requirements were eased somewhat during the third quarter of CY71 when the mileage prerequisite of less than 20,000 miles for used vehicles was eliminated, and later in the fourth quarter when Annex A (Transfer Criteria) to MACV Dir 795-4 was revised to permit transfer of vehicles considered to be "combat serviceable" as opposed to to the former criteria of having to meet "depot overhaul standards."

Turnover of Equipment to ARVN

(C) US depot to ARVN depot transfers. Depot to depot transfers took place in large volume in CY71, to satisfy the requirements of Project 981. During the third quarter of 1971 depot to depot transfers were the heaviest in the history of the Keystone Program (US redeployment program), primarily due to the volume of small arms turnover:

DEPOT TO DEPOT EQUIPMENT TURNOVER: CY71

<u>Major Items</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2d Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>
Communications-				
electronics Equipment	1,213	804	273	1,491
Engineer Equipment	18	6	38	336
Ordnance Equipment	1,612	678	18,135	14,275

(C) Interservice transfers. Interservice transfers peaked during the second quarter of CY71 with the final redeployment of US Marine Corps units:

INTERSERVICE EQUIPMENT TRANSFER: CY71

<u>To ARVN from:</u>	<u>Quarter</u>	<u>Equipment</u>
III MAF	1st	141 C-E items 23 major ordnance items
3d MAB	2d	621 C-E items 213 major ordnance items 50 quartermaster items
USAF	3d	34 C-E items
	4th	None

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(C) Unit to Unit transfers. During CY71 transfers of equipment were made from US units to ARVN units as shown below:

UNIT TO UNIT TRANSFER: CY71

<u>From US Unit:</u>	<u>Quarter</u>	<u>To ARVN Unit</u>
USAECAV selected units	1st	218th Land Clearing Co
4th PSYOP Gp		10th POLWAR Bn
1st MI Bn	2d	1, II, III, and IV CORPS MI Detachments
USAECAV selected units		216th Land Clearing Co
4th PSYOP Gp		20th, 30th, 40th, and 50th POLWAR Bn
577th Eng Bn	3d	61st and 64th Engr Const Bn
USAECAV selected units		218th Land Clearing Co
	4th	None

(C) Turnover of floating craft to ARVN. ARVN was authorized 172 watercraft under the Marine Modernization and Improvement Program (MMIP) which came into being in 1969. During 1970, transfer of the required craft fell short of the intended goals. Action was accelerated in the second quarter of CY71 to transfer all required craft to ARVN not later than 31 Oct 71. Due to craft breakdown, failure of craft to pass sea trials, and other justifiable operational considerations the CY71 goals were not met, although significant additions were made to the ARVN fleet during the year. The progress made during the year and the status of ARVN craft on 31 December are reflected below.¹²⁸

STATUS OF ARVN FLOATING CRAFT: CY71 On Hand


<u>Type of Craft</u>	<u>No Auth</u>	<u>31 Mar 71</u>	<u>31 Dec 71</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
LCM	96	94	96	
LCU	10	4	10	
Tug	10	2	9	6 to be transferred Feb 72
Floating Crane	1	0	1	
J Boat	5	1	1	4 to be transferred Jun 72
Barge	50	4	44	6 to be transferred Feb 72
Total	172	105	161	

(U) ARVN communications-electronics capability. Significant progress was made during CY71 in the improvement of the ARVN Integrated Communications System (ICS) and Dial Telephone Exchange (DTE) capability. Instruction at the USA/RVNAF Signal Training Facility, Vung Tau, was provided by Page Communications Engineers, Inc. (See Figure VIII-9 for location of strategic sites referenced in this section.) During CY71 the school graduated an average of 35 men per month and would increase that rate to an average of 70 men per month during the first 4 months of CY72. This graduation rate and subsequent increased input into the hard skill MOS courses would enable RVNAF to meet the minimum manning level of the ICS/DTE sites as early as October/November 1972 rather than March 1973. The increased input into the hard skill MOS courses required 15 to 19 MOS classes to be conducted

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Source : MHB

Figure VIII - 9

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simultaneously, a requirement which exceeded the programmed RVNAF instructor capability. To capitalize on the increased student availability, MACV requested USARV to extend the Page training contract for a period of 4 to 5 months in CY72. The opportunity to meet the minimum manning level of the ICS/DTE sites 4 to 5 months ahead of schedule would be a significant step in increased ARVN C-E capability.

(C) RF/PF equipment buildup. The following reflects the on hand percentage of selected items of RF/PF equipment as of 31 Dec 71: ¹²⁹

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Percent on hand</u>
Weapons	99
Vehicles:	
1/4 ton	93
2 1/2 ton	96
5-ton wrecker	75
Signal:	
AN/PRC-25(RF)	100
AN/PRC-25(PF)	29

VNN Equipment Turnover

(U) The turnover of equipment to the VNN primarily focused on the transfer of watercraft and coastal surveillance radar sites. The magnitude of the assets and effort involved in the USN Accelerated Turnover to Vietnamese (ACTOV) program is discussed elsewhere in this chapter and in Chapter V, Naval Operations. To maintain the assets which were transferred under the ACTOV program the VNN supply support facilities had to be developed and outfitted to provide the necessary level of repair.

(C) VNN repair program. The VNN repair system consisted of seven strategically located logistic support bases (LSBs) and eleven intermediate support bases (ISBs). Three LSBs and 11 ISBs were turned over to the VNN during CY71. As of 31 Dec 71, the Da Nang, Binh Thuy, Cam Ranh Bay, and Nha Be LSBs remained to be transferred. Three craft repair barges and the repair ship USS Satyr (ARL-23) were also transferred during the year thereby completing the VNN inventory of mobile repair assets which were authorized under CRIMP.

(C) In June 1971, the deteriorating condition of river assault craft (RAC) and river patrol boats (PBR) dictated establishment of a high priority program to restore the craft to an acceptable level of readiness. By 31 Dec 71, 115 RACs and 245 PBRs had been completely overhauled and were again operationally ready in the VNN inventory.

(C) VNN shipyard. The VNN shipyard (VNNSY) maintained the ships of the blue water fleet. Adequate drydocking facilities were not immediately available. A small 1,000 ton auxiliary floating drydock (AFDL-11) was received on loan in April 1971 and used by the VNN to reduce a critical docking situation; the number of ships awaiting drydock facilities was thereby reduced from an average of 10 to 12 ships to 3 to 5 ships. The loan of the AFDL-11 was an austere compromise to an original request for an AFDL-22, a 1,900 ton floating drydock. An AFDL-25 subsequently declared in excess of Cam Ranh Bay requirements was transferred to the VNN, and appreciably increased the VNNSY capability to fulfill drydocking requirements.

(C) In addition to the VNNSY situation, 13 of 18 craft repair bases had significant equipment deficiencies during the second quarter of CY71. A total of 304 items were ordered to upgrade existing repair facilities and were on hand by 30 Nov 71. ¹³⁰

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Vietnamese Naval Shipyard, June 1971.

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Turnover of Equipment to VNAF

(U) The emphasis in equipment turnover to the VNAF was primarily on increasing the number of aircraft. VNAF's expansion in this regard is covered elsewhere in this chapter and in Chapter VI, Air Operations. To maintain the operational readiness of these increased assets the VNAF communications and support capabilities were given priority assistance during CY71.

(U) VNAF C-E equipment turnover. VNAF assumption of operational and maintenance responsibility for C-E equipment progressed at a rapid pace during CY71. The first significant transfer took place on 13 Feb 71 when the USAF 3,000 line DTE at Nha Trang was transferred to VNAF. On 30 April the Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) facilities at Binh Thuy were owned, operated, and maintained by VNAF. On 1 June the Dial Central Office and associated cable distribution plant at Bien Hoa was turned over. On 28 June VNAF acquired the TACAN facilities at Tan Son Nhut AB and on 30 June the TACAN facilities at Ban Me Thuot, Bien Hoa, and Nha Trang were transferred.

(U) During the third quarter the following transactions took place between USAF/VNAF:

- On 1 July the base weather telautograph systems (generally consisting of three transmitters and five receivers) at Pleiku, Nha Trang, Binh Thuy, and Bien Hoa air bases were transferred.
- On 23 September the Direct Air Support Centers (DASC) at Pleiku and Bien Hoa Air Bases were transferred.
- On 25 September eleven formal agreements were jointly signed by the USAF/VNAF representatives for "title transfer" of the Telephone Tandem Switches at Tan Son Nhut and Da Nang; the Ground Control Approach facilities at Nha Trang, Binh Thuy, Pleiku, Bien Hoa, and Da Nang; the Tactical Air Navigation facilities at Pleiku and Da Nang; and Dial Central Offices at Pleiku and Da Nang Air Bases.

(U) The last major turnover activities for CY71 occurred during the fourth quarter:

- On 31 October the Bien Hoa dial telephone exchange was turned over and became a self-sufficient VNAF facility.
- On 2 November operation and maintenance responsibility for the Direct Air Support Center (I DASC) at Da Nang passed to VNAF.
- On 5 November the Tan Son Nhut transfer agreement was amended to indicate that the facility was owned, operated and maintained by VNAF.
- On 30 December the Chu Lai TACAN was transferred to the VNAF 291st Communications Squadron at Da Nang.
- Throughout December the Phu Cat dial telephone exchange, telautograph system, TACAN, nondirectional beacon, ground control approach radar, control tower and weather communications facilities were transferred. This constituted the eighth major air base facility to be turned over to the VNAF as part of the I&M program.

(U) Univac 1050-II computer system. To improve VNAF support capability a Univac 1050-II computer was installed at the Air Logistics Command (ALC) at Bien Hoa AB in 1970. During the first quarter of CY71 the first base (Bien Hoa) was satellited to the ALC computer for direct communications between base supply and the computerized central supply files. Three additional Air Division accounts were satellited during May, June, and July with satisfactory

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results. Additional satellite accounts were added throughout the remainder of the year and refinements were made in all phases of automated supply management. Continuation of the base level satellite program for all repair items would provide additional management control for VNAF materiel managers at all levels. The configuration of the 1050-II computer was changed during the fourth quarter to increase the in-line processing time and provide a secondary system for simultaneous report processing. Although VNAF logistics capability progressed rapidly, a primary problem existed in the lack of skilled middle management resources. It was estimated that this problem would not be fully resolved for approximately 2 years during which time the VNAF and their USAF advisors would work jointly to develop and train VNAF instructors to improve the air force organic training capability.¹³¹

VNMC Equipment Turnover

(C) During the third quarter of CY71 the Marine Advisory Unit and the VNMC staff jointly reviewed and updated unit Tables of Organization and Equipment to incorporate the approved FY72-73 force structure increase of 610 billets. On 25 Aug 71, the Commandant of the Marine Corps approved revised FY71-73 MASF programs for the VNMC. The approval coincided with the decision to accelerate delivery of MASF equipment and varying quantities of the 144 line items of major VNMC equipment for the FY68-72 program years which had not been delivered. The initial fill of the MASF items was expected to be completed on or about 30 Nov 71.

(C) The accelerated delivery of MASF equipment proceeded essentially as planned. By 30 Sep 71 only 19 line items were delivered, but by the end of the second week in December over 90 line items had been received and the VNMC was virtually at full programmed combat effectiveness in terms of TE requirements. Outstanding deficiencies included: 18 1/4 ton M-151A1C jeeps to transport the 18 106mm recoilless rifles belonging to the VNMC anti-tank company; 22 90mm recoilless rifles to upgrade the organic direct fire capability of the infantry battalion; 40 2 1/2 ton trucks to achieve the full TA of 363 2 1/2 ton trucks in the Marine division; and the balance of the communications equipment (one AN/TRC-24, 14 AN/VRC-47s, 9 AN/VRC-46s, and 6 AN/PRC-106s) to complete outfitting the division radio relay system and the command and control nets down to battalion level. All of these items except the 18 M-151A1C jeeps were to be transferred from USARV prior to 30 Jun 72; the M-151A1C jeeps were due to arrive from the Taiwan Material Agency no later than 30 Jun 72. The combat effectiveness of the Vietnamese Marine Corps would continue to be outstanding; however, fill of remaining equipment deficiencies would be required prior to deployment as a full scale division.¹³²

Improving RVNAF Support Capabilities

(U) Running parallel with and complementing the process of providing RVNAF with physical resources was the equally important task of upgrading their service support capabilities. CY71 was a year in which the success of US training, prodding, and advising was realized as the Vietnamese proved capable of assuming many support functions which had traditionally been performed by US elements.

Port Turnover Program

(C) In keeping with the phased withdrawal of US forces, action was initiated to provide RVNAF with a responsive logistics support program. Project 981/982 effort had marked impact on the in-country ammunition port facilities and resulted in significant increased inbound shipping. Through the coordinated efforts of MACV and RVNAF the abnormally high hold (awaiting unloading) days, experienced during the US buildup phase, were averted.¹³³

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(C) During 1971 Vietnamization of the waterports progressed well and on an accelerated basis. The ARVN ability to handle peak tonnages was displayed during May and June when over 30,000 tons of cargo were handled by ARVN at the shallow-draft Can Tho-Binh Thuy Port. The port, which had a TOE capability of 25,000 tons, was again severely exercised in October when 36,000 tons were moved in connection with the accelerated delivery of equipment to RVNAF. Also in October, the ARVN Saigon Transportation Command (STTC), augmented by a Vietnamese contractor, handled a peak workload of 45,000 tons of general cargo, vehicles, and engineer materiel at the Saigon Military Port.

(C) On 1 Jul 71, ARVN assumed discharge operations for the Saigon Ammunition System at the Cogido barge sites. On 1 September, ARVN began total operation of deep draft and barge discharge for both US and RVNAF ammunition. Deep draft discharge operations were conducted at Cat Lai, and discharge of barges containing ammunition was done at Binh Trieu, Vietnamese Newport, Bien Hoa, Cogido, and Thanh Tuy Ha. During October and November, 70,000 tons of US and RVNAF ammunition were processed by ARVN.

(C) On 1 Jan 72, ARVN, augmented by a VN contractor, assumed operation of the Qui Nhon deep draft port. During the first month of operation under ARVN management, 26,000 tons of US, FWF, and RVNAF cargo was handled.

(C) With the turnover of Qui Nhon two major ports remained to be turned over to ARVN, Cam Ranh Bay, and all or part of the Da Nang port complex. Action was underway to effect these transfers on 1 May 72, at which time US retrograde tonnage was expected to be between 60,000 and 100,000 tons at each site. ¹³⁴

Depot Upgrade Program

(U) The depot upgrade program, "Project LSY," was initiated in 1969 to increase the overhaul capacity of the ARVN Signal, Engineer, and Ordnance Base Depots and promote ARVN self-sufficiency in most engineer, ordnance and signal equipment. The program included improved facilities, roads, buildings, and drainage; the selection, authorization, and procurement of equipment; and increased authorization and hiring of employees.

(U) As of 30 Dec 71 the construction portion of the upgrade program was approximately 98 percent complete both at the two depots and the newly named ARVN Army Arsenal (previously 80th Ordnance Rebuild Base Depot). The contract construction work at the 60th Signal Base Depot was completed in November 1971; the remaining equipment would be installed by ARVN. Construction at the 40th Engineer Base Depot was scheduled for completion during the third quarter, FY72. The Army Arsenal's construction program was delayed by the installation and hookup of several items of capital equipment. The water distribution system for the engine test dynamometers had to be redesigned. However, completion was expected by the fourth quarter, FY72. The major effort remaining was to expand the tire retread capacity.


(U) The receipt of capital equipment industrial machines was completed in 1971; 483 lines of the Defense Industrial Plant Equipment Center (DIPEC) equipment with a value of \$3,166,000 were purchased for \$1,362,000. Approximately 3,580 other lines of equipment were also required of which 1,913 lines had been received by the end of the year.

(U) To complement the increased plant capacity, the authorized strength for the base depots was increased from 4,615 to 7,313 personnel. There had been difficulty in hiring new employees; however, GVN approval of a special 5-year draft exemption was obtained on 12 Jul 71 to permit hiring of 17 year old employees. The assigned strength was 7,281 as of 30 Dec 71. Training of the 17 year olds was aggressively pursued through OJT and extensive classroom training.

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Da Nang Port, June 1971.

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As a result of the upgrade program, the FY73 off-shore repair/rebuild requirements would be significantly reduced and would be nearly eliminated by FY75. ¹³⁵ Additional statistics on this topic can be found in Chapter IX.

RVNAF Lines of Communication Program

(U) The highway restoration program progressed well in 1971. As US engineer units redeployed additional funds were made available to facilitate the transfer of US construction responsibility from troops to contractors in the Delta area, and ARVN engineer units took on increased construction responsibility. By the end of December 552 km of roadway had been restored.

(U) To assist RVNAF in the new lines of communication (LOC) restoration role they had assumed in 1970, 394 items of road construction equipment were added to the 56 new high capacity commercial equipment items which were ordered in late CY70. By 31 Dec 71, ARVN engineers had assumed responsibility for 671 km of highway restoration or approximately 16 percent of the total LOC program. In order to accomplish their portion of the program, ARVN dedicated six engineer battalions for road work and two additional battalion equivalents for bridge construction and other LOC support. ARVN work was expected to be completed in 1975. During CY71 ARVN restored 163 km of highway.

(U) The accelerated redeployment of US engineer units resulted in 108 km of roadway not being restored as planned. Therefore the LOC fund ceiling was increased by \$16 million and funding was provided during the third quarter CY71 to accommodate the switch in construction effort from troop to lump sum contractors. US troop road restoration activities essentially ceased on 15 Dec 71. On 31 December the SECDEF-imposed fund ceiling for the LOC program was \$463 million, of which \$456.6 million was funded as follows:

<u>Fund Source</u>	<u>Funded (\$ Mil)</u>
MCA	99.2
MCN	20.0
AID/DOD	128.2
AID	17.8
OMA	152.1
OPN	32.3
MAP	7.0
Total	456.6

(U) MACV had assumed responsibility in February 1968 for the advisory support to the GVN Director General of Highways (DGOH), a function which had been performed previously by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). In the fall of 1970, MACV and USAID agreed to the formulation of a joint Ad Hoc Committee to study the return of the highway advisory function from MACV to USAID. The joint committee submitted the report concurrently to each agency on 11 May 71. MACV concurred in the recommendation of the joint committee that the advisory role to the DGOH be returned to USAID on 1 Jul 72. Additional information on this topic can be found in Chapter IX:


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LOC CONSTRUCTION

As of 31 Dec. 71

LOC COMPLETE —————
2,907 KM



Source: MACDC

Figure VIII-10

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(U) Figure VIII-10 shows the status of LOC construction as of 31 Dec 71. A synopsis of the total LOC program (4,075 km) is reflected below:

<u>Year Completed</u>	<u>KM</u>
CY68 and prior	809
CY69	810
CY70	736
CY71	552
Total	2,907
Pending as of 31 Dec 71	1,168
Deferred	(536)
Under Construction	(381)
Remain to start	(251)
Total	4,075

Base Turnover Program

(U) The turnover of major US facilities to the RVNAF began in 1969 with the transfer of the US 9th Inf Div base camp at Dong Tam, MR 4. During 1970, RVNAF received 77 installations which were excess to US requirements. As US redeployments accelerated during 1971, 173 facilities were transferred during the year. These transfers were as follows:

Army bases	105
Navy bases	28
Air Forces bases	3
Industrial sites	10
Advisor sites	27
Total	173

(U) The overall status of the base transfer program on 31 Dec 71 was: 136

	<u>Transferred</u>	<u>Remaining</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percent Transferred</u>
Military facilities	241	150	391	62
Advisor facilities	27	353	380	7
Industrial sites	10	54	64	16
Total	278	557	835	33

RVNAF Integrated Bulk POL Distribution System

(U) Bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) represented high tonnages and dollar items in support of the RVNAF. During 1971, 3 years of phased effort culminated in the transition of the RVNAF POL system from a package operation to a modern self-sufficient and responsive bulk storage and distribution system.

(U) In 1968 the RVNAF petroleum depot system consisted of a base depot in Saigon and five field depots. Products were received into the depot system either from commercial petroleum companies or from USARV POL terminals. Products were delivered via barge, pipeline, commercial or military tank truck, or in 55-gallon drums. Distribution from depot to supply point

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was accomplished by military tank trucks and 55-gallon drums. Aviation fuels were delivered primarily in bulk by commercial and military tank trucks directly into air base tankage; some aviation fuels were delivered to air bases via pipeline from commercial or military water terminals.

(U) During 1968 and 1969, the initial steps were taken towards a bulk distribution system. RVNAF was authorized and received five 5,000 gallon trailers and sixteen 1,200 gallon tank trucks for each of the five field depots. This gave the field depot the capability of delivering bulk products to subdepots and to those customer units which had bulk storage capability. Review of the planning in late 1969 indicated that effective utilization of bulk delivery means could not be realized if customer units had only 5-gallon cans and 55-gallon drums in which to receive the fuel. A program was then initiated to authorize customer units the capability to receive and store petroleum in bulk.

(U) In 1970 the RVNAF Integrated Bulk POL Distribution System was formally instituted and a plan was developed which specifically addressed the objective of an independent RVNAF integrated petroleum system. The program stressed the need for dependable, adequate, and responsive bulk supply in an effective logistic system. The three distinct, but inter-related requirements for a modern bulk petroleum system were:

- A bulk receiving and storage capability at the field depot and subdepot level.
- A bulk delivery capability from field depot to subdepot and from the subdepot to the customer unit.
- A bulk receiving and storage capability at the customer unit level.

(U) The RVNAF Integrated Bulk Petroleum Plan was approved by the Department of the Army during the second quarter of CY71. On 30 June the US Army tank farm at Pleiku was transferred to ARVN marking the first transferral of large US bulk storage facilities under the new plan. By the end of December, ARVN owned and operated 25 helicopter refueling sites; VNAF was operating refueling sites at each of the major VNAF air bases; and ARVN was operating tank farms at Quang Tri, Chu Lai, Da Nang, Pleiku, Dalat, Phan Thiet, Tan My An, Go Vap, Can Tho, and Dong Tam. ARVN had received 61 of an authorized 110, 5,000-gallon trailers, 117 of 137, 12,000-gallon tank trucks and 57 of the 110, 5-ton tractors which had been made available to RVNAF.

(U) The progress made in 1971 provided RVNAF with wholesale bulk storage facilities and bulk delivery capability. With the complete implementation of this program in CY72 a significant step in RVNAF self-sufficiency will be attained. ¹³⁷

RVNAF Medical Capability

(U) By the end of 1971 the RVNAF Medical Service was considered capable of providing health care services necessary to assure the maintenance of the health of RVNAF personnel and their dependents; this was true under the assumption of continued US medical materiel support, and in consideration of a standard of military medicine within the economic and educational means of the RVN to ultimately support and sustain, and within the bounds of its culture to accept.

(S) A complete review of the PVNAF Medical Service force structure was conducted jointly by the MACV Command Surgeon's Office and the RVNAF Surgeon General's Office, during the second quarter of FY71. This review was part of the US Mission/GVN review of accelerated

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FY72 and FY73 force structure discussed earlier in this chapter. The force structure approved 10 Jun 71 resulted in an increase of 3,887 spaces for the RVNAF Medical Service.

(S) The total authorized strength of the RVNAF Medical Service approved for FY72 approximated some 22,679 personnel, which would permit the following improvements in the RVNAF medical posture during CY72:

- Increase hospital staff/bed ratio from 0.6 to 0.7 and 0.8:1.
- Activate a 600-bed TB hospital at Da Nang.
- Provide the medical company in the medical group with the ability to deploy a limited surgical capability in direct support of combat operations.
- Increase the capability of each ground ambulance company by 12 ambulances for an authorization of 27 3/4-ton ambulances.
- Activate orthopedic prosthetic detachments at Da Nang, Nha Trang, and Can Tho. 138

(S) Other medical implications of the accelerated FY72/73 VNAF force structure included increasing the strength of the Air Medical Center from 139 to 183 spaces to support the operation of a 100-bed station hospital at the center, and the addition of 10 spaces for the VNAF Altitude Chamber at Tan Son Nhut. In addition, 60 spaces were transferred from the ARVN to the VNAF medical force structure to support the requirement for trained enlisted personnel as members of VNAF aeromedical evacuation crews.

(S) The total personnel authorizations for the RVNAF Medical Service were sufficient for a modern and comprehensive medical service, but in many instances the RVNAF lacked the trained personnel to fill the authorized position vacancies. This was mainly the result of a combination of the accelerated expansion of the RVNAF Medical Service and the shortage of trained professional personnel available in the RVN. At end-1971 it was anticipated that continued emphasis would have to be given to off-shore training of all levels of RVNAF Medical Service personnel.

(S) Hospitals. By March 1972 the staff-bed ratio in the RVNAF hospital system had increased from a previous overall ratio of 0.6:1 at the end of CY70 to a status ranging from 0.6:1 in the small 100-bed sector hospital to 0.7 and 0.8:1 in the general and station hospitals. This increased staff-bed ratio represented a significant step toward the long-range program of placing emphasis on expanding and refining the capability of the existing system.

(S) The proposed FY73 RVNAF Medical Service force structure, approved for planning on 10 Jun 71, included the following hospitals, with a total of 20,500 beds:

Type Hospital	Number
1,000 Bed General Hospital	1
1,800 Bed General Hospital	1
2,400 Bed General Hospital	1
600 Bed Tuberculosis Hospital	1
1,200 Bed Tuberculosis Hospital	1
600 Bed Station Hospitals	5
400 Bed Station Hospitals	10
700 Bed Convalescent Centers	4
100 Bed Sector Hospital	29
400 Bed Paraplegic Hospital	1
100 Bed Air Force Hospital	1
100 Bed Navy Hospital	1
100 Bed Marine Hospital	1
100 Bed Airborne Hospital	1

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(U) Facilities transfer. Sufficient beds were not available within the RVNAF to provide an adequate level of patient care. To relieve this, the US Forces offered medical facilities which would become available subsequent to the redeployment of US units. Discussions between medical representatives of MACV and RVNAF identified 5 US Army hospitals which could be used as RVNAF hospitals. These facilities were the 71st Evacuation Hospital, Pleiku, the 95th Evacuation Hospital, Da Nang, the 3d Surgical Hospital at Can Tho, the 36th Evacuation Hospital at Vung Tau, and the 8th Field Hospital at Nha Trang. In addition to these facilities the US Air Force had seven 20-bed dispensaries which could be transferred to the VNAF at various air bases throughout Vietnam. The facilities at Nha Trang and Vung Tau were transferred during October-November 1970.

(U) As of end-March 1972 the US Army had transferred to RVNAF the sites at Pleiku and Can Tho and the US Air Force had transferred all dispensaries to VNAF except the one at Da Nang. The Da Nang facilities, the 95th Evacuation Hospital and the Air Force Dispensary, were still being used by US forces.

(U) The medical equipment required to equip the facilities for RVNAF use was transferred in place. The requirement for the equipment was based upon existing or modified Vietnamese authorization documents. In addition, other commodity managed items, such as generators, air conditioners, and laundry units were also transferred to the RVNAF medical facility. As a result, the RVNAF received a facility that could be immediately put to patient care use.

(U) The transfer of US medical facilities and equipment to the RVNAF filled a critical gap in the military health care delivery system, but also caused problems which had to be overcome. Problems associated with facilities maintenance were partially resolved by converting the buildings to Vietnamese standards. The high cost of providing electrical power was reduced considerably by removing several of the air conditioners and tropicalizing the buildings. A further savings in maintenance costs was realized by converting the Western style latrines to Vietnamese latrines reducing thereby the burden on the sewage disposal system. During the phaseover period, US facilities at Nha Trang and Vung Tau received electrical power from the Vinell Corporation and water from Pacific Architect and Engineers. When these facilities were transferred the power and water supply were to continue for approximately 1 year, at which time the US contractors would be phased down. The costs to operate these facilities would then have to be born by the RVNAF as well as the cost to repair and maintain the facility.

(U) To further assuage the facilities maintenance problem the RVNAF established formal training and on-the-job training for five 20-man facilities engineer maintenance teams. Speciality training was conducted in refrigeration, water treatment plants, fire-fighting teams, generator repair, electrical power distribution, and engineer construction to provide a cadre which could adequately maintain the facility. Although response to this program was slow and the personnel trained during CY71 were limited to the specialities of power distribution and construction, there were sufficient personnel available to adequately maintain the newly acquired medical facilities.¹³⁹

(U) RVNAF medical supply levels. In early August 1971 the RVNAF were authorized to increase their supply levels from 7 to 12 months. Requisitions were to be immediately submitted citing Project 982, which would provide recognition of the purpose of the requirement to each point in the US supply system through which the requisition would pass. Additional information regarding Project 982 is contained in the Equipment Delivery and Turnover section of this chapter.

(U) The major problem in developing the requisitions rapidly was that all records in the RVNAF medical supply system were manual. Thus, no capability existed at a central point which would permit an analysis of the stock position of each item. To overcome this, the RVNAF were requested to provide the stock status of each item at each depot location to include

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the present requisitioning objective, on hand, due ins, and due outs. This information was converted to punch cards and, with the assistance of the ADP services of the US 32d Medical Depot, a computer program was developed which enabled the American advisors to prepare requisitions. By the end of August all requisitions had been matched against long supplies and excesses available from the 32d Medical Depot and the remaining requisitions were transceived to Okinawa. Funds were made available in February 1972 to completely raise all RVNAF medical supply levels to 1 year.

(U) Patient evacuation. RVNAF helicopter aeromedical evacuation capabilities had progressed to the point of near self-sufficiency in CY71. This was due primarily to the increase in the number of helicopters available to the VNAF and an increased training program in CY71. With the training and other advisory support of US Army and Air Force personnel, a number of Medevac crews were trained in aeromedical evacuation operations. Additionally, training was initiated at the RVNAF Military Medical School to provide instruction in the ground portion of Medevac procedures. Although the capability for helicopter Medevac had not progressed to the same level in each MR, a reallocation of existing resources would provide adequate capability to perform the RVNAF mission.

(U) Fixed-winged aircraft were available within the VNAF and could be readily configured to carry both ambulatory and litter patients. Only a very limited use had been made of this capability, and there was no established program at the end of 1971 for the development of a dedicated, fixed-wing aeromedical evacuation capability.

(U) Because it was not anticipated that the RVNAF would achieve a level of aeromedical evacuation capability similar to that realized by US Forces in Vietnam, advisory efforts are directed towards encouraging maximum use of surface evacuation, both by ground ambulances and inland waterways. Only the most urgent cases were moved by air, and continued emphasis was placed on the improvement of the ground ambulance capability.

(U) VNAF Medevac and air rescue capability. In January 1971 COMUSMACV approved a concept through which a VNAF helicopter aeromedical Medevac and search and rescue capability would be developed; VNAF crews were to be trained in Medevac procedures by the US Army Medical Command, Vietnam (USAMEDCOMV) and the Air Force Advisory Group under the monitorship of the MACV Command Surgeon.

(U) USAMEDCOMV developed a program designed to accomplish training commensurate with the overall VNAF/MACV programmed improvement and modernization objectives. To do so it was necessary to:

- Develop an effective Medevac/search and rescue system within allocated resources.
- Integrate Medevac/search and rescue capability into a single VNAF Medevac system.
- Recommend and monitor required training programs.
- Develop concurrently an effective patient regulating system.
- Orient and train the "user" of the Medevac/search and rescue system.

(U) On 19 Feb 71, RVNAF Directive 310-19 was published outlining in detail the procedures for helicopter Medevac and search and rescue operations. On 24 Apr 71, RVNAF published the procedures for the use of fixed-wing aircraft in the Medevac/search and rescue system, RVNAF Directive 480-6.

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(U) US training effort was primarily dedicated to helicopter crews. On 3 Mar 71, US helicopter air ambulance units began training the VNAF. In addition to regular crew training, emphasis was directed at training the field medical soldier in helicopter evacuation request procedures, patient classification, patient loading techniques, and communications and landing zone security. The formal US training program terminated on 11 Jan 72 at which time 83 VNAF helicopter pilots, 29 crew chiefs, and 28 medical specialists had been trained and were considered fully qualified. The RVNAF Military Medical School assumed responsibility for future formal Medevac crew training.

(U) As a result of this special program RVNAF developed a significant aeromedical evacuation capability. By the end of CY71, VNAF crews were accomplishing more than 80 percent of all RVNAF Medevac missions in MRs 2, 3, and 4 and approximately 25 percent in MR 1. In addition, VNAF had developed the capability to train additional crews to expand the Medevac program as additional helicopters were acquired.¹⁴⁰

(U) Specialized capabilities. Orthopedic prosthetic detachments approved for activation at Da Nang, Nha Trang, and Can Tho were designed to complement the convalescent centers at those locations and provide rehabilitative care to amputees. Normally this would have been a nonmilitary function, if an adequate agency had existed in RVN to handle those patients who could not be returned to productive military service. The entire convalescent center system, to include the paraplegic hospital at Vung Tau, would eventually revert from RVNAF to the Veteran's Administration.

(U) Optical fabrication capability. In the spring of 1971 equipment necessary to open an optical fabrication facility was obtained and installed at the RVNAF 70th Medical Base Depot, and necessary spectacle components procured. Lens stock was limited to that which provided spherical but not cylindrical corrections. The Optical Branch of the depot commenced operation on 1 Jun 71. During the first 2 weeks of operation, they fabricated and issued to RVNAF personnel 200 pairs of spectacles. Thereafter approximately 450 pairs of spectacles were produced each month, using simple spherical corrections only.

(U) Immediately after the Optical Branch opened, plans were started to provide the activity a multivision fabrication capability. Since this was believed to be beyond the existing RVNAF technical skills, MACV decided to upgrade the equipment available and introduce a capability to produce cylindrical as well as spherical corrective spectacles. Until RVNAF personnel gained experience in handling cylindrical corrective lenses, before progressing into multivision lenses, MACV arranged in March 1972 for multivision spectacles to be obtained from the US Army Medical Materiel Agency, Pacific.

RVNAF Automated Management System

(U) A contract for systems development of the RVNAF Automated Material Management Systems (RAMMS) was negotiated on 28 Oct 70. During 1971, the program gained momentum. The RVNAF National Material Management Agency (NMMA) was developed concurrent with RAMMS development. Supported by the RVNAF Logistics Data Processing Center (LDPC), which would ultimately operate the RAMMS computer programs, the NMMA would centralize RVNAF logistic management functions which were fragmented among four ARVN technical service base depots in the Saigon area.

(C) During the first half of CY71 an IBM 360-40 computer was placed on order and the Computer Science Corporation was engaged in training the ARVN instructor cadre in RAMMS detailed systems specifications. Concurrently, the five technical services converted to an interim punch card machine operation. Steps were also initiated to develop NMMA internal procedures, TOE requirements, and personnel selections.

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(C) During the second half of CY71 the commander and key members of the NMMA organization were selected. In late August, the computer was delivered and installed at the LDPC complex. Training courses in stock control for potential NMMA personnel, conducted at NMMA by the ARVN RAMMS cadre team, were initiated on 6 September and completed on 18 Dec 71. Through a series of joint ARVN/US counterpart conferences, procedures were developed in NMMA stock control storage operations, customer interface and RAMMS reports processing. On 30 June the wall-to-wall depot inventories and location surveys were on target with a completion date set for 15 Jan 72.

(C) In mid-November 1971 it became apparent that to best achieve the objectives of NMMA and RAMMS with the least impact in a combat environment, technical service implementation should be phased. Actions were then directed to convert 60,000 Ordnance Technical Service logistic line items from depot punch cards to RAMMS format. By 31 December, NMMA key personnel, representatives of the ARVN Technical Services, the ARVN RAMMS instructor cadre and NMMA, LDPC, and Ordnance US advisors were engaged in finalizing the NMMA procedures, developing the Command Post Exercise "Test Package," and preparing lesson plans for instruction in storage and customer operations based on the NMMA procedures.

(C) Future planning focused on the theater-wide implementation of Ordnance Technical Service supply management functions. The phased implementation of the remaining technical services would follow the same general cycle as Ordnance. Lessons learned and experience gained were to be applied to each succeeding Technical Service. 141

ASSESSMENT OF RVNAF CAPABILITIES

(U) US troop withdrawals gave credence to increased RVNAF capability and near completion of the Vietnamization process. US assistance had prevented Communist military takeover of the RVN and had substantially formed, trained, and equipped the RVNAF to the degree required for military self-defense. Sooner or later Vietnamization would have to be tested. The ultimate manner in which RVNAF employed the increased skills, knowledge, equipment, and confidence they had acquired during 1971 would determine to what degree the US assistance and advisory policies in South Vietnam had been effective.

ARVN/VNMC Capability

(S) The experience gained in the conduct of large-scale operations highlighted the year for the RVNAF ground forces. The impact of these operations on effectiveness and confidence was considerable. From the initiation of LAM SON 719 into Laos through the late 1971 campaigns into Cambodia, each operation was subjected to a critical review to determine weak areas requiring improvement and strong points to be exploited. The need for an improved combined arms doctrine was identified early in the year as a result of LAM SON 719. By early December, the RVNAF combined arms doctrinal handbook had been produced and implemented in schools and training centers. Similar emphasis was placed on other areas such as support coordination, individual motivation training, and leadership. During September the success of LAM SON 810 demonstrated the professional skills of the Vietnamese commanders in the deployment and employment of units and the coordination of supporting assets.

(S) Despite the reduction of US advisors, the increased confidence, aggressiveness, and professionalism of ARVN/VNMC units was evident. The cross-border operations of 1971 demonstrated the ability of the ARVN units to effectively operate without advisor support. In

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Master Sergeant Huynh Quan, Mekong Delta, March 1971.

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the division, US advisor strength was reduced and tailored to meet the requirements of the ARVN. Division advisor teams were reduced in size by approximately 30 percent. Based on increased ARVN proficiency at lower tactical levels, advisors were withdrawn from most ARVN battalions.

(C) Personnel problems eased somewhat during the year as a result of pay increases and renewed efforts to apprehend deserters. Quantity and quality of leadership remained a problem. The solution rested with the success of on-going efforts to identify leadership potential and improve the available leadership training.

(S) The withdrawal of considerable US air and artillery support increased the use, effectiveness, and reliance on Vietnamese support assets. Ground operations increased significantly from January through December. Battalion days on large operations were three times greater in December than during January 1971. Operational results, expressed in terms of kill ratios, weapons exchange ratios, friendly and enemy losses, favored RVNAF throughout the year and, in each case, bettered the levels of 1970.

(C) Comparison of US and RVNAF Battalion Days on Large Operations:

	1968		1969		1970		1971		Total
	Jan	Dec	Jan	Dec	Jan	Dec	Jan	Dec	CY71
US	3,259	4,690	4,832	3,817	3,804	2,214	2,080	467	15,530
RVNAF	2,148	3,755	4,310	4,371	4,225	5,589	6,629	17,740	154,644

Note: Battalion days of operations—the number of days a battalion is on an operation or a figure obtained by dividing the number of companies employed on a large scale operation by three and multiplying the result by the number of days the operation lasted. Large unit operations—a battalion size operation or one involving three or more companies of line troops (ARVN, RF, PF, Rangers, Airborne, Marines, or Armor) which the reporting unit controlled.

VNN Capability

(S) Effectiveness in conducting riverine operations and coastal surveillance improved during 1971. The VNN assumed responsibility for all riverine operations and the inner MARKET TIME barriers. During the year the VNN boarded and searched an average of 137,014 junks per month. Day and night searches of coastal traffic increased appreciably over 1970. Task units continued to demonstrate the feasibility of working with Visual Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance (VARS) aircraft to locate zone violators or suspicious craft.

(S) Seven of 16 planned coastal surveillance radar stations were in operation by 31 December. Turnover of the entire network was scheduled no later than 30 April 72, with the system in full operation by 31 May 72. The VNN continued to refine operational command and control procedures for the complex task of coordinating the functions of the radar stations, surveillance centers and patrol units. In addition, plans were made for a formal training course for VNN radar system officers to commence in February 1972.

(S) Improvements in VNAF support to VNN operations were made with the implementation of procedures to request both preplanned and quick reaction air strikes, and indoctrination of VNAF crews in the requirements and peculiarities of riverine operations. Although limited VNAF aircraft, personnel, and funding retarded progress towards permanent deployment of VNAF helicopter gunship detachments in the Delta, initial results of this program were excellent.

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(S) Logistics, primarily supply and maintenance, were major problems during 1971 and received a high priority for advisor assistance. Some progress was noted, particularly in the operationally ready rates for the fleet and the fact that the VNN should achieve supply self-sufficiency by 30 Jun 72. Lack of trained personnel and a shortage of middle management personnel remained the major barriers to greater progress in this area. By year-end VNN had received 98 percent of its authorized watercraft and had assumed the preponderance of patrol missions required to insure the security of RVN's many rivers and the inner sea barrier.

(S) Comparison of VNN and US Ships on Patrol:

	1969	1970	1971
Avg Nr US ships on patrol	49	24	4
Avg Nr VNN ships on patrol	18	47	52

VNAF Capability

(S) The year was one of major expansion for VNAF with a 40 percent increase in the number of activated squadrons. These increased assets resulted in the VNAF assumption of a greater share of the air role, both in-country and out. At the end of the year VNAF was conducting over 63 percent of the in-country combat sorties and 39 percent of those in Cambodia. On 31 December VNAF had 42 squadrons; two UH-1 helicopter squadrons had been activated 4 months ahead of schedule, and of the 42 squadrons activated, 37 had been declared operationally ready. For the year, hours flown increased by 56 percent and sorties by 69.8 percent over calendar year 1970.

(S) The increases in operational statistics coincided with the reduction of US support and the increased reliance which the naval and ground forces had on VNAF assets. Improving the VNAF's flexibility and responsiveness to meet these demands received a great deal of emphasis during 1971. The support functions turned over to VNAF were no less important than the combat missions and included a multitude of responsibilities in the areas of base defense, civil engineering, communications, and logistics. The assumption of these functions placed great demands on the VNAF training system, particularly for the production of adequate middle management and technically qualified personnel. Aggressive training programs were implemented in all in-country training facilities and OJT was also used extensively.

(S) Comparisons of VNAF force readiness as of 31 December each year:

	1968	1969	1970	1971
Total pilots available	861	1,065	1,645	2,571
Nr aircraft on hand (all types)	361	451	746	1,222
Nr combat aircrews ready	NA	NA	558	984

Capability of the Territorial Forces

(U) Day to day security for most RVN land areas was the responsibility of the Territorial Forces. The functions they performed were often overshadowed by the more spectacular large scale operations of the regular forces. However, the fact remained that their actions in providing local security contributed much to freeing the regular forces for larger operations, particularly the cross-border operations which dominated 1971.

(C) The Regional and Popular Forces made up the Territorial Forces and represented the primary military forces responsible for local security. Their missions included the security of villages and hamlets, prevention of enemy infiltration into populated areas, and the conduct

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of offensive operations in the consolidation and clearing zones. The RF strength on 31 Dec 71 stood at 96.6 percent of that authorized, with 87.1 percent present for duty. The PF ended the year at 95.5 percent of authorized strength with 92.2 percent present for duty.

(C) Territorial Force operations increased throughout the year as evidenced by over 2,300,000 RF operations and more than 3,930,000 PF operations compared to 1,787,000 and 2,979,000 during CY70. The results of these operations during 1971 were indicative of the increased effectiveness of these forces. The enemy-to-RF kill ratio averaged 3.94:1 for the year while the average individual weapons exchange ratio was 5.6:1. The same ratios for the PF averaged 1.75:1 and 1.78:1 respectively.

(C) Although the operational results favored the Territorial Forces, the number of operations resulting in contact with the enemy showed a steady decline during 1971. Decreased enemy activity was a factor, but the stationing of a large percentage of the RF and PF in relatively secure areas also influenced this trend. Recognition of this fact, and the need to revitalize the GVN expansion of territorial security, subsequently led to implementation of the force transition concept, as discussed in Annex H. Under this program of redeployment, reallocation, and redistribution, more emphasis was placed on freeing the RF from static security missions in order to conduct more offensive operations in the unpopulated areas.

(C) Comparison of RF/PF small unit operations:¹⁴²

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
RF	590,621	1,433,069	1,787,039	2,301,010
PF	1,087,287	1,979,077	2,979,258	3,934,122

ADVISORY EFFORT

CHANGES IN COMMAND STRUCTURE

(U) Vietnamization and US redeployments were directly related to the level of advisory effort in RVN. The overall improvement in the capability of RVNAF combat and combat support elements lessened the requirement for tactical advisors and generated the shift of advisory emphasis from the combat role to the functional areas of administration, management, and logistics.

MACV Planning for US Advisory Force (MAAG)

(S) Reduction in the command and staff structure of MACV and support commands had been an integral part of redeployment planning. The ultimate goal of the troop reductions was to reduce to a MAAG level. In February 1970, anticipating the eventual US drawdown and RVN self-sufficiency, MACV developed a concept for reversion to a Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (MAAGV) in mid-1973. This concept, which was approved in June 1970, envisioned MAAGV would emerge as a minimum strength advisory group which would provide advice and assistance to the GVN and RVNAF, manage the MAP/MASF program, and conduct limited support operations in intelligence, communications, and strategic air support.¹⁴³

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(S) The acceleration of the Vietnamization progress, and the President's announcement in April 1971 of a ceiling of 184,000 US military in Vietnam by 30 Nov 71, made it likely that the mid-1973 date might be advanced. The reduction of US Forces to 69,000 by end-April 1972, as announced by the President in January 1972, made it even more apparent that an earlier date might set for reversion of MACV to an advisory group.

Vietnam Assistance Command

(C) On 1 Sep 71, COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC of the altered concept through which MACV would transition to MAAG status, and reported the direction of future MACV military advisory effort:

This headquarters envisages the transition from the current assistance organization to an Assistance Group by undergoing a phased reduction from the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) to the Vietnam Assistance Command (VAC), and the further reduction to the Vietnam Assistance Group (VAG) which would be the ultimate organization for the long term advisory period. A detailed study is in progress to develop a proposed VAG organization, command relationships, and concept for providing assistance to the RVN. In the interim, the advisory effort will focus upon the following areas as hostilities are reduced:

- The reallocation, redistribution, and deployment of Territorial Forces.
- Decentralization of funding authority and responsibility to the local levels.
- Improvement of government functioning at all levels.
- Establishment of GVN programs designed to alleviate the impact of the reduction of US presence.
- Establishment of GVN programs that help "bind the wounds of war" such as: vocational training, rehabilitation of war victims and disabled veterans, housing, and employment services.
- Establishment of a management and reporting system suitable to the level of the GVN needs and sophistication required.
- Development or improvement of policies pertaining to conscription, mobilization, draft deferments, reserve programs, terms of service agreements, PW repatriation, Military Police procedures, and health care services and medical policies.
- Development of responsive distribution systems, increase the efficiency of maintenance systems, and establish efficient control of labor and material resources.
- Development of a self-propagating ADP system with the required responsiveness to meet the needs and demands of the RVNAF. 144

(S) As the year ended, an interim organization of Headquarters MACV was under active consideration.

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Redesignation of Field Commands

(C) Reflecting the decreased combat role of US Forces and the projected reversion of MACV to an advisory group status, changes were made during 1971 in field headquarters and advisory elements. These subordinate elements of MACV were restructured, at reduced strength, in an effort to insure more efficient, coordinated advisory assistance commensurate with the objectives of Vietnamization.

(S) During 1970, HQ MACV, component commands, and major field commands had been substantially reduced (except for only slight reduction in XXIV Corps in MR 1, because of the substantial US forces retained there). I and II FFORCEV were scheduled for consolidation with the respective military region US Army advisory group (USAAG) and conversion to Military Assistance Commands (MACs); the MACs would command the residual US forces as well as provide advisory assistance support to RVNAF. At that time, the redesignation and conversion was scheduled by 1 Jul 71. ¹⁴⁵

(U) Early in 1971 the first step was taken in the reorganization of the command and advisory structure. On 30 April, COMUSMACV redesignated all field commands except XXIV Corps in MR 1. In MR 2, IFFORCEV was redesignated Second Regional Assistance Command (SRAC); IFFORCEV merged with USAAG MR 3 and became the Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC); the Delta Military Assistance Command, MR 4, converted to the Delta Regional Assistance Command (DRAC).

(U) Because of the proximity to North Vietnam, MR 1 required US combat support for a longer period than the other regions. XXIV Corps and the Advisory Group in MR 1 were scheduled to consolidate early in 1972, at which time the new command would become the First Regional Assistance Command (FRAC). ¹⁴⁶

(U) Further reorganization took place in SRAC in May 1971. On 16 May, COMUSMACV activated the Second Regional Assistance Group (SRAG) to replace SRAC as the senior MACV activity in MR 2. SRAC was redesignated Headquarters, US Army Forces, MR 2. Mr. John P. Vann was designated Director, SRAG, and Senior Advisor to the CG, II Corps and MR 2. To assist him in the discharge of his responsibilities were two deputies: the Deputy for Military Functions, who was the CG, US Army Forces, MR 2, and the Deputy for CORDS. This action represented a new melding of military and civil functions at the highest level of the field advisory effort. ¹⁴⁷ The reorganization of MR 2 was completed on 2 Nov 71 when the US Army Advisory Group, II Corps and MR 2, was inactivated and SRAG was redesignated Second Regional Assistance Group/US Army Forces Military Region 2. ¹⁴⁸

Reduction of MACV Staff Advisory Elements

(C) The first major internal reduction in support of MACV's transition into a VAC headquarters was the disestablishment of the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Assistance (ACofS, MA, or MACMA). This office had been established on 9 Sep 67 as the principal program manager of and the focal point for the military assistance and advisory effort the RVN. ¹⁴⁹

(U) The organization of MACMA on 1 Feb 71 is shown in Figure VIII-11. On 1 May 71, MACMA was reorganized and eight personnel spaces were deleted. This resulted in the elimination of the Advisor Affairs Division and the Evaluation Branch. An Advisor Liaison Branch was created and replaced the Evaluation Branch as the third branch of the RVNAF Plans and Force Structure Division. The functions of the Evaluation Branch were absorbed by the remaining branches in the Plans and Force Structure Division. ¹⁵⁰


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ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

(as of 1 Feb 71)

Total Authorized-59



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Source: MACMA

Figure VII-11

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(C) On 1 Nov 71, the office of the ACofS, MA (37 officers, 17 EM) was dissolved and functions were merged with other staff agencies. The Plans and Force Structure Division, less the Advisor Liaison Branch, was absorbed by MACJ3-03 which assumed the MACMA functions of long-range and mid-range planning for the RVN military assistance effort; planning and developing MACV recommendations on RVNAF force structure; recommending changes within MASF-supported RVNAF manpower ceiling; monitoring the progress of CRIMP; assisting advisory elements in development of Tables of Allowances and validating changes to these documents; and proponency for ARVN infantry and infantry-type Tables of Organization and Equipment.

(C) MACJ1 took over the Advisor Liaison Branch functions of coordinating with appropriate US and GVN authorities all matters pertaining to the RVNAF advisory programs; providing the MACV central point of contact on advisory matters for the Field Advisory Elements, Naval Advisory Group (NAG) and Air Force Group (AFGP); and providing field liaison to CORDS and Army Advisory Elements. MACJ4 absorbed the Organization and Programs Division and became responsible for the development of RVNAF authorization documents (less VNAF and VNN), control of the MASF program, and monitor of approved ARVN requisitions.¹⁵¹

(U) On 12 Dec 71 all traces of MACMA's former existence disappeared when the Advisor Liaison Branch was eliminated from the MACJ1 JTD. The functions of the branch were allocated to other MACV staff agencies:¹⁵³

- J1: retained responsibility for review of adequate personnel and administrative support to all advisory elements.
- J3: became the central point of contact on advisory matters for the FAE, NAG, and AFGP and was responsible for review of FAE requests for changes to JTDs.
- J4: reviewed adequacy of logistical support to all advisory elements.
- all other cognizant staff sections: coordinated with appropriate US and GVN authorities on all matters pertaining to RVNAF advisory programs, and provided necessary field liaison to CORDS and Army Advisory Elements.

Changes in HQ MACV Manpower Authorizations

(U) The steady reduction in HQ MACV manpower is shown in Figure VII-12, which shows Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) authorizations for HQ MACV staff elements from May 1969 to March 1972. Note that until 14 Mar 72, there was a separate JTD for HQ CORDS elements.

CHANGES IN FIELD ADVISORS

(U) Changes in advisory effort particularly affected the level of advisory effort in the field. As headquarters and subordinate commands consolidated and reduced, the advisors assigned to MACV were reduced. The reduction in strength in the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) organization, discussed below, encompasses both headquarters and field elements.

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HQ MACV MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS

STAFF AGENCY	25 MAY 69	28 JAN 70	30 MAY 70	1 OCT 70	1 FEB 71	20 SEP 71	2 JAN 72	14 MAR 72
CMD GP	29	61	61	55	49	66	57	59
Dep CoS for Econ Affairs 1	--	--	--	18	18	25	23	18
Asst CoS for Mil Assistance 2	61	66	66	61	59	52	0	0
Asst CoS for CORDS 3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	174
J-1	96	78	45	40	35	31	34	55
J-2	360	338	338	296	254	256	242	206
J-3	511	368	345	299	255	274	255	194
J-4	147	155	134	124	114	138	145	125
J-5 4	38	40	40	35	30	26	18	0
J-6	79	46	48	48	42	37	30	19
Construction Directorate	101	87	65	51	46	43	38	21
Training Directorate 5	69	96	8	0	0	0	0	0
AG 6	204	297	297	256	219	216	81	61
SJA	17	16	12	11	10	10	9	6
Chaplain	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	5
HQ Cndt 7	39	58	62	64	56	59	0	0
IG	21	50	47	47	47	36	30	20
Surgeon	51	47	35	35	35	31	19	13
OI	62	53	48	42	36	31	25	17
Comptroller	24	22	23	20	18	16	14	13
Data Mgmt Agency 8	--	89	89	85	81	70	66	60
Office of The Provost Marshal 9	--	25	23	22	25	25	23	21
Free World Mil Assistance Office	14	13	13	12	12	10	9	7
Science Advisor	18	10	10	9	8	7	6	0
Technical Assistance Coordinator 10	2042	2021	1815	1636	1455	1465	1130	1078
	(1346)	(1365)	(1205)	(1084)	(973)	(1000)	(716)	(604)
ARMY	(209)	(189)	(179)	(157)	(141)	(136)	(122)	(109)
NAVY	(367)	(360)	(329)	(308)	(280)	(275)	(242)	(219)
USAF	(104)	(92)	(87)	(73)	(49)	(43)	(40)	(19)
USMC	(16)	(15)	(15)	(14)	(12)	(11)	(10)	(47)
USCIV								

- 1 Initially established in the 1 Oct 70 JTD.
- 2 Disestablished 1 Nov 71 and functions transferred to J3 and J4.
- 3 Spaces formerly carried in the HQ CORDS JTD. Effective with the 14 Mar 72 JTD, spaces were transferred to the HQ MACV JTD.
- 4 Disestablished 1 Apr 72 and functions transferred to J1 and J3.
- 5 Beginning with the 30 May 70 JTD, spaces were transferred to the Staff Advisory Element (SAE) JTD.
- 6 The large decrease in spaces in the 2 Jan 72 JTD was due primarily to the transfer of various Army personnel functions to the 527th Personnel Services Company.
- 7 The HQ Cndt spaces were combined with the USAHAC spaces to form MACV Special Troops effective 1 Jan 72.
- 8,9 Initially established in the 7 Jan 70 JTD.
- 10 Formerly Science Advisor.

Source: MACJ3

Figure VIII - 12

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CORDS Advisory Strength

(U) In June 1971, COMUSMACV addressed the mission and strength of the CORDS organization in light of impending strength reductions and possible variations in its structure.¹⁵³

It must be clearly recognized, however, that US personnel remaining in the CORDS structure, however few, continue the mission involved in Vietnamization, i. e., assisting and supporting the strengthening of the Vietnamese constitutional structure. The reduction in numbers of Americans does not reduce the responsibilities of those remaining. The CORDS structure will be reduced to the minimum necessary to carry out its role in Vietnamization.

(C) At the same time the American Embassy, Saigon, directed that a detailed study be made of potential civilian and military strength reductions in CORDS for FY72. The study concluded that 2,673 personnel -- a 10.4 percent reduction -- would be a viable program, provided CORDS personnel spaces would be filled to, or approximate, projected authorizations and that the new strength ceilings would not have to be met prior to 30 Jun 72. On 16 Sep 71, SECSTATE informed the Ambassador that President Nixon had approved the following CORDS personnel ceilings to be attained by the end of FY72:¹⁵⁴

<u>Type</u>	<u>Personnel Spaces</u>
<u>Military</u>	
HQ MACV	142
MR headquarters	166
Provinces	1,309
Districts	411
Mobile Advisory Teams	0
Subtotal	2,028
<u>Civilian (CORDS/AID)</u>	
Chieu Hoi	3
Community Development	9
Public Safety	186
Saigon Civil Assistance Group	2
War Victims	38
Senior Management Positions	68
Program Officers and Management Analysts	27
Administrative	65
Development Advisors	142
Secretaries	30
Vietnam Training Center, Wash. D.C.	20
Subtotal:	590
Total:	2,618

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(C) The CORDS military personnel reductions from mid-1970 to 30 Nov 71 were 3,802 spaces, or 55.3 percent of the peak 1970 total authorization of 6,876. On 4 Dec 71 the forecast for future CORDS strength was as follows:¹⁵⁵

	<u>End FY71</u>				<u>End FY72</u>			
	Civilian				Civilian			
	<u>AID</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>DOD</u>	<u>MIL</u>	<u>AID</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>DOD</u>	<u>MIL</u>
HQ MACV	260	9	43	225	198	9	41	142
MR 1	92	31	3	868	63	20	3	237
MR 2	124	34	2	920	99	26	3	466
MR 3	132	38	4	966	85	20	4	477
MR 4	184	42	3	1,773	125	30	4	706
VN Tng	-30				20			
Cen, Wash	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	822	154	55	4,752	590	105	55	2,028

	<u>End FY73</u>				<u>End FY74</u>			
	Civilian				Civilian			
	<u>AID</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>DOD</u>	<u>MIL</u>	<u>AID</u>	<u>OPCON</u>	<u>DOD</u>	<u>MIL</u>
HQ MACV	67	8	41	100	132	0	41	82
MR 1	52	18	3	165	37	12	3	30
MR 2	92	18	3	246	62	12	3	55
MR 3	71	15	4	286	50	8	4	47
MR 4	103	21	4	320	82	15	4	78
VN Tng	20				0			
Cen, Wash	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	505	100	55	1,117	363	64	55	292

Modification of the District Senior Advisor Program

(U) On 1 Sep 71, HQ DA approved revised personnel requirements for the District Senior Advisor (DSA) program. The new requirements increased the program's FY72 end-strength from 124 to 156 and decreased its FY73 end-strength from 65 to 0. The following actions were taken or planned to meet the objectives. (1) commencing with class 40 at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), which ran from 15 Nov 71 to 24 Mar 72, the 18-month tour option with its attendant incentives was withdrawn and the length of tour for DSAs was reduced to 12 months; (2) effective 15 Nov 71, requests for tour extensions (18 months option) from either students attending FSI or DSAs serving in Vietnam were no longer approved; (3) effective 15 Nov 71, unprogrammed

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replacements were drawn from MACV in-country assets: these personnel, if nominated by MACV, were offered the opportunity to join the DSA 12-month program provided they had sufficient time remaining in-country to serve at least 10 months in a DSA position prior to 30 Jun 73; (4) student input for class 41 (17 Jan to 19 May 72), would be increased to provide 100 percent fill (156) by end FY72. Subsequent FSI classes would be cancelled.¹⁵⁶

Elimination of Mobile Advisory Teams

(U) The increased ability of the Vietnamese to assume responsibility for pacification programs had a direct influence on the phasedown of a key CORDS advisory element -- the Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs). The program was initiated in March 1968 when the first class of 25 MATs entered the USARV Advisory School. Initially 353 teams were provided to assist the RF and PF in developing comprehensive village defense plans. As a result of the rapid growth of elements of the People's Self-Defense Force an additional 134 MATs were authorized in 1970. It was during this period that the MAT peak strength was reached; thereafter, as the Vietnamese assumed a greater share of the pacification effort, the MAT presence decreased. On 31 Dec 71, the number of authorized teams had been reduced from 487 to 66 and it was anticipated that MATs would be totally eliminated during the first half of CY72.

(U) As the MATs phased out, the mission of the USARV Advisor School at Di An was reduced and the school was inactivated on 30 Sep 71. Although this school was administered by USARV, it was under the operational control of HQ MACV to train personnel for duty with the US Mobile Advisor Teams. The last MAT class graduated on 29 Sep 71.¹⁵⁷

(C) Restructuring of combat assistance teams. Division Combat Assistance Teams (DCATs) had operated in each MR for many years and were organized to provide tactical assistance and advice to ARVN units down to battalion level. In November 1970, COMUSMACV advised all MR Senior Advisors (SA) of his plan to restructure the DCATs and eliminate Regimental and Battalion Combat Assistance Teams (RCATs and BCATs). This concept was fundamental to the gradual shift in the advisory effort.

(C) Under the initial plan, 183 BCATs were to be phased out by 1 Jul 71 and 36 RCATs were to be eliminated between 1 Sep 71 and 1 Mar 72. With the elimination of the BCATs, two three-man teams would be added to each RCAT and utilized in a mobile assistance concept to support ARVN battalion training and operations. To compensate for the ultimate reduction of RCATs, a five-man team would be added to the DCAT to selectively provide assistance and coordination to the ARVN as required. The team consisted of one lieutenant colonel, two majors, one captain, and one E7.¹⁵⁸

(C) In May 1971, after LAM SON 719, a review was conducted to determine the impact of eliminating the battalion tactical advisors. The consensus of all senior advisors of MRs and divisions was that the phasedown should continue as planned. The BCAT reductions proceeded as scheduled and were completed on 30 Jun 71 with the exception of MR 1 in which retention of battalion advisors in selected units was authorized until 30 Sep 71. Also, the Airborne Division was authorized to retain BCATs until 1 Nov 71.¹⁵⁹

(S) With the RCAT phasedown scheduled to begin on 1 Sep 71, the SA, SRAG on 18 Jun 71 requested authorization to retain a two-man team in seven regiments beyond March 1972. In July the CG, DRAC requested retention of RCATs through CY72. On 16 Jul 71, COMUSMACV directed that the total strength of individual DCATs in each MR would not exceed 100 spaces by 31 Dec 71 nor 50 spaces by 30 Jul 72. This gave SRAG and DRAC the latitude to retain RCATs as required, provided they did so within the specified strength ceiling. On 31 December the phased restructuring of DCATs was proceeding according to the basic plan and within authorized strength constraints.¹⁶⁰

Phasedown of Other Field Advisory Elements

(U) The increase in Vietnamese expertise and training capability also contributed to diminishing the advisory role. Many long standing advisory positions in the RVNAF service schools were phased out as the incumbent US advisors completed their tours in RVN. The following field advisory elements (FAE) were terminated in 1971:¹⁶¹

<u>F AE Locations</u>	<u>Began</u>	<u>Terminated</u>
Admin/Finance School, JGS Compound	1965	5 Apr 71
MP School, Vung Tau	Aug 1962	24 Apr 71
AG School, JGS Compound	1962	14 May 71
Mil Dog Trng School, Trang Tuy Ha	Feb 1962	12 Sep 71
QM School, Saigon	1963	12 Sep 71
WAFC Trng Center, Saigon	Sep 1968	18 Oct 71
Advisor to Director, WAFC, JGS Compound	1965	30 Nov 71

Summary of Advisory Reductions

(C) US elements. Major reductions were made throughout the year in most of the advisory elements including HQ MACV. The steady improvement in ARVN permitted gradual selective reduction of advisory teams and FAEs. Paradoxically the buildup and development of the VNAF and VNN required that the US Air Force (AFGP) and Navy Advisory Groups (NAG) remain essentially constant until their counterpart services attained a greater degree of self-sufficiency.¹⁶² The scope and effectiveness of the advisory effort contributed by the AFGP and NAG are discussed in detail in Chapters V and VI respectively.

(C) US Advisor Strength, CY71¹⁶³

<u>Element</u>	<u>1 Jan 71</u>		<u>1 Jan 72</u>		<u>In-Country Reduction</u>
	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgn</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgn</u>	
HQ MACV Staff	1,522	1,894	1,261	1,398	-496
F AE (less NAG, AFGP)	4,811	5,416	5,003	3,888	-1,528
CORDS	6,661	6,147	4,752	2,682	-3,465
NAG	2,729	3,288	2,970	2,912	-376
AFGP	1,148	1,011	1,195	904	-107

(C) Third country elements. Free World Military Assistance Forces continued their advisory assistance in PSYOP, civic action, counterinsurgency training, and medical aid. These contributions are highlighted in the training section of this chapter and in Annex G, Free World Forces. By 31 Dec 71 the preponderance of Free World advisory elements had been withdrawn, leaving New Zealand and Australia as the major advisory/training elements. New Zealand would maintain a training group through 1 Jul 72, and Australia would furnish a training team and an engineer group (132 troops) in addition to 30 instructors for FANK training. The Australian advisory force was assigned as follows:¹⁶⁴

Advisors/instructors, JWTC	27
MATTS, Phuoc Tuy Province	10
RF/PF Advisor, Phuoc Tuy Province	1
Assistance to FANK training at US sites	30

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THE FUTURE ADVISORY EFFORT

Reappraisal of the Advisory Effort

(S) The impact which Vietnamization and US redeployments had had on the advisory effort in RVN was the subject of a JCS query to CINCPAC in October 1971. The JCS also requested CINCPAC's views on planned objectives, functions, and structure of the future advisory effort.

(S) Stressing the more important issues involved, the following specific questions were posed. (1) Should the advisory structure and role revert to the pre-1965 posture? (2) Should the advisory reduction be tied to the reduction of other US forces? (3) What are the most important continuing advisory functions and can they be fulfilled through other than US channels? (4) How important is the information gained by field advisors, at what level do we need advisors to obtain it, and could it be obtained in any other way? (5) Is it feasible to develop a small corps of high-quality advisors to concentrate on the weaker RVN military units and provinces? (6) Should the imminent US advisory reduction be concentrated in MR headquarters and staffs as opposed to the field elements? (7) What "mix" is appropriate between military and pacification advisors?¹⁶⁵

Military Assistance Objectives

(S) COMUSMACV was subsequently tasked by CINCPAC to provide views, comments, and recommendations relative to the RVN advisory effort and the specific questions raised by JCS. Based on the objectives of the Military Assistance Program, Vietnam which COMUSMACV had proposed in July 1971, a succinct appraisal of advisory accomplishments and a forecast for the future was provided CINCPAC on 14 Oct 71.

(S) The basic objectives of MAP Vietnam were:

- To assist the Republic of Vietnam in developing an improved and modernized armed force which is self-sufficient with the manpower and operational capability to:
 - Defend against the NVA/VC threat, both internal and external, with decreasing support from US and Allied forces.
 - Assist in creating and maintaining an environment within which the people of South Vietnam can be self-governing.¹⁶⁶

(S) Military assistance objectives were realized throughout 1971 by concentrating the advisory effort on the functional areas of command and control, personnel logistics, training, communications-electronics, and civil operations and rural development. Within these functional areas emphasis was directed toward management of resources and developing the capability to fully plan for and integrate the military ground, air, and naval elements into a cohesive military force. The RVNAF assumed a major share of ground and naval operations, an increased share of air operations, and in general, demonstrated a high order of military competence. With this shift and the decrease of US combat power, the advisory force became increasingly more important. Advisory teams for all services were task organized to adapt to the changing concept.

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Advisory Accomplishments

(S) The advisory structure that existed prior to 1965 was oriented toward tactical operations and matters germane to the situation of that time and was not relevant to the present or future advisory requirements. As evidenced by the cross-border operations, the RVNAF demonstrated a steadily improving capability to conduct tactical operations and to maintain a secure environment. Since 1965 new and innovative elements had been added to the advisory effort, e.g., the integrated civil/military approach in the CORDS organization; the Single Integrated Military Telecommunications System (SIMS) for the RVNAF, automated data processing (ADP) systems, and a centralized, functioning logistics system. The trend had been toward more advice and assistance in these areas, with less advice in purely military areas. The steady improvement of the RVNAF permitted gradual selective withdrawal of advisory elements. These reductions were expected to accelerate as the services attained further competence and confidence. Advisor reductions would be concentrated at the lower organizational levels initially, and gradually proceed upward until advisors would be principally at the higher headquarters and in those areas where a specific weakness existed. During FY72 CORDS military advisors would continue to provide advice and assistance at Saigon, military region, province, and district levels. During 1973 the advisory effort at district level would be reduced, leaving only a district senior advisor who would probably be located at the province serving as a district liaison officer.

(S) The strength and role of the advisory force had not been determined independently from the consideration of other US force reductions. The advisory role increased in importance as US forces withdrew and the presence of the advisor assisted in sustaining the confidence of the RVNAF. Since mid-1969, when US forces began to redeploy there had been a continual decrease in both advisors and other US forces. While all US forces had reduced 66 percent by 1 Dec 71, the advisory effort had decreased 22 percent over the same period. Each redeployment increment had been tailored to achieve a balanced US force necessary to support the advisory and security efforts.

Utilization of Advisors

(S) The most important continuing military advisory functions were identified as being in the areas of command and control, personnel, logistics, training, communications-electronics, intelligence, and in monitoring the end-use of equipment provided through the MAP and MASF programs. In the civil sector efforts would continue to be focused upon advising and assisting the GVN at all levels to attain the broad objectives of the Community Defense and Local Development Plan: local self-defense, local self-government, and local self-development.

(S) COMUSMACV believed that the number of advisors could be reduced, but that the total advisory function could not be fulfilled without military advisors. Within the broad areas of logistics and communications-electronics, there were some tasks that could be performed by civilian contractor personnel. US "Service Department civilians" could be used to monitor MAP/MASF funding requirements. As a consideration towards helping to reduce the US presence in the RVN, contractor support could utilize third country resources or local contractual services. Another alternative was the use of MATs working primarily at MR level but with the capability of visiting field units when technical expertise was required. In this instance MACV stipulated that MATs were not as effective as resident advisors.

(S) The importance of information gained by US field advisors depended on where and how the information was used. While reports could be obtained from RVNAF sources alone, advisory channels were usually more responsive. The operational reports during the cross-border operations had been based on RVNAF input and were reasonably accurate. On the other hand, technical reports in the logistics, communications, maintenance, and intelligence areas

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required verification by advisory personnel. GVN officials at the highest levels realized the usefulness of the upward communication of data through US reporting channels. Not only did such data provide a cross check on Vietnamese reported information, but often constituted the only source of certain types of information from certain geographical areas. MACV continually reviewed reports with a view toward elimination, simplification, and consolidation. As these efforts continued, the reporting role of the advisor would diminish, however, it would have been premature for MACV to estimate the ultimate degree of reduction.

(S) The development of a small corps of high-quality advisors to concentrate on the weaker RVN military units and provinces was considered by MACV to be a desirable and an attainable objective provided those selected would be proficient in the Vietnamese language, have previous experience in the RVN, have an understanding of the people and their culture, and have the temperament and patience of soft-sell salesmen. Although the "small corps" concept was desirable the "concentration of effort on weak areas" was neither unique nor innovative. The MACV advisory effort had for some time concentrated effort where weaknesses existed, e.g., the logistics advisory element consisted of trained, experienced military and civilian personnel who were assigned to the RVNAF logistics commands, base depots, and other logistic agencies based on the degree of self-sufficiency achieved by the Vietnamese. The advisory effort in ARVN divisions was also tailored to place the skilled advisor where he was needed most.

Future Advisory Reductions


(S) Advisory reductions planned for the immediate future included concurrent reductions in both headquarters and field advisory elements. For comparison, under current plans the total strength of HQ MACV, service components, and MR headquarters, would be reduced between 1 Jul 71 and 30 Jun 72 by over 70 percent, while during the same period the total advisory force would be reduced by approximately 65 percent. Reductions in 1971 had been selective rather than spread evenly across the board. They were directly related to the advisory progress made, RVNAF capabilities and self-sufficiency, and US requirements. The HQ MACV staff had undergone continual modification in keeping with the changed nature of the war and continued US redeployments. Likewise, the US headquarters in each of the four military regions and the Naval and Air Force Advisory Groups had varied widely in size and mix to meet advisory requirements.

(S) The particular ratio of military to pacification advisors had and would continue to vary as each of these advisory efforts reduced over a period of time. A continuing need was envisioned for advisory effort in military areas. With respect to CORDS, the mix of personnel should and did vary by district, province, and MR according to the security, developmental needs, and situation at any given place and time.

(S) In summary, advisory emphasis had shifted from tactical operations to the functional and technical areas and the level of effort in terms of numbers of advisors decreased as the GVN and the RVNAF gained expertise in various areas. The reductions were conducted incrementally in careful balance with other US force redeployments, and the remaining advisory assets were and would continue to be assigned to teams tailored to satisfy existing requirements. This was equally true in HQ MACV where effort and personnel reduced as the US presence in RVN decreased. 167

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ORGANIZATION PLAN FOR MACV ECONOMIC AFFAIRS



Source: MACEA

Figure VIII-13

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ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF VIETNAMIZATION

A sound Vietnamese economy is crucial for political stability and a viable government . . . The Vietnamization program in its broadest sense means establishing security and winning allegiance in the countryside; developing responsive political institutions; managing a war-torn economy and steering it toward longer range development. Progress in these efforts will determine South Vietnam's future.

President Nixon's Third Annual
Foreign Policy Report, 9 Feb 72

(U) MACV's responsibility for economic affairs developed early in September 1970. At that time the SECDEF was concerned over the impact of economic matters on the success of Vietnamization and recognized the possible contribution by DOD to economic development in Vietnam through the US military presence, programs, and assets. Accordingly, SECDEF advised the Chairman, JCS, that he believed it imperative that COMUSMACV be assisted by an economic advisor who should be a general officer.

MACV'S ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS

(U) COMUSMACV established the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Economic Affairs (MACEA) on 4 Sep 70, to insure that Vietnamization did not fail for nonmilitary reasons and that DOD made maximum contribution to solution of GVN economic and financial problems. As advised by the SECDEF, close coordination with the US Mission and USAID was essential. During the remaining months of 1970 MACEA evaluated the RVN economic situation, identified problem areas, and formulated plans which were vigorously pursued during CY71. ¹⁶⁸

(U) In early 1971 the organization of MACV's Office of Economic Affairs was redesigned to respond more fully to the needs of the GVN civil sector and to parallel, to the extent possible, counterpart organizations of the US Embassy and USAID. The new organization of MACEA is shown in Figure VIII-13. ¹⁶⁹

(U) By SECDEF's October 1970 mandate, COMUSMACV was given the responsibility for a wide-ranging and detailed analysis of the RVN economy and the responsibility to provide DOD with the requisite information upon which DOD policies affecting US goals and the RVN economy would be made. In reviewing MACV's 1971 activities in fulfilling this charge, it is useful to make a two-fold distinction between these activities. On the one hand there were those studies and analyses which, in conjunction with actions by other US Mission agencies, had direct influence on resultant DOD policy actions. The activities of MACEA's Commercial Branch and Industries Branch fell predominantly in this category. On the other hand, a large portion of MACV's responsibility required the monitoring, analyzing, and reporting to DOD of general economic conditions within the RVN. While such studies provided the requisite economic intelligence for US Mission policy decisions, it was generally impossible to relate these reports to specific policy decisions. A prominent example of such reporting was the MACV Report on Economic Aspects of Vietnamization sent quarterly from COMUSMACV to the JCS. ¹⁷⁰ Such information received a forum wider than official DOD channels. For example, at a major RVN economic planning conference held 26 to 28 May 71 in Singapore, a representative of COMUSMACV participated with senior Washington and Saigon representatives of USAID, DOD, and the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). ¹⁷¹ MACV analyses provided, in part, the information and

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studies which formed the bases for the conference discussions. These contributed to informal recommendations to the GVN for major economic reforms later decreed on 15 Nov 71. Most of this second category of MACV economic intelligence was generated by the MACEA's Macro-Analysis Branch.

REVIEW OF THE RVN ECONOMY

(U) Throughout the last decade the RVN economy continued to expand despite the adverse influence of the war, which accentuated the problems characteristic of a contemporary, less developed country. To the extent that those problems were kept at bay, or even somewhat alleviated in certain instances, the RVN was heavily dependent upon foreign assistance, predominately from the US and significantly from the Department of Defense.

Gross National Product

(U) As with most less developed countries, the statistical base in the RVN was fragmentary and often conflicting. Nonetheless, most sources indicated that composition of the Gross National Product (GNP) had been distorted through the war years. The loss of rural security and the effects of military operations and restrictions in rural areas caused a relative decline in the contributions which agriculture and the industrial sector made to the GNP. Moreover, the weak RVN industrial sector was heavily concentrated in foodstuffs and beverages, products which did not provide long-run growth potential.

(U) It was clearly the public sector which had provided the main impetus to the GNP, reflecting not an increase in productive capacity but primarily the absorption of manpower and physical resources into the war effort. In short, although growth had occurred, the pattern of this growth did not provide a firm economic base for long-run development.

(U) As the RVNAF matured and strengthened, security returned to the countryside, agricultural restrictions were relaxed, and RVN industry was revitalized.

SECTOR ORIGIN OF GNP (percent of GNP)

CY	<u>Agriculture</u>	<u>Service</u>	<u>Manufacturing and Industry</u>	<u>Public Admin and Defense</u>
1964	32	35	12	21
1969	24	32	4	39
1971	29.70	24.20	14.75	31.35

PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL AGRICULTURE PRODUCTS (1,000 metric tons)

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971*</u>
Paddy	4955	5185	5115	5716	6223
Fish	NA	397	464	577	600
Forestry <u>1</u> /	319	303	463	427	670
Rubber	78	74	28	33	36

1 / Cubic meters of round and sawn wood arrivals in Saigon
* Estimate

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INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT, CY70

Percent of Contribution	VN\$27.3 billion
Foodstuffs	9.3
Beverages	59.1
Tobacco products	13.3
Textile	9.2
Other (clothing, wood products, paper, chemicals, metal products, machinery)	9.1

Note: Comparative figures not available for CY71

Inflation

(U) The GVN budget for 1971 shown below, revealed a pattern typical of the past decade. Total expenditures of VN\$260 billion [approximately 59 percent of which supported the Ministry of National Defense (MOND)], were matched by only VN\$50 billion of domestic tax revenues, indicating the critical weakness of the domestic tax system. When all sources of GVN revenues were considered, the 1971 budget produced a deficit equal to VN\$61 billion:

GVN BUDGET CY71 (VN\$ billions)

	Value	Percent of Expenditure
Expenditures	260.0	100
Tax Revenue		
Domestic taxes	50.0	19
Import taxes	109.0	42
Foreign aid and Other	39.5	15
Deficit	61.5	24

(U) Similar deficits in the past had contributed to massive inflation. During 1971 the GVN experienced significant success in holding inflationary pressure to 14 percent. This was achieved through GVN financial reforms which had begun in late 1970 and continued through 1971.

PERCENT INCREASE IN SAIGON RETAIL PRICE INDEX

Year	Percent
1966	36
1967	32
1968	30
1969	34
1970	30
1971	14

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Foreign Trade

(C) The most dramatic indication of the combined effects of underdevelopment, war, and inflation were found in Vietnam's economic relations with the world community. Continual inflation through the 1960s resulted in a significantly overvalued exchange rate which eroded the competitive position of the RVN in international markets. As the impact of war decreased, the production of Vietnam's principal export products, rice and rubber, declined to US\$12.5 million in 1971. The same factors contributed to an increasingly heavy dependence upon imports, producing a 1971 balance of trade deficit equal to US\$703 million. This deficit was entirely supported by foreign assistance; US\$311.5 million were provided through traditional US aid channels, and US\$403.2 million were provided primarily by DOD dollar expenditures in the RVN.

FOREIGN TRADE (US\$ million)

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1971</u>
Exports	84.5	12.5
Imports	<u>240.3</u>	<u>715.5</u>
Balance of Trade	-155.8	-703.0
 Total AID	 196.7	 311.5
 US Mission Expenditures in RVN (primarily DOD)	 Negligible	 463.2

(U) The foreign trade deficit emphasized two central points regarding the condition of the RVN economy. First, the maintenance of a politically viable RVN economic environment had been, and would continue to be, directly dependent upon US assistance. Second, the major DOD contribution to this assistance fully justified the close and continual involvement of the DOD, advised by MACV, in the economic conditions of Vietnam.

GVN Economic Reforms

(U) On 15 Nov 71, in his "State of the Republic" speech, President Thieu called for sweeping economic reforms.

-- A "realistic" piaster-dollar exchange rate designed to stimulate export production:

- Official US purchases at 118:1.
- US-financed imports at 275:1.
- GVN-financed imports at 400:1.
- Accommodations and exports at 410:1.

-- A simplified system of administering imports with a new import tax schedule of zero, 25, 50, and 200 percent designed to eliminate inefficient protection and stimulate sound industrial growth.

-- A wage increase of VNS1,200 per month (civilian and military), plus combat pay of VNS4,500 per month for designated RVNAF personnel. (Additional information on RVNAF pay is contained in the RVNAF Leadership section of this chapter.)

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-- A new investment law designed to attract foreign capital to the RVN economy by permitting annual repatriation of profits accruing to the foreign interest up to 100 percent of the total foreign capital investment.

(U) These actions were courageous and development-oriented, and indicative of the economic acumen of the GVN leadership. Given adequate external support, the reforms provided maximum opportunity for the RVN to progress toward economic independence.

MACV ECONOMIC EFFORTS

US Foreign Assistance to RVN

(U) A significant portion of MACV's economic projects were generated by the responsibility to monitor the foreign assistance program and advise DOD on money supply, expenditure rate, and RVN economic stability.

(C) US assistance came primarily from three sources: US aid programs such as the Commercial Import Program (CIP) and the Food-For-Peace program (Public Law [PL] 480); DOD dollar expenditures in the RVN; and the Military Assistance Service Funded Program (MASF) which provided RVNAF with military materiel directly from the several US services.

MAJOR SOURCES OF US ASSISTANCE, CY71 (US\$ million)

Aid programs	312
DOD expenditures	385
MASF	1,717
Total	2,414

(C) The dollar expenditure levels for DOD and the primary USAID programs are shown below. During CY70 and CY71 DOD contributed 48 and 55 percent of the respective total expenditures:

EXPENDITURE LEVELS (US\$ million)

CY70		CY71
165	PL 480	81
183	CIP	231
318	DOD	385
666	Total	697

(C) By providing RVNAF directly with war materiel, the MASF program both reduced the impact of war on the GVN budget and allowed the GVN foreign exchange (derived primarily from US aid programs and DOD expenditures) to maintain a level of civilian imports sufficient to sustain a politically and economically stable nation. Given that the level of US aid programs was largely outside DOD's influence, MACV was primarily concerned with three questions in this area. (1) what level of total GVN dollar resources was required to support an adequate civil

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Farmer Pham Van Dieu (center) in An Giang Province tills three hectares of riceland formerly withheld for military reasons.

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import program? (2) given that aid levels were fixed by the US Congress, what level of DOD dollar expenditures in the RVN was necessary to meet the requirement of RVN imports? and (3) once an annual level of DOD expenditures had been targeted by DOD, did monthly and quarterly expenditures track to reach the annual requirement?

(U) To answer the first two questions MACV developed a computerized, mathematical economic growth model designed to predict the amount of foreign assistance and import volume required to meet RVN national goals such as growth rate in GNP and consumption. In addition, the model was used to predict the consequence for GNP and consumption of various levels of US aid and DOD expenditures.

(U) To determine whether DOD components in the RVN were expending dollars at a rate adequate to achieve predicted annual DOD expenditure levels, MACV carried on a continuous projection of piaster purchases by DOD agencies in the RVN. The projections, complicated by a variety of exchange rates and budget accounting procedures, received high level consideration in Washington.¹⁷²

(U) Another area of MACV concern was the continuing problem of economic instability in the RVN. Reflecting the basic assumptions that inflation in Vietnam was related directly to changes in the money supply and inversely to the level of US assistance, MACV developed a computerized static expenditure model designed to predict inflationary pressure based on money supply and foreign assistance. The model was used extensively by DOD personnel in Saigon and Washington as a means of evaluating the effects of various economic policy decisions made throughout 1971.¹⁷³

Relief From Military Restrictions

(U) The impact which military operations had had on the RVN economy was emphasized in March 1971 when COMUSMACV issued a policy regarding denial of resources from productive use.¹⁷⁴

It is the policy of COMUSMACV that military decisions to deny resources from productive use consider carefully the economic effects of the restrictions imposed. The establishment or continuation of blockades or curfews in fishing areas, prohibitions against the planting of certain crops or the cultivation of designated lands, and the imposition of similar restrictions will be discouraged, consistent with the military situation. Restrictions now in effect will be reviewed to determine whether they can be relaxed or removed.

(U) In May, a MACV study was initiated to assess limitations of resources availability which could impede economic development and possibly delay RVN's attainment of economic self-sufficiency. The data source for this project was obtained from field commanders and included the amount of arable land lost to production as a result of implicit and explicit restrictions. This study was the first assessment to consider the influence of the military's role in economic development, and provide information for use in helping to determine priorities for securing certain restricted areas of economic significance. Further, it suggested trade-offs which could be made between the security of an area and the productive use of that area. The results of the study were furnished to US field commanders and to the Chief, JGS on 17 Nov 71.¹⁷⁵

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Commercial Projects

(C) A joint MACV (MACDC, MACEA and CORDS), USAID, GVN Committee for the Development of the Industry of Construction (CDIC) was convened in late April 1971 to (1) identify factors inhibiting growth in the indigenous construction industry and develop courses of action to overcome them, and (2) examine excess Raymond International, Morrison, Knudsen/Brown, Root, Jones (RMK/BRJ) contractor assets for the purpose of determining the base way of stimulating and supporting the growth of the local civilian industry. In order to provide a basis upon which these efforts could proceed, MACV completed a study which forecast rock and construction demand in RVN (nonmilitary) for the period 1972-76. This study, completed in June 1971, formed the basis upon which recommendations made by CDIC led to approval for transfer of five excess, completely operational, industrial sites and 725 items of major construction equipment to the Vietnamese Engineering and Construction Company (VECCO), a government-owned corporation. Additional information on CDIC and identification of these sites can be found in Chapter IX. At year-end, the CDIC was in the process of conducting a study to determine the best use of the RMK/BRJ Saigon Island Depot. This study was scheduled for completion in February 1972.

(U) One of the most inhibiting factors to development of RVN construction capabilities was the artificially low exchange rate of 118 piasters per dollar in a market conditioned by an equilibrium rate of about 390 piasters per dollar. This obstruction was partially removed in July by the granting of the parallel exchange rate of 275:1 to construction projects undertaken by VN firms. The position was again improved in November 1971 with the extension of the financial market rate of 410:1. The value of VN contracts increased from about US\$1.0 million in August 1971 to more than 6.5 million in December 1971.

(C) The remaining constraints in the areas of economics and finance were effectively covered by the GVN Economic Reform of 1971. Complicated prohibitive tariffs were removed for most construction equipment and restrictive import measures were simplified to benefit private business. In November, MACV teamed with the Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC) and the US Embassy to restrict bidding on the Bearcat Combined Arms School Project to qualified VN bidders. (Additional information on this project can be found under RVNAF Training.) The contract was let to VN contractors in December 1971 at a cost of US\$3.4 million, a savings of about 1.5 million based on earlier US estimates. During the same period, this team cooperated in restricting the ARVN-affiliated Vietnamese Industrial Construction Company (VICCO) from contract construction work administered by the US, thereby preserving the competitive spirit among private Vietnamese firms.

(U) Property disposal. In addition to the base and facility turnover to RVNAF which is discussed under RVNAF logistic upgrade, COMUSMACV also had interest in the disposal of facilities which had potential economic value for the RVN civil sector. In February 1971 the Facilities Disposition Committee (FDC), a joint MACV MACDC, J4, EA and CORDS) USAID group, sought to screen real property records to identify those facilities which, due to location, size, and function could best serve the civilian economy. Eighty such facilities were initially identified. The list, refined to 37, was turned over to the GVN Inter-Ministerial Committee for Determining Priorities and Allocation of Excess US Military Properties. This GVN committee examined all excess military property to determine best use by the GVN.¹⁷⁶ In 1971, 7 facilities were transferred to civil use: The Duc Hoa Advisory Compound, Qui Nhon Airfield, Cam Ly Airfield, Camp Brooks, Hon Tre Island, Camp Freznel Jones, and the Nha Trang Industrial Site. Numerous facilities also were given to the National Police for dismantling.

(C) In-country procurement of goods. To assist in promoting economic development and military-economic self-sufficiency and provide the GVN with additional foreign exchange, MACV set forth specific recommendations in late 1970 that would enable in-country procurement

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of MASF funded items which were being procured outside Vietnam, e.g., lumber, operational rations, and sandbags. Subsequently, on 31 Mar 71, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (I&L) acting in response to MACV recommendations, authorized the CO, United States Procurement Agency, Vietnam (USAPAV) to conduct test procurements of MASF funded commodities provided certain conditions were satisfied. These conditions, which were in effect throughout the remainder of 1971, permitted test procurements to be conducted provided:

- The Vietnamese bid for an item was less than the US cost of the item plus estimated packaging and transportation charges to SVN.
- A significant portion of the final value of all products purchased was created in RVN by local manufacturers or processors.
- It was determined that the Vietnamese industry from which the goods were purchased had the prospect of becoming internationally competitive at an equilibrium official exchange rate.

(C) Vietnamese goods could meet the price competitive criteria only if GVN authority were obtained to allow the bidders to use the export rates of 275:1 instead of the official rate of 118:1. A formal request to obtain this authority was submitted by the American Embassy to the RVN Prime Minister in January 1971. Unfortunately, GVN authority to use the export rate of exchange was not obtained until 29 May 71. This delay on the part of the GVN proved to be a costly one since using activities in RVN had to continue to requisition fiscal year requirements from CONUS.

(C) The foregoing dramatized the need for a flexible, less restrictive, commodity procurement program, one that would take into consideration anticipated changes in the official exchange rate and industrial capability. Accordingly, MACV developed such a program, the Vietnam Developmental Procurement Program (VDPP), which was submitted to SECSTATE and SECDEF on 8 Nov 71. On 15 Nov 71, the GVN promulgated a commendable package of economic reforms which included a new rate of exchange entitled the Financial Market Rate (FMR) of 410:1. This rate replaced the old export rate and was extended to procurement of VDPP items shortly before the end of the year. Use of the FMR would make additional locally-produced commodities price competitive and was expected to facilitate accomplishment of the basic goal of the VDPP to procure commodities valued at up to US\$5 million in FY72 and thus establish the basis for an evolutionary procurement program that would exceed US\$15 million in FY73.¹⁷⁷

(C) In-country procurement of services. During the second half of CY71, MACV conducted a detailed analysis of the status of DOD-funded service contracts calling for performance in RVN. For the purposes of this review, contracts were categorized into 17 functional areas, e.g., construction, marine maintenance, stevedoring, etc. The final report, submitted to JCS on 19 Jan 72, pointed out that as of 15 Oct 71, Vietnamese contractors had been awarded only 5.5 percent (US\$23.2 million) of the total dollar value of FY72 DOD service contracts reviewed. For FY73, it was estimated that local national (LN) contractors would receive 8.0 percent (US\$15.1 million) of the contracts to be awarded. To increase the LN share of the contractual effort, the report recommended that DOD seek authority to permit in-country procurement personnel to award USG contracts to LN bidders provided three conditions were met: first, that the contracting officer determine that LN capability existed; second, that an element of free and open competition for the procurement existed; and third, that the LN offers obtained were reasonable and under no circumstances exceeded 20 percent above the lowest invited bid for the contract in question. This recommendation was applicable to six of the 17 functional areas. MACV further recommended that DOD require subcontracting with LN firms in the area of operation and maintenance (O&M) of government facilities. MACV estimated that indigenous contractors could obtain approximately US\$51.3 million in FY73 contracts if the foregoing recommendations were approved and implemented.¹⁷⁸

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THE SOLDIERS' MUTUAL AID AND SAVINGS FUND




Figure VII-14

Source: MACEA

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(U) Ferrous scrap. With the drawdown of US troops, there was little reduction during 1971 in war-generated scrap at US property disposal yards. Sales and new generations were about equal, with a year-end inventory of approximately 118,000 tons of ferrous scrap.

(U) Recognizing ferrous scrap as a potential national resource, representatives of the American Embassy, MACV, and the Property Disposal Agency, Vietnam, developed a proposal in October 1971 which would accelerate sales while preserving the scrap in-country. Under this plan, the GVN would purchase the scrap at a price well below the local market and retain it in-country for future sales to the nascent steel industry. In order to insure maximum economic benefit to the GVN, export of this scrap would be prohibited. Through this program the US would be able to dispose of scrap through sale vice abandonment; the GVN would retain a vital raw material; and the emerging steel industry would be stimulated. In this latter regard, approximately 91,430 short tons of wire rods, reinforcing bars, and steel billets were imported annually. All these items should be processed from scrap using indigenous labor.

(U) The draft US proposal was subsequently altered to reflect sales to the GVN at 25 to 33 percent of international market price in lieu of employing the official exchange rate (118:1). It was considered more realistic to effectively lower prices via such a discount rather than through application of a non-rational exchange rate. The GVN informally indicated approval of such an agreement on 21 Jan 72, and on 4 Feb 72, CG USARV requested DA authority to enter into negotiations with the GVN for such an agreement. 179

Military-Economic Interrelationships

(U) MACV studies and efforts also extended to specific areas of interface between the military and civil economic sectors, particularly those involving industrial, agricultural, and manpower resources.

(C) Mutual savings fund. The RVNAF Soldiers' Mutual Aid and Savings Fund (SMASF) was established in 1968 by decree of the Minister of Interior to provide a savings fund for servicemen, support military social welfare programs, and provide assistance for disabled servicemen and families of deceased or missing servicemen. The fund was supported by involuntary deductions from the pay of servicemen in the amount of VN\$100 monthly.

(C) From the fund's inception to 1970, its capital was invested in bank deposits and government bonds. In 1970 the decision was made by the fund's management to seek out more profitable investments. That decision led to the incorporation of the Commercial and Industrial Bank, commonly referred to as the military bank. This bank actively competed as a full service commercial bank. Additional companies were formed during 1971 with fund support. The Vietnamese Industrial Construction Corporation (VICCO) was formed in January 1971 and engaged in all types of construction activity. The Vietnam Transportation Corporation (VINAVATCO), active in stevedore services, freight handling, and in developing basic transportation services, was formed in June 1971. The Foods Production Corporation (FOPROCO) was formed in September 1971 to process food products. The Industrial and Commercial Company (ICICO) was also formed in 1971, to sell all forms of insurance. In addition the fund held a minority interest in the COGIVINA Paper Company and the SICOVINA Textile Company. Figure VIII-14 portrays subsidiary companies and other investments of MMASF.

(C) On 9 Sep 71 the Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs, US Embassy, Saigon, expressed concern over the degree to which MMASF funds were being used for commercial and semi-public enterprises and solicited MACV's comments on the matter. There had been reports that VICCO had used its political power to obtain a contract that already had been awarded to a private company and there was also strong indication that MOND was proposing greater utilization of RVNAF manpower in economics and commercial activities.

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(C) MACV concurred with the Minister-Counselor's assessment of SMASF, supported the principle of noninvolvement by military agencies in nonmilitary affairs, and recommended a course of action on 27 Oct 71 which would reorganize SMASF and accomplish two objectives:

- Savings would be on a voluntary basis with participatory procedures established whereby individual depositors could exert influence over the fund's activities.
- The fund would function along the lines of a trust fund subject to GVN audit controls, with investments restricted to commercial bank deposits and government bonds, bills, or notes. ¹⁸⁰

(C) On 8 Nov 71, as a result of the MACV recommendation, Ambassador Bunker expressed his reservations concerning the fund's activities and proposed to Prime Minister Khieu that a joint US Mission/GVN Committee discuss the problem. ¹⁸¹ The first meeting of this committee was held in December 1971. Substantial progress was being made at year's-end to identify and eliminate objectionable features of the fund's activities. On 31 Dec 71 the total SMASF assets were VN\$3,262,678,775.

(U) RVNAF commissary system. In August 1971, the United States Embassy expressed concern over RVNAF commissary operations and requested assistance from COMUSMACV. RVNAF commissary reliance on imports at a preferential exchange rate was in conflict with US Mission efforts to stimulate economic development in South Vietnam. Purchases of imports at an unrealistic exchange rate (118:1) created undesirable economic effects: (1) depressed the demand for local products which were substitutes for commissary imports, (2) required large amounts of GVN foreign exchange, (3) enabled the commissary to adopt unrealistic pricing policies, and (4) acted as a barrier for new and existing domestic producers to expand capacity in commodity markets catering to commissary demand. A joint RVNAF/MACV Committee was established in February 1972 to develop a Commissary Operating Policy Statement. The statement outlined the scope and direction of RVNAF commissary policies and insured that commissary policies would not undermine GVN efforts to stimulate economic development in South Vietnam. ¹⁸²

(U) Economic input to 1972 Combined Campaign Plan. In October 1971, RVNAF Combined Logistics Command and MACV jointly produced an economic annex for the Combined Campaign Plan 1972, AB 147. Inclusion of this annex represented the RVNAF's first recognition of the economic ramifications of military planning and operations. The basic purpose of the annex was to provide support to the GVN economic development program consistent with military objectives and capabilities. Specifically, implementation of the plan involved safeguarding the security of major lines of communications, and agricultural production and marketing areas; continued reliance upon local industries to provide items required by RVNAF; assisting the Vietnamese construction industry to increase production; and aiding the private sector development by specialized training programs for servicemen prior to their release from active duty.

(C) RVNAF farm program. The ARVN and VNN Farm Programs were implemented to raise the standard of living of military persons and their dependents and to provide them training in animal husbandry. A preliminary study of the comparative efficiencies of public (RVNAF) versus private civil sector swine breeding farms was conducted as a means of replacing the RVNAF Ration Supplement Program. Because of an imbalance in the distribution of breeder stock, feed, drugs, veterinarians and trained personnel, the efficiency of the public sector farm was found to be significantly greater than corresponding commercial enterprises. A 5-year development plan calling for extensive expansion of the farm program was produced by the ARVN Quartermaster Corps in November 1971. The project goals called for production of 50 percent of the total subsistence requirements of a 700,000 man force in 1976. Because of the magnitude of this planned expansion, this project's effect on private sector development

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was continuously evaluated. Due to MACV's recommendations, which emphasized the conflict between this program and the expansion of civilian entrepreneurship, the US Embassy directed that the activities of the RVNAF Farm Program be kept under close scrutiny.¹⁸³

(U) Local national labor force. During 1971, MACV devoted increased attention to local national manpower problems associated with US redeployment. In conjunction with other US and GVN agencies, MACV collected and disseminated information regarding local national reductions-in-force, and also requested the collection of more detailed manpower data on local nationals scheduled for release by the US sector. This information was passed on a regular basis to responsible GVN agencies. Moreover, MACV recommended to the US Embassy that an effective program be implemented to absorb terminated Vietnamese employees into RVNAF civilian jobs and GVN Civil Service. In December 1971 and January 1972, a job placement program was initiated by JGS/RVNAF to coordinate and expedite placement of local nationals released by the US sector.¹⁸⁴

(U) Rice distribution model. In May 1971, a simple computer model was constructed by MACV to facilitate a study of the potential costs of the GVN-supported rice distribution system from surplus areas in the Delta to rice-deficient areas of MRs 1 and 2. The purpose of the study was to determine the monthly cost of the current distribution system and the cost of alternatives. Findings of the study indicated that the GVN could save US\$15,750 per month by utilizing direct shipments of rice from the Delta (Dai Ngai) to MR 2 (Cam Ranh Bay), primarily by avoiding intermediate shipments through Saigon, as had been the historical practice. The model results were made available to USAID for action.¹⁸⁵

(U) Mineral exploration proposal. Numerous potential mineral areas had been found in RVN over the years and good samples of iron, copper, lead, and gypsum were identified. The GVN Geological Survey agency did not have the funds, manpower, or equipment for field work or follow-up on these discoveries. Consequently no reserve estimates had been made nor were investment opportunities known.

(U) A study was originated by MACV in October 1971 to prepare a minimum cost proposal for developing the mineral exploration capability in SVN. The study was completed on 25 December and recommendations were made to transfer excess US-owned, civilian-operated equipment to the GVN Geological Survey agency, screen RVNAF personnel assets for skills necessary for geological field work, and grant draft deferments for selected personnel.

(U) The MACV study was forwarded to the Director of USAID on 7 Jan 72 and was subsequently carried by him to AID, Washington, D.C.¹⁸⁶

(U) Wholesale fish marketing study. Saigon was the primary wholesale market for the commercial fishing industry of Vietnam. Monopolistic pricing policies employed by the fish brokers at the market had been a major constraint in the development of this industry and had historically resulted in low returns to producers and inflated prices to consumers. The brokers were able to maintain control of the industry through the practice of providing credit in return for a guaranteed supply from the fishermen. With support from USAID, a new Fishermen's Cooperative was organized by the GVN Directorate of Fisheries late in CY71 to provide an alternate and equitable marketing system.

(U) In December 1971, MACV completed a study which endorsed the new system and recommended that USAID support the Cooperative's request for a VN\$40 million loan from the Bank of Vietnam, and assist in obtaining surplus military equipment and the technical and material support necessary to insure success of the venture. The study was forwarded to USAID on 20 Feb 72.¹⁸⁷

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Summary

(U) In spite of war and the syndrome of underdevelopment, RVN experienced relative prosperity during 1971. However, the RVN economy was heavily dependent upon US aid, a large portion of which was directly attributable to military expenditures of the DOD. Vietnam's agricultural sector showed signs of revival as military security improved, but the industrial sector remained small and inefficient. Although significant success in reducing economic instability had been achieved, the national budget was still burdened with heavy defense expenditures and continued to generate inflationary deficits. Foreign exchange earnings through traditional exports had been woefully inadequate in providing the imports required for political and economic stability. Consequently imports still had to be directly supported by USAID and indirectly by DOD. It was hoped that the GVN economic reforms late in 1971 would produce an environment which would provide some degree of solution to these problems, but MACV would still continue to monitor and advise on the impact of military actions on the GVN economy.



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10. Same as # 7, p A-II-1.
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
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CHAPTER IX

US LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

The primary purpose of logistics is to deliver adequate potential or actual fire power or shock to the critical places at the critical times for achievement of tactical and strategic objectives. . . . All else is subordinate. . . .

Strategy and tactics and logistics are different aspects of the same thing. If completely separated they become meaningless. They comprise three arcs of a circle, without beginning or ending, each arc influencing, and influenced by, each of the others.¹

(U) Logistics activities in 1971, while similar in scope to those of the preceding year, reflected the change in US combat activity. Starting early in the year in Operation LAM SON 719, the US role was clearly one of support. In this RVNAF incursion into Laos, the US logistician's work overshadowed the combat function; the RVNAF was plainly responsible for conduct of the combat operations. But primarily during 1971, US logisticians were less occupied with combat support and were increasingly engaged in clearing or transferring facilities and processing large quantities of materiel for disposition. The sharper reduction of US and FWMAF strength during 1971 did not so much ease the burden of US logistical support as shift its emphasis from buildup to retrograde, and simultaneously as LAM SON 719 illustrated, from directly assisting all Allied military activities to accelerating the process of assuring RVNAF logistical self-sufficiency.

(U) To the logistician's classic role of providing US, RVNAF, and FWMAF forces with supplies, services, and facilities was added the management of a myriad of programs peculiar to the Vietnam war in 1971.

(U) Construction was a notable example of the change in focus. For the first time since the 1955 buildup, the FY 72 DOD budget contained no request for authorization or appropriations for military construction in support of Southeast Asia operations. Thus 1971 marked the beginning of the end of a unique era in combat history in which contractors and civilian workers had assumed a major construction role in an active theater of operations.² It became more difficult than ever to obtain approval of new construction, although building erection, repair, and maintenance were performed when required.

(U) Redeployments and a lesser US combat role also resulted in reducing casualties to the lowest rate since 1965. This in turn imposed fewer requirements on medical support facilities. MACV medical support organizations meanwhile continued their tasks of serving the remaining forces in Vietnam as well as supervising efforts of RVNAF units and agencies to improve health programs benefiting GVN troops, their dependents, Vietnamese civilians, and enemy prisoners of war.

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(U) MACV communications-electronics functions likewise reflected the progress of Vietnamization; as in the year past, communicators were engaged in planning signal unit redeployments, maintaining uninterrupted service throughout the changing command, and overseeing RVNAF assumption of signal responsibilities and functions. These included the transfer of 26 integrated communications systems sites, 51 manual telephone exchanges, 11 dial telephone exchanges, and 3 tandem telephone switching centers.³

(U) Not all logistics problems confronted in 1971 were totally overcome at year's end, by either the US or RVNAF, but the major activities -- transfer of equipment and facilities to the RVNAF, retrograde of US equipment, and continuing support of US forces in Vietnam -- were professionally and effectively accomplished.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES

Organizational Relationships

(C) Despite the large-scale redeployment of US units based in RVN and transfer of their missions to RVNAF, the logistical relationship of HQ MACV to its major subordinate commands remained essentially unchanged in 1971, except as indicated below. The service component commands continued to exercise the following support responsibilities.

DCG, USARV, for the CG, USARV:

- Directed and supervised the US Army logistic support system in the RVN, to include common supply and common service support for all US forces and FWMAF in MRs 1, 2, 3, and 4, and US Army-peculiar support throughout the RVN.
- Performed base development in MRs 1, 2, 3, and 4, except for bases and facilities assigned to other services.
- Provided administrative, logistic, and service support functions to HQ MACV and other directed activities.
- Coordinated real estate functions and activities of all US forces and FWMAF in MRs 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam (COMNAVFORV):

- Provided service-peculiar support for US Navy and Coast Guard units throughout the RVN.
- Performed base development functions for all Navy support and MARKET TIME bases.
- Provided naval mobile construction support to 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade (3d MAB) until redeployment, other US forces, and FWMAF.

Commander, Seventh Air Force (7AF):

- Was provided logistic support by USARV, except for service-peculiar items provided from own service resources.

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- Coordinated real estate functions and activities for all US forces and FWMAF on air bases where the Air Force had primary mission requirements.

CG, XXIV Corps: was provided logistic common item support and Army-peculiar items by USARV.

CG, 3d MAB (until redeployment end-June 1971): was provided logistic common item and common service support by USARV, except for service-peculiar items provided from own service resources.

(C) Following are the changes in logistical responsibilities required because of reorganization or redesignation of MACV's subordinate commands.

- Normal logistical responsibilities were transferred to the Second Regional Assistance Command (SRAC) on 30 April when IFFORCEV was redesignated SRAC. On 16 May when SRAC was redesignated the Second Regional Assistance Group (SRAG), with a civilian director, the logistical responsibilities were transferred to US Army Forces (USARMYF), MR 2, which was activated on that date. Combat service support to RVNAF in MR 2 was furnished by SRAG as required and approved by MACV.
- Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC) was assigned in April the logistical responsibilities formerly assigned to IFFORCEV.
- Delta Regional Assistance Command (DRAC) was assigned in April the logistical responsibilities formerly assigned to Delta Military Assistance Command.
- MACV Special Troops (MACST) replaced USA Headquarters Area Command effective 1 Jan 72 and assumed responsibility for providing logistical support to HQ MACV and to US and FWMAF forces in the greater metropolitan Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh/Tan Son Nhut area, less Tan Son Nhut Air Base. USARV was responsible for furnishing logistical support to MACST.⁴

Dissolution of ACofS, Military Assistance

(U) One of the initial steps taken to reduce the strength of HQ MACV, while maintaining continuity of operations, was the dissolution of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Assistance (ACofS, MA) effective 1 Nov 71. Up to that date, the ACofS, MA was the principal staff assistant to COMUSMACV for the RVNAF force structure and organization; the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program; the Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) Program; and the US Advisory Program. These major functions were transferred to the offices of the ACofS, J1, J3, and J4.

(U) The ACofS, MA responsibilities pertaining to service-funded military assistance were transferred to the ACofS, J4. These were:

- Coordinating all matters pertaining to RVNAF organization and the MASF Program.
- Disseminating command guidance and providing support on military assistance to the MACV staff and subordinate commanders.
- Developing the MASF Program for ARVN and reviewing the MASF programs developed by the Naval Advisory Group for the Vietnamese Navy and the Vietnamese Marine Corps, and by the Air Force Advisory Group for the Vietnamese Air Force.

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- Monitoring the execution of the overall MASF Program through an analysis of approved programs; recommending appropriate program adjustments and revisions; and serving as the MACV focal point for triservice review of military assistance support provided to the RVNAF.
 - Directing the functions and activities of the MASF Program Watch Committee.
 - Providing advice on all matters pertaining to service funded military assistance to the RVNAF.
 - Reviewing and approving RVNAF tables of organization and equipment and tables of allowances for MASF support.
 - Initiating programming actions for equipment and supplies to support ARVN and coordinating common item support for the RVNAF.⁵

MACV Relationship to MEDTC

(C) Establishment of MEDTC. When US military assistance to Cambodia was resumed on 22 Apr 70, upon request of the new government which replaced Prince Sihanouk, it was obvious that the growing VC/NVA threat demanded a strong, prompt logistical response to the requirements of the existing Cambodian armed forces and those yet to be organized and trained.⁶ A formal Military Assistance Program (MAP) was decided on as the most effective means of funding this support, because of the relative availability of MAP funds and the speed with which they could be obtained. Because of MACV's resources, capabilities, and ability to coordinate with the RVN for operational support, COMUSMACV felt that he should be assigned the responsibility for the management of MAP, Cambodia. Thus, based on CINCPAC's recommendation of 24 May 70, SECDEF placed the Cambodian MAP under the management of COMUSMACV with CINCPAC supervision.

(C) Since MACV was the only immediate source of supply for Cambodia, and because of the sensitivity of the Cambodian aid issue, initial staffing actions concerned with supplying Cambodia in April and early May 1970 were personally performed by the MACV ACoS, J4 assisted by several members of the staff. Continuous operations and emergency requirements, however, made it apparent that staff support could not be maintained effectively on an ad hoc basis. Therefore in late May, the Special Supply Support Group, later renamed the Special Support Group (SSG), was established to manage and coordinate the assistance program. MACJ4-SSG was composed of representatives from CINCPAC, MACTHAI, JGS, MACJ4, and US elements in Cambodia. The SSG became totally responsive to the urgent military needs of Cambodia and operated one of the most unique supply undertakings in recent military or foreign assistance history.

(C) The SSG performed its important and trying tasks commendably; but as the amount of US military materiel and services in RVN decreased with troop redeployments, the level of assistance to Cambodia continually increased, compelling COMUSMACV to recommend to CINCPAC in November 1970, the establishment of a joint service Cambodia Military Assistance Group. Ultimately, with SECDEF approval, CINCPAC activated the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC) on 31 Jan 71. Simultaneously, the SSG under ACoS, J4 was deactivated. The team was placed under the command of CINCPAC as MAP administrator, while COMUSMACV was designated the coordinating authority to ensure compatibility of assistance to Cambodia with Vietnamization. This coordination authority included the planning of force structures, programming of materiel, storage and delivery of equipment, and all other functions affecting the planning and execution of US and third country programs in the RVN and the Khmer Republic. In addition, COMUSMACV provided administrative and logistic support including airlift to MEDTC.⁷

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(U) MACV support of MEDTC. Since MEDTC was not configured or staffed to function independently, its operations were directly dependent on MACV support. MEDTC maintained daily coordination with MACV staff elements, particularly the J2, J3, J4 and MACV Training Directorate. The J2 and J3 staffs maintained Cambodian desks and provided daily intelligence and operations summaries, and friendly and enemy order of battle data. The J4 staff provided a full range of technical advice, transportation assistance, and feedback on local availability of supplies and equipment for issue or loan. As required, all staff elements assisted MEDTC with expert advice and recommended solutions to numerous problems. MACV and its subordinate commands made individuals and teams available to enter Cambodia to survey schools, training centers, and many other technical facilities in order to provide data for improving MEDTC's operations. For example, the MACV Surgeon, in continuous liaison with MEDTC and the Surgeon of the Cambodian armed forces, recommended to MEDTC the types and quantities of medical equipment for all MAP Cambodia tables of organization and equipment, the numbers and types of hospitals required, and the quantities and types of medical supplies to requisition. The MACV Surgeon also operated the Medevac system in support of MEDTC in Phnom Penh.

(U) In addition to this assistance related to its mission performance, MEDTC was also wholly dependent on MACV for administrative support.⁸ The timing and effectiveness of MEDTC support was in large part responsible for the failure of the VC/NVA forces to improve their military posture significantly within Cambodia in 1971. (For additional information see Annex I)

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PROGRAMS

(C) MACV logistical programs covered a multitude of activities supporting and affecting agencies, commands, and personnel throughout RVN as well as other parts of SEA. The primary MACV logistical role consisted of responsibility for supervising and coordinating all logistics matters in support of US forces and agencies, FWMAF, and RVNAF, including military assistance and advisory efforts to RVNAF. The major emphasis was to complete or continue programs launched in earlier years and, where possible, steadily reduce US participation as the number of forces decreased and the RVNAF assumed more responsibility for logistics operations under limited US advisory support. The following are discussions of programs that were important, representative, unique, or troublesome in 1971.

Scrap Ammunition Brass

(C) US efforts to recover scrap ammunition brass (SAB) continued to present problems which necessitated command and staff emphasis. In September 1970 MACV was advised by CG, US Army Materiel Command that the urgent requirement for SAB in CONUS warranted its recovery, including from the battlefield, notwithstanding the cost. Later, in June 1971, a survey by the Deputy Comptroller for Internal Audit, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, concluded that improved controls were required to increase the quantity of expended brass casings returned to US control by RVNAF and FWMAF. Consequently, in 1971 MACV took action to stimulate brass recovery by continuing joint efforts with GVN to recover brass from civilians who declared their holdings as a result of a GVN edict; by seizures of brass from VN citizens who failed to declare their holdings; and by asserting to our Allies the need for improving their brass recovery levels.⁹

(U) In November 1970 MACV was advised that reimbursement of the GVN for recovery cost of SAB could be accomplished out of property disposal operations proceeds. In February 1971 funding of US\$450,000 was approved for recovery of approximately 3,000 short tons (STON) of SAB

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through the GVN from identified local civilian holders, but recovery operations were pending issuance of a GVN decree to brass holders announcing the program. To further encourage other holders or collectors to declare their SAB, the GVN agreed to pay for a 3-month period, approximately 6 cents per pound for scrap brass in addition to the US payment of 7 1/2 cents per pound as reimbursement for labor. The GVN decree was to state that after the 3-month period, no further payment for SAB collection would be made and that brass found after that date would be confiscated. MACV anticipated that the terms of the decree would increase the amount of brass collected above the 3,000 STON already identified. Wishing to exploit the advantageous results of the expanded recovery operation, MACV requested assurance from Department of the Army that additional funding would be made available to pay for the extra tonnage to be recovered.¹⁰ Accordingly, on 1 Mar 71, an additional US\$450,000 funded reimbursement authority was released to support the expanded brass recovery program.¹¹

(U) The approval of the extra funding did not, however, resolve all the issues and result in immediate progress. There was a delay in starting recovery operations caused by difficulties in getting the GVN to agree to an initial starting date; the program finally went into effect on 29 March. Even then, early results did not meet expectations for several reasons. First, the GVN affirmed that its agencies would work only a 5 1/2-day week. Also, the names of the GVN program representatives in MRs 1, 2, and 4 were not provided to US representatives until late May, precluding all recovery operations in those areas for more than 2 of the 3 months of the program. Then, on 16 June, the entire recovery operation was stopped by the Office of the Ministry of Defense because of a decision from the Office of the Ministry of Justice that ammunition brass containing unfired primers would be confiscated by the GVN. This suspension was imposed to permit segregation of the brass but would have caused an undue delay in recovery operations. Therefore, MACV arranged with the Ministry of Defense to forego brass segregation, but the program was not resumed until 28 June, which constituted another 11-day hiatus in the collection effort. A few days later on 2 July, the GVN Ministry of Economy representative informed the USARV recovery team that he refused to sign any more documents associated with the brass recovery program because the original 90-day program had expired. His signature was necessary to obtain GVN payment for the brass holders. Negotiations for GVN approval of an additional 90-day extension further delayed collections until 26 Jul. The GVN representative also announced that the new order provided only for an extension of the collection period and not for continued recovery cost sharing by the GVN. As a result, several holders refused to release their brass to the USARV team until they were assured that they would continue to receive the GVN share of the recovery cost.¹²

(C) A concurrent problem that hindered recovery was the condition of the scrap brass. Some 2,400 STON of brass stored in ARVN depots was found to contain a percentage of links, live small arms rounds, and foreign matter, and the special handling of such brass delayed processing.¹³ As increasing amounts of SAB were discovered to contain rounds with unfired primers, the USARV recovery team was required to keep MACV advised of the estimated percentage of such rounds present in each load.¹⁴ Later, payment was ordered denied for cartridge casings with unfired primers, on the premise that such brass was illegally misappropriated or obtained from serviceable stocks. The procedure followed was that the USARV recovery team took samples of casings during loading in order to make an estimate of the percent of unfired primers. Full payment for recovered brass containing up to 5 percent of unfired primers was authorized; but if the percentage of casings with unfired primers exceeded 5 percent, payment for the entire amount with unfired primers was disallowed.¹⁵ The acceptable quantity level was subsequently raised to 6 1/2 percent.¹⁶

(C) On 13 May the Chief, Police Bloc, National Police Command, Mr. Pham Kim Qui, was informed that some consignments of recovered brass contained an excessive amount of unfired primers, and he was requested to initiate an investigation to determine where this brass came from. As of the end of the year, no definite conclusion as to the source had been reached.¹⁷

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(U) Despite these problems, the US efforts were not without success. By December the brass recovery program had collected from declared civilian holders and returned to US control a total of 3,313 STON of brass. In addition, 1,122 STON of illegal brass was seized by the 8th MP Group Crime Suppression Team in CY71 from undeclared holders or from holders from whom declared quantities had been previously recovered by USARV recovery teams.¹⁸

(U) The results of direct turn-ins of SAB by military agencies were uneven

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(U) Noticeable progress was eventually made in this area, since the percentage of brass ammunition turned in during 1971 more than doubled that of 1970, as indicated below:²¹

AMMUNITION BRASS SUMMARY

	Brass (Short Tons)		Percent	Percent
	Issued	Turned In	Turned in CY71	Turned in CY70**
USARV	4,226	698	16.5	7.7
7AF	1,340	914	68.2	43.7
ROKFFV	396	96	24.3	.23
ROKMC*	18	3.36	18.6	0.00
RTFV	62	1.42	2.3	0.00
ARVN	13,020	2,960	22.7	7.6
Total	19,062	4,672.78	24.5	10.6

* Excludes issues and turn-ins January - May 1971 since issue data for that period is lacking.

** Covers July 1970 through December 1970 only.

MACV Retrograde Program

(C) Background. On 24-25 Mar 71 USARV conducted the first MACV Retrograde Movement Planning Conference. Among those present were representatives from MACV ACoS J4, the US Public Health Service, and the US Department of Agriculture. The purpose of the conference was to develop retrograde forecasts and transportation capabilities per quarter beginning on 1 Apr 71. In April, the MACV ACoS J4 decided that, since this was a MACV program, USARV should not host the conferences, and he designated his agency as the MACV office of primary responsibility for retrograde matters. During that month, MACJ4 developed a data base and an estimate of total in-country tonnage expected to be retrograded. This estimate was based on inputs from component services, estimates of government owned/contractor operated (GOCO) equipment, FWMAF deployments, and estimates of property disposal items to be retrograded. In May 1971, the ACoS J4 changed the quarterly retrograde conference to a monthly meeting of representatives from the component services, shipping activities, and other interested agencies. The purpose of these meetings was to update retrograde forecasts and transportation capabilities and to provide a forum for discussing and resolving problems associated with retrograding materiel. Guidance for retrograde forecasting and transportation planning was directly tied to the announced withdrawal rate. As additional withdrawals or redeployments were announced, the concerned services adjusted forecasts accordingly.

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(U) Problems encountered. One continuing problem concerning retrograde was the use by higher headquarters of forecasts as goals. The forecasts were estimates based on then current knowledge and were always subject to change. Emphasis of this fact met limited success. The major problem faced in 1971 was processing by washing and cleaning of retrograde cargo and equipment to meet US Public Health Service and Department of Agriculture quarantine standards. The shortage of high pressure water pumps and their spare parts at Army processing points made materiel cleaning more difficult. Additional pumps and parts were ordered in September and October 1971 and their use alleviated the problem to a great extent. Also, processing capability at Da Nang was doubled by the addition of wash racks and water pumps, alleviating a bottleneck at that port.²²

(C) In August 1971 CINCPAC initiated a monthly report of retrograde status. Below are shown the total tonnage of retrograde materiel on hand, its dollar value in terms of acquisition cost, the tonnage shipped, and the mode of shipping used.

US RETROGRADE MATERIEL²³

1971	On Hand	Value (\$ Million)	Shipped (STON)	
	STON (1,000s)		Surface	Air
Aug	1,509.8	3,635.5	44,570	2,605
Sep	1,266.0	3,074.0	173,905	2,653
Oct	1,113.0	2,763.0	48,872	2,217
Nov	1,062.0	2,638.0	49,587	2,647
Dec	1,008.0	2,502.0	53,762	2,096
		Total	370,696	12,218

Property Redistribution and Disposal Operations

(U) Background. The continuing standdown and subsequent redeployment of US organizations and units that began in 1969 was a major concern of all the component services in RVN. The departure or deactivation of units and reductions in troop strength resulted in the turn-in of large amounts of supplies and equipment which required disposition. Initially, serviceable turned-in equipment was redistributed to meet the unfilled requirements of units remaining in Vietnam. Scrap, unserviceable, and uneconomically repairable materiel was sent to property disposal activities for disposition mainly through sales.

(U) Redistribution. Early reductions in troop levels caused no major problems in excess equipment disposition. This was because these excesses were used to fill existing requirements in the organizations of the respective component services. This practice precluded the need for shipping equipment to RVN from offshore sources. But as the tempo of redeployments increased and more units left Vietnam, in-country requirements became satisfied and redistribution grew more difficult. It was apparent that a more systematic method of disposing of excess equipment was needed. Consequently, on 1 Aug 70 the Interservice Excess Screening System (IESS) was established to provide a method by which US forces in RVN could obtain assets which were excess to the needs of their sister services. Items required by one service and excess to another were arranged for transfer. During the period 1 Aug through 31 Dec 70, the IESS managed the transfer of approximately US\$7 million worth of secondary items among the US component services in RVN. The IESS served as an interim measure until the PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA) was able to handle the redistribution of excesses located in all of the RVN. The service components began reporting equipment excesses and requirements to PURA for redistribution when the IEES was terminated in December 1970. PURA was controlled by

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PACOM and had the responsibility to redistribute serviceable assets to and from all commands within PACOM. Most of the assets available for redistribution originated in RVN. Under the PURA system, after US requirements were filled, locally and world-wide, these assets were issued to RVNAF and FWMAF forces based upon their authorized requirements and established priorities.

(U) Property disposal operations. Scrap, unserviceable and uneconomically repairable equipment turned in by redeploying US units was handled by property disposal activities. The US Army Property Disposal Agency, Vietnam (USAPDAV), was responsible for the receipt, storage and disposition of such materiel. The chart below shows both the tonnage of scrap and the acquisition value of usable equipment on inventory in US property disposal yards in RVN and reflects the increase of turn-ins by redeploying units. Primarily because of a shortage of interested

PROPERTY DISPOSAL INVENTORY

<u>Date ending</u>	<u>Scrap (STON)</u>	<u>Usable items Value (US\$ million)</u>
September 1968	90,400	----
February 1969	67,000	----
July 1969	46,000	----
December 1969	70,000	38.7
July 1970	400,000	54.8
December 1970	324,000	57.7
July 1971	259,000	30.0
December 1971	137,000	41.6
July 1972 (projected)	100,000	52.6

bidders, the sale of both scrap and usable equipment proved difficult in Vietnam. The USAPDAV partially overcame this by innovative efforts, primarily through vigorous merchandising techniques; and emphasizing offshore sales in Okinawa, the Philippines and Singapore. Dollar returns on these offshore sales varied from 3.3 percent of the acquisition cost for items sold in Okinawa to 14.6 percent for sales in Singapore.

(U) Performance. MACV programs for the disposition of excess equipment assets were successful. Redistribution of serviceable assets within Vietnam, PACOM and throughout the services were orderly and effective. This redistribution resulted in significant savings to the US Government by eliminating the necessity for offshore transportation and purchasing new equipment. The property disposal program was also a success, notwithstanding the amounts of inventory remaining in property disposal yards. Sales were anticipated to match or exceed receipts as fewer units deploy and aggressive sales methods prove effective.²⁴ Purification of records and improvements made in yard inventory conditions and locator systems in 1971 would also assist in obtaining significant inventory reductions.²⁵

Delta Transportation Plan

(U) Background. Under the Delta Transportation Plan (DTP) approved on 27 Dec 67, the first shipment of construction rocks was delivered in January 1968. The DTP was established as a systems approach to the production and distribution of vitally needed rock for use in military and other construction, primarily in the Delta region of the RVN. The plan included four rock production quarries located at University/Sumpco, Vung Tau, Nui Sap, and Nui Sam, sponsored

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Rach Soi Port on the western coast of MR 4 is one of several rock distribution ports within the Delta Transportation Plan network.

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respectively by the Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC)-RVN, USARV, the Ministry of Public Works (MPW), and ARVN. Military Sealift Command (MSC) provided the tugs and barges to line haul the s ed rock from barge loading points near each quarry to barge discharge ports.²⁶ From there it was moved to work sites in the Delta, where it was used mainly for road building, but also in the construction of such projects as dependent shelters, training centers, and sector logistics centers.

(U) Performance. In 1971 the DTP came closer than ever before to achieving its initially programmed goal of 240,000 short tons (STON) of rock per month. As of the end of December, a total of 7,158,125 STON had been produced and distributed under the plan since its inception. The 1971 output of 2,776,767 STON exceeded by more than one-half the amount processed in the previous 3 years, and it exceeded that of 1970 by more than 400,000 STON.²⁷ The reasons for this were that (1) rock pilferage was reduced by means of better controls and tighter security, (2) the time lost because of labor disputes was reduced, (3) construction requirements increased, and (4) operations became more efficient as experience was gained.²⁸

SUMMARY OF ROCK PRODUCTION: 1971

	<u>STON</u>		<u>STON</u>
Jan	192,914	Jul	257,184
Feb	235,960	Aug	272,389*
Mar	266,986*	Sep	247,028
Apr	239,186	Oct	214,128
May	245,963	Nov	192,360
Jun	231,412	Dec	181,252

* New monthly all-time high

(U) At the end of December, Military Sealift Command assets devoted to the DTP were 28 tugboats and 111 barges,²⁹ at a cost of approximately \$1.4 million per month.³⁰

Project MOOSE

(U) Background. This program, implemented in 1966 to improve US/RVN relations, was continued in 1971. Project MOOSE (Move Out of Saigon Expeditionously) had as its purpose the reduction of the American presence in the Saigon metropolitan area through the relocation of units and activities, consolidation of facilities and cancellation of the leases of the facilities affected, and control over the movement of military personnel from outlying areas into the metropolitan area.

(U) Progress in 1971. Effective 31 Aug 71, liaison detachments located in Saigon for certain commands and units were disestablished and the personnel withdrawn to their parent units. This action reduced American forces strength in metropolitan Saigon by 71 personnel.³¹

(C) Through 30 September, the last month for which reports were required, 67 units/activities in the Saigon area were consolidated, relocated, or reduced in strength by a total of 3,513 personnel. Of this total, 3,152 were removed completely from the greater Saigon area, while the remaining 321 were relocated outside of the immediate Saigon/Cholon district. Additionally, 45 leases with a total annual cost of \$1,723,484 were terminated. Thirteen more leases totaling \$679,113 in annual costs were proposed for termination in the last quarter of CY71.³² Updating

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of the pertinent MACV Directive 210-8 on 28 Dec 71 reaffirmed the program's original purpose.

Privileges for Nonmilitary Personnel

(U) Prior to 1971 military logistical support and individual privileges were provided to numerous civilian personnel of both military and nonmilitary agencies. In light of changing conditions (the drawdown of military units, personnel, facilities and resources, and the changing nature of the US mission in Vietnam), it became evident that there should be an in-depth investigation and review of the support and privileges being rendered. As a result of an inspection by the MACV Office of the Inspector General in April 1971, it was recommended that an immediate review be made of existing MACV policies to determine their adequacy and the appropriate level of their implementation. (For more complete discussion, see Inspector General Activities, Chapter X.)

(U) The MACV Chief of Staff tasked J4 with the responsibility of implementing the recommendations of the IG inspection and of accomplishing this task in three phases:

PHASE I

- Publication of a directive establishing general policy guidance. This was accomplished with the publication of MACV Directive 700-12 in July 1971 which contained the following policy guidance:
 - Privileges would be limited to individuals, agencies, and US Government-sponsored contractors supporting the US mission in RVN.
 - Privileges would be granted only after a case by case review based upon verification of actual US mission support, proof that logistical support is cost effective, availability of logistical support, and the best interests of the US.
 - Policy would be applicable to all categories of nonmilitary personnel.
 - Exceptions must be justified for J4 approval.

PHASE II

- Publication of 10 revised individual staff directives concerned with general policy contained in MACV Directive 700-12, i. e., messing/commissary, billeting, postal services, and exchange privileges. This task was completed in October 1971.

PHASE III

- Distribution of MACV Directive 700-12 and all supplemental directives to subordinate commands and implementation, to include issuing new PX cards and civilian privilege cards (MACV Form 6). This was accomplished by December.

(U) The IG requested that the overall policy directive include a ready reference which would summarize the major privileges authorized the 15 occupational categories identified. This ready reference table included as Annex A to MACV Directive 700-12 broke down the occupational categories into two major elements, US citizens and third country nationals (TCN), and indicated privileges of primary concern to individuals, as exchange, postal, military banking, and messing/commissary. Individual directives were published to explain specific logistical support available such as transportation, billeting, and communications.

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(U) In general, after 1 December support and privileges were provided only to US citizens employed directly by the US Government to support the US mission in RVN or who were in-country rendering specific services in support of the US mission. The policy reflected in the new directives resulted in the following changes:

- US citizen contract personnel were authorized the use of only the field ration mess; commissary use was authorized only on a case by case basis, if approved by MACJ4; PX privileges were limited to \$25 per month instead of the former \$25 per purchase.
- TCN on direct hire by US who formerly had commissary or field ration mess privileges were restricted to field ration mess and lost all PX privileges. Contractor TCN lost both PX and field ration mess privileges.
- Military air transportation service for US citizens and TCN was to be strictly limited to those on official US Government business. RVNAF personnel on leave or R and R would no longer receive air transport privileges nor would Vietnamese employees of the US Government on leave or pass.
- Press personnel were no longer authorized air transportation over routes served by commercial aircraft; however, exceptions were permitted when there was evidence of no commercial aircraft space available and space was available on military aircraft, or in the event of a major news break.
- Use of postal and military banking facilities remained restricted to designated US citizens only.

(U) All these actions were taken to be fully in keeping with the President's planned reduction of the US presence in RVN.³³

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

(U) The year 1971 was marked by steadily decreasing requirements for construction and maintenance of US facilities as unit redeployments continued. Strong command emphasis was placed on making do and doing without. Those major programs which were relatively least affected, such as LOC construction and depot upgrading, were directly related to generating GVN self-sufficiency in the face of the diminishing American presence. One US firm had its contracts reduced from \$70.7 million in FY71 to \$56.5 million in FY72, a 20 percent decrease and the third consecutive reduction in a row.³⁴ In absolute terms of dollars and manhours 1971 was another busy year, but the downward trend was unmistakable and inevitable.

MILCON Funding

(U) Additional construction requirements continued, however. On 24 Mar 71, MACV Director of Construction (MACDC) forwarded a request to CINCPAC for release of US\$25,419,000 in FY71 Military Construction, Army (MCA) funds for use in RVN. This letter explained troop and contractor abilities to accomplish current projects and that the additional work would be funded with FY72 MCA funds.³⁵ The \$25 million apportionment was received on 2 May 71.³⁶

(C) On 30 Jul, a COMUSMACV message was forwarded to CINCPAC providing MACV's validation of the FY73 MILCON Program, RVN. Army requests were validated for requirements

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having an estimated cost of \$58,219 million of which \$40,717 million consisted of proposed facilities to support residual forces. The Navy and Air Force did not request any funds. This MACV FY73 program submittal was supported by CINCPAC and forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for final action.³⁷ By end-December congressional committee hearings to review the budget had not begun. See Figure IX-1 for the status of the MILCON Program as of 31 Dec 71.³⁸

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM STATUS

(as of 31 Dec 71)

(\$ millions)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY65 Basic	12.8	9.4	15.9	38.1
FY65 Supplemental	36.6	17.4	21.4	75.4
FY66 Basic	29.1	30.3	13.5	72.9
FY66 Amendment	36.0	32.9	39.7	108.1
FY66 Supplemental	425.4	189.0	1	792.6
FY67 Supplemental	217.7	76.1	96.6	392.4
FY68 Regular	72.4	31.9	24.6	129.0
FY68 Supplemental	16.4	8.7	13.8	38.9
FY69 Regular	97.0	50.9	-0-	147.9
FY71 Basic	25.0	-0-	-0-	25.0
Total	968.4	446.6	405.3	1820.3

	<u>Total Funds</u>	<u>Cumulative Commitments</u>	<u>Cumulative Obligations</u>	<u>Cumulative Disbursements</u>
Army	968.4	951.9	926.5	489.1
Navy	446.6	446.0	441.4	422.4
Air Force	405.3	405.2	404.7	392.8
Total	1820.3	1803.2	1772.6	1304.3

Source: MACDC

Figure IX - 1

New MILCON Program Guidance

(U) The continuing drawdown of US units and personnel, the attendant closure of bases and facilities, and the desire to bring about economies in military expenditures caused OSD to establish more rigid start criteria for MILCON projects. A message to MACV on 23 September furnished this new guidance.

- New project starts costing over \$50,000 required OSD approval prior to the obligation of funds.
- Strong justification was required for all new-start requests and had to be submitted to OSD.
- All project overruns were to be financed from in-country undistributed assignments, and all savings were to be placed in a special account by service and reported as recovered contingencies on monthly reports starting in October 1971.

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MACV furnished the above guidance to the component commanders for compliance.³⁹

Committee for the Development of the Industry of Construction

(U) On 23 Apr 71 a meeting was held with Minister Vang of the Prime Minister's Office to elicit GVN participation at the Prime Minister level in planning for the future utilization, disposal, and maintenance of excess Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC) facilities and equipment. (The OICC was the US Navy DOD agent for construction by contracts in RVN.) Present were representatives from the ministries of Public Works, Finance, and Economy; MACV; the OICC; and USAID. Out of this meeting, a joint Committee for the Development of the Industry of Construction (CDIC) was formed for the purpose of (1) assisting the GVN in determining the scope of its construction program and requirements for excess contractor assets, (2) determining funding requirements for operating and maintaining acquired assets, (3) recommending sources of operating funds, and (4) removing constraints which were inhibiting the development of the construction industry.

(U) Subsequent meetings of the CDIC produced initial policy guidelines; the Committee envisioned transfer of a portion of the contractor's excess assets to USAID for further transfer to a GVN agency. The selection of assets to be transferred was based upon the ability of the GVN to fund and manage the facilities, and upon the requirement for their products. The GVN proposed a government-owned company to operate industrial sites such as quarries, asphalt plants, and maintenance overhaul facilities, and a construction rental activity. The products of the industrial facilities and the construction equipment were to be made available to both the government and the private sector.⁴⁰

(U) In early July, MACV received a DEPSECDEF Memorandum indicating broad OSD support for the actions taken by the MACV staff and the OICC relating to the program for the development of Vietnam's construction industry. The memorandum also stated that OSD had requested Department of State and USAID participation and funding support. MACV was designated the program manager and was directed to submit to OSD the MACV plan for the enhancement of the Vietnamese construction industry. This plan was submitted on 21 July and on 1 September, MACV received the OSD response to the plan. Generally, OSD reduced the scope of the MACV program: MACV was directed to continue the horizontal construction projects (Lines of Communication), while other projects were to be assigned to the more efficient combination of US, third country, and Vietnamese contractors, but encourage the maximum use of the latter. DOD also said that there would be no further funding for nation building and eliminated the requirement for US Federal agencies to reimburse DOD for excess equipment transferred to them. In response to this guidance USAID requested 1,551 pieces of construction equipment; 825 pieces were for the GVN Director General of Highways for the road maintenance program; the other 726 pieces were used to establish an equipment rental pool for use by the private sector.⁴¹

(U) In early October 1971, the CDIC prepared a document to provide the GVN Prime Minister with information concerning its activities and progress. Participating MACV agencies were Economic Affairs (MACEA), Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS), and Construction Directorate (MACDC); other contributing agencies were the OICC, USAID, and the principal GVN ministries. This paper, prepared at the request of the Minister of Public Works, stressed the importance of construction to the economic development of RVN and recommended these general measures be taken to augment industrial development planning:


- Give greater recognition to the importance of the construction industry in its contribution to social and economic development.

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Back roads like this one are kept in repair by local people, aided by government-supplied equipment.



Major road repair jobs are handled by contractors who lease heavy equipment. Here, RMK crews work along Highway 1.

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- Encourage government agencies to recognize and use their influence as clients of construction to create conditions for modernization of construction practices, including action to remove outmoded administrative regulations and economic constraints on the development of the construction industry.
- Assign economic research to direct more attention to the nature of construction and its effects upon development.
- Assist educational institutions to modernize engineering syllabuses and textbooks and to establish managerial and subprofessional training courses.
- Direct government agencies to help create an understanding of the importance of the construction industry, generate a demand for foreign monetary and technical assistance in this area, and devise methods of transferring needed skills and technology to local institutions and agencies.

(U) This report was signed by the MACV Director of Construction and the GVN Minister of Public Works, Cochairmen of the CDIC. On 28 Oct 71, it was forwarded to the Prime Minister who approved the recommendations the following day. Under the recommended policies, excess contractor industrial facilities at Da Nang, Nha Trang, Binh Dinh, Sumpco Quarry and Binh Thuy were approved by MACDC for transfer through USAID to the Vietnamese Engineer Construction Company (VECCO), the GVN agency designated to receive and manage contractor excess facilities and equipment. The first such facility, located at Nha Trang, was turned over to USAID and VECCO on 30 Dec 71, an action that held great promise for SVN's economic development and independence.

(U) The CDIC continued to meet to discuss ways of removing or reducing constraints to GVN construction enhancement and proposals for the transfer of additional major construction facilities and functions.⁴²

Highway Maintenance

(U) Background. In response to a DEPCOMUSMACV request of 29 Nov 71, MACDC conducted a review of the status of highway maintenance in the RVN. Until the US restoration program began in 1958, the Vietnamese road net was substantially the same as prior to World War II. Generally, the routes were two-lane, 5-meter maximum width, double bituminous surface treatment roads suitable for light trucks and the vehicle traffic of the period. The principal means of transportation then were railroads and waterways, since constant warfare precluded all but minimal road maintenance. Under US sponsorship in the late 1950s, several main highways routes were significantly improved. In the 1960s, however, increasing VC sabotage, damage from natural causes, a steadily decreasing maintenance capability, and considerably increased military traffic progressively deteriorated the roads, virtually destroying the entire network. For example, two-thirds of the highway between Saigon and Hue was impassable.


(U) The highway maintenance program as an identifiable entity came into being in the fall of 1966 with the AID/DOD realignment program, but the overall responsibility for the highway program was transferred by the US Mission Council from USAID to MACV in early 1968. The introduction of asphalt concrete pavement highways in Vietnam by the US forces under this program resulted in an entirely new concept in the area of maintenance for the Vietnamese.

(U) The Directorate General of Highways. In 1971 the highway system of RVN consisted of approximately 20,000 kilometers of road, about 2,500 of which are considered to be military

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DGOH FIELD ORGANIZATION (1971)



Source: MACDC

Figure IX - 2

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essential, and 4,500 bridges. By the end of the LOC program in 1975, 3,539 kilometers of national highway and 34,000 linear meters of bridges would be restored with an asphaltic concrete surface. The management of the GVN highway system was the responsibility of the Directorate General of Highways (DGOH) of the Ministry of Public Works. The office of the DGOH in Saigon consisted of administrative, accounting, and planning divisions and directorates of engineering and operations. Its lines of responsibility extended through five District Engineer offices at Da Nang, Nha Trang, Da Lat, Saigon and Can Tho, down to the province engineer at each of the 44 provinces.

(U) The operational doctrine of the DGOH was that maintenance and minor repairs of highways were to be performed with in-house forces, while major repairs and new construction would be accomplished by contract. This concept was common among US highway institutes and was supported in RVN by additional considerations which affected the DGOH, i.e., the absence of a major repair or overlay capability in Vietnam, exclusive of ARVN, shortages of trained personnel, and other constraints, such as employment and pay policies and national budgetary priorities.

(U) The DGOH field organization for maintenance of the highway system consisted of three operational supporting activities which played an increasingly important role in enhancing the maintenance capability of the DGOH (see Figure IX-2). The National Highway Training School instructed students in skills required to support highway maintenance, such as equipment operation, mechanics, and surveying. Its training capacity was 500 students a year, including RF and PF personnel who worked on rural roads under the direction of their province chiefs. The DGOH Highway Shops were the backbone of the Vietnamese equipment repair program. This agency, owned by the GVN and operated by a US contractor, accomplished depot level upgrading and repair of equipment, provided spare parts support to the field, and trained DGOH managerial personnel and technicians. The National Equipment Pool contained the low density equipment, such as large cranes and heavy-duty pile drivers, that were used only on special projects.

(U) Adverse factors. In preparation for the return of the highway advisory responsibilities to USAID on 1 Jul 72, MACV and USAID conducted a comprehensive joint study of the RVN highway system and the DGOH organization. This study identified the following deficiencies that adversely affected the maintenance capability of the DGOH:

- A shortage of 1,527 pieces of major equipment, as well as spare parts.
- A critical shortage of middle managers, equipment operators, and mechanics.
- A shortage of support facilities.
- Inadequate funding for the DGOH budget based on higher defense priorities.

(U) Immediate far-reaching actions were taken or contemplated to ameliorate the effects of these adverse factors.

- Equipment. USAID was programed to provide financial support for new equipment and spare parts; MACV would provide equipment and parts that became excess as US units continued to stand down.
- Personnel. Current training programs and the reduction of US military and contractor operations were scheduled to provide more qualified employees. Proposals to change defense manpower mobilization policies and civil service salary scales were under consideration as ways to provide more trained technicians.

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- Facilities. Five excess US industrial sites were to be identified for turnover to the DGOH. Future requirements could be satisfied within the capability of the DGOH budget.
- Funding. Budget support was to be provided for several years to assure continued progress until other defense requirements were reduced and GVN priorities were realigned.

(U) Conclusions. Several important conclusions were drawn from the MACV/USAID study as well as from observations, experience and reports.

- DGOH had at best a marginal capability to perform day-to-day maintenance of asphaltic surfaced roads. This deficiency resulted in a continuing requirement for major repairs over the next several years.
- ARVN had an ever-increasing capability for asphaltic concrete highway construction and was the only RVN agency with this capability.
- USAID, OICC, and MACV studies estimated that development of a local horizontal construction industry required a minimum of 5 years.
- The US had to continue a high level of funding and advisory support for several years in order to achieve a viable RVN highway construction and maintenance system.
- GVN reforms were needed to remove constraints on recruitment of trained and trainable personnel.
- The DGOH was unable to absorb or effectively utilize appreciable increases in funds or deliveries of equipment because of limited available manpower and administrative and regulatory constraints.

(U) On-going actions. As of the close of December 1971 many program improvement actions affecting the DGOH were underway.

- The development of a horizontal construction industry was begun, with three OICC lump-sum contracts let for 108 kilometers of interprovincial roads in the Delta.
- Two RMK prestressed concrete plants for manufacturing bridge components were transferred to the DGOH.
- MACV approved and JGS accepted the transfer of five RMK industrial sites to the GVN.
- DGOH established highway vehicle wheel load limitations.
- DGOH and ARVN developed a closer working relationship at both the national and field levels.
- DGOH and ARVN jointly developed a standard bridge design and construction program.
- MACV and USAID coordinated to develop a joint budget for USAID support for FY 73 and subsequent years.
- Contracts were let to support USAID field advisory efforts for the period beginning 1 Jul 72.

At year's end MACV continued to work closely with the GVN and USAID to minimize or eliminate the problems interfering with the full development of the DGOH ⁴³

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Ammunition Depot Upgrade Program

(C) One of the major programs leading to RVNAF's logistical self-sufficiency in 1971 was the ARVN Ammunition System Improvement Plan, which was approved in 1970. Execution of the upgrade plan was to improve ammunition operations in all of the following functional areas:

- Ammunition reporting system.
- Ammunition surveillance program.
- Ammunition maintenance and renovation program.
- Training and technical assistance program.
- Ammunition depot upgrade program.

The most extensive part of the plan was that devoted to upgrading ammunition storage facilities. Ammunition stored in existing depots was susceptible to deterioration and sympathetic detonation due to unsuitable storage conditions. Construction under the current ammunition depot upgrade program included the upgrading of six ARVN ammunition depots: one general support depot in each of the five Area Logistics Commands and one direct support depot at Pleiku. The program was funded at over \$US24.9 million and when completed in May 1972 would provide covered storage for 77 percent of all ARVN ammunition storage requirements. In addition, it would provide the necessary renovation, maintenance and surveillance facilities. Figure IX-3 indicates the percentage of upgrade completion of the six depots as of 1 Dec 71 and the estimated completion date of each.⁴⁴

AMMO DEPOT UPGRADE PROGRAM: 1971

Depot	Construction Cost (\$ million)	Percent Complete		Est Comp Date
		1 Sep	1 Dec	
Dong Ba Thin	6.000	32	77	Apr 72
Qui Nhon	2.800	13	67	Feb 72
Bien Hoa	2.849	37	68	Mar 72
Can Tho	3.261	6	43	May 72
Da Nang	1.780	10	57	Apr 72
Pleiku	1.200	11	46	Mar 72

Source: MACJ4

Figure IX - 3

Depot Upgrade Program

(C) Increased RVNAF logistical self-sufficiency in the important area of rebuild of end items was realized through the Depot Upgrade Program which was designed to improve the capability of base depots and reduce equipment shortfalls. The degree of self-sufficiency for RVNAF depot overhaul of end items at the end of December was approximately 35%, with the remaining 65% performed offshore. The goal by FY73 was 80%. The major areas of concentration and the 1971 funding are shown below:

Category	Cost in Dollars
Construction	16,950,000
Equipment	3,254,500
Technical assistance and training	542,000
Total	20,746,500

As of December 1971, the degrees of upgrade completion of the Engineer and Signal depots and of the ARVN Arsenal were 100 %, 79 %, and 98 % respectively.

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VNN dependent housing under construction at Cat Lai.

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(C) In addition to this improvement of the physical facilities, an upgrading of the industrial equipment also took place. By year's end, approximately \$3 million worth of tools and industrial equipment were obtained from excess DOD stocks on a nonreimbursable basis. Technical assistance was provided by US Army Materiel Command and civilian contract personnel in the areas of supply, maintenance, production control, industrial engineering, and the use of new equipment, as well as extensive on the job training with personnel from US units.⁴⁵

RVNAF Dependent Shelter Program

(U) Background. The RVNAF Dependent Shelter Program was initiated by the GVN in 1961 with the original goal of providing approximately 64,000 family housing units for servicemen below the grade of sergeant. Apart from its obvious intent to upgrade the living conditions of RVNAF families, it was hoped that the program's favorable influence on troop morale would lead to a decrease in desertions. Through 1966, without US participation, approximately 75,000 out of a programmed 137,300 shelters of varying design were completed, but they were generally of constructed wooden siding and were without water, electricity, or sanitary facilities. They were built under a variety of Vietnamese contractors who served as the construction agents. By 1966, however, the deteriorating SVN internal security situation caused such significant shortfalls in shelter completions that responsibility for the program was transferred from each Corps Tactical Zone Commander to the Base Development Division at the Central Logistics Command of the Joint General Staff.

(U) US participation in the dependent shelter program was begun in 1967 by the provision of \$2.8 million in Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funds for a self-help ARVN pilot program consisting of 1,378 units. This program was reoriented in 1968 to provide materials for similar self-help programs and for follow-on contracts funded by the GVN. This sum of \$2.8 million was programmed for distribution as follows:

- \$0.8 million for materials for ARVN self-help pilot programs.
- \$1.35 million for commodity support for the CY69 program.
- \$0.65 million for commodity support for the CY70 program.

Then on 8 Aug 69, the US Navy provided \$1.5 million of their FY69 military construction funds for 2,420 units to be built for the Vietnamese Navy, although actual work under this program did not begin until CY70. Collectively, these US programs and the previous GVN efforts produced over 85,000 completed shelters in the period 1961 - 1969.

(U) On 3 Nov 69, the MACV CoS directed the establishment of a joint US-RVNAF action group to supervise the dependent shelter program. This Dependent Shelter Program Group (DSPG) was responsible for providing overall planning and direction, coordinating US responsibilities and monitoring the use of US materials. Construction responsibilities and the management thereof remained with the GVN. At a meeting in April 1970 the DSPG approved the requirement for 200,000 shelters under an 8-year RVNAF program. The extent of US participation was to support the construction of 16,000 units during CY70 and 20,000 more units per year for the remaining 7 years at a cost of \$6 million per year. The balance of the 200,000 units was to be supported totally by the GVN. The US support was to be in the form of furnishing material such as lumber, cement, roofing and hardware.

(U) Also in 1970 the US Air Force and US Navy undertook unilaterally sponsored subprograms to speed up the availability of shelters to the VNAF and VNN. They implemented plans to transfer several Air Force and Navy bases in 1970 and 1971, and were properly concerned that some of

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
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AUTOSEVOCOM

Location of SECORDe, 31 Dec 71



Source: MAC J632

Figure IX-4

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these bases, which were located in fairly isolated areas, had no dependent shelters. Both MACV and the RVNAF welcomed this added support for the DSPG program. These two MILCON-funded subprograms provided for 2,400 VNAF units and 5,000 VNN units, which meant that there were three separately funded housing programs approved by MACV and DOD. The 5,000-unit Navy program was included in the \$1.5 million of FY69 MILCON funds mentioned previously.

(U) Year-end status. As of 31 Dec 71, a total of 17,399 shelter units were completed for all the services under the DSPG sponsored programs, and 14,446 more were under construction.⁴⁶ This compared with total of 7,909 built and 5,739 under construction at the end of 1970.⁴⁷ By the end of 1971 the RVNAF 1970 program was 95 percent complete; the 1971 RVNAF program was 54 percent complete; the VNAF subprogram was 31.7 percent complete; and the VNN subprogram was 79 percent complete. There was a marked increase in the rate of completion of the RVNAF program in December 1971 due to the delivery of materials and the continuing emphasis placed on the shelter completion progress by MACDC and the RVNAF JCS. With material for the 1972 program ordered and beginning to arrive, future prospects for meeting established targets were optimistic.⁴⁸

(U) In all cases, desertion data showed a significant difference in favor of personnel housed in government quarters. For example, at the 31 Aug 71 DSPG meeting it was stated that in a study of 31 infantry regiments, the desertion rate was 1.36 percent among 10,981 married soldiers in dependent shelters, while among 32,300 soldiers who were not living in dependent shelters, the rate was 4.8 percent. RVNAF reports in October revealed the same favorable impact on military personnel who were housed, reflecting the achievement of the Dependent Shelter Program's objective of improving the living standards, morals, and effectiveness of married RVNAF personnel.⁴⁹

COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

(U) Redeployments of US troops and units also made their impact felt in the area of communications-electronics (C-E) operations and support. In 1971 emphasis was placed on properly supporting the forces remaining in RVN while turning over more facilities and responsibility to RVNAF agencies. Both of these major functions were carried out effectively during a period of high activity without the loss of vital communications in a still hostile environment.

Automatic Secure Voice Communications

(C/NF) The Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) program was a Defense Communications Agency (DCA)-managed worldwide network which, as a dedicated portion of the Defense Communications System (DCS), provided means for establishing encrypted voice communications among US forces and government agencies.

(C/NF) In June a new item of AUTOSEVOCOM trunking equipment was installed at the AN/FTC-31 switches in Saigon and Hawaii. Called a voice excited vocoder (VEV), this equipment significantly improved the voice reproduction quality between long-haul AUTOSEVOCOM trunk subscribers.

(C/NF) The redeployment of units led to sizable reductions in the number of active AUTOSEVOCOM subscribers. See Figure IX-4 for location of SECORDS at the end of 1971.⁵⁰

[REDACTED] AUTOSEVOCOM SUBSCRIBERS

	<u>End - 1971</u>	<u>End - 1970</u>
Subscribers served off Saigon primary switch	77	80
Subscribers served through SECORDS*	<u>49</u>	<u>111</u>
Total	126	191

* Secure Voice Cordboards

Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone System

(U) The Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone System (SEA-ATS) provided direct dial service to all Class A telephone subscribers throughout RVN and Thailand. The system was managed by Defense Communications Agency-Southeast Asia Mainland (DCA-SAM). The first SEA-ATS long distance tandem switching center was completed at Bang Pla, Thailand in November 1968, with the system's nine centers completed and operational by late 1969. Six of the switching centers were located in RVN at Can Tho, Da Nang, Tan Son Nhut, Nha Trang, Pleiku, and Vung Chau Mountain, with the remaining three sited in Thailand at Bang Pla, Korat, and Warin. Of the six centers in RVN, Can Tho and Pleiku were operated by the US Army, while the other four were under Air Force control. Each of the nine centers was interconnected to all of the others in both RVN and Thailand. Thus, the customer had direct dialing service to dial telephones in both countries.

(U) In November 1970 the switch at Pleiku was deactivated, and in 1971 the Vung Chau Mountain switch was also deactivated. This left seven switching centers operative at the end of 1971.⁵¹

Dial Telephone Exchange System

(U) Integral to SEA-ATS was the dial telephone exchange (DTE) systems which were begun throughout RVN and Thailand in 1967. By the end of 1970 the long distance SEA-ATS was handling approximately 500,000 calls per day using 42 US-operated DTEs serving over 160,000 main lines. As of 31 Dec 71, 245,000 calls a day were borne by 25 US and six RVNAF-operated DTEs. The number of US DTEs for each major agency was as follows:⁵²

<u>Service</u>	<u>No of DTE</u>	<u>Lines Capacity</u>
US Army	18	28,160
US Air Force	4	11,500
State Dept	<u>3</u>	<u>2,760</u>
Totals	25	42,420

Automatic Digital Data Network

(U) The Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) was a worldwide, high-speed, common-user defense communications system (DCS) managed by the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) to provide direct user-to-user and message switching record communications service for DOD and other government agencies. The AUTODIN system began operations in RVN in 1968, and by

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the end of 1970 there were 24 operational digital subscriber terminal equipment (DSTE) terminals in RVN with 15 others programed for completion in early 1971. By the end of 1971 there were 32 DSTE terminals operational in RVN. Twenty of these were homed or connected to Phu Lam, Gia Dinh Province, while the remaining 12 were homed to Korat, Thailand.⁵³ Although the total number remained constant, three US Marine Corps terminals were deactivated in conjunction with the Marines' redeployment while some Army terminals were deactivated through redeployments and new sites were activated.⁵⁴

(U) In March, the Phu Lam Automatic Switching Center (ASC) experienced a failure of its uninterrupted power supply. This outage necessitated implementation of the Pacific AUTODIN Restoral Plan (PARP) which remained in effect for approximately 36 hours. While there were some delays in processing low precedence traffic, this ASC failure did not significantly affect operational traffic. Some valuable lessons were learned which led to changes relating to restoral and alternate routing actions by DCA at selected ASCs.⁵⁵ Many corrective actions were taken after a comprehensive survey of the ASC operation by a quality assurance team of manufacturer's representatives, DCA personnel, and power and environmental control specialists. Another 12-hour failure of the Phu Lam ASC in late July also resulted in no loss of message traffic.⁵⁶

US Advisor Communications Support Below MR Level

(C) The Vietnamization of US advisor communications support below the MR level, as outlined in the Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Plan (CEIMP), began in the spring of 1970 and was completed successfully in 1971. By October the responsibility for communications support of 39 provinces, 11 Division Combat Assistance Teams, the 44th Special Tactical Zone headquartered at Cao Lanh, Kien Phong Province and the 1st Task Force at Quang Da, Quang Ngai Province was assumed by ARVN units from US advisory teams, which thereby became dependent on ARVN for their communications support. Because of the continued high density of the US presence in certain areas, the five provinces of Pleiku and Khanh Hoa in MR 2, Bien Hoa, and Gia Dinh in MR 3, and Phong Dinh in MR 4 were not included in this program.⁵⁷

Signal Support of NVA PW Repatriation

(U) As an example of special communications requirements, MACJ6 was tasked to prepare the signal plan for supporting the repatriation of sick and wounded NVA PW in June. The communications system provided for this operation was as follows:

- One multipoint circuit from the USNS Upshur to the 7AF and the MACV Command Center.
- One multipoint circuit from the USNS Upshur to Monkey Mountain and XXIV Corps Tactical Operations Center.
- Radio teletypewriter facilities for press copy from the USNS Upshur to Military Assistance Command Office of Information (MACOI).

The above communications system was provided by both 7AF and USARV personnel aboard the USNS Upshur and at appropriate ground sites in MR 1.⁵⁸

(C) On 4 June the Upshur arrived at the designated rendezvous point with 13 sick or wounded NVA PW repatriates aboard. As it sailed, however, US agencies monitored a Hanoi radio broadcast to the Vietnam News Agency in Paris. This broadcast labeled the repatriation a US-Saigon "trick" and declared the transfer terms "annulled," thus aborting the project.⁵⁹

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MEDICAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

(U) MACV medical support operations were no less affected than all other activities by the on-going redeployments of US units and troops and the increasing emphasis on RVNAF self-sufficiency. Fewer American troops and decreased numbers of casualties reduced requirements for medical units, facilities, and support. Operation LAM SON 719 bore witness to the capability of RVNAF to tend to their own combat medical needs, although they still had some hard lessons to learn. In other areas the US services continued to advance medical programs which improved living conditions and health standards of the remaining US and RVNAF forces, as well as RVNAF personnel, their dependents, and Vietnamese civilians.

Civilian War Casualty Program

(U) The Civilian War Casualty Program (CWCP) was originally approved by the Department of Defense in 1967 to provide definitive treatment in US military hospitals for Vietnamese civilians suffering from war-related injuries or sickness. For humanitarian reasons emergency and nonwar-related patients were also cared for at US facilities. The CWCP accommodated that segment of the civilian war casualty (CWC) workload which temporarily exceeded the capacity of the GVN Ministry of Health (MOH) system. Care was provided for GVN civilian patients whose medical condition could be improved by a relatively short period of treatment. US air ambulances were authorized to be used for civilian patient evacuation, subject to the availability of resources.⁶⁰

(U) Based on an estimated 50,000 CWCs annually, only half of which could be supported by GVN means, DOD approved construction of facilities for 1,100 hospital beds. In 1968 the Army constructed three CWCP hospitals at Da Nang (400 beds), Chu Lai (300 beds) and Cai Tho (400 beds). When it was discovered that the Vietnamese were reluctant to be hospitalized in facilities located away from their homes, DOD directed the joint utilization of all US hospitals by both CWCs and US military patients, while authorizing a total of 1,100 beds throughout the US medical support system for use by CWCs. In October 1969 the US Mission Council requested that its Medical Policy Coordinating Committee (MPCC) reconsider the number of beds programmed for CWCs in light of the admission rate and anticipated redeployments of US medical units. The Committee's recommendation to reduce the number of CWCP beds to 600 was approved by the US Mission Council in December 1969. Later, again on the recommendation of the MPCC and with the approval of the US Mission Council, CWCP hospital beds in US military facilities were reduced from 600 to 400 on 2 Sep 71,⁶¹ and with the approval of the American Embassy, to 200 on 4 December. These actions were in response to the continued reduction of US forces, the concomitant decrease in US medical resources, and the drop in the number of daily average beds occupied by CWC patients.⁶² The chart below shows the decreasing trends in both the daily average number of CWCP beds occupied per calendar year and the total number of beds authorized.⁶³

<u>CY</u>	<u>Daily Average Occupancy</u>	<u>Beds Authorized</u>
1968	542	1,100
1969	666	600
1970	452	600
1971	214	400 (to Sep) 200 (Oct-Dec)

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(U) The number of civilian war casualties admitted to GVN Ministry of Health hospitals since 1969 was also on the decline. The following chart shows the number of CWC admissions to MOH hospitals, the percentage of these CWCs to the number of MOH admissions for all causes, and the number of CWC admissions to US military hospitals categorized by injuries resulting from hostile action (IRHA) and disease and nonbattle injuries (DNBI).⁶⁴

CWC SUMMARY OF HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS

Year	CWC to MOH Hospitals	Percent of CWC to all MOH Admissions	CWC to US Hospitals		
			IRHA	DNBI	Total
1967	46,783	9.9	--	--	--
1968	76,702	12.4	6,137*	8,164*	14,321*
1969	59,223	11.3	7,850	12,224	20,074
1970	46,247	8.0	4,920	10,873	15,793
1971	38,318	6.4	974	4,494	6,468

* Feb through Dec only


(U) The continuing drawdown of US medical units in 1971 contributed to the decrease in the number of admissions of CWC patients to US facilities. Because of the strong attachment of civilians to their own geographic area, Vietnamese patients were rarely transferred to another US hospital. The decreasing number of overall CWC admissions reflected the lower level of military activity. Since there continued to be strong political interest in the CWCP it was recognized that the beds provided a protective measure of medical resources which could be utilized in the event that large-scale CWC admissions to US facilities became necessary because of enemy action. Future reviews of US support would consider these factors along with the daily average bed occupancy by CWC patients.⁶⁵

Medical Services at the Central PW Camp

(C) Reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in October 1970 revealed the presence of unsatisfactory conditions at the RVN Central Prisoner of War Camp (CPWC) on Phu Quoc Island (located in the Gulf of Thailand). The US Secretary of State informed the American Ambassador in Saigon and COMUSMACV that senior officials in Washington were seriously concerned about the unfavorable reports. Subsequently, the MACV CofS directed that MACJi organize and conduct a staff visit to the CPWC, which was done on 20-23 Oct 71. Staff findings were that the camp was not complying with both US and GVN standards relative to seven articles of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention (GPW), including those pertaining to medical treatment of PW. Thereafter, the MACV staff made special efforts to assure GVN compliance with established standards of PW conditions and treatment.⁶⁶

(S) In 1971 commendable progress was made in improving the medical facilities and services at the CPWC hospital, largely as a result of greater emphasis by MACMD (Command Surgeon's Office) in effecting through its staff and advisors needed reforms by RVNAF agencies. Following a survey by a MACV Medical Supply Advisory Team, the levels of consumable medical supplies were increased at the CPWC. In response to the direction of the RVNAF Surgeon General that 100 percent of routine medical items be filled,⁶⁷ 45 tons of medical supplies and equipment were delivered in January alone, as well as an additional 12 CONEX containers of medical supplies by July. Permission was granted in mid-January to expand the hospital into existing buildings, five of which were converted into 25-bed wards, and another building was constructed to

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USS Sanctuary

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house the laboratory and dental clinic. Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) activities by personnel from the 3d Surgical Hospital, Binh Thuy Province, provided treatment for 550 PW, 35 ARVN disciplinary prisoners, and 105 Quan Canh (QC, ARVN Military Police) personnel and their dependents. In addition, 250 QC dependent children were given diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus immunizations. To maintain high levels of treatment, a program of continuous training was established which upgraded the effectiveness of ARVN enlisted aidmen and the QC dispensary personnel. Select PW were also trained as preventive dentistry technicians to instruct other PW in oral hygiene and preventive dentistry.⁶⁸

(U) In response to a MACMD recommendation,⁶⁹ the RVNAF Surgeon General's Office informed the CPWC commander that the food ration rate of \$VN34.6 per PW per day was to be increased to \$VN126, which would make it more equitable with the rate allowed ARVN patients. To further supplement the prisoners' diet, the camp established an extensive gardening program in which the PW voluntarily participated.⁷⁰ Close liaison between the MACV Civilian Health Officer and the Provost Marshal, and frequent staff visits to the CPWC by a combined US-RVNAF team comprised of members of the Command Surgeon's Office and the RVNAF Surgeon General's Office served as means of exchanging information, monitoring progress, and recommending further improvements.⁷¹

Redeployment of the USS Sanctuary

(U) Ending 4 years of service in RVN waters the hospital ship USS Sanctuary (AH 17) redeployed to the US on 1 May. The Sanctuary had a capacity of 560 beds and was staffed by 24 medical corps officers, 7 medical service corps officers, 3 dental corps officers, 30 nurses, and 253 enlisted corpsmen. From the time of her arrival off the coast of Da Nang on 10 Apr 67, a total of 18,760 helicopter landings were made on her platform, 24,197 inpatients were admitted, and 47,237 outpatients received treatment.⁷² Upon the ship's departure, COMUSMACV sent to her officers and men a letter of profound thanks on behalf of MACV in appreciation of their efforts. The Sanctuary was the last of two hospital ships that performed such service in RVN, the USS Repose having redeployed in March 1970 after 4 years of providing medical support to the III Marine Amphibious Force.

Plans for Treating Repatriated US PW

(U) An ad hoc committee was established in late 1971 by the MACV Command Surgeon to address the medical aspects of the possible in-country repatriation of US PW. The committee, composed of representatives from each component service, including specialists in internal medicine, surgery, psychiatry, and aviation medicine, held its first meeting on 7 Oct 71. Over a period, the committee conducted a comprehensive review and analysis of existing plans to establish procedures for medically processing future returnees. Medical data from returned PW of the Korean conflict, the Pueblo, and previous in-country repatriations were studied and evaluated.

(U) The committee made the following recommendations which were supported by MACV and forwarded to CINCPAC:

- One or more offshore PACOM hospitals should be designated to handle large scale PW repatriations, in view of the constantly decreasing in-country medical capability.
- A hospital facility within Vietnam should be designated for the temporary staging of returnees prior to their medical evacuation to a PACOM hospital.

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- The established processing time prior to evacuation to CONUS should be 10 days instead of the current 3, to provide an adequate period of time for medical treatment and psycho-social adjustment.

At year's end the report and its recommendations were under consideration by the OSD (ISA) PW/MLA Task Force for possible revision of current DOD policies. ⁷³

Medical Support of Operation LAM SON 719

(U) US medical advisory and operational aspects of the LAM SON 719 incursion into Laos were important because of the striking similarity of the problems faced by the RVNAF medical services to those confronted earlier by the US military medical services. RVNAF results were also a measure of the progress of Vietnamization in military medicine.

(U) Considering the low level of RVNAF medical service support experience, the short planning period, and the complexity of the operation, RVNAF medical service support in LAM SON 719 was labeled a success. Once the ARVN Medical Groups were informed and briefed on the impending operation, they responded with a workable plan, organized their resources, established treatment facilities, alerted their medical depots, and commenced treating and evacuating casualties. The major evacuation method from Laos was by US Army Dustoff and logistical helicopters to the Khe Sanh area. Within South Vietnam, US CH-47s and VNAF CH-34s evacuated patients from Khe Sanh to Dong Ha or Quang Tri for more extensive care before further evacuation to hospitals at Hue or Da Nang. As military hospitals in MR 1 became more crowded, the RVNAF Office of the Surgeon General responded with a sound plan for further evacuation to hospitals in MRs 2 and 3. Medical supply support was admirably responsive throughout the operation. The degree of the success of the RVNAF medical services in supporting LAM SON 719 signalled their growing capabilities and resourcefulness.

(U) US medical support of LAM SON 719 was relatively limited, except for the major role played by the Dustoff units assigned to the 67th Medical Group and the 101st Airborne Division. The two detachments of the 67th Medical Group were placed under the operational control of XXIV Corps and further under the 101st Airborne Division. This unprecedented development was in response to the operational necessity to provide gunship escorts for every flight and to effect the coordination necessary to enter US fire zones safely. Other ways in which US medical services participated were in furnishing advisory assistance and hospitalization of patients requiring special treatment. The US Air Force provided the final link in the chain of evacuation south to Saigon.

(U) Based on problems confronting US and RVNAF medical personnel during the operation, the following lessons were learned.

- Medical commanders, their staffs, and US advisors should have been included in the earliest stages of operational planning if proper medical support was to be provided. Advisors must urge their counterparts to seek information and participate in planning from the outset.
- US advisors must train counterparts in Dustoff request and coordination procedures until ARVN personnel can perform them reliably and consistently.
- ARVN medical personnel and their supporting operations centers must be kept informed of the location of medical units receiving casualties for treatment and of the displacement of medical treatment facilities.

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-- Gunship support for Dustoff aircraft is necessary for successful operations in areas of intense hostile fire.

-- Interpreters are essential whenever indigenous troops are supported by Americans to preclude difficulties from arising because of language differences.

-- Maximum effectiveness of medical support operations was achieved when control of Medevac missions was centralized.

(C) Following are statistics relating to the medical aspects of Operation LAM SON 719:⁷⁴

Patients Evacuated by US Dustoff from 5 Feb to 6 Apr 71:

	<u>US</u>	<u>RVNAF</u>	<u>Total</u>
All Operations	1,325	2,845	4,170
(Laos only)	(22)*	(2,511)	(2,533)

* Air crew members

US Dustoff Crew and Aircraft Statistics:

KIA	6
WIA	14
Aircraft hit	34
Aircraft lost	10
Aircraft hours	1,660
Flying hours (Laos)	687
Aircraft utilized	25

Patients Evacuated by US Fixed Wing Aircraft:

<u>US</u>	<u>RVNAF</u>	<u>Patient Movements</u>
777	2,503	3,280

Admissions to US Hospitals:

<u>US</u>	<u>RVNAF</u>	<u>Total</u>
1,558	97	1,655

Admissions to RVNAF Hospitals (estimated):

3,000 to 4,000 patients
6,000 screened at Dong Ha (one-third to one-half returned to duty)

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White Medevac Helicopters

(C) Disproportionate losses of aeromedical evacuation helicopters due to enemy ground fire were a matter of continued concern in 1971. The USA Medical Command, Vietnam (USA-MEDCOMV) with a fleet of 85 UH-1H lost a total of 141 helicopters in the period from 30 Jun 66 to 30 Apr 71. This corresponded to a rate of 0.42 aircraft lost per 1,000 hours of flying time, as compared to a rate of 0.17 for all other Army helicopters. This was considered excessive, even granting the hazardous nature of the Medevac mission.⁷⁵

(C) The idea that conspicuously marked helicopter ambulances might be immune to enemy fire was advanced by Dustoff pilots who reported during the LAM SON 719 operation of January-April 1971 that they were not fired on in certain landing zones in which nonmedical aircraft received intense fire. These observations and similar experiences reported in the past led the MACV Command Surgeon to request that a study be initiated of the advisability of painting medical helicopters white with large red cross markings, to facilitate their identification by the enemy.⁷⁶ As a result of the study recommendation, MACV tasked USARV to test and evaluate the proposal.⁷⁷

(U) On 1 Oct 71 USARV implemented the test program to determine whether Medevac helicopters painted white with large red crosses would result in decreased losses from hostile fire. In conjunction with an extensive PSYOP campaign designed to inform the enemy of the white helicopter program, six air ambulances were initially employed in the two southernmost provinces of MR 1, Quang Ngai and Quang Tin. On 1 Dec the test area of operations was extended to include all of MR 1.

(U) As of 31 Dec 71, 12 of the programed 48 USAMEDCOMV Medevac helicopters were painted white, and some were operating in MR 3. The original 3-month test period was extended another 3 months to 31 Mar 72 in order to obtain more statistical data on which to base a valid determination about the results of the program, and plans to paint the helicopters white continued.⁷⁸

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